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| id | title | publish_date ▲ | update_date | status | content_type | authors | topics | summary | pdf_url | html_url |
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| R48984 | The Certification of Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) Aircraft: In Brief | 2026-06-12T04:00:00Z | 2026-06-13T05:38:03Z | Active | Reports | Bart Elias | Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) refers to a novel transportation system for flying a few passengers and small payloads of cargo over relatively short distances—about 10 miles to 150 miles—using new aircraft designs. Congress has expressed interest in supporting the development of AAM flight operations and promoting U.S. leadership in technology innovation to support the industry developing AAM aircraft and its supporting infrastructure. This report discusses the framework, approach, and complexities of certifying new aircraft designs to enable future AAM production and operations. Most AAM concepts envision using electric vertical takeoff and landing (eVTOL) aircraft. The FAA classifies most of these designs as powered-lift aircraft, which have characteristics of both rotorcraft (helicopters) and fixed-wing airplanes, as well as novel characteristics that are distinct from more traditional aircraft designs. The FAA is requiring developers to address special conditions to demonstrate vehicle safety and airworthiness before the FAA issues a final aircraft type certification approval for the design of a specific AAM model. Type certification of an aircraft refers to the regulatory approval of an aircraft design and the conditions and limitations imposed regarding the use of that aircraft. No AAM vehicles have been certified by the FAA to date, but a few are progressing through the required steps to obtain certification. This process will address aircraft systems, flight operations, maintenance, and noise and environmental considerations. After type certification, manufacturers must obtain production certification to produce aircraft, and each aircraft assembled must obtain an airworthiness certification demonstrating safe construction and adherence to the type design. Future design changes would require FAA approval through either a supplemental type certification or an amended type certification. Manufacturers or their successors would be generally responsible to assist the FAA and aircraft operators in identifying s… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48984/R48984.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48984.html | |
| LSB11440 | FCC v. AT&T: Supreme Court Rejects Seventh Amendment Challenge to FCC Forfeiture Penalties | 2026-06-12T04:00:00Z | 2026-06-13T05:38:17Z | Active | Posts | Chris D. Linebaugh, Daniel T. Shedd | On June 4, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC or Commission) issuance of forfeiture penalties does not violate the right to a jury trial enshrined in the Seventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The Court’s decision is a significant sequel to its 2024 decision in SEC v. Jarkesy. In Jarkesy, the Court held that the Seventh Amendment prohibits the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) from imposing civil penalties for securities fraud by way of an in-house administrative adjudication. By contrast, in FCC v. AT&T, the Court concluded that the FCC’s forfeiture penalties pass constitutional muster because they are not binding. While the SEC could immediately collect its administrative penalties by garnishing violators’ wages or making deductions from their tax returns, recipients of FCC forfeiture orders are only required to pay once the Department of Justice (DOJ) prevails in a follow-on de novo jury trial (i.e., a trial without any deference to the FCC’s factual or legal conclusions) in federal district court. AT&T may have several implications for Congress. Should Congress wish to empower agencies with administrative penalty authority, AT&T demonstrates a potential path for doing so consistent with the Seventh Amendment. The case also provides a framework for evaluating whether existing statutes establishing administrative penalty schemes are constitutional. The Seventh Amendment and Jarkesy The Seventh Amendment preserves “the right of trial by jury” in “Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars.” The Supreme Court has explained that the term suits at common law embraces all actions that are “legal in nature,” meaning that it is the type of action that courts of law, rather than courts of equity (which historically sat without a jury and typically awarded nonmonetary relief such as injunctions), would hear. The Court, however, has recognized an exception to the Seventh Amendment for cases involving “public,” rather than “… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB11440/LSB11440.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/HTML/LSB11440.html | |
| R48983 | China’s Role in the International Financial Institutions | 2026-06-11T04:00:00Z | 2026-06-13T05:38:13Z | Active | Reports | Rebecca M. Nelson | Foreign Policy Institutions & Tools, East Asia, International Financial Institutions | The United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC, or China) are the world’s two largest economies. The U.S. and PRC governments have foreign policy and economic priorities that sometimes overlap and sometimes diverge. The international financial institutions (IFIs)—including the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and regional multilateral development banks—provide a formal venue through which the United States and China, in coordination with other IFI members, can advance economic cooperation on areas of agreement and negotiate differences on a range of international financial issues. Examples of issues discussed at the IFIs include macroeconomic policies, structural reforms, banking regulations, efforts to combat money laundering, exchange rates, capital controls, development priorities, coordination of foreign aid, and debt relief for developing countries, among many others. Some key policy questions about China’s role in the IFIs include the following: To what extent, if any, should the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank continue to fund development projects in China? China’s level of economic development has increased over the past two decades and it has sizeable resources it could use to pay for development projects itself, rather than relying on multilateral financing. At the same time, World Bank and AsDB projects include environmental, labor, and procurement standards that might not otherwise be adopted, and multi-year development projects provide visibility into China’s economy. What is the appropriate representation of China at the IFIs? Voting shares at the IFIs are broadly tied to a member’s economic size; countries with larger economies generally have larger voting shares. By this metric, China is underrepresented at the IFIs—China’s voting share does not reflect its rapid economic growth over the past two decades. Increasing China’s voting share could strengthen the legitimacy of the IFIs and raise additional funds for the IFIs, but it might also allow China to advanc… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48983/R48983.7.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48983.html |
| R48982 | The 2026 Childhood Immunization Schedule | 2026-06-11T04:00:00Z | 2026-06-13T05:38:17Z | Active | Reports | Kavya Sekar, Alexandria K. Mickler, Vanessa C. Forsberg | Since 1995, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), has published an annual immunization schedule for children and adolescents (18 years of age and younger). Prior to 2026, the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP)—a committee of experts who advise on U.S. vaccine policy—led the annual process of updating the schedule in consultation with federal health officials and nonfederal health groups, such as medical associations. In January 2026, the CDC Acting Director, forgoing the usual ACIP process, approved a new childhood immunization schedule developed solely by federal officials that included several changes to prior childhood vaccine recommendations. The schedule was supported by an assessment, developed by Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and other HHS officials, that outlined the rationale for the schedule’s recommended changes. The assessment centered on three primary concerns: (1) how the U.S. vaccination schedule compares with those of other countries, (2) public trust in vaccines, and (3) vaccine safety. This assessment was prompted by a December 2025 presidential memorandum that directed HHS and CDC to review childhood vaccine recommendations. As of March 16, 2026, this schedule is currently stayed (i.e., suspended) by a U.S. district court; the federal government appealed the ruling on April 29, 2026. On May 29, 2026, Executive Order 14407 (E.O. 14407) stated that the assessment, and its proposed 2026 updates to the childhood immunization schedule, are a “guiding resource” for the federal government. E.O. 14407 directs CDC and ACIP to review the assessment and the latest clinical data and, to the extent permitted by law, take steps to update the child and adolescent immunization schedules. The new schedule does not remove any vaccines from the previous childhood immunization schedule. The new schedule differs from the January 2025 schedule by incorporating prior 2025 ACIP-recommended changes to the COVID-19 and… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48982/R48982.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48982.html | |
| IN12696 | Effects of Iran Conflict on Natural Gas Prices | 2026-06-11T04:00:00Z | 2026-06-12T16:08:18Z | Active | Posts | Michael Ratner | Iran, Strategy, Operations & Emerging Threats, Global Economy, Natural Gas Prices, Oil & Gasoline Prices | The U.S./Israel military operations against Iran that commenced on February 28, 2026, quickly raised the specter of a closure of the Strait of Hormuz, a key waterway in the Persian Gulf for the transit of natural gas, oil, and other commodities. Approximately 20% of the world’s liquefied natural gas (LNG), primarily from Qatar, uses the Strait to reach global markets. Iran reportedly struck Qatari LNG infrastructure in retaliation for Israeli attacks against Iran’s energy infrastructure. The conflict’s impact on global natural gas prices, however, has been less pronounced and regionally varied than the conflict’s impact on oil prices. The differences in how the conflict has affected these two commodities underscores some key features of these markets and highlights associated policy considerations for Congress. The global natural gas market remains less integrated than the global oil market. As shown in Figure 1, while U.S. crude oil prices have trended upward since the war with Iran began, U.S. natural gas prices have stayed relatively flat. This is, in part, because the crude oil market is more connected globally, so that an event anywhere generally affects prices everywhere. Natural gas is a more regional commodity and the global market is not as reactionary. Almost 30% of U.S. crude oil is exported, while 23% of U.S. natural gas is exported. One of the key factors that affects natural gas prices is the weather. As shown in Figure 1, the January 2026 freeze in the United States greatly affected domestic natural gas prices. This is partially because a major use of natural gas is to provide heat to homes, businesses, and industrial processes. In addition, natural gas is the primary fuel used in electricity generation in the United States, where data centers are likely to increase demand for electricity and consequently natural gas. By comparison, the United States’ use of oil for heating is limited to certain regions, mainly the Northeast. Oil is primarily used in the transportation sector. Figure 1. U.S. Natura… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12696/IN12696.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/HTML/IN12696.html |
| TE10123 | Examining Local Needs in Disaster Recovery | 2026-06-10T04:00:00Z | 2026-06-16T04:35:29Z | Active | Testimony | Joseph V. Jaroscak | Community Development Block Grants for Disaster Recovery, CDBG-DR, Mitigation, Resilience, Disaster Management. | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/TE/PDF/TE10123/TE10123.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/TE/HTML/TE10123.html | |
| R48980 | Noncompetitive Federal Contract Awards: Other than Full and Open Competition | 2026-06-10T04:00:00Z | 2026-06-12T17:38:06Z | Active | Reports | Dominick A. Fiorentino, David H. Carpenter | In the context of federal procurement, Congress has long been interested in the view that increased competition among potential vendors could result in (1) lower prices, (2) higher quality goods and services, (3) increased innovation, and (4) greater public trust in government. The Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 (CICA), as amended, forms the current framework for competition in federal procurement. CICA requires that executive agencies “obtain full and open competition through the use of competitive procedures” for the procurement of all property and services unless expressly authorized by statute (10 U.S.C. §3201(a), 41 U.S.C. §3301(a)). Under CICA, “full and open competition” results when “all responsible sources are permitted to submit sealed bids or competitive proposals” (41 U.S.C. §107). Procurement contracts are subject to CICA’s full-and-open-competition requirement unless a separate statute expressly authorizes the use of different procedures or a statutory exception applies. Non-procurement contracts, such as those resulting from agencies’ use of other transaction authority (OTA), are not subject to CICA (see, e.g., 51 U.S.C. §20113). Contracts awarded using simplified acquisition procedures; contract modifications that are within the scope of the original contract award; and orders placed under requirements, definite quantity, indefinite quantity, task order, and delivery order contracts are also not subject to the full-and-open-competition requirement (FAR §6001). Some competitions in which only certain contractors can compete still meet CICA’s requirement for full and open competition because CICA provides for “full and open competition after exclusion of sources.” This occurs in two contexts: agencies’ “dual sourcing” initiatives and set-asides for small businesses (10 U.S.C. §3203(a)-(b), 41 U.S.C. §3303(a)-(b)). Although CICA establishes full and open competition as the default in federal procurement, it also provides seven exceptions that agencies may invoke. These exceptions generally c… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48980/R48980.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48980.html | |
| LSB11439 | Congressional Court Watcher: Circuit Splits from May 2026 | 2026-06-10T04:00:00Z | 2026-06-12T16:22:59Z | Active | Posts | Michael John Garcia, Peter J. Benson | Jurisprudence | The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the thirteen “circuits” issue thousands of precedential decisions each year. Because relatively few of these decisions are ultimately reviewed by the Supreme Court, the U.S. Courts of Appeals are often the last word on consequential legal questions. The federal appellate courts sometimes reach different conclusions on the same issue of federal law, causing a “split” among the circuits that leads to the nonuniform application of federal law among similarly situated litigants. This Legal Sidebar discusses circuit splits that emerged or widened following decisions from May 2026 on matters relevant to Congress. The Sidebar does not address every circuit split that developed or widened during this period. Selected cases typically involve judicial disagreement over the interpretation or validity of federal statutes and regulations, or constitutional issues relevant to Congress’s lawmaking and oversight functions. The Sidebar includes only cases where an appellate court’s controlling opinion recognizes a split among the circuits on a key legal issue resolved in the opinion. This Sidebar refers to each U.S. Court of Appeals by its number or descriptor (e.g., “D.C. Circuit” for “U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit”). Some cases identified in this Sidebar, or the legal questions they address, are examined in other CRS general distribution products. Members of Congress and congressional staff may click here to subscribe to the CRS Legal Update and receive regular notifications of new products and upcoming seminars by CRS attorneys. Civil Procedure: The Tenth Circuit held that a group of plaintiffs alleging breach of a settlement agreement satisfied the ascertainability requirement for certifying a class action. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, which sets the prerequisites for bringing a class action in federal court, does not expressly refer to ascertainability. Most circuits, however, treat ascertainability as an implied prerequisite and require the party seeking class certification… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB11439/LSB11439.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/HTML/LSB11439.html |
| IF13245 | FDA Regulation of AI-Enabled Devices | 2026-06-10T04:00:00Z | 2026-06-11T10:37:59Z | Active | Resources | Amanda K. Sarata | FDA Product Regulation & Medical Research | Artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled applications are increasingly used in health care, including for financial, administrative, and clinical purposes. They hold the promise of increased efficiency, improved quality of care, and better health outcomes, while simultaneously challenging regulators, clinicians, payers, and legislators with their safe deployment. The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulates a subset of AI-enabled health care applications as medical devices, and it is balancing regulation of these rapidly advancing, novel tools with access to low-risk products. Over the past several years, the agency has taken a number of steps to support device manufacturers developing these products. Which AI-Enabled Applications Are Regulated by FDA? FDA regulates the safety and effectiveness of medical devices, including those with device software functions (DSFs). DSFs include both software as a medical device (SaMD) and software integral to a traditional hardware device (software in a medical device, SiMD). SaMD is defined as “software intended to be used for one or more medical purposes that perform these purposes without being part of a hardware medical device.” An AI-enabled device is generally defined in nonbinding guidance by FDA as a device that includes one or more AI-enabled DSFs (AI-DSF), but FDA also uses the terms interchangeably. FDA has authority only over software functions that meet the definition of “device” in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA). The 21st Century Cures Act (Cures Act, P.L. 114-255) clarified the scope of software functions that meet the definition of device. Specifically, the Cures Act excluded from the device definition those software functions intended (1) “for administrative support of a health care facility”; (2) “for maintaining or encouraging a healthy lifestyle ... unrelated to the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, prevention, or treatment of a disease”; (3) “to serve as electronic patient records”; and (4) “for transferring, storing, converting formats,… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13245/IF13245.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13245.html |
| R48979 | DHS Budget Request Analysis: FY2027 | 2026-06-09T04:00:00Z | 2026-06-13T05:38:04Z | Active | Reports | William L. Painter | On April 3, 2026, President Donald Trump’s Administration released its budget request for FY2027, including $118.39 billion in total budget authority for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). DHS is the third largest agency in the federal government in terms of civilian personnel. Its appropriations bill is the only one of the twelve annual measures that funds a single agency exclusively and in its entirety. The FY2027 budget request was the second budget proposal delivered by the second Trump Administration. It was released 27 days before the enactment of the DHS Appropriations Act, 2026, which was Division A of P.L. 119-86. Many of the proposals in the FY2026 budget request are reiterated in the FY2027 budget request, as the Administration considered those issues unresolved (FY2026 appropriations for DHS were finalized after the delivery of the budget). This report provides an overview of the FY2027 annual budget request for DHS. It provides a component-level analysis of the appropriations requested for FY2027, and puts the requested appropriations in context with the FY2025 and FY2026 enacted and FY2026 requested appropriations, to the extent possible. The FY2027 budget request for DHS includes $99.39 billion in gross discretionary budget authority, up $1.45 billion from the budget request for FY2026. When the $28.38 billion in funding requested for the costs of major disasters (which receives special budgetary treatment) is set aside, the remainder of the discretionary request is $0.46 billion below the FY2026 budget request. The $28.38 billion request represents the largest amount of annual appropriations ever requested for the Disaster Relief Fund. Some of the other major drivers of change from the FY2026 request included a 5,364-position staffing reduction for the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the budget for which was further offset by a legislative proposal to provide TSA an additional $1.68 billion in budget authority by providing it the full resources of the Aviation Security Passen… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48979/R48979.4.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48979.html | |
| R48978 | Russian Military Activities in Asia: Combined Military Exercises and Patrols | 2026-06-09T04:00:00Z | 2026-06-13T05:38:19Z | Active | Reports | Andrew S. Bowen | East Asia & Pacific, National & Military Intelligence, Europe, Russia & Eurasia | Historically, Russia has claimed a role as a major actor in the Asia-Pacific region. In 2012, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced a policy by which Russia would seek to emphasize and further develop economic and trade opportunities with Asia, in particular with the People’s Republic of China (PRC, or China). Although Russia’s military focus has been drawn westward since its initial 2014 invasion of Ukraine and has further accelerated since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russia has pursued military activities aimed at asserting influence in the Asia-Pacific region. With most of its ground forces committed to fighting in Ukraine, Russia has maintained a naval and strategic air presence in the Asia-Pacific region. Russia’s Pacific Fleet, headquartered in Vladivostok and part of Russia’s sea-based nuclear deterrent force, is Russia’s primary military force in the region and primary tool for power projection. Russia uses the presence of its Pacific Fleet and strategic bomber force to signal its strength to other powers in the region, including the United States. Combined Russia and PRC military exercises and patrols are key components of Russia’s signaling strategy. Since 2014, Russia and the PRC have conducted increased numbers of bilateral and multilateral military exercises and combined naval and air patrols, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region. These activities also are increasingly conducted near contested areas (such as near Taiwan) or close to the United States, such as off the coast of Alaska. These exercises and patrols have become more complex, involving greater coordination and communication as well as more high-end military equipment and sensitive activities. Despite this cooperation, the Russian and PRC militaries are not interoperable; based on open-source information, it is not clear whether the two governments seek such a high level of military integration. U.S. officials and some Members of Congress have expressed concerns about Russia’s military activities in the Asia-Pacifi… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48978/R48978.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48978.html |
| R48977 | Russian Military Activities in Asia: Combined Military Exercises and Patrols | 2026-06-09T04:00:00Z | 2026-06-11T08:07:53Z | Active | Reports | Andrew S. Bowen | Historically, Russia has claimed a role as a major actor in the Asia-Pacific region. In 2012, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced a policy by which Russia would seek to emphasize and further develop economic and trade opportunities with Asia, in particular with the People’s Republic of China (PRC, or China). Although Russia’s military focus has been drawn westward since its initial 2014 invasion of Ukraine and has further accelerated since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russia has pursued military activities aimed at asserting influence in the Asia-Pacific region. With most of its ground forces committed to fighting in Ukraine, Russia has maintained a naval and strategic air presence in the Asia-Pacific region. Russia’s Pacific Fleet, headquartered in Vladivostok and part of Russia’s sea-based nuclear deterrent force, is Russia’s primary military force in the region and primary tool for power projection. Russia uses the presence of its Pacific Fleet and strategic bomber force to signal its strength to other powers in the region, including the United States. Combined Russia and PRC military exercises and patrols are a key component of Russia’s signaling strategy. Since 2014, Russia and the PRC have conducted increased numbers of bilateral and multilateral military exercises and combined naval and air patrols, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region. These activities also are increasingly conducted near contested areas (such as near Taiwan) or close to the United States, such as off the coast of Alaska. These exercises and patrols have become more complex, involving greater coordination and communication as well as more high-end military equipment and sensitive activities. Despite this cooperation, the Russian and PRC militaries are not interoperable; based on open-source information, it is not clear whether the two governments seek such a high level of military integration. U.S. officials and some Members of Congress have expressed concerns about Russia’s military activities in the Asia-Pacif… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48977/R48977.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48977.html | |
| R48976 | Connecting Constituent Organizations to Behavioral Health Funding | 2026-06-09T04:00:00Z | 2026-06-11T13:53:04Z | Active | Reports | Ada S. Cornell | Substance Use Disorders, Behavioral & Mental Health Services, Health Care Delivery, Constituent Services | This report provides information and resources to assist congressional offices with responding to constituent questions about federal funding for local organizations that provide behavioral health services. Constituent organizations supporting behavioral health (i.e., mental health and substance use) activities may include local governments or nonprofit programs that support mental health, substance use prevention, or substance use disorder treatment, including the prevention of drug overdose. This report provides information on selected federal programs within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) that may be relevant to such organizations. Assistance may be provided through block and formula grants, competitive grants, and cooperative agreements. The grants in this report vary by size and scope: Some grants are specific to behavioral health, and some are more general. | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48976/R48976.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48976.html |
| LSB11438 | Mandatory Detention During Removal Proceedings: Circuit Split | 2026-06-09T04:00:00Z | 2026-06-10T12:23:04Z | Active | Posts | Hillel R. Smith | Immigrant Removal, Immigration Judges, Immigration Law, Unauthorized Foreign Nationals, Immigrant Detention, Immigration Enforcement & Removal | The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) may arrest and detain aliens for immigration status violations that render them removable. While the agency generally has discretion to release aliens from custody during the pendency of their removal proceedings, some categories of aliens must be detained. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), if an immigration officer determines that an individual is an “applicant for admission” who is “seeking admission” into the United States and is “not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted,” the alien “shall be detained” during the removal proceedings. Federal statute expressly states that aliens who are either arriving in the United States or present in the country without lawful admission shall be treated as “applicants for admission,” but federal law does not define “seeking admission.” In 2025, it was reported that the Trump Administration issued interim guidance determining that unlawfully present aliens found in the United States—including some who may have been present in the country for several years—are subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A). This interpretation has resulted in numerous legal challenges by aliens present in the United States without having been admitted, who have been detained and, as a result of the interim guidance, are no longer eligible for a custody determination or release during their removal proceedings before an immigration judge. They argue that they are not subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) because they were not actively “seeking admission” into the United States. In the ensuing litigation, there has been a growing circuit split in the federal courts of appeals over whether § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies strictly to aliens actively seeking legal admission at the border or whether it also covers aliens present anywhere in the United States who have not been lawfully admitted. Statutory Background The current statutory framework governing the detention of aliens placed in removal proceedings was established by the I… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB11438/LSB11438.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/HTML/LSB11438.html |
| IF13246 | The U.S.-South Korea Alliance: Issues for Congress | 2026-06-09T04:00:00Z | 2026-06-12T10:23:30Z | Active | Resources | Daniel J. Longo | Overview The U.S.-South Korea (Republic of Korea, or ROK) alliance dates to the 1950-1953 Korean War, during which more than 36,000 Americans died in-theater helping South Korea repel an invasion by North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or DPRK) intended to reunify the country under communist rule. An Armistice Agreement was signed in 1953, the same year the United States and South Korea signed the U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty, which commits the United States to defend South Korea, particularly from North Korea. The U.S. military has maintained a presence in South Korea since. More than 28,500 U.S. troops are based in the ROK, predominately U.S. Army personnel. Most U.S. troops are stationed at Camp Humphreys, the largest U.S. overseas military base in terms of land (Figure 1). Amid evolving threats by the People’s Republic of China (PRC, or China), Russia, and North Korea, the United States and the ROK appear ready for the ROK to take a more active role in the alliance and to broaden the alliance’s mission. Through legislation, oversight, and other tools, Congress may direct and influence the executive branch’s efforts to modernize the alliance, including on strategic flexibility, wartime operational control, burden sharing, extended deterrence, and defense industrial cooperation. Figure 1. U.S. Military Facilities in South Korea / Source: Created by CRS using data from the U.S. Department of Defense and U.S. Marine Corps. “Strategic Flexibility” of USFK Over the decades, U.S. officials have wrestled with whether and to what extent the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) should address broader regional threats. In a 2006 joint statement, the U.S. and ROK “confirmed their understanding” that the ROK “respects the necessity for strategic flexibility of the U.S. forces in the ROK.” “Strategic flexibility” has garnered renewed attention as the second Trump Administration has indicated it will modernize the U.S.-ROK alliance to deter not only North Korea but also China, with the ROK leading in the defense of t… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13246/IF13246.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13246.html | |
| R48974 | Researching Critical Minerals: Selected Resources | 2026-06-08T04:00:00Z | 2026-06-10T16:38:09Z | Active | Reports | Michael P. Jourdan, Emily N. Peterson | Energy Policy, Natural Resources Policy, Natural Resources Trade & Economics, Critical Minerals, Rare Earth Elements (REEs) | The demand for critical minerals and rare earth elements is increasing due to their applications in various advanced and emerging technologies, including batteries, semiconductors, medical equipment, solar and wind energy systems, and certain military equipment. The increasing demand has led to supply chain challenges in the United States that may impact the economy and national security. Congress has considered legislation to address a wide array of issues concerning critical minerals—including mining, trade, recycling, and research and development—and may continue to engage in critical minerals policymaking. To help provide context to Members of Congress and their staffs when considering legislative proposals, this report compiles a selection of resources providing information on a wide array of issues concerning critical minerals. Selected resources include CRS products, a Congress.gov legislation search, an executive orders search, and various products and data sources from U.S. government agencies and organizations outside of the U.S. government. | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48974/R48974.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48974.html |
| R48973 | Vegetation Management for Wildfire Mitigation Along Electric Power Line Rights-of-Way on Federal Lands | 2026-06-08T04:00:00Z | 2026-06-10T15:23:01Z | Active | Reports | Alicyn R. Gitlin | Congress has shown interest in protecting lives and property from catastrophic wildfires and in protecting electric grid reliability. Electric power line rights-of-way (hereinafter, power line ROWs) often cross multiple land jurisdictions, which may include one or more parcels of federal land. Power line owners and operators (hereinafter, operators) are responsible for clearing vegetation (e.g., trees), both to prevent wildfire ignitions and to protect power line facilities from wildfires on the surrounding landscape. Operators do this by various means, including removing, cutting, or replacing vegetation. Four federal land management agencies (FLMAs) administer the vast majority of federal lands in the United States: the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), National Park Service (NPS), and U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) within the U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI), and the Forest Service (FS) within the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). Each has its own management mission and purposes. The majority of power line facilities on federal lands are on lands managed by BLM or the FS, which adhere to the same statutes regarding vegetation management along power line ROWs (43 U.S.C. §1772), though each has its own regulations and policies. Vegetation management along power line ROWs on NPS and FWS lands is generally guided by each agency’s regulations and policies. Power line ROWs also cross lands under the jurisdiction of other federal departments or agencies and are managed according to their unique missions and policies. Operators whose power lines affect the bulk-power system, defined as those “facilities and control systems necessary for operating an interconnected electric energy transmission network (or any portion thereof)” and the electric energy “needed to maintain transmission system reliability” also must adhere to mandatory and enforceable reliability standards (16 U.S.C. §824o). The reliability standards are developed and enforced by the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), a … | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48973/R48973.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48973.html | |
| R48975 | Recent Political Developments in Bangladesh: Background and Issues for Congress | 2026-06-05T04:00:00Z | 2026-06-10T10:52:53Z | Active | Reports | Maria A. Blackwood | On February 12, 2025, Bangladesh, a Muslim-majority South Asian country of 176 million, held parliamentary elections and a concurrent referendum. Sixty-eight percent of voters endorsed the July National Charter, which proposed changes to “reconstruct the state on the foundation of democracy and human dignity.” At the same time, voters gave one of the country’s two historically dominant political parties, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), a parliamentary supermajority. The party’s leader, Tarique Rahman, was sworn in as Prime Minister on February 17. The elections follow a period of turbulence; in August 2024, student-led protests led to the ouster of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina of the Awami League (AL), seven months into her fourth consecutive term in office. After Hasina fled to India, an interim government headed by Muhammad Yunus, a Nobel Peace Prize-winning economist, assumed power and initiated a reform process. Although the interim government enjoyed general support, Yunus’s administration encountered ongoing challenges that the new government now faces, including crime, inflation, human rights concerns, and the rise of Islamist groups. Rahman has committed to bolstering democracy in Bangladesh, but some observers have questioned the extent to which his party may implement the July Charter. This report discusses recent political developments in Bangladesh, including the 2024 demonstrations that led to the collapse of Sheikh Hasina’s government, the interim government under Yunus, and ensuing parliamentary elections, as well as changes that have taken place in Bangladesh’s politics and foreign policy, economic challenges, and human rights concerns. | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48975/R48975.3.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48975.html | |
| R48972 | Class Action Lawsuits and Classwide Injunctive Relief | 2026-06-05T04:00:00Z | 2026-06-06T05:54:27Z | Active | Reports | Bryan L. Adkins | In Trump v. CASA, Inc., the Supreme Court limited the ability of federal courts to issue nationwide (or universal) injunctions, which are court orders prohibiting the government from implementing a challenged law, regulation, or other policy against all persons and entities, including non-parties to the lawsuit. Trump v. CASA, Inc., 606 U.S. 831 (2025). Although CASA limited the availability of nationwide injunctions, the decision left open a number of potential avenues for litigants to obtain broad relief for persons or entities affected by allegedly unlawful government policies. Class action lawsuits are one such avenue, and class actions have attracted increased attention as a potential alternative to nationwide injunctions following CASA. Whereas a nationwide injunction blocks the government from enforcing a law or policy against all persons and entities, a class action is a form of representative action that seeks relief for members of a defined class. Classwide injunctive relief is sometimes functionally equivalent to a nationwide injunction insofar as a class may be defined broadly to cover large numbers of affected individuals or entities who are not participating actively in the case. Class actions in federal court must satisfy certain procedural requirements. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 (Rule 23) governs class actions in federal courts. Rule 23’s requirements help ensure that absent class members’ interests are protected and that the lawsuit is the type of case for which class treatment would be beneficial. A lawsuit may not proceed on a class basis unless the court certifies the class upon determining that Rule 23’s requirements are met. Smith v. Bayer Corp., 564 U.S. 299, 313–15 (2011). The party seeking class certification bears the burden of demonstrating that the requirements are met, and the Supreme Court has held that courts must perform a “rigorous analysis” before deciding whether certification is warranted. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350–52 (2011). Class certificatio… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48972/R48972.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48972.html | |
| IF13244 | Health Savings Account Contributions: By the Numbers | 2026-06-05T04:00:00Z | 2026-06-06T05:54:07Z | Active | Resources | Alice Y. Choi, Ryan J. Rosso | A health savings account (HSA) is a tax-advantaged account that eligible individuals can use to save and pay for qualified medical expenses. Eligibility to contribute to an HSA is generally associated with enrollment in a high-deductible health plan (HDHP). An HSA is a trust or custodial account and not health insurance. HSAs have several tax advantages: individual contributions are tax deductible when not made through a cafeteria plan; employer contributions and individual contributions made through a cafeteria plan are excluded from taxable income and payroll taxes; earnings on invested account balances are tax exempt; and withdrawals are not taxed if used for qualified medical expenses. For more information, see CRS Report R45277, Health Savings Accounts (HSAs). This In Focus examines Internal Revenue Service (IRS) tax return data on HSA contributions to assess how HSA contribution amounts vary by source and adjusted gross income (AGI). These trends may inform congressional consideration of proposals to modify HSA eligibility, contribution limits, or the tax treatment of contributions. These data are available at the tax return level: a return can represent one or multiple individuals if the return is filed jointly with a spouse or includes dependents. A tax return can also represent contributions to more than one HSA (e.g., married individuals filing jointly both have HSAs). In the following analyses, average contributions are calculated by dividing total contribution amounts by the number of tax returns. Employer contributions are both direct employer contributions and employee pretax contributions made through a cafeteria plan. Individual contributions are those made by an individual outside of employer involvement. These contributions are not mutually exclusive; a single tax return may report both contribution types. These data predate recent changes in the Fiscal Year 2025 Budget Reconciliation Law (P.L. 119-21) that expanded the types of plans that can be paired with an HSA. Overview of HSA Contribution… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13244/IF13244.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13244.html | |
| IF13243 | Direct Loan Program: Student Loan Repayment Plans | 2026-06-05T04:00:00Z | 2026-06-06T05:53:51Z | Active | Resources | Rita R. Zota | When an individual borrows from the Direct Loan program, they assume a contractual obligation to repay that debt over a period of time that may span a decade or more. While borrowers are required to make payments on a monthly basis, they may currently choose from among a number of loan repayment plans to repay their loans. This In Focus provides a brief overview of the loan repayment plans available to borrowers of loans made by the U.S. Department of Education (ED) under the Direct Loan program. For a comprehensive description of loan repayment plans, see CRS Report R45931, Federal Student Loans Made Through the William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program: Terms and Conditions for Borrowers. Repayment Plan Categories Borrowers may currently choose from among numerous options to repay their loans. The available repayment plans fall into three broad categories: fixed repayment plans, income-driven repayment (IDR) plans, and alternative repayment plans. Fixed repayment plans require monthly payments amortized over a specified period of time (from 10 to 30 years) based on the borrower’s loan principal amount and interest rate. Monthly payments are structured so that a borrower repays their loan, plus interest, in full over the specified period of time. There are three types of fixed repayment plans: standard, extended, and graduated plans. IDR plans require monthly payments based on a borrower’s income. There are two types of IDR plans: income-contingent repayment (ICR) plans and income-based repayment (IBR) plans. The ICR plans comprise the Income-Contingent Repayment plan, the Pay As You Earn (PAYE) plan, and the Saving on a Valuable Education (SAVE) plan; however, ED is not currently implementing the SAVE plan as it is the subject of litigation. The IBR plans comprise the Original Income-Based Repayment plan (Original IBR) and the IBR plan for Post-July 1, 2014, New Borrowers (New IBR). The alternative repayment plans are available in more limited situations to borrowers who demonstrate that the terms of the othe… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13243/IF13243.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13243.html | |
| IF13242 | Major Railroad Mergers and Acquisitions | 2026-06-05T04:00:00Z | 2026-06-06T05:53:47Z | Active | Resources | John Frittelli, Ben Goldman | On July 29, 2025, Union Pacific Railroad (UP) announced that it had agreed to acquire Norfolk Southern Railway (NS). If the transaction is approved, it would reduce the number of U.S. Class I railroads—defined as having annual operating revenues of $900 million or more in inflation-adjusted 2019 dollars—from four to three (see Table 1). Two additional Class I Canadian railroads provide transcontinental service across southern Canada, own track in the United States that connects to some northern tier U.S. ports, and also own track that parallels the Mississippi River with connections to and into Mexico. Table 1. U.S. Class I Railroads 2024 Railroad and Region Operating Revenue ($ Millions) Route Miles Operated Employees UP (West) $24,189 32,880 32,388 BNSF (West) $23,747 32,897 36,958 CSX (East) $13,278 19,701 19,471 NS (East) $12,122 19,154 20,236 Source: Association of American Railroads, Railroad Fact Book, December 2025. Notes: UP = Union Pacific, NS = Norfolk Southern. Not shown are two Class I Canadian railroads that own track in the United States through U.S. subsidiaries. Class I railroads are defined as having annual operating revenues of $900 million or more in inflation-adjusted 2019 dollars. Prior railroad mergers have enabled the surviving railroads to consolidate their networks by abandoning or selling off parallel lines. End-to-end mergers have also allowed railroads to improve profitability by carrying long-haul traffic greater distances. A wave of mergers in the 1970s through the 1990s left seven Class I carriers controlling almost all long-distance freight rail traffic in the United States and Canada; some of these resulted in periods of poor service reliability as rail networks combined. The merger between Canadian Pacific Railway (CP) and Kansas City Southern Railway (KCS), approved in 2023 (see below), further reduced the number of Class I carriers to six. The volume of freight transported by rail has broadly declined over the last 20 years, as has the overall share of freight transported… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13242/IF13242.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13242.html | |
| IN12695 | Possible Changes in U.S. Military Aid to Israel: Considerations for Congress | 2026-06-04T04:00:00Z | 2026-06-05T11:38:05Z | Active | Posts | Jeremy M. Sharp | Overview The Trump Administration and Israeli government are reportedly negotiating a new Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on U.S. foreign assistance to Israel, which, if completed, would make it the fourth such bilateral understanding reached between the two countries. MOUs are not legally binding agreements like treaties and do not require Senate ratification; ultimately, lawmakers’ appropriations power subjects foreign assistance levels delineated in MOUs to congressional approval. Past MOUs have significantly influenced U.S. aid to Israel; historically, Congress has appropriated foreign aid to Israel largely according to the terms of the MOU in place at the time (with the exception of supplemental appropriations acts). Congress last authorized military aid to Israel per the terms of the current MOU in P.L. 116-283, the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for FY2021. With potentially consequential elections scheduled this fall in Israel and Israel seeking munitions replenishment in light of the war in Iran and other conflicts, both sides may seek to complete a new MOU in the months ahead. Historical Background The first 10-year MOU (FY1999-FY2008), agreed to under the Clinton Administration, represented a political commitment to provide Israel with at least $26.7 billion in total economic and military aid (of which $21.3 billion was military aid). This MOU provided the template for the gradual phaseout of all economic assistance to Israel. In 2007, the George W. Bush Administration and the Israeli government agreed to a second MOU, consisting of a $30 billion military aid package for the 10-year period from FY2009 to FY2018. In 2016 during the Obama Administration, the U.S. and Israeli governments signed the third MOU covering FY2019 to FY2028. Under its terms, the United States pledged $38 billion in military aid—$33 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) grants and $5 billion in defense appropriations for missile defense programs—to Israel. This third MOU phases out a benefi… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12695/IN12695.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/HTML/IN12695.html | |
| IF13241 | Artificial Intelligence (AI): Implications for Size and Composition of the U.S. Armed Forces | 2026-06-04T04:00:00Z | 2026-06-05T13:52:56Z | Active | Resources | Kristy N. Kamarck, Ebrima M'Bai | Overview The U.S. Armed Forces have been adopting artificial intelligence (AI) to analyze data, support decisionmaking, and improve military and administrative processes, including logistics, intelligence analysis, maintenance, planning, and personnel management. Senior military leaders have characterized AI as a means to improve speed, effectiveness, and decisionmaking rather than as a replacement for human judgment. Congress exercises oversight of military personnel through end strength authorizations (i.e., maximum size of the Armed Forces), appropriations, and legislation governing military personnel systems. As AI-enabled technologies expand across defense processes, Congress may examine how these systems could influence the size and structure of the Armed Forces and the composition of the broader Department of Defense (DOD) workforce, including civilian employees, and contractors. (DOD is “using a secondary Department of War designation,” under Executive Order 14347.) AI adoption may alter force size requirements, how work is performed, and the skills required to perform it. AI in the Military Context In DOD usage, AI generally refers to software systems that analyze large datasets, recognize patterns, generate predictions, or automate routine tasks. In many cases, these systems rely on machine-learning or data-driven software tools that assist in decision-support processes. Uses include predictive maintenance, intelligence data analysis, planning support, and personnel skill-matching. DOD strategy documents emphasize that AI systems are designed to support personnel rather than replace them and that decisionmaking responsibility is to remain with military leaders and authorized personnel. DOD-Wide Organization and Strategy In December 2021, the Deputy Secretary of Defense established the Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Officer (CDAO) to integrate and scale data, analytics, and AI efforts across the department. The CDAO is to serve as the principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense on these mat… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13241/IF13241.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13241.html | |
| R48971 | The Arab Gulf States, the Iran Conflict, and U.S. Relations: In Brief | 2026-06-03T04:00:00Z | 2026-06-06T05:53:48Z | Active | Reports | Christopher M. Blanchard, Jeremy M. Sharp | Since February 2026, U.S./Israel-Iran conflict in the Persian Gulf region and the de facto closure of the Strait of Hormuz to most shipping have presented fundamental risks to the security and economic vitality of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries—Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, and Bahrain. Thousands of attacks on facilities hosting U.S. forces and critical infrastructure locations across the GCC countries during this period have demonstrated the Arab Gulf states’ vulnerability to threats from neighboring Iran and Iran-aligned regional armed groups. GCC member state responses to the 2026 conflict have differed, while each state has condemned attacks on its respective territory. The UAE, having faced the most attacks of any GCC state, has adopted a defiant and forceful posture toward Iran. Saudi Arabia has called for de-escalation and has promoted Pakistan-based peace talks, while asserting its right to self-defense. Both Saudi Arabia and the UAE reportedly have conducted strikes on Iran, the UAE reportedly has welcomed direct Israeli defense aid, and Saudi Arabia and Kuwait reportedly have struck Iran-linked targets in Iraq. Other GCC states have thwarted attacks, Qatar and Oman have promoted diplomatic engagement, and Qatar has hosted Iranian officials for mediation talks. Iran’s attacks and the course of the wider conflict may be raising pivotal questions in the Gulf about U.S. security commitments to the Gulf states and future U.S.-GCC security partnership. The conflict has underscored an important reality for the GCC: the success of the Gulf states’ strategies to diversify their economies and become globally integrated commercial hubs remains dependent on the stability of the Persian Gulf region. Whether Iran emerges from the current conflict cowed and contained, emboldened and empowered, or undone, the Gulf states will face consequences. In the future, the GCC states may deepen their ties with the United States, pursue alternative partnerships with other states… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48971/R48971.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48971.html | |
| R48968 | Department of Veterans Affairs FY2026 Appropriations | 2026-06-03T04:00:00Z | 2026-06-05T16:23:01Z | Active | Reports | Sidath Viranga Panangala, Jared S. Sussman, Madeline E. Moreno | Veterans Affairs (VA) Appropriations, Veterans Disability Compensation & Pensions, Veterans & Military Health Care, Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), Veterans Budget & Appropriations | The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) administers numerous programs that provide benefits and services to eligible veterans and their families. These benefits include medical care, disability compensation, Dependency and Indemnity Compensation (DIC), pensions, education, vocational rehabilitation and employment services, assistance to homeless veterans, home loan guarantees, and administration of life insurance, as well as traumatic injury protection insurance for servicemembers and benefits that cover burial expenses. President Donald Trump released the FY2026 budget request for VA in several stages during May and June 2025. The Trump Administration requested $434.81 billion for FY2026. This included $300.42 billion in mandatory appropriations and $134.39 billion in discretionary appropriations. On June 25, 2025, the House passed its version of the FY2026 Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies (MILCON-VA) appropriations bill (H.R. 3944; H.Rept. 119-161). The House-passed version would have provided $435.33 billion for VA for FY2026, including $301.57 billion in mandatory funding and $133.75 billion in discretionary funding. On August 1, 2025, the Senate amended the House-passed version of H.R. 3944 and passed the Military Construction and Veterans Affairs, Agriculture, and Legislative Branch Appropriations Act, 2026 (H.R. 3944, as amended). Division A of the measure contained the FY2026 MILCON-VA appropriations bill (Division A of H.R. 3944). The Senate-passed version of the bill would have provided $434.86 billion for VA for FY2026, including $301.57 billion in mandatory funding and $133.28 billion in discretionary funding. On November 12, 2025, after a 42-day lapse in appropriations from October 1, 2025, through November 11, 2025, the President signed into law the Continuing Appropriations, Agriculture, Legislative Branch, Military Construction and Veterans Affairs, and Extensions Act, 2026 (H.R. 5371; P.L. 119-37). Division D of this act contained the FY2026 MILCON-VA Appropriations A… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48968/R48968.3.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48968.html |
| R48967 | The Natural Gas Act: Background, Key Provisions, and Policy Issues | 2026-06-03T04:00:00Z | 2026-06-06T05:53:52Z | Active | Reports | Paul W. Parfomak, Adam Vann, Michael Ratner | Energy Policy, Fossil Energy, International Energy Issues, Environmental Policy | Natural gas has been sold commercially in the United States since 1816, starting with the Gaslight Company of Baltimore. Technological advancements around the turn of the 20th century greatly expanded its uses for heating, cooking, and industrial applications. New pipeline technology and new drilling techniques led to a shift from local, manufactured gas (i.e., distilled from coal) toward geological gas shipped from distant fields through an expanding interstate pipeline network. Growth of the industry brought with it unfair business practices and market abuses. In response, Congress passed the Natural Gas Act of 1938 (NGA; P.L. 75-688), giving the Federal Power Commission (FPC) regulatory authority over interstate natural gas transportation and wholesale sales, the import or export of natural gas, and companies or persons engaged in these activities. In 1977, Congress terminated the FPC and transferred its authorities to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and the Department of Energy (DOE), both newly created under the Department of Energy Organization Act (EOA; P.L. 95-91). Congress has amended the NGA several times since 1938 to address regulatory gaps, court decisions, or changes in natural gas markets. These amendments added eminent domain authority for interstate natural gas pipelines; exempted certain natural gas companies from federal regulation; allowed intrastate pipelines to transport gas for interstate pipelines; deregulated wellhead natural gas prices; eased restrictions on liquefied natural gas (LNG) trade with free trade partners; gave FERC authority to prohibit gas market manipulation; and designated FERC as the lead agency for coordinating federal authorizations and compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA; P.L. 91-190), among other changes. In recent Congresses, certain NGA authorities and requirements, or the absence thereof, have drawn the attention of stakeholders and Members of Congress. Congress has debated FERC’s interpretation of the “public interest” stand… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48967/R48967.3.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48967.html |
| R48966 | Spain: Background and U.S. Relations | 2026-06-02T04:00:00Z | 2026-06-04T12:08:33Z | Active | Reports | Derek E. Mix | Spain, Europe, Russia & Eurasia | Relations between the United States and Spain have experienced tensions during the second Trump Administration. Over the past several decades, the two countries have had extensive cultural ties, shared a mutually beneficial economic relationship, and cooperated closely on numerous diplomatic and security issues. Spain has been a member of NATO since 1982 and a member of the European Union (EU) since 1986. Some Members of Congress may have an interest in Spain’s internal political situation and relations with the United States. Political Situation Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez of the center-left Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) has led the government of Spain since 2018. PSOE formed a minority coalition government with Sumar, an alliance of left-wing parties, following Spain’s 2023 election. The government relies on parliamentary support from smaller regional parties to pass legislation. The center-right Popular Party (PP) and the far-right party Vox are the main opposition parties. The next election is due by August 2027. King Felipe VI is Spain’s head of state. U.S.-Spain Tensions Prime Minister Sánchez has been a leading European critic of the Trump Administration’s foreign policy. The Sánchez government has expressed opposition to the U.S. military operation against Iran that began in February 2026 and denied the use of military bases in Spain to U.S. forces involved in strikes against Iran. The Trump Administration has strongly criticized Spain’s position, and President Trump has threatened to “cut off all trade” with Spain in response. At NATO’s 2025 summit, Spain was the only member of the alliance not to commit to spending 5% of gross domestic product on defense by 2035 (3.5% on core defense requirements, such as equipment and personnel, and 1.5% on defense- and security-related spending, such as critical infrastructure, civil preparedness, and a strong defense industrial base). President Trump strongly criticized Spain’s position. Security and Defense Relations Spain has played an important role in U.S. de… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48966/R48966.8.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48966.html |
| R48965 | Statutory Mechanisms for Agency Oversight After INS v. Chadha | 2026-06-02T04:00:00Z | 2026-06-04T15:23:03Z | Active | Reports | Matthew D. Trout | Legislative Branch, Presidential Vetoes, Executive Branch, Government Oversight, Separation of Powers | This report examines legislative options for Congress to create statutory mechanisms for executive branch oversight. Historically, and to some extent still today, Congress enacted legislative vetoes as a method of ensuring executive adherence to legislative preferences. A legislative veto is a provision in statute that permits Congress, or some component of Congress, to review an executive action and prevent it from going into effect by voting to disapprove, or failing to approve as the case may be, that action. Although the statute creating the veto is initially passed like other legislation through bicameralism and presentment—passing both Houses of Congress and being signed by the President (or overriding the President’s veto)—exercising the legislative veto only requires a vote of the specified part of Congress. In some cases that could mean a simple majority vote in a single committee is sufficient to veto the executive action. In a landmark 1983 decision, INS v. Chadha, the Supreme Court held that legislative vetoes were unconstitutional because they made legislative changes without meeting the Constitution’s bicameralism and presentment requirements for passing new legislation. That decision and its progeny have had significant effects on Congress’s methods of statutory executive branch oversight, limiting legally enforceable options in certain ways. Nonetheless, Congress has remaining interest in fashioning statutory mechanisms that comply with the Constitution, providing executive oversight in a timely manner, and ensuring legislative preferences are taken into consideration during executive branch decisionmaking. This report examines the history of legislative vetoes leading up to the Supreme Court decision in Chadha. It examines the legal reasoning behind the decision, including how the Supreme Court and lower courts have applied that reasoning in subsequent cases. With those legal principles in mind, it examines potential options for legislators seeking to establish statutory oversight mechanisms, beg… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48965/R48965.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48965.html |
| R48964 | USMCA Joint Review: Background on Prior Negotiations and Selected Issues for Congress | 2026-06-02T04:00:00Z | 2026-06-06T05:53:44Z | Active | Reports | Kyla H. Kitamura, Christopher A. Casey, Shayerah I. Akhtar, Danielle M. Trachtenberg, Cathleen D. Cimino-Isaacs, Michael D. Sutherland | Latin America, Caribbean & Canada, U.S. Trade Policy, U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), Major Economies & U.S. Trade Relations, Trade Agreements | In 2026, the United States, Canada, and Mexico are scheduled to conduct a review of the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) that could result in the revision or phasing out of the agreement. The review is the first of its kind in any U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA). Congress was heavily involved in shaping U.S. priorities during the negotiation of USMCA. Congress also approved USMCA and enacted legislation in 2020 to implement the agreement. In its oversight capacity, Congress may request consultations with the executive branch regarding USMCA implementation and the review process. Members of Congress may also consider whether—and, if so, to what extent—congressional priorities raised during the 2017-2019 USMCA negotiations have been addressed and/or implemented, and whether to pursue any changes to USMCA as part of the review process. Congress could also assess the advantages and disadvantages of comprehensive FTAs for the U.S. economy and the lessons learned from the negotiation, implementation, and review of USMCA. A key trade policy issue for Congress at the time of USMCA negotiations related to President Trump’s threats to potentially withdraw from the trilateral 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and what that might imply about shared or overlapping congressional-executive authorities on U.S. trade policy. Other issues that were a focus of congressional attention included adding a clause requiring periodic reviews of USMCA, the first such provision in a U.S. FTA; making changes to the rules for duty-free trade of automotive products; modernizing the agreement by including digital trade provisions and updating intellectual property rights protections; changing and removing some investor-state dispute settlement provisions; enhancing provisions related to labor and environment standards; modifying government procurement provisions; and determining whether to retain NAFTA’s binational dispute settlement mechanism. In response to concerns expressed by some Members and other policymakers… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48964/R48964.4.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48964.html |
| LSB11437 | Denaturalization: A Brief Overview of the Current Legal Framework | 2026-06-02T04:00:00Z | 2026-06-04T11:23:15Z | Active | Posts | Alejandra Aramayo | Immigration Law, Permanent Immigration, Naturalization | Congress has established terms and conditions under which foreign-born persons may acquire citizenship through a process known as naturalization. In addition to providing a framework for the acquisition of citizenship for persons born abroad to U.S. citizen parents, federal law sets forth a process for a lawful permanent resident (LPR) to become a U.S. citizen if he or she meets certain statutory requirements. As discussed in another CRS product, most LPRs residing in the United States are eligible for naturalization. The process to revoke an individual’s previously granted naturalization status is commonly known as denaturalization. This process may generally occur any time after naturalization has been granted, with few exceptions. Section 1451 of Title 8 of the U.S. Code specifies several grounds upon which to revoke naturalization. Following denaturalization, an individual’s status reverts back to the status held before becoming a U.S. citizen. An individual may also face criminal penalties or imprisonment if a court determines that he or she “knowingly procure[d] or attempt[ed] to procure, contrary to law, the naturalization of any person.” The Trump Administration has issued multiple directives on denaturalization. On January 20, 2025, President Trump issued an executive order that, among other things, requires the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Attorney General, the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Director of National Intelligence, to “ensure the devotion of adequate resources to identify and take appropriate action for offenses described in 8 U.S.C. § 1451.” On June 11, 2025, the Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ) directed attorneys to prioritize denaturalization cases as a civil enforcement priority (June memo). Additionally, it has been reported that the Trump Administration issued internal guidance in December 2025 asking DHS’s U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) field offices to “supply [DOJ’… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB11437/LSB11437.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/HTML/LSB11437.html |
| IF13240 | Connecting Constituents with Federal Assistance for Health and Medical Businesses | 2026-06-02T04:00:00Z | 2026-06-06T05:53:06Z | Active | Resources | Kate M. Costin, Michele L. Malloy | Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR), Health & Medical R&D, Small Business, Technology & Innovation, Prescription Drugs, Health Care Delivery, SBA 8(a) Business Development Program, Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR), FDA Product Regulation & Medical Research | Federal assistance for health- and medical-related groups primarily focuses on nonprofit organizations. For-profit health and medical businesses do not qualify for many of these opportunities. However, these businesses may qualify for other business-related federal assistance. Health and medical businesses include medical equipment companies, digital health companies, for-profit health care facilities, and medical device and pharmaceutical manufacturers, among others. Federal agencies assist businesses through a number of credit and technical assistance programs. With few exceptions, the federal government typically does not award grants for starting or expanding for-profit businesses. Exceptions include certain federal grants that may be available for businesses involved in research and development (R&D) activities (e.g., the Small Business Research Programs—see CRS Report R43695, Small Business Research Programs: SBIR and STTR). Agencies may also contract with businesses. This In Focus includes a summary of selected federal agencies and programs that provide business assistance such as loans, business counseling, and other forms of technical assistance to health and medical businesses. These programs vary in scope, funding levels, and availability, and their relevancy to meeting the needs of specific businesses also varies. This In Focus does not represent a comprehensive list of all potentially relevant federal assistance programs for health and medical businesses, nor does it cover federal contracting preferences and tax incentives. For broader business assistance opportunities, including those from the Small Business Administration (SBA), see CRS In Focus IF12449, Connecting Constituents with Federal Assistance for Businesses. Specific information about health care facilities is available in CRS Report R48081, Sources of Federal Funding for Health Care Facilities: Frequently Asked Questions. Health and Human Services (HHS) Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization (OSDBU) HHS partners with the S… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13240/IF13240.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13240.html |
| IF13239 | Prohibiting Senators from Prediction Market Participation | 2026-06-01T04:00:00Z | 2026-06-02T17:53:07Z | Active | Resources | Jacob R. Straus, Jason O. Heflin | In April 2026, the Senate agreed to S.Res. 708, as amended, to amend Senate rules to prohibit Senators, Senate officers, and Senate employees from participating in prediction markets—exchange platforms that specialize in offering event contracts with a binary payoff structure tied to the occurrence or nonoccurrence of a specific event. This In Focus provides background on the Senate prohibition on participation in prediction markets, related legislation, legal context, and considerations for Congress. Amendment to Senate Standing Rules On April 30, 2026, the Senate agreed to S.Res. 708, as amended, to amend Rule XXXVII (Senate Rule 37) of the standing rules of the Senate and prohibit Senators, Senate officers, and Senate employees from participating in prediction markets. During debate on the resolution, the sponsor explained his reasoning for introducing the measure. Engaging in any way in a prediction market or trying to place bets where we might have insider information deteriorates the confidence our constituents have in us. So it is extremely important that the public know that from this day forward, there is no chance that any Member of Congress—Member of the Senate in this case, in this resolution I am going to propose—will be involved in any prediction market whatsoever. I am presenting a resolution that makes that crystal clear. By changing the standing rules of the Senate, what we are doing is allowing our constituents to know once and for all that no Member of the U.S. Senate, no Member of the staff of the U.S. Senate can ever use that inside information as a way to monetize this job whatsoever. —Senator Bernie Moreno, Congressional Record, April 30, 2026 (p. S2151) Senate Rule 37 contains “Conflict of Interest” provisions that govern outside employment restrictions, financial ethics, and other conflicts of interest. As amended, the new clause in Rule 37, as added by S.Res. 708, states: Section. 1. Prohibition on Prediction Market Trading by Senators ... 15. No Member, officer, or employee of the Sena… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13239/IF13239.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13239.html | |
| IF13238 | The Role of Employer Reports in Understanding Labor Markets | 2026-06-01T04:00:00Z | 2026-06-02T17:23:28Z | Active | Resources | Elizabeth Weber Handwerker | Artificial Intelligence, Generative Artificial Intelligence, Technology & Innovation, Labor Force, Labor Standards | Much knowledge about labor markets in the United States comes from employer reports, such as employers’ responses to government surveys and tax filings. While employer responses provide valuable labor market information, there are limitations on what employers can or will report about changes in labor markets. This In Focus describes measures of labor markets based on employer reports, with an emphasis on the value and limitations on information from employers about how Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Generative AI (GenAI) technologies are now and may in the future affect labor markets. It relies on ideas presented in CRS In Focus IF13182, The Impact of Generative AI on Labor Markets: Frameworks. Measures Based on Employer Reports Many existing measures of labor markets—including measures critical for understanding the impacts of AI and GenAI—are based on data collected from employers. Measuring Employment Levels and Changes Some of the most fundamental concerns about how AI and GenAI may affect labor markets involve potential changes in employment levels. Changes in the number of jobs in the United States are measured each month by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Current Employment Statistics (CES) program. The CES surveys thousands of employers each month, asking how many people are on these employers’ payrolls. These employer reports are used to estimate employment changes (total and by industry) with less than a one-month lag. CES employment change estimates are benchmarked each year to incorporate less timely but more comprehensive data based on employers’ unemployment insurance tax filings, as compiled in the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW). These data do not capture reasons for employment changes. Some private sector payroll companies also publish estimates of employment change based on payroll data. New technologies, such as AI and GenAI, may lead to changes in employment for particular types of work, which are not captured in the CES or QCEW. The Occupational Employment and Wage… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13238/IF13238.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13238.html |
| R48963 | Cryptocurrency: Regulatory and Legislative Policy Issues | 2026-05-29T04:00:00Z | 2026-05-30T05:24:05Z | Active | Reports | Paul Tierno | Cryptocurrencies are digital assets that can be held and transacted using software and across networks of disparate groups that do not require financial intermediaries, such as banks. Their key features are that they are pseudonymous, decentralized, and permissionless assets, features that are essential to creating the alternative and censorship-resistant financial system promoted by early adopters. These features may also make them instrumental in facilitating illicit activity and create challenges for regulators. Over time, cryptocurrency has grown into a multi-trillion-dollar industry, and a host of policy issues have arisen. This report discusses legislative and regulatory contexts of the cryptocurrency industry and addresses the key issues debated by Congress. The legislative and regulatory contexts have changed somewhat over the past few years. Recent policies pursued by President Trump that diverge significantly from policies of the Biden Administration, along with personnel changes at regulatory agencies, highlight the impermanence of regulatory policy from one Administration to the next. Absent legislation, the current more favorable regulatory climate for certain cryptocurrency businesses—a reversal from the regulatory climate during the Biden Administration—could presumably be reversed again. In the legislative context, congressional reception of cryptocurrencies and the industry has also been changing, and many Members on the committees of jurisdiction have expressed interest in establishing legislation to create what they believe are necessary new authorities and a new regulatory structure. Congress has generally approached cryptocurrency-related legislation on two tracks, separately considering a stablecoin framework and a cryptocurrency market structure framework. The 119th Congress passed the Guiding and Establishing National Innovation for U.S. Stablecoins Act (GENIUS Act; P.L. 119-27), which regulates payment stablecoin issuers, in July 2025. Congress continues to debate the details of the bro… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48963/R48963.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48963.html | |
| R48962 | Transition of Servicing Defaulted Federal Student Loans to the Department of the Treasury: Background and Observations | 2026-05-29T04:00:00Z | 2026-05-30T05:24:33Z | Active | Reports | Alexandra Hegji | As of December 31, 2025, the Department of Education’s (ED’s) portfolio of defaulted federal student loans comprises loans of about 7.8 million borrowers (about 18% of all federal student loan borrowers) owing $179 billion. To collect on defaulted federal student loans, the federal government may negotiate a repayment agreement with borrowers, report the loan default to consumer reporting agencies, initiate administrative wage garnishment (AWG) against borrowers, offset borrowers’ federal payments through the Treasury Offset Program (TOP), and/or refer a borrower’s case to the U.S. Department of Justice for civil litigation, among other actions. Borrowers may resolve the default through mechanisms such as payment in full, loan rehabilitation, and loan consolidation. ED’s Office of Federal Student Aid (FSA) is the primary entity that administers the Higher Education Act (HEA) Title IV federal student loan programs. Prior to policies implemented by ED in response to and following the COVID-19 pandemic (e.g., a pause in most debt collection activities), FSA and its contracted private collection agencies (PCAs) serviced defaulted student loans by using the above-described tools and assisting borrowers to resolve their loan default. FSA and its contractors significantly decreased their debt collection activities because of the COVID-19-related policies. Additionally, in the midst of the COVID-19-related collection pause, FSA cancelled its contracts with PCAs but did not transition servicing of defaulted student loan debt to a new set of contractors as planned. The Department of the Treasury’s (Treasury’s) Bureau of the Fiscal Service (Fiscal Service) provides centralized delinquent debt collection via its Cross-Servicing Program (CSP) for most other federal agencies. Fiscal Service and its contractors attempt to collect on many types of federal delinquent nontax debts and use similar tools as those FSA might use to collect on defaulted federal student loans. On March 19, 2026, ED and Treasury entered into an interag… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48962.html | ||
| LSB11436 | Immigration-Related Crimes | 2026-05-29T04:00:00Z | 2026-05-30T05:23:51Z | Active | Posts | Michael John Garcia | Through the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and other laws, Congress has established a comprehensive framework governing the admission, removal, and presence of people who are not citizens or nationals of the United States (aliens). These rules are buttressed by an enforcement scheme that includes civil and criminal components. Aliens who have engaged in certain kinds of proscribed conduct may be denied admission into the United States or, if present, face removal through civil proceedings. Congress has also established criminal penalties for some activities that undermine immigration rules and requirements, such as smuggling aliens into the country. Some of these offenses carry severe penalties. Immigration-related crimes make up a significant portion of the federal criminal docket. The U.S. Sentencing Commission reported that in 66,662 cases involving individuals sentenced for a federal offense in FY2025, a 37.7% plurality (22,743) involved immigration-related offenses. This Legal Sidebar begins by discussing how the criminal enforcement components of federal immigration law contrast with the civil enforcement components, and then briefly describes the range of immigration-related criminal offenses in federal statute. Differences Between Criminal and Civil Components of Immigration Enforcement Federal immigration law includes both civil and criminal components. Civil enforcement mechanisms are intended to correct or remedy a statutory violation, whereas criminal enforcement mechanisms are primarily aimed at punishing an offense and deterring future wrongdoing. The Supreme Court has long characterized immigration removal proceedings as civil in nature, despite the potentially severe consequences for the removed individual. Other immigration violations—such as knowingly hiring or recruiting aliens for work who lack authorization for employment—may be subject to civil fines and, unlike immigration removal proceedings, apply to offenders (e.g., employers) regardless of citizenship or alienage. Congress has en… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB11436/LSB11436.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/HTML/LSB11436.html | |
| LSB11435 | The Department of Justice’s First Lawsuit Enforcing a Presidential Order Under Section 721 of the Defense Production Act | 2026-05-29T04:00:00Z | 2026-05-30T05:23:51Z | Active | Posts | Peter J. Benson | On July 8, 2025, President Trump issued an order prohibiting a 2020 acquisition of Jupiter Systems, LLC (Jupiter), by Suirui International, a subsidiary of Suirui Group Co., Ltd. (Suirui). Suirui is organized under the laws of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Its subsidiary, Suirui International, is based in Hong Kong. Jupiter designs and produces hardware and software that is provided to U.S. government customers and integrated into military and critical infrastructure systems in the United States. In his order, the President found credible evidence that Suirui “might take action that threatens to impair the national security of the United States.” As the President’s order recognized, the transaction being prohibited was already complete. Suirui purchased Jupiter more than five years before the President prohibited the acquisition. Section 721 of the Defense Production Act (DPA), however, gives the President authority to initiate reviews of—and ultimately to prohibit—certain foreign investments in the United States regardless of when the transactions at issue closed. Invoking that authority, the President ordered Suirui to divest all interests and rights in Jupiter within 120 days of July 8, 2025. In February 2026, the Department of Justice (DOJ) sued Suirui and Jupiter, alleging that the ordered divestiture had not yet occurred. When announcing the lawsuit, DOJ stated that it marks the first time the agency has sought judicial enforcement of a presidential order issued under Section 721 of the DPA. Shortly after suing, DOJ asked the court to place Jupiter in a receivership while the litigation proceeds. On May 26, finding that “no remedy short of transferring Suirui’s control of Jupiter Systems to a receiver will address the national security risks pending litigation,” the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia granted DOJ’s request. This Sidebar analyzes this first-of-its-kind enforcement action. It begins by describing the President’s authority to prohibit transactions under Section 721 of t… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB11435/LSB11435.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/HTML/LSB11435.html | |
| IF13237 | Medicare Part B Drugs Overview | 2026-05-29T04:00:00Z | 2026-05-30T05:23:30Z | Active | Resources | Laura A. Wreschnig | Health Care Delivery, Health Care Reform, Medicare, Medicare Part B | Introduction Between 2017 and 2022, spending on drugs dispensed outside of retail settings grew nationally at an annual rate of 9.4%, outpacing the 6.5% annual growth in spending on drugs in retail settings, such as retail pharmacies. The Medicare program covers these nonretail drugs, such as novel oncology and immunology treatments, under Part B. The annual growth rate in per enrollee spending under Fee-for-Service (FFS) Medicare for all Part B drugs was over three times the growth rate of Medicare Part D drugs between 2008 and 2021, and four times that of prescription drug spending in the United States in general. This In Focus provides an overview of the drugs covered under Medicare Part B, how they are reimbursed under FFS Medicare, and relevant policy developments relating to these drugs. Medicare Coverage Background Medicare is a federal program that pays for covered health care services of qualified beneficiaries. There are four distinct parts of Medicare: Part A (hospital insurance), Part B (supplementary medical insurance), Part C (also known as Medicare Advantage), and Part D (an outpatient prescription drug benefit). Together, Parts A and B of Medicare are often referred to as Original or Fee-for-Service Medicare. Medicare is administered by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS). Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in both Parts B and D can access outpatient prescription drugs through each benefit, depending on the type of drug and/or its route of administration. Medicare Part D covers the majority of self-administered outpatient prescription drugs dispensed in retail pharmacies, while Part B covers a variety of drugs (described below) that are typically not self-administered or available through retail pharmacy settings. Medicare Part B Drugs In general, for drugs to be covered under Medicare Part B, they must fall within a Medicare benefit category, be deemed to be reasonable and necessary for the diagnosis or treatment of an illness or injury, and not be excluded by statute. The largest… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13237/IF13237.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13237.html |
| R48970 | Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education: FY2026 Appropriations | 2026-05-28T04:00:00Z | 2026-06-06T05:53:56Z | Active | Reports | Karen E. Lynch, Jessica Tollestrup, David H. Bradley, Ada S. Cornell, Cassandria Dortch, William R. Morton, Angela Napili, Kavya Sekar, Kyle D. Shohfi, Rebecca R. Skinner | Appropriations Policy, Labor, HHS & Education Appropriations | This report offers an overview of the FY2026 Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies (LHHS) appropriations bill. This bill includes all accounts funded through the annual appropriations process at the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) and U.S. Department of Education (ED). It also provides annual appropriations for most agencies within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), with certain exceptions (e.g., the Food and Drug Administration), and for more than a dozen related agencies (including the Social Security Administration). This report primarily focuses on regular FY2026 LHHS discretionary funding enacted during the annual appropriations process. Totals generally do not include emergency-designated funds, except as noted. In general, no emergency-designated funds were proposed or enacted for LHHS programs and activities in FY2026; a limited amount of emergency-designated appropriations were provided to LHHS in FY2024 and FY2025. FY2026 Appropriations FY2026 LHHS Omnibus: On February 3, 2026, the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2026 (FY2026 LHHS omnibus; H.R. 7148; P.L. 119-75) was signed into law by the President, providing full-year annual appropriations for LHHS (Division B). Annual discretionary LHHS appropriations totaled $226.1 billion (0.4% less than FY2024 enacted, 0.3% more than FY2025, and 29.9% more than the FY2026 President’s request). It also provided $1.513 trillion in mandatory funding, for a combined LHHS total of $1.739 trillion. The distribution of discretionary funding was as follows: DOL: $13.7 billion, 0.2% less than FY2024 and 0.5% more than FY2025. HHS: $116.4 billion, 0.9% less than FY2024 and 0.2% more than FY2025. ED: $79.0 billion, 0.1% less than FY2024 and 0.3% more than FY2025. Related Agencies: $17.1 billion, 1.4% more than FY2024 and 1.0% more than FY2025. FY2026 Continuing Resolutions: At the start of the fiscal year (October 1, 2025), a funding lapse commenced, resulting in a government shutdown that affected … | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48970/R48970.3.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48970.html |
| R48961 | U.S. Environmental Protection Agency: Origins, Authorities, and Organization | 2026-05-28T04:00:00Z | 2026-05-30T05:23:52Z | Active | Reports | Angela C. Jones | Air Quality, Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Waste Management & Cleanup, Water Quality | The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was established through the Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970 (Reorganization Plan No. 3), issued by President Nixon, with the purpose of consolidating and coordinating federal pollution control responsibilities and functions. In 2025, President Trump signed several executive orders that directed EPA, among other agencies, to make changes to its structure and eliminate certain programs. As changes to the agency have been planned and implemented, Congress has demonstrated increasing interest in the origins, authorities, and structure of EPA. Congressional interest in pollution control began in the 1940s with enactment of several pollution control statutes to address a range of environmental concerns. Prior to the creation of EPA, federal pollution control responsibilities were implemented by several different departments and agencies, separately addressing air quality, water pollution, solid waste management, pesticides, radiation, and other pollution and environmental protection issues. In addition, many states and some local governments had implemented pollution control laws and programs. The general purpose of Reorganization Plan No. 3 was to centralize and coordinate most federal pollution control functions within one independent federal agency. In 1984, Congress ratified as law all reorganization plans then in effect, including Reorganization Plan No. 3. Since 1970, Congress has enacted and amended more than a dozen pollution control statutes that EPA implements, such as the Clean Air Act; the Clean Water Act; the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act; the Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act; the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act; the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act; the National Environmental Policy Act; and the Safe Drinking Water Act. EPA’s purposes, as established in Reorganization Plan No. 3 and generally continuing to the present day, include environmental standard-setting; research;… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48961/R48961.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48961.html |
| LSB11434 | Civil Procedure at the Supreme Court: Selected Cases from the October 2025 Term | 2026-05-28T04:00:00Z | 2026-05-29T14:54:33Z | Active | Posts | Joanna R. Lampe | During the October 2025 Term to date, the Supreme Court has considered multiple cases focused on procedural issues. Among them, as discussed in order below, are cases about the relationship between federal and state procedural rules, the timing of motions for relief from judgment, federal court diversity jurisdiction, sovereign immunity, removal of cases from state to federal court, and constitutional requirements related to standing to sue. Congress has the power to enact legislation to regulate proceedings in federal courts. Thus, these cases may be of interest to Congress because Congress could amend the specific statutes or rules at issue in these cases or could look to the rulings as guidance on how the Court might interpret related legislation in the future. This Legal Sidebar provides an overview of seven civil procedure cases from the Supreme Court’s October 2025 term, listed chronologically by date of decision, then briefly discusses related considerations for Congress. Berk v. Choy In Berk v. Choy, the Supreme Court held that a state law—Delaware’s law requiring that medical malpractice complaints must be dismissed unless accompanied by expert affidavits—cannot apply in federal court because it conflicts with a valid federal procedural rule. Federal courts hearing cases involving state law claims between parties from different states, known as diversity cases, apply federal procedural law and state substantive law, “except where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide.” After suffering complications from an ankle fracture, plaintiff-petitioner Harold R. Berk filed a medical negligence complaint in Delaware federal court against the treating physician and his employer. Under Delaware law, a plaintiff filing a medical malpractice claim must include an affidavit from a qualified expert stating that “there are reasonable grounds to believe that there has been health-care medical negligence committed by each defendant.” Berk was unable to comply with… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB11434/LSB11434.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/HTML/LSB11434.html | |
| IF13236 | The Congressional Accountability Act’s Employment Discrimination Provisions | 2026-05-28T04:00:00Z | 2026-05-30T05:24:10Z | Active | Resources | Abigail A. Graber | Federal Workers, Labor Force, Legislative Branch, Civil Rights & Liberties, Federal Workforce Management, Employment Discrimination | Before the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995 (CAA), federal legislative branch employees were largely exempt from the federal employment protections available to employees in the private sector, state and local governments, and the executive branch. The CAA applied much of the body of federal employment law to legislative branch employees, including the primary laws prohibiting employment discrimination. This In Focus briefly reviews the application of federal employment discrimination law to the legislative branch through the CAA. It does not address other laws applied to the legislature through the CAA, including those related to employee bargaining rights, family and medical leave, workplace safety, layoff protections, and disability accommodations for non-employees, among other things. The CAA’s Employment Discrimination Prohibitions The federal employment discrimination laws the CAA applies to federal legislative branch employees include Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), prohibiting discrimination on the basis of age (40+); Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act (Section 501) and Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), prohibiting discrimination on the basis of disability and requiring reasonable accommodations; and The Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA), prohibiting discrimination on the basis of a person’s past, present, or intended uniformed service, among other requirements. Certain later-passed employment discrimination laws cover legislative branch employees while adopting the CAA’s enforcement mechanisms. These are The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA), prohibiting discrimination on the basis of genetic information or family medical history; and The Pregnant Workers Fairness Act (PWFA), requiring employers to provide reasonable accommodations for pregnancy, childbirth, and re… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13236/IF13236.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13236.html |
| R48959 | SBA Disaster Loan Credit Standards, Collateral Requirements, and Debt Collection | 2026-05-27T04:00:00Z | 2026-05-29T12:39:41Z | Active | Reports | Anthony A. Cilluffo, Bruce R. Lindsay, Maria Kreiser | The U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) provides low-interest, long-term loans to disaster survivors to allow them to repair or replace uninsured or underinsured property. About 80% of SBA disaster loans are made to individuals, either for real property damage (such as that to a house) or for personal property damage (such as that to a vehicle or other personal belongings). The other 20% of disaster loans are made to businesses and private nonprofit organizations, either to cover physical damage to business property or to cover financial obligations that could have been met had the disaster not occurred. In designing the disaster loan program, Congress and the SBA have sought to balance “sympathetic consideration” of the needs and circumstances of disaster survivors with the need to maintain program integrity and protect the federal government’s financial interests. Three key factors in this balance are (1) the credit standards required to obtain a disaster loan; (2) the amount and quality of collateral required to be pledged to secure a disaster loan; and (3) debt collection processes followed after default. Together, credit, collateral, and collection policies are designed to keep loan performance and program losses at levels that are deemed acceptable by Congress and the SBA. To secure an SBA disaster loan, an applicant must demonstrate that they are reasonably likely to repay the loan. The SBA relies on an applicant’s credit score to determine whether the applicant has an acceptable credit history; the applicant’s credit score further determines whether the applicant is eligible for a loan, what level of processing is required, and whether the applicant likely has access to credit elsewhere (which determines the loan’s interest rate). The applicant’s repayment ability is gauged on the applicant’s income and existing debt. Besides determining loan eligibility, the applicant’s estimated repayment ability contributes to decisions regarding monthly payment amount and loan maturity date. The SBA uses a multis… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48959/R48959.4.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48959.html | |
| R48958 | National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities: FY2026 Appropriations | 2026-05-27T04:00:00Z | 2026-05-30T05:23:59Z | Active | Reports | Shannon S. Loane | Education Budget & Appropriations, Interior & Environment Appropriations | The National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities is the primary vehicle for federal support for the arts and the humanities. Established in 1965, the foundation currently consists of three agencies: the Institute of Museum and Library Services (IMLS), the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA), and the National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH). IMLS is funded through the Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act. NEA and NEH are funded through the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act. P.L. 119-4, the Full-Year Continuing Appropriations and Extensions Act, 2025, provided FY2025 funding for IMLS, NEA, and NEH at the FY2024 levels. For IMLS, this was $294.8 million, for NEA it was $207.0 million, and for NEH it was also $207.0 million. P.L. 119-74, the Commerce, Justice, Science, Energy and Water Development, and Interior and Environment Appropriations Act, 2026, provided FY2026 appropriations for the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations act, including NEA and NEH. P.L. 119-75, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2026, provided FY2026 appropriations for the Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, including IMLS. For FY2026, IMLS received an appropriation of $291.8 million. This level was $3.0 million less than in FY2024 and FY2025. NEA and NEH each received $207.0 million, the same amount as in FY2024 and FY2025. | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48958/R48958.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48958.html |
| R48957 | U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Horticulture Programs: Action in the 119th Congress | 2026-05-27T04:00:00Z | 2026-05-29T14:24:58Z | Active | Reports | Zachary T. Neuhofer | The farm bill generally contains reauthorizations, amendments, and new programs that impact specialty crops, organic agriculture, local and regional food programs, hemp, and pest and disease management. Many of these programs are contained in the horticulture title, which was first added to a farm bill in the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (2008 farm bill; P.L. 110-234). The 2008 farm bill amended programs that were introduced in the Specialty Crop Competitiveness Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-465) (such as the Specialty Crop Block Grant Program), created new programs that primarily benefitted horticulture (such as the Plant Pest and Disease Management and Disaster Prevention Program), and contained support for the National Organic Program (NOP). In subsequent farm bills, the Agricultural Act of 2014 (2014 farm bill; P.L. 113-79) and the Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018 (2018 farm bill; P.L. 115-334), the horticulture title expanded to include support for local and urban agriculture and hemp production. Farm bill support for horticultural crops is not limited to the horticulture title; programs in other titles, such as the research and trade titles, also provide support for these crops. The most recent farm bill, the 2018 farm bill, expired in 2023. It has been extended three times for a year at a time: in November 2023 to cover FY2024 and crop year 2024 (P.L. 118-22, Division B, §102); in December 2024 to cover FY2025 and crop year 2025 (P.L. 118-158, Division D, §4101); and in November 2025 to cover FY2026 and crop year 2026 (P.L. 119-37, Division E, §5002). The 119th Congress passed two laws that impact horticulture programs and provisions from the 2018 farm bill. These two laws are the FY2025 budget reconciliation law (P.L. 119-21), which amended certain existing horticulture programs, and the Continuing Appropriations, Agriculture, Legislative Branch, Military Construction and Veterans Affairs, and Extensions Act, 2026 (P.L. 119-37, Division B, §781), which amended the federal definition of hemp and … | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48957/R48957.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48957.html | |
| IN12694 | Trump Administration’s FY2027 Small Business Administration (SBA) Budget Request | 2026-05-27T04:00:00Z | 2026-05-29T17:55:02Z | Active | Posts | Anthony A. Cilluffo, Adam G. Levin | The U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) operates a range of programs to support small businesses. These include loan guarantee and venture capital programs to enhance small business access to capital; contracting programs to increase small business opportunities in federal contracting; direct loan programs for individuals, businesses, and nonprofit organizations to assist their recovery from natural disasters; and management and technical assistance training programs to assist small business formation and expansion. The Trump Administration requested $329.0 million in new discretionary budget authority for the SBA for FY2027. This would represent a 74.7% decrease from the $1.3 billion in appropriations that Congress provided the SBA in FY2026. In nominal terms (not adjusted for inflation), the Administration’s FY2027 request would be the lowest amount of SBA funding since at least FY2000. (See Figure 1 for recent funding data.) In announcing the proposed cuts and eliminations, the Trump Administration stated that its budget request “eliminates a number of SBA programs that waste taxpayer dollars on failed business counseling and training programs.” The proposed decreases are concentrated in several accounts and activities, including SBA’s entrepreneurial development programs, which provide management and technical assistance to small businesses ($21.4 million requested for FY2027, compared with $330.0 million in appropriations for FY2026); the administrative costs for SBA’s business loan program (no money requested for FY2027 due to a proposed legislative change that would offset these costs, compared with $161.0 million in appropriations for FY2026); SBA’s salaries and expenses account, which pays for agency-wide services, SBA regional and district offices, and most daily agency operations ($260.2 million requested for FY2027, compared with $323.1 million in appropriations for FY2026); congressionally directed spending (no money requested for FY2027, compared with $106.9 million in appropriations for FY20… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12694/IN12694.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/HTML/IN12694.html | |
| R48960 | U.S. Foreign Policy in the Western Hemisphere: Issues for Congress | 2026-05-26T04:00:00Z | 2026-05-30T05:23:54Z | Active | Reports | Kyla H. Kitamura, Clare Ribando Seelke, Karla I. Rios, Shelby B. Senger, Cathleen D. Cimino-Isaacs, Michael D. Sutherland, Danielle M. Trachtenberg, Carla Y. Davis-Castro, Shayerah I. Akhtar, Christopher A. Casey, Liana Wong, Joshua Klein, Peter J. Meyer | International Terrorism, Trafficking & Crime, Latin America, Caribbean & Canada, U.S. Trade Policy | Historically, many U.S. policymakers have regarded the Western Hemisphere as a U.S. sphere of influence, vital to U.S. interests, or both. U.S. engagement in the region has shifted over time, responding to changes in the hemisphere and in U.S. objectives. Following the end of the Cold War, the U.S. approach to the Western Hemisphere primarily sought to promote democracy and human rights, reduce barriers to trade, and combat transnational security threats. The second Trump Administration has identified the Western Hemisphere as a priority for U.S. foreign and defense policy. The Administration has begun to implement potentially far-reaching changes to U.S. relations with Latin American and Caribbean countries; Canada; and Greenland, a self-governing part of the Kingdom of Denmark, with some variation by country. Competition with China and Russia. The Administration has placed renewed emphasis on limiting the influence of extra-hemispheric powers in the Western Hemisphere. This approach has included U.S. efforts to secure or enhance access to locations the Administration deems strategic, such as the Panama Canal and Greenland, and to prevent competitors from controlling critical infrastructure in the region. Counternarcotics and Transnational Crime. The Administration has increased the U.S. military’s involvement in combating illicit narcotics and addressing related security challenges. This approach has included designating transnational criminal organizations as terrorists, conducting unilateral lethal strikes on suspected drug traffickers, and executing the January 2026 U.S. military capture of then-Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro. Migration Policy. The Administration has focused extensively on stemming unauthorized immigration into the United States and removing unauthorized immigrants from the country. Among other actions, the Administration has imposed new restrictions at the border, ended humanitarian protections that had provided relief from removal for some immigrants in the United States, and negotiate… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48960/R48960.3.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48960.html |
| R48956 | National Security, Department of State, and Related Programs: FY2027 Budget and Appropriations | 2026-05-26T04:00:00Z | 2026-05-28T17:24:58Z | Active | Reports | Cory R. Gill, Emily M. McCabe | Department of State (DOS), State & Foreign Operations Appropriations | Congress typically considers 12 distinct appropriations measures on an annual basis to fund federal programs and activities. Between FY2008 and FY2025, one of these measures was the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS) appropriations. Beginning in FY2026, Congress retitled this measure as the National Security, Department of State, and Related Programs (NSRP) appropriations. The measure includes funding for U.S. diplomatic activities; cultural exchanges; development, security, and humanitarian assistance; and participation in multilateral organizations, among other international activities. For FY2027, the Trump Administration is requesting $37.79 billion in new budget authority for NSRP accounts. This funding level, if enacted, would be 26.8% less than what Congress provided for FY2026. When including proposed rescissions of certain prior-year balances, the FY2027 request totals $35.51 billion, a 29.1% decrease from the FY2026 enacted NSRP level. As with previous budget requests and annual SFOPS/NSRP appropriations measures, the budget request is divided into two main components: Diplomatic Engagement and Related Accounts. These accounts, which are provided for in Title I of the NSRP bill, primarily support Department of State diplomatic and security activities. The Trump Administration proposes $13.24 billion in new budget authority for Title I accounts in FY2027, a 20.4% decrease from FY2026 enacted levels. Foreign Operations. These accounts, which are provided in Titles II-VI of the NSRP bill, have funded most foreign assistance activities. The FY2027 request includes a total of $24.55 billion in new budget authority for these accounts, a 29.9% decrease from total FY2026 enacted levels. On April 28, 2026, the House Appropriations Committee approved a FY2027 NSRP bill, H.R. 8595. If enacted, the bill would provide $49.21 billion in new budget authority for NSRP accounts, or a net total of $47.37 billion when including rescissions of prior year budget authority. Table A-1 provi… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48956/R48956.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48956.html |
| IF13235 | Federal Investigations and Seizures of Voting Records | 2026-05-26T04:00:00Z | 2026-05-27T16:53:03Z | Active | Resources | Jimmy Balser | This In Focus provides background on the constitutional and statutory framework underlying federal investigations of elections, summarizes investigations by the Trump Administration and legal action surrounding demands for and seizures of state and county voting records, and offers considerations for Congress. Constitutional Background States have the initial and principal responsibility for administering elections in the United States, including in determining voter eligibility. The federal government maintains a significant role in elections, such as in enforcing federal laws protecting election integrity. The states’ primary role in congressional elections is partially set out in Article I, Section 4, Clause 1, of the U.S. Constitution, the Elections Clause: “The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof[.]” The Elections Clause also references Congress’s power to “at any time by Law make or alter” state regulations, which the Supreme Court has sometimes described as an “override” authority. Article I, Section 2, Clause 1, the Voter Qualifications Clause, further empowers the states to decide who is qualified to vote in federal congressional elections. For presidential elections, Article II, Section 1, Clause 4, provides that Congress may determine the “Time” of choosing presidential electors and the day the electors shall cast their votes. The states hold the power to appoint presidential electors to the Electoral College and decide how those appointments are made under Article II, Section 1, Clause 2, the Electors Clause. Congress does not have general regulatory authority over state and local elections, but it may still exercise its power over them in several contexts. For example, Congress has authority to prevent unconstitutional voter discrimination in a state or local election. In addition to its Article I powers, Congress’s authority to legislate regarding these issues derives principally from the Fourte… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13235/IF13235.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13235.html | |
| IF13234 | Retroactive Federal Tax Legislation and Due Process | 2026-05-26T04:00:00Z | 2026-05-27T16:23:12Z | Active | Resources | Milan N. Ball | Federal tax statutes routinely have effective dates that precede their dates of enactment. The Supreme Court has stated that this “customary congressional practice” generally “has been confined to short and limited periods required by the practicalities of producing national legislation.” Some taxpayers have challenged the retroactive application of federal tax legislation based on the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Courts generally rely on the Supreme Court’s seminal decision from 1994, United States v. Carlton, to determine whether the retroactive application of tax legislation violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. In Carlton, the Court upheld a tax statute with a retroactive period slightly more than a year. Applying a two-part test, the Court held that the retroactive tax statute was consistent with the Due Process Clause because it (1) was “rationally related to a legitimate legislative purpose” and (2) had “only a modest period of retroactivity.” While courts continue to apply the rational basis standard in the first part of the test, it is unclear whether the second part of the test, the “modest period” limitation, is a dispositive factor. This In Focus provides an overview of due process, summarizes Carlton, discusses due process arguments based on notice and reliance and the length of a retroactive period, and concludes with considerations for Congress. Due Process The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause provides that “no person” shall “be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” The Supreme Court has long recognized that a statute that claims to tax can be “so arbitrary . . . that it was not the exertion of taxation but a confiscation of property.” The Court has established that the due process standard that applies to retroactive tax legislation does not focus “exclusively on” notice and reliance—whether a taxpayer had adequate notice of a tax statute’s retroactive application and whether a taxpayer detrimentally relied on federal tax laws prior to ame… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13234/IF13234.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13234.html | |
| LSB11433 | En Banc Tenth Circuit to Consider Scope of DIDMCA OptOut Provision | 2026-05-22T04:00:00Z | 2026-05-28T13:39:33Z | Active | Posts | Jay B. Sykes | Banking | The United States has a dual banking system in which banks may obtain either a federal or a state charter. State-chartered banks are not, however, unaffected by federal law. In addition to imposing a range of regulatory requirements on state-chartered banks, federal law frees state banks from the strictures of some state laws. On April 2, 2026, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit (the Tenth Circuit) granted rehearing en banc in National Association of Industrial Bankers v. Weiser, a case involving federal preemption of state interest-rate limits as applied to state-chartered banks. Weiser raises an issue of first impression concerning states’ ability to opt out of Section 521 of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 (DIDMCA), which allows state-chartered banks to charge certain interest rates when extending credit notwithstanding contrary state law. This Legal Sidebar discusses the Weiser litigation and highlights considerations that may be of interest to Congress. The Weiser Litigation At issue in Weiser are two provisions in DIDMCA. The first, Section 521, allows state-chartered banks to charge interest on loans at a rate up to the greater of one percent more than the discount rate on 90-day commercial paper in effect at the Federal Reserve Bank in the Federal Reserve district where a bank is located (the “discount-plus-one” rate) or the rate allowed by the state where the bank is located. Section 521 thus preempts state law in two respects. Section 521 allows a state-chartered bank to charge the discount-plus-one rate even if a state imposes a lower interest-rate limit. Section 521 also permits a state-chartered bank to charge the maximum interest rate of the state in which it is located, even when lending to borrowers in other states with lower interest-rate limits. This latter power is often referred to as interest-rate “exportation.” Congress extended these powers to state-chartered banks to preserve their competitive parity with national banks, which poss… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB11433/LSB11433.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/HTML/LSB11433.html |
| IF13233 | Medicare’s Site-Neutral Payment Policy | 2026-05-22T04:00:00Z | 2026-05-23T10:38:11Z | Active | Resources | Jim Hahn, Wen W. Shen | Overview By law, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) determines Medicare program Parts A and B payments to providers and suppliers for services furnished to covered beneficiaries through multiple payment systems. Some Medicare payment systems pay for services furnished at particular sites of service (e.g., a physician’s office, an acute care hospital inpatient setting, a hospital outpatient department, or skilled nursing facility), while other payment systems apply to certain services independent of location, such as clinical laboratory or durable medical equipment services. Each payment system uses a separate methodology specified in statute to determine the value and payment rate for covered services. Discrepancies can exist for similar types of care furnished to a beneficiary across the payment systems—for example, whether a patient is treated in a physician’s office and paid under the physician fee schedule (PFS), in a hospital outpatient department (HOPD) and paid under the outpatient prospective payment system (OPPS), or in an ambulatory surgery center (ASC) and paid under the ASC payment system. Medicare’s site-neutral payment policy sets payments for certain services to be equivalent independent of the location where a beneficiary receives the service. The policy is intended to eliminate the differences and any corresponding incentives that might lower the quality of patient care or lead to inefficiencies in the Medicare program. This In Focus summarizes the background and rationale behind the site-neutral payment policy, the statutory basis for and implementation of the policy, legal challenges to the policy, and considerations for Congress. Background and Rationale Medicare payments for similar services are typically higher under the OPPS than the PFS, as the additional overhead costs associated with being part of the hospital or health system are included in the calculation under the OPPS but not in the PFS. The Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC), an independent congressional … | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13233/IF13233.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13233.html | |
| R48954 | Data.gov: Implementation and Perspectives on Its Functions | 2026-05-21T04:00:00Z | 2026-05-22T17:08:41Z | Active | Reports | Meghan M. Stuessy, Clinton T. Brass | Over many decades, Congress has legislated policies to provide federal data to different types of users for a variety of purposes or “use cases.” From constituents seeking to learn more about the functions of their representative government to researchers seeking authoritative data for ongoing work, Data.gov is the latest effort in a series of initiatives addressing ongoing debates about how the public may access government data. Through administrative initiatives beginning in 2009 and implementation of the Open, Public, Electronic, and Necessary Government Data Act (OPEN Government Data Act; P.L. 115-435, Title II) from 2019 to the present, Data.gov has operated primarily as a directory to certain kinds of government-held information. The General Services Administration administers Data.gov’s day-to-day operations, while the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) effectively exercises control over the website’s implementation and develops related guidance for agencies. Data.gov hosts the federal data catalog, which lists information about many agency data assets and provides means to access some of them. However, Data.gov does not typically serve as a repository for the underlying data assets themselves; rather, it is characterized in law as “a single public interface online as a point of entry” that directs users to data assets hosted elsewhere, such as on individual agency websites. The OPEN Government Data Act defines data as “recorded information” and data asset as “a collection of data elements or data sets that may be grouped together.” However, OMB’s definition from implementation guidance in Memorandum M-25-05 interpreted the act’s definition of the term data asset more narrowly to mean data that are both structured (e.g., organized into columns and rows and a database of digital images) and logically grouped (e.g., with a shared function or purpose). These definitions and others contained in the statute may permit agencies a level of discretion in determining which data assets are included and which are … | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48954/R48954.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48954.html | |
| R48953 | FY2025 State Grants Under Title I-A of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) | 2026-05-21T04:00:00Z | 2026-05-23T13:53:04Z | Active | Reports | Rebecca R. Skinner, Joe Angert | The Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), most recently comprehensively amended by the, Every Student Succeeds Act (P.L. 114-95), is the primary source of federal aid to support elementary and secondary education. The Title I-A program is the largest grant program authorized under the ESEA and was funded at $18.4 billion for FY2025. It is designed to provide supplementary educational and related services to low-achieving and other students attending elementary and secondary schools with relatively high concentrations of students from low-income families. Under current law, the U.S. Department of Education determines Title I-A allocations to local educational agencies (LEAs) based on four separate funding formulas: Basic Grants, Concentration Grants, Targeted Grants, and Education Finance Incentive Grants. State grants are the total of the allocations for all LEAs in a state under all four formulas. The four Title I-A formulas have somewhat distinct allocation patterns, providing varying shares of allocated funds to different types of LEAs and states. Thus, for some states, certain formulas are more favorable than others. This report provides FY2025 state grant amounts under each of the four formulas used to determine Title I-A grants. Overall, California received the largest FY2025 Title I-A grant amount ($2.3 billion, or 12.47% of total Title I-A grants to states). Vermont received the smallest FY2025 Title I-A grant amount ($41.6 million, or 0.23% of total Title I-A grants to states). | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48953/R48953.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48953.html | |
| IF13232 | Unemployment Compensation, Strikes and Lockouts in 2025 | 2026-05-21T04:00:00Z | 2026-05-22T16:23:00Z | Active | Resources | Julie M. Whittaker, Katelin P. Isaacs | Unemployment Insurance, Labor Relations | Introduction Eligible unemployed workers may receive weekly income support from the joint federal-state Unemployment Compensation (UC) program while they search for new work. In general, such workers must have lost their jobs through no fault of their own and be able, available, and seeking work. Some states provide UC benefits to workers during labor disputes that involve temporary work stoppages (e.g., when workers strike or employers prevent employees from work), if certain conditions are met. Congress has considered proposals to amend federal requirements for state UC programs in how to treat labor disputes in UC determinations. This In Focus discusses the role of UC in labor disputes, including current UC eligibility and disqualification related to labor disputes as well as examples of recent federal legislation to expand or limit UC access in labor dispute situations. It also provides examples of union strike assistance payments. Labor disputes among workers and employers may involve temporary work stoppages. Strikes occur when workers initiate the work stoppage. Lockouts happen when employers refuse to allow employees to work at the worksite. For 2025, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) reported that 16.5 million workers were represented by a union. Additionally, BLS reported 30 major work stoppages (i.e., involving 1,000 or more workers), impacting approximately 306,800 workers. (Workers involved in a work stoppage may or may not be members of a union.) Unemployment Compensation The joint federal-state UC program provides income support to workers through weekly UC benefit payments. Its two main objectives are to (1) provide temporary partial wage replacement to involuntarily unemployed workers and (2) stabilize the economy during recessions. The UC program is financed through employer taxes imposed by the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) and state payroll taxes required under each state’s unemployment tax law. Although there are broad requirements under federal law regarding UC benefits and f… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13232/IF13232.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13232.html |
| R48955 | CARES Act Eviction Notice Requirements: Background and Recent Developments | 2026-05-20T04:00:00Z | 2026-05-29T16:55:24Z | Active | Reports | David H. Carpenter, Maggie McCarty | Eviction Protections, CARES Act, COVID-19 Pandemic Domestic Response, Department of Housing & Urban Development (HUD) | The COVID-19 pandemic disrupted business operations nationwide, leading to dramatic job losses that threatened the ability of many to meet their financial obligations, including housing rental payments. It brought attention to the risks posed by potential increased evictions and tenant displacement, which could further the spread of the virus and cause economic hardship for tenants and landlords. In response to these concerns, Congress and the President enacted several laws providing significant amounts of supplemental funding to help tenants pay their rent and remain stably housed. The laws also included arguably unprecedented new federal policies designed to prevent landlords from pursuing eviction. Most of the funding and policies enacted were temporary, designed to address the immediate impacts of the pandemic. One eviction-related provision—a thirty-day notice to vacate requirement enacted as Section 4024(c) of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act) (Pub. L. No. 116-136, § 4024(c), 134 Stat. 281, 492 (2020))—remains in effect, although its scope and future remain subject to debate. In response to legal challenges to Section 4024(c)’s notice to vacate requirements, courts have reached some inconsistent holdings, but most have held that the CARES Act notice to vacate requirement is not time-limited and, thus, is still in effect (see, e.g., Arvada Village Gardens LP v. Garate, 529 P.3d 105, 108 (Colo. 2023); D.H. v. Common Wealth Apartments, 231 N.E.3d 284, 288 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024); Olentangy Commons Owner LLC v. Fawley, 228 N.E.3d 621, 633 (Ohio Ct. of App. 2023); Sherwood Auburn LLC v. Pinzon, 521 P.3d 212, 216 (Wash. Ct. App. 2022); but see MIMG CLXXII Retreat on 6th, LLC v. Miller, 16 N.W.3d 489 (Iowa 2025)); the CARES Act notice to vacate requirement is only applicable to the nonpayment of rent, rather than other grounds for eviction (see, e.g., West Haven Hous. Auth. v. Armstrong, 2021 WL 2775095, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 16, 2021); King County Hous. Auth. v. Knight, 563… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48955/R48955.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48955.html |
| R48952 | Opportunity Zones Round Two Selection Process: Frequently Asked Questions | 2026-05-20T04:00:00Z | 2026-05-22T11:08:37Z | Active | Reports | Anthony A. Cilluffo, Donald J. Marples | Economic Development, Tax Policy for Economic Development | The Opportunity Zone program provides tax incentives to taxpayers who invest in certain designated geographic areas. The program was enacted in 2017, as part of P.L. 115-97, and began operations in 2018. It was initially set to expire by the end of 2028; however, the program was permanently extended and amended in 2025 by P.L. 119-21. Changes to the program include a new selection round for Opportunity Zones. Most 2018 selections are scheduled to lose their designation at the end of 2028. A new selection round is to choose the areas that are eligible for the tax incentives for the 10-year period from January 2027 through the end of December 2036. The first iteration of the program, from 2018-2028 under the P.L. 115-97 rules, is referred to as “Round One Opportunity Zones.” The new selection round, starting in mid-2026 under permanent rules created by P.L. 119-21, is referred to as “Round Two Opportunity Zones.” This report addresses questions about the upcoming selection process for Round Two Opportunity Zones. | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48952/R48952.3.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48952.html |
| IF13231 | Indexing Capital Gains Taxes for Inflation: Marginal Effective Tax Rates and Revenue Estimates | 2026-05-20T04:00:00Z | 2026-05-21T17:23:57Z | Active | Resources | Jane G. Gravelle, Mark P. Keightley | Proposals to index capital gains taxes for inflation have recently generated public debate. For example, S. 798 and H.R. 1857 would inflation index capital gains on assets held for at least three years. Some Members of Congress have also advocated for the Administration to adopt indexing of capital gains by regulation. This In Focus compares capital gains taxation under current law with inflation indexing, examines how indexing affects marginal effective tax rates (METRs) on corporate stock returns, and presents revenue estimates of selected versions of inflation indexing options. Current Law and Inflation Indexing A capital gain represents the increase in value of an asset over time. It is computed by subtracting the asset’s basis from the final sales price. For a financial asset, such as corporate stock, the basis is typically its original purchase price. For a physical asset, such as a building, the basis is the acquisition cost plus any improvements, minus depreciation. Under current law, an asset’s basis is not adjusted for inflation. Consequently, a portion of any capital gain often reflects “phantom gains”; that is, compensation for eroded purchasing power rather than a true increase in investor wealth. For example, a stock originally purchased for $100 and sold for $150 after 10 years would result in a taxable gain of $50 under current law. But if inflation averaged 2% over those 10 years, inflation indexing would adjust the basis upward by $22 (2% compounded over 10 years), leaving a taxable real gain of $28 ($150 minus $122). Capital gains receive a number of tax benefits under current law that some view as proxies for inflation indexing. Taxes on capital gains are deferred until realization. Long-term capital gains (on assets held for more than a year) are taxed at rates (0%, 15%, and 20%) that are lower than those imposed on ordinary income (up to 37%). And capital gains are excluded from taxation at death via a step-up in basis on inherited assets. Higher-income taxpayers (incomes over $200,000 if… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13231/IF13231.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13231.html | |
| R48951 | Shark Conservation and Management in the United States | 2026-05-19T04:00:00Z | 2026-05-22T17:08:36Z | Active | Reports | Anthony R. Marshak, Pervaze A. Sheikh | Shark conservation and management in the United States have received attention from stakeholders and Congress due to biological, aesthetic, human safety, and other factors related to sharks. Stakeholders have discussed issues related to the status of shark populations, specifically regarding domestic and international fishing of sharks; human-shark conflicts, such as shark depredation of targeted fishery species (i.e., sharks completely or partially consuming marine species caught by fishing gear); and the predatory role of sharks in marine ecosystems. These discussions, among other matters, have prompted Congress to pass legislation related to the conservation and management of sharks and their body parts (e.g., shark fins), such as the Shark Finning Prohibition Act (P.L. 106-557), the Shark Conservation Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-348, Title I), and the legislation sometimes referred to as the “Shark Fin Sales Elimination Act of 2023” (P.L. 117-263, Division E, Title LIX, Subtitle E, Section 5946(b)). Additional statutes (e.g., the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act [MSA; 16 U.S.C. §§1801-1891d] and the Endangered Species Act [ESA; 16 U.S.C. §§1531-1544]) and multilateral agreements govern shark conservation and management, including for sharks inhabiting coastal, state, and international waters. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA’s) National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) primarily administers federal shark-related efforts, including the conservation and management of targeted and protected shark species. Congress has considered legislative proposals relating to sharks, which have focused on shark conservation and management, the feeding of sharks, and shark depredation and human safety, among other topics. For example, H.R. 207 as passed by the House and S. 2314 as reported, the Supporting the Health of Aquatic systems through Research Knowledge and Enhanced Dialogue Act (SHARKED Act; introduced in the 119th Congress), would require the Secretary of Commerce to establ… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48951/R48951.6.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48951.html | |
| IF13229 | Executive Order 14395, “Establishing the Task Force to Eliminate Fraud” | 2026-05-19T04:00:00Z | 2026-05-20T11:53:25Z | Active | Resources | Garrett Hatch | Background Fraud, the act of obtaining something of value through willful misrepresentation, is a growing concern for the federal government. According to the U.S. Sentencing Commission, convictions for government benefits fraud increased 242% between 2020 and 2024. During the pandemic, criminal organizations and individual actors fraudulently obtained hundreds of billions of dollars from programs intended to assist American businesses and people, including more than $100 billion from the Unemployment Insurance program. Nearly 50 individuals have been convicted of fraudulently obtaining nearly $250 million in funds from one pandemic assistance program, the Federal Child Nutrition Program. Similarly, in 2025, more than 320 doctors, nurses, and pharmacists were arrested across the nation for schemes to defraud Medicare and other federal assistance programs out of an estimated $14.6 billion. The Government Accountability Office estimates that federal agencies lose between $233 and $521 billion annually to fraud. On March 16, 2026, President Trump signed Executive Order (E.O.) 14395, "Establishing the Task Force to Eliminate Fraud.” Section 1 of E.O. 14395 alleges that “loopholes” at the state level have created the conditions for fraud in federal benefit programs, such as allowing applicants to self-certify information, failing to verify applicants’ eligibility, and “refus[ing]” to implement adequate fraud controls, among other things. To address these issues, E.O. 14395 establishes a multi-agency task force to develop “a comprehensive national strategy to stop fraud, waste, and abuse within Federal benefit programs, including programs administered jointly with State, local, tribal, and territorial partners.” Composition of Task Force Section 2 of E.O. 14395 identifies three leadership positions at the task force and who shall fill them. The Vice President of the United States is to serve as chairman; the Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission is to serve as vice chairman; and the Assistant to the President for H… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13229/IF13229.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13229.html | |
| IF13230 | Current Hantavirus Outbreak and Considerations for Congress | 2026-05-18T04:00:00Z | 2026-05-21T11:23:22Z | Active | Resources | Todd Kuiken, Kavya Sekar, Pervaze A. Sheikh | Public Health Emergency Preparedness & Response, Wildlife & Ecosystems | Background and Current Hantavirus Outbreak Hantavirus is a zoonotic pathogen carried by rodents (e.g., mice and rats) and transmitted to humans generally from contact with their droppings, urine, and saliva. On May 2, 2026, the World Health Organization (WHO) received notification of two deaths and one critically ill passenger from an acute respiratory illness onboard the M/V Hondius cruise ship, originating from Argentina. These cases were later confirmed to be the Andes strain of the hantavirus, according to the WHO. Symptoms appeared for the initial case on the ship on April 6, 2026. Related policy issues for Congress include the nature of international coordination for outbreaks, domestic preparedness for disease outbreaks, and U.S. research and development for zoonotic diseases. As of May 13, 2026, the outbreak was ongoing; there were 11 reported cases of hantavirus linked to the cruise ship, 8 of which have been laboratory confirmed. Passengers from the M/V Hondius have been repatriated, and public health authorities have initiated contact tracing to monitor for additional spread. Additional passengers who departed the cruise ship prior to the identification of the outbreak may have been exposed to hantavirus and unknowingly exposed others. Symptoms of hantavirus from the Andes strain can appear in 4 to 42 days after exposure. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has stated that the “the overall risk to the American public and travelers remains extremely low.” No U.S. hantavirus cases associated with the current outbreak have been reported as of the publication of this product. What Is Hantavirus? Hantavirus has been known to infect humans for at least several decades. The disease was first documented during the Korean War in the 1950s, the virus was isolated in 1978, and the WHO recognized the disease in 1982. Hantavirus is endemic throughout the world. Hantaviruses belong to the family Hantaviridae, with each strain typically associated with a specific rodent species. More than 40 str… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13230/IF13230.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13230.html |
| R48948 | Suspension of the Federal Gas Tax: In Brief | 2026-05-15T04:00:00Z | 2026-05-16T04:53:50Z | Active | Reports | Ali E. Lohman | In May 2026, the average price of a gallon of gasoline for U.S. consumers had increased more than $1.50 compared with the price in February 2026. President Trump and multiple Members of Congress have proposed suspending the federal excise tax on gasoline as a way to potentially offset this price increase. The gas tax rate is established in statute by Congress. While some Members of Congress have previously proposed suspending the gas tax, no such law has ever been enacted. Reducing the price of gas by 18.4 cents per gallon could provide some relief to consumers. Suspending the gas tax may not reduce consumer prices by exactly 18.4 cents per gallon. Gasoline suppliers, distributers, refiners, and blenders could choose to reduce prices by more or less than 18.4 cents per gallon or not reduce prices at all. Suspending the gas tax may not reduce consumer prices by exactly 18.4 cents per gallon. Gasoline suppliers, distributers, refiners, and blenders could choose to reduce prices by more or less than 18.4 cents per gallon or not reduce prices at all. The gas tax is the primary source of revenue for the federal Highway Trust Fund. The Congressional Budget Office projects that the balance in the Highway Trust Fund’s two accounts, the mass transit and the highway account, will approach zero in FY2027 and FY2028 respectively, which could delay reimbursements to state and local governments for work completed on federally-funded transportation projects and delay initiation of new transportation projects. Suspending the gas tax could cause the balances in the mass transit account and highway account to approach zero sooner. If, as in some current proposals in the 119th Congress, this reduction in revenue were coupled with a general fund transfer, this reduction would not affect the health of the Highway Trust Fund, but it would increase the budget deficit. The gas tax is also the primary source of revenue for the Leaking Underground Storage Tank (LUST) Trust Fund, which helps the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) … | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48948/R48948.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48948.html | |
| LSB11432 | Congressional Authority to Regulate Presidential Recordkeeping | 2026-05-15T04:00:00Z | 2026-05-16T04:53:17Z | Active | Posts | Todd Garvey | When Richard Nixon stepped from the White House lawn onto Marine One after resigning the presidency in the wake of the Watergate scandal, he could well have assumed that some of the most familiar remnants of his administration—hundreds of audio tape recordings of conversations he had in the oval office—would remain under his control. There was, at that point, a long tradition of Presidents retaining ownership of their papers and records after leaving office. Consistent with that practice, President Nixon soon reached an agreement with the Administrator of General Services ensuring that the tapes, along with more than 40 million pages of records, would be taken in former President Nixon’s custody to California, where the agreement explicitly permitted the oval office recordings to eventually be destroyed. Once word of this arrangement reached the legislative branch, Congress acted quickly to enact the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act (PRMPA), which effectively abrogated the agreement and directed the Administrator to take “complete possession and control” of the former President’s records. That law marked the beginning to a new legislative approach to the preservation of presidential records. President Nixon challenged the PRMPA as a violation of the separation of powers, among other claims, but the Supreme Court rejected those arguments in its 1977 decision of Nixon v. Administrator of General Services. Soon after, Congress solidified its new approach to the ownership and preservation of presidential records by enacting the Presidential Records Act of 1978 (PRA). That law established that “[t]he United States shall reserve and retain complete ownership, possession, and control” of the records of future Presidents by ensuring their preservation in the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). The PRA continues to govern the retention and preservation of presidential records to this day. On April 1, 2026, the Department of Justice (DOJ) Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) expressed its … | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB11432/LSB11432.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/HTML/LSB11432.html | |
| IN12693 | FEMA Review Council: Final Report | 2026-05-15T04:00:00Z | 2026-05-16T04:53:38Z | Active | Posts | Diane P. Horn, Erica A. Lee, Elizabeth M. Webster | On Thursday, May 7, 2026, the FEMA Review Council (FRC), established by President Donald J. Trump to undertake a “full-scale review” of the agency, held its final meeting and voted to approve its final report of findings and recommendations. Establishment of FEMA Review Council (FRC) Executive Order (EO) 14180 established the FRC in January 2025 to evaluate FEMA’s operations, staffing levels, alleged political bias, and role in federal emergency management. At approximately the same time, President Trump dismissed all members of the National Advisory Council, which Congress established to advise the Administrator on all aspects of emergency management. Under the terms of the E.O., the Secretaries of Homeland Security and Defense co-chaired the FRC; broader membership included FEMA and nonfederal representatives. In past meetings, then-Co-Chair Kristi Noem echoed the President’s calls to eliminate FEMA as it currently exists; other members advocated narrower reforms, including reducing FEMA assistance for smaller disasters. The FRC was to publish a report with findings and recommendations in late 2025; subsequent EOs extended this deadline to no later than May 29, 2026. News reports described draft FRC reports and conflicts over proposed reforms, particularly a proposed 50% staffing cut. FRC Requests for Information The FRC solicited information from the public in March 2025 and received more than 11,700 comments. According one outside group’s analysis, most comments were “overwhelmingly supportive ... of maintaining FEMA’s capacity, and of making good-faith reforms.” The FRC summarized the feedback and cited as common problems “bureaucratic inefficiencies, delays in funding, inconsistent program administration, workforce constraints, and insufficient engagement with local governments.” Additionally, the FRC reported receiving 1,387 survey responses (from nonfederal and non-governmental partners); engaging 50 states, territories, and at least 20 tribal nations; and conducting 17 listening sessions, including i… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12693/IN12693.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/HTML/IN12693.html | |
| IF13228 | Department of Labor’s Proposed Regulation on Fiduciary Duties in Selecting Designated Investment Alternatives | 2026-05-15T04:00:00Z | 2026-05-16T04:53:13Z | Active | Resources | John J. Topoleski, Elizabeth A. Myers | Introduction The fiduciary standards in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA; P.L. 93-406) require that individuals (referred to as fiduciaries) who make decisions in private-sector pension plans adhere to specified standards of conduct. The standards include an obligation to act prudently and for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to participants and beneficiaries. Among the individuals who are fiduciaries are those who choose plan investments in defined contribution (DC) plans (such as 401(k) plans). In DC plans, participants have individual retirement savings accounts in which contributions by employees, employers, or both are invested. DC plans typically offer their participants a variety of investments, such as mutual funds, collective investment trusts (CITs), target date funds, employer stock, and annuities or other lifetime income products. The investment options that DC plan sponsors provide to their participants are called designated investment alternatives (DIAs). In recent years, various stakeholders have expressed interest in expanding investment options in 401(k) plans to include alternative assets, such as private investments (e.g., private equity) and digital assets (e.g., cryptocurrencies). Proponents say that the benefits of incorporating these investments include the potential for higher investment returns and increased portfolio diversification. Opponents note the risky and speculative nature of these investments, the high and sometimes opaque nature of private equity fees, and concerns about the liquidity of these investments. ERISA does not restrict the investments a 401(k) plan sponsor can offer; however, plan sponsors generally act cautiously for a number of reasons, such as the obligation to act prudently and the possibility of lawsuits by plan participants for perceived violations of fiduciary duty. Regulatory History In 1979, DOL issued a regulation titled “Investment Duties,” which said that a fiduciary has satisfied their duties if they have given “appr… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13228/IF13228.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13228.html | |
| R48947 | Department of Transportation FY2027 Funding Request | 2026-05-14T04:00:00Z | 2026-05-16T04:53:20Z | Active | Reports | William J. Mallett, John Frittelli, Ben Goldman, Ali E. Lohman, Jennifer J. Marshall, Naseeb A. Souweidane, Rachel Y. Tang | The Department of Transportation (DOT) is responsible for the federal regulation and funding of most modes of U.S. transportation. DOT is mainly organized into operating administrations that each oversee a mode of transportation (e.g., Federal Aviation Administration [FAA]) or maintain responsibility for a certain aspect of transportation (e.g., Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration). Two DOT offices—the Office of the Secretary (OST) and the Office of Inspector General (OIG)—have department-wide responsibilities. DOT also includes the Great Lakes St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation (GLSDC), a wholly owned government corporation that operates and maintains two locks on the St. Lawrence Seaway and other aspects of navigation infrastructure. The Trump Administration’s FY2027 budget request for DOT by operating administration and office was released in April 2026. This report compares the President’s request with FY2026 enacted funding. This report also presents enacted funding for FY2022-FY2025 to provide additional context for the funding request. For surface transportation modes, FY2022-FY2026 is the period covered by the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA; P.L. 117-58), which authorizes federal spending on surface transportation. Congress reportedly is developing new surface transportation reauthorization legislation, but such legislation had not been introduced as of the publication of this report. For aviation, FY2022-FY2026 spans time periods covered by the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-254) and the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 (P.L. 118-63). (FAA is the Federal Aviation Administration.) CRS derived requested and enacted funding data primarily from DOT’s “budget estimates” documents. Overall, DOT’s budget request for FY2027 ($113.9 billion) is 23% lower than FY2026 enacted funding ($148.5 billion). The reduction comes mainly from the absence of a Trump Administration request for the provision of multiyear advance appropriations beyond FY2026 (as was provided in Division … | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48947/R48947.10.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48947.html | |
| R48946 | National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) FY2027 Budget and Policy Issues: In Brief | 2026-05-14T04:00:00Z | 2026-05-16T04:53:19Z | Active | Reports | Anya L. Fink, Mary Beth D. Nikitin | The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is a semiautonomous agency within the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). NNSA is responsible for maintaining the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile, carrying out nuclear nonproliferation activities and nuclear and radiological emergency response, and providing nuclear reactors and fuel to the U.S. Navy. (For additional information on NNSA and its sites, see CRS Report R48194, The U.S. Nuclear Security Enterprise: Background and Possible Issues for Congress.) For FY2027, NNSA requested $32.80 billion—$7.40 billion (29%) more than the FY2026 enacted discretionary amount of $25.40 billion. Of this, $27.44 billion was requested for programs related to development, production, certification, and maintenance of the U.S. nuclear warhead stockpile (i.e., the Weapons Activities account) and $2.39 billion for nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear counterterrorism (i.e., the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation account). NNSA also requested $2.39 billion for the Naval Reactors program, carried out in collaboration with the U.S. Navy, and $577.10 million for NNSA federal salaries and expenses. Congress generally authorizes funding for NNSA in an annual National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and provides funding for NNSA through an annual Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act. In authorizations and appropriations hearings for NNSA’s FY2027 budget request, some Members have discussed oversight issues, such as proposed funding increases and warhead development activities in the Weapons Activities budget, NNSA’s plutonium pit production strategy and costs, proposed cuts to the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation budget and staff, costs and schedules of NNSA projects, NNSA’s long-range plans to modernize infrastructure, NNSA’s potential contributions to the monitoring and verification of Iran’s nuclear capabilities, and U.S. policy on testing nuclear weapons. This report profiles NNSA’s FY2027 budget request and tracks selected legislative activity. | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48946/R48946.4.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48946.html | |
| LSB11431 | Congressional Redistricting: High Court Narrows Voting Rights Act in Louisiana v. Callais | 2026-05-14T04:00:00Z | 2026-05-15T17:54:44Z | Active | Posts | L. Paige Whitaker | On April 29, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court in Louisiana v. Callais significantly narrowed the circumstances under which a racial vote dilution challenge to a redistricting map can be made under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended (VRA). In Callais, the Court held that the State of Louisiana engaged in an “unconstitutional racial gerrymander” when it created a second majority-minority district in its congressional redistricting map to comply with Section 2. Applying standards revised in Callais, the Court determined that because Section 2 did not require the creation of the second majority-minority district, there was no compelling governmental interest that justified the state’s use of racial considerations in creating the map. In so ruling, the Court held that Section 2 is violated “only when the evidence supports a strong inference that the State intentionally drew its districts to afford minority voters less opportunity because of their race.” This Legal Sidebar provides a brief history of Section 2 of the VRA in the context of redistricting and related legal framework, discusses the lower court litigation and the Supreme Court ruling in Callais, and offers some considerations for Congress. Section 2 of the VRA and Legal Framework Ratified in 1870, the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution guarantees that the right “to vote shall not be denied or abridged” based on race or color, and provides Congress with the authority “to enforce” the Amendment “by appropriate legislation.” Invoking that authority in 1965, Congress enacted the VRA to achieve the Fifteenth Amendment’s goal of bringing “an end to the denial of the right to vote based on race.” A key provision of the VRA, Section 2, prohibits discriminatory voting practices or procedures, including those alleged to diminish or weaken minority voting power (known as minority vote dilution). Section 2 prohibits any voting qualification or practice applied or imposed by any state or political subdivision (e.g., a city or county) that results … | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB11431/LSB11431.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/HTML/LSB11431.html | |
| IF13227 | The McNamara-O’Hara Service Contract Act (SCA) | 2026-05-14T04:00:00Z | 2026-05-15T13:53:13Z | Active | Resources | Elizabeth Weber Handwerker, Jon O. Shimabukuro | Labor Standards | Introduction The McNamara-O’Hara Service Contract Act (SCA) of 1965, 41 U.S.C. §§ 6701-6707, requires the payment of locally prevailing wages and fringe benefits to employees working pursuant to contracts that are made by the federal government or the District of Columbia; involve an amount greater than $2,500; and have a principal purpose of furnishing nonconstruction services in the United States by service employees. The SCA was intended to establish labor standards for service employees who were generally not covered at the time by the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) or by state minimum wage laws. Because, at the time of passage, federal contracts were typically awarded to the lowest bidder and labor costs were the predominant factor in most service contracts, companies providing the lowest wages were more likely to be successful. The Johnson Administration advocated for service contract proposals in Congress, saying they would prevent low-bid federal contracts from depressing wages. This In Focus examines the SCA and how it is currently implemented and enforced by the Wage and Hour Division (WHD) of the Department of Labor (DOL). Coverage Service Employees The SCA defines a service employee as “an individual engaged in the performance of a contract made by the Federal Government ... the principal purpose of which is to furnish services in the United States.” The definition does not encompass those determined to be “bona fide executive, administrative, or professional” employees for purposes of the FLSA. Typical covered positions include cooks, medical assistants, and gardeners. Covered Contracts The SCA applies to contracts exceeding $2,500 for services furnished in the “United States,” which includes any state, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, the Outer Continental Shelf, American Samoa, Guam, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, Wake Island, and Johnston Island. The SCA does not apply on military bases within foreign countries. The SCA does not apply to cont… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13227/IF13227.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13227.html |
| R48945 | Housing Cost Burdens in 2024: In Brief | 2026-05-13T04:00:00Z | 2026-05-15T10:38:04Z | Active | Reports | Mark P. Keightley, Maggie McCarty | Homeownership & Housing Finance, Housing-Related Assistance to Communities & Tribes, Public & Assisted Housing, U.S. Economy | This report uses the 2024 American Community Survey to quantify the prevalence of housing cost burden in the United States in 2024. The report describes differences in housing cost burden rates among renters and homeowners across various demographic groups and income brackets. | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48945/R48945.3.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48945.html |
| IN12692 | U.S. Aircraft Combat Losses in Operation Epic Fury: Considerations for Congress | 2026-05-13T04:00:00Z | 2026-05-14T16:38:00Z | Active | Posts | Jennifer DiMascio, Daniel M. Gettinger | Fighter Aircraft, Air, Land, Sea, Space & Projection Forces, Defense Authorization, Defense Budgets & Appropriations, Defense Readiness, Training, Logistics & Installations | Overview On February 28, 2026, the United States, in coordination with Israel, initiated military operations against Iran under the designation Operation Epic Fury (OEF). The conflict has involved air, maritime, and missile combat engagements across the Middle East. The pace of combat activity declined amid a ceasefire in April. Within weeks, some strikes resumed, and conditions remain fluid. The Department of Defense (DOD, which is “using a secondary Department of War designation,” under Executive Order 14347 dated September 5, 2025) has not published a comprehensive assessment of combat losses in OEF. During a May 12, 2026, hearing, Acting Pentagon Comptroller Jules W. Hurst III testified that the department’s cost estimate for military operations in Iran has increased to $29 billion. “A lot of that increase comes from having a refined estimate on repair or replacement costs for equipment,” he said. Listed here are 42 fixed-wing or rotary-wing aircraft, including uncrewed aircraft (i.e., drones), reportedly lost or damaged in OEF, according to news reports and statements by DOD and U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). The number of aircraft damaged or destroyed may remain subject to revision due to multiple factors, which may include classification, ongoing combat activity, and attribution. Reports of OEF Aircraft Losses and Damage Four F-15E Strike Eagle fighter aircraft On March 2, 2026, CENTCOM reported that three F-15Es were shot down and destroyed by friendly fire over Kuwait; all six aircrew ejected safely and were recovered. On April 5, 2026, CENTCOM reported that one F-15E was shot down and destroyed during combat operations over Iran; both aircrew were safely recovered during separate search-and-rescue operations. One F-35A Lightning II fighter aircraft A March 19, 2026, news article reported that Iranian ground fire damaged one F-35A during combat operations over Iran. One A-10 Thunderbolt II ground-attack aircraft In an April 6, 2026, news conference, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Air Force Ge… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12692/IN12692.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/HTML/IN12692.html |
| IF13226 | Seabed Mining on the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf: Background and Recent Developments | 2026-05-13T04:00:00Z | 2026-05-16T04:53:13Z | Active | Resources | Caitlin Keating-Bitonti, Laura B. Comay | As part of a national effort to secure reliable supplies of critical minerals, President Trump issued Executive Order (E.O.) 14285 of April 24, 2025, “Unleashing America’s Offshore Critical Minerals and Resources.” One potential source of offshore critical minerals is the federally managed U.S. outer continental shelf (OCS; Figure 1). The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM), within the Department of the Interior (DOI), has authority under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA; 43 U.S.C. §§1331-1356c) to lease areas of the U.S. OCS for the development of offshore energy and non-energy marine minerals, including critical minerals. (This authority is separate from U.S. seabed mining authority in areas beyond U.S. jurisdiction, which are administered by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.) For U.S. OCS marine minerals, BOEM’s roles include evaluating the OCS for mineral resources and leasing submerged lands for mineral development. Pursuant to the OCSLA, BOEM has issued regulations (30 C.F.R. §§580-582) addressing leasing for non-energy marine minerals. E.O. 14285 directed the Secretary of the Interior to “identify which critical minerals may be derived from seabed resources” and to “establish an expedited process for reviewing and approving permits for prospecting and granting leases for exploration, development, and production of seabed mineral resources” consistent with applicable law, among other actions. In June 2025, DOI announced that BOEM and its sister agency, the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement, were “updating [critical mineral] policies across all stages of development” to “reduce delays, improve coordination and provide greater certainty for industry, all while upholding key environmental safeguards.” On February 24, 2026, BOEM published a proposed rule to make “administrative revisions” to its mineral leasing regulations. Some stakeholders have supported these executive actions, while others have expressed concerns about potential societal and environmental cos… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13226/IF13226.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13226.html | |
| R48944 | Energy and Water Development: FY2027 Appropriations | 2026-05-12T04:00:00Z | 2026-05-15T14:52:56Z | Active | Reports | Mark Holt, Anna E. Normand | The Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies appropriations (E&W) bill funds civil works activities of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) in the Department of Defense; the Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation) and Central Utah Project (CUP); the Department of Energy (DOE); the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC); the Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC); and several other independent agencies. DOE typically accounts for about 80% of the bill’s funding. Overall Funding Totals President Donald Trump submitted his FY2027 budget request on April 3, 2026. The request includes $67.597 billion in discretionary appropriations for energy and water development agencies, an increase of $5.866 billion (10%) above the FY2026 enacted amount, excluding emergency appropriations, mandatory appropriations, rescissions, offsets, and adjustments. The E&W budget request for FY2027 includes offsets totaling $4.917 billion from unobligated appropriations transferred from the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (P.L. 117-58). Energy and Water Development Appropriations, FY2026 and FY2027 Actions (in millions of nominal dollars and % change from FY2026 enacted) AgencyFY2026 EnactedFY2027 Request (% Change) U.S. Army Corps of Engineers10,435 6,663 (-36%) Bureau of Reclamation/CUP1,650 1,292 (-22%) Department of Energy49,12459,330 (21%) Independent Agencies522 312 (-40%) Total Appropriations61,73167,597 (10%) Rescissions and Offsets-3,692-4,917 Adjusted Total58,03962,680 (8%) Sources: P.L. 119-74 and related H.R. 6938 explanatory statement; President’s FY2027 Budget Appendix, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/appendix_fy2027.pdf. Notes: Enacted amounts do not include supplemental or reconciliation appropriations. CUP = Central Utah Project. Selected Key Issues Zero Funding Request for Wind, Solar, and Hydrogen Research and Development (R&D). No appropriations are requested for FY2027 for Wind, Solar, and Hydrogen R&D, which received $480 million in FY2026. Proposed Elimin… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48944/R48944.3.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48944.html | |
| R48943 | Income and Poverty by State and Congressional District | 2026-05-12T04:00:00Z | 2026-05-14T15:07:57Z | Active | Reports | Ben Leubsdorf, Joseph Dalaker | Poverty | Members of Congress may assess the economic well-being of households in the geographic areas they represent: states and congressional districts. This report describes two widely used statistical measures: median household income (a single number that represents the middle of the income distribution) and the poverty rate (the percentage of the population that lives in poverty, with income below a dollar threshold that represents needs for a low level of material well-being). It also provides current estimates for states and U.S. House districts based on data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s American Community Survey (ACS), a large-scale survey of U.S. households. | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48943/R48943.3.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48943.html |
| R48942 | Yemen: In Brief | 2026-05-12T04:00:00Z | 2026-05-14T15:22:56Z | Active | Reports | Christopher M. Blanchard | Middle East & North Africa, Yemen | Yemen has been politically, economically, and militarily divided for more than a decade; its slow-burning internal conflicts are at risk of reigniting amid multisided confrontations between regional and global actors. Yemen descended into conflict in 2014 prompting years of foreign military interventions, regional security disruptions, and lingering confrontations that have posed national security challenges for the United States and its partners. As of 2026, the Iran-backed Ansar Allah movement (aka the Houthis, a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization) and its aligned de facto government control the national capital, Sana’a, and much of western Yemen, home to most of Yemen’s population. A Saudi Arabia-based, internationally recognized government (IRG) nominally administers non-Houthi held areas at the direction of a Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), whose members represent anti-Houthi forces with distinct agendas. Until January 2026, the PLC included leaders of the Southern Transitional Council (STC), an independence-seeking coalition of southern Yemeni forces backed by the United Arab Emirates. That month, Saudi military strikes halted an STC campaign to assert security control across the south, leading to the expulsion of STC figures from the PLC and simmering IRG-STC tensions. With Saudi support, the IRG is seeking to unify Yemeni factions and consolidate command and control over forces in non-Houthi held areas. As of April 2026, the IRG’s reach remains limited, local authorities and armed groups remain influential, and STC supporters continue to call for self-determination. Saudi Arabia, Iran, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Israel all act in Yemen in pursuit of what their governments perceive to be their national interests. As the leader of an anti-Houthi multilateral coalition and now chief sponsor of Yemen’s residual national government, Saudi Arabia has played a prominent if inconclusive role in Yemen’s politics and security. Differences between Saudi Arabia and the UAE within the Saud… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48942/R48942.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48942.html |
| R48941 | Combating Robocalls and Robotexts: Background, Selected FCC Activity, and Legislative Activity in the 119th Congress | 2026-05-12T04:00:00Z | 2026-05-14T15:22:54Z | Active | Reports | Patricia Moloney Figliola | Curtailing robocalls and robotexts presents challenges for lawmakers, regulators, the telecommunications industry, and consumers. Robocalls are calls made with an automatic telephone dialing system—usually referred to as an “autodialer”—that transmits a message made with a prerecorded or artificial voice. Robotexts are text messages also made using autodialers. An autodialer is any equipment that can “store or produce telephone numbers ... using a random or sequential number generator” and dial those numbers. The term robocall generally encompasses both robocalls and robotexts. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regulates robocalls and robotexts. Both are generally illegal if they are made to any mobile phone (and in the case of robocalls, to a nonbusiness landline) without the recipient’s prior express written consent. Three laws are the primary basis for the FCC’s authority to regulate robocalls: The Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA; P.L. 102-243) restricts the use of autodialers, the use of prerecorded/artificial voice messages, and unsolicited advertisements both by voice phone call and by fax. The TCPA and its implementing regulations generally prohibit prerecorded advertising calls to residential landline numbers unless the called party has given prior express written consent. The Truth in Caller ID Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-331) prohibits any person, in connection with any voice service or text messaging service, to “cause any caller identification service to knowingly transmit misleading or inaccurate caller identification information with the intent to defraud, cause harm, or wrongfully obtain anything of value.” The Pallone-Thune Telephone Robocall Abuse Criminal Enforcement and Deterrence Act (TRACED Act; P.L. 116-105) expanded the actions the FCC could take to fight illegal robocalls. The TRACED Act is the basis for many of the tools targeting illegal robocalls. For example, the TRACED Act led to implementing the protocol designed to limit the completion of illegal robocalls and… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48941/R48941.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48941.html | |
| IF13225 | Farm Bill Primer: Horticulture Title | 2026-05-12T04:00:00Z | 2026-05-13T16:38:12Z | Active | Resources | Zachary T. Neuhofer, Jason O. Heflin | Congress has included a horticulture title in the farm bill since the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-234). The horticulture title of a farm bill generally contains reauthorizations, amendments, and new programs that support specialty crops (defined as fruits, vegetables, tree nuts, dried fruits, horticulture, and nursery crops including floriculture; 7 U.S.C. §1621 note); organic agriculture (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§6501-6524); local, regional, and urban food systems; hemp production; and pesticide regulation. Initially, the horticulture title consisted primarily of programs that supported specialty crops and organic agriculture. In subsequent farm bills, the Agricultural Act of 2014 (P.L. 113-79) and the Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018 (2018 farm bill; P.L. 115-334), Congress expanded the title to include programs related to local and regional food systems, hemp production and cultivation, and pesticide regulation. These programs are administered primarily through the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), although the primary law regulating pesticides, the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA; 7 U.S.C. §§136-136y), involves the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). This CRS In Focus provides a summary of existing programs and provisions that support specialty crops; organic agriculture; local, regional, and urban food systems; and hemp production and cultivation. It also discusses proposals that would amend pesticide provisions, including provisions currently subject to litigation pending before the Supreme Court. This summary does not discuss pending legislation or include all the programs in the farm bill that directly or indirectly support these issue areas and which receive support from other titles, such as the commodity, trade, research, nutrition, and crop insurance titles. Farm Bill Programs The 2018 farm bill amended, reauthorized, and codified programs in the horticulture title through FY2023. Congress enacted three one-year extensions of the 2018 farm … | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13225/IF13225.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13225.html | |
| IF13224 | Federal Requirements for Student Consumer Information Transparency in Higher Education | 2026-05-12T04:00:00Z | 2026-05-14T14:52:59Z | Active | Resources | Rita R. Zota | Postsecondary Education, Colleges & Universities, Direct Loan Program, Federal Student Aid Programs, Higher Education, Pell Grants, Student Loans | In light of rising college costs and growing student loan debt, the availability of practical information about college costs, value, and quality has garnered congressional interest. Students and their families may consult various sources to inform their decisions about pursuing postsecondary education, such as publications with college rankings, school guidance counselors, or family and friends. The federal government also plays a role in ensuring student consumer information transparency in higher education. This In Focus describes statutory requirements of the Department of Education (ED) relating to student consumer information transparency, ED’s implementation of these requirements, and some prevailing issues with and gaps in existing requirements. Existing Higher Education Act Transparency-Related Requirements The Higher Education Act (HEA) is the primary federal law governing postsecondary education in the United States. It includes several requirements for ED-administered data collection and reporting on institutions of higher education participating in HEA Title IV student aid programs (e.g., Federal Pell Grants and Direct Loans) (IHEs). These requirements were designed to contribute to college transparency for students and their families in making decisions about applying to and attending college. For example, Section 131 of HEA requires that ED establish definitions for and collect and publish data on, for each IHE, measures of tuition and fees and cost of attendance (COA) for full-time undergraduate students and the number of undergraduate students who received and their average amount of financial assistance. Section 132(i) of HEA requires ED to annually collect and make publicly available other additional information on COA and financial assistance, such as COA for first-time, full-time undergraduates by whether they live on or off campus and information about annual grant aid awarded to undergraduate students, including by specific source of aid. Section 132(i) requires ED to collect other compreh… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13224/IF13224.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13224.html |
| R43434 | Policy and Legislative Research for Congressional Staff: Finding Documents, Analysis, News, and Training | 2026-05-11T04:00:00Z | 2026-05-15T13:52:58Z | Active | Reports | Sarah K. Braun, Tilly Finnegan-Kennel, Ellen M. Lechman, Michele L. Malloy | This report is intended to serve as a finding aid for congressional documents, executive branch documents and information, news articles, policy analysis, contacts, and training, for use in policy and legislative research. It is not intended to be a definitive list of all resources, but rather a guide to pertinent subscriptions available in the House and Senate in addition to selected resources freely available to the public. This report is intended for use by congressional offices. | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R43434/R43434.25.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R43434.html | |
| IF13223 | The Federal Role in Hazardous Wildfire Fuel Treatments | 2026-05-11T04:00:00Z | 2026-05-13T09:08:03Z | Active | Resources | Alicyn R. Gitlin | Introduction Hazardous fuels are combustible vegetation that accumulates on the landscape, presenting a threat of starting and spreading wildfires that resist control. Hazardous fuels and their associated wildfire threats cross land management and ownership boundaries. Federal and nonfederal land managers mitigate hazardous fuels (hazardous fuel treatments) for various reasons, including altering fire behavior; protecting desired uses or resources; and promoting overall ecosystem health. Much of the debate surrounding hazardous fuels and wildfire mitigation focuses on how to protect life and property in the wildland-urban interface (WUI), where human development abuts undeveloped wildlands. More than 50 bills introduced during the 119th Congress pertain to treating hazardous fuels. Most prominent among these is the Fix Our Forests Act (H.R. 471, S. 1462), which would affect various aspects of treatment planning, environmental compliance, contracting, implementation, litigation, research, and assistance, among other things. Federal Role and Statutory Authorities Hazardous fuels generally are managed by the owner of the underlying land. Five federal land management agencies (FLMAs) across two departments are responsible for the majority of hazardous fuels treatments on federal and tribal lands—the Forest Service (FS), under the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA); and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), National Park Service (NPS), Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), and Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), under the Department of the Interior (DOI). The federal government also provides assistance to nonfederal groups to address hazardous fuels on nonfederal lands. No federal law explicitly requires hazardous fuels mitigation from a broad perspective. Instead, various statutes implicitly authorize the FS, BLM, NPS, FWS, and BIA to mitigate hazardous fuels as part of their mandates to manage and protect the lands and resources under their jurisdictions (e.g., 16 U.S.C. §551, 43 U.S.C. §§1701 et seq., 54 U.S.C. §100101, … | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13223/IF13223.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13223.html | |
| IF13222 | Fees to Administer Title I of the Toxic Substances Control Act: Authority, Implementation, and Reauthorizing Legislation | 2026-05-11T04:00:00Z | 2026-05-12T15:23:05Z | Active | Resources | Jerry H. Yen, Angela C. Jones | In June 2016, the Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st Century Act (LCSA; P.L. 114-182) amended Title I of the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA; 15 U.S.C. 2601 et seq.) to provide the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) with more authorities to gather information regarding various industrial and commercial chemicals. EPA uses this information to evaluate risks to human health and the environment and to determine if regulation may be warranted. LCSA supplements the discretionary appropriations for TSCA implementation by authorizing the collection of fees from chemical manufacturers and processors. These fees partially cover EPA’s costs for reviewing chemicals for risks. This fee collection authority expires at the end of FY2026. This In Focus discusses the authority to collect fees under TSCA, associated rulemakings, the relationship between discretionary appropriations and fee receipts, selected issues regarding the fees, and proposed reauthorization legislation. Section 26(b) of the Toxic Substances Control Act, as amended LCSA amended TSCA Section 26(b) (15 U.S.C. 2625(b)) to authorize the collection of fees from chemical manufacturers and processors to partially cover certain EPA costs of implementing the TSCA amendments. EPA may collect fees in a given fiscal year if appropriations for the Chemical Risk Review and Reduction (CRRR) program project match or exceed what was appropriated in FY2014 to the program project. In EPA’s FY2015 budget justification, the agency reported allocating $58.6 million in FY2014 to the CRRR program project. This allocation was part of the $93.8 million appropriated for the Toxics Risk Review and Prevention program within the agency’s Environmental Programs and Management (EPM) account. Since FY2017, annual appropriations have included a provision that directs EPA to allocate to the CRRR program project an amount not less than the amount EPA allocated for the program project for FY2014. Fee collections are initially limited to 25% of EPA’s annual costs of a… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13222/IF13222.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13222.html | |
| R48940 | Current Foreign-Born Population by State and Congressional District | 2026-05-08T04:00:00Z | 2026-05-09T05:56:23Z | Active | Reports | Tilly Finnegan-Kennel, Ben Leubsdorf | Census, Temporary Immigration, Unauthorized Foreign Nationals, Permanent Immigration | The United States in 2024 was home to an estimated 50.2 million foreign-born individuals, who lived in every state and congressional district. This report provides a snapshot of recent U.S. Census Bureau estimates for the foreign-born population (i.e., people now living in the United States who were not U.S. citizens at birth) in each state, as well as estimates for the foreign-born population in each congressional district. It also discusses alternative and additional sources of data on the foreign-born population. | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48940/R48940.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48940.html |
| IF13221 | Community Development Block Grants for Disaster Recovery: A Primer | 2026-05-08T04:00:00Z | 2026-05-09T05:56:25Z | Active | Resources | Joseph V. Jaroscak | In response to some disasters, Congress has provided supplemental funding for long-term disaster recovery and other related purposes under the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program’s statutory authority (42 U.S.C. §§5301 et seq.). Administered by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), this assistance is commonly referred to as CDBG-DR funding. Since FY1993, Congress has appropriated, and HUD has allocated, more than $111 billion in CDBG-DR funds. Roughly $65 billion of this total has been provided since FY2016. During this period, Congress also began to provide dedicated supplemental CDBG appropriations for certain mitigation activities, which are included in the totals. Overview CDBG-DR funding is intended to support needs unmet by other forms of federal disaster assistance, including Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) grants and Small Business Administration loans. Typically, Congress directs HUD to allocate CDBG-DR funds for use in the “most impacted and distressed areas” in jurisdictions with major disaster declarations under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. §§5121 et seq.; Stafford Act)—see for example P.L. 118-158. CDBG-DR is not a program with its own standing authorization or regulations. Instead, CDBG-DR funds, generally, are subject to the conventional CDBG program’s statutory authority and regulatory requirements. The text of CDBG-DR supplemental appropriations typically include specific statutory directives and authorize HUD to establish waivers and alternative requirements as circumstances may require, which can make each instance of CDBG-DR appropriations unique. Grants Management Process Although directives in appropriations acts and aspects of HUD’s grant administration may vary, the CDBG-DR funding and disbursement cycle typically follows a common series of general steps governed by congressional requirements and overarching HUD regulations. The basic steps in the CDBG-DR funding and disbursement process are listed… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13221/IF13221.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13221.html | |
| IF13220 | Congressional Nominations to U.S. Service Academies: Member Office Management Considerations | 2026-05-08T04:00:00Z | 2026-05-09T05:56:22Z | Active | Resources | Sarah J. Eckman, R. Eric Petersen | Members of Congress are authorized by law to nominate candidates for appointment to four U.S. service academies: the U.S. Military Academy (USMA); U.S. Naval Academy (USNA); U.S. Air Force Academy (USAFA); and U.S. Merchant Marine Academy (USMMA). A fifth service academy, the U.S. Coast Guard Academy (USCGA), does not require a congressional nomination for appointment. These institutions provide college-age Americans with a tuition-free, four-year undergraduate education and prepare them to be officers of some of the U.S. uniformed services. Upon graduation, service academy graduates are commissioned as officers in the active or reserve components of the military or the merchant marine for a minimum of five years. This In Focus provides some management considerations for addressing service academy nominations, a timeline for congressional nomination actions (Figure 1), and statutory and regulatory requirements for allocating congressional nominations to service academies. Additional information is available in CRS Report RL33213, Congressional Nominations to U.S. Service Academies: An Overview and Resources for Outreach and Management, CRS In Focus IF13219, Congressional Nominations to U.S. Service Academies: Candidate Qualifications and Noncongressional Nominating Authorities, and CRS Infographic IG10096, U.S. Service Academy Nominations: Timelines. Congressional Considerations The nomination of constituents to one of the service academies can provide Members of Congress with the opportunity to perform community outreach and other representational activities. In some states and congressional districts, nominations are highly competitive. Others are less competitive, and some offices do not receive expressions of interest from enough applicants to fill the number of nominations allocated. As a result, some congressional offices may need to dedicate considerable staff resources to the selection process to identify qualified candidates, while others can incorporate service academy nominations alongside other const… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13220/IF13220.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13220.html | |
| IF13219 | Congressional Nominations to U.S. Service Academies: Candidate Qualifications and Noncongressional Nominating Authorities | 2026-05-08T04:00:00Z | 2026-05-09T05:56:24Z | Active | Resources | Sarah J. Eckman, R. Eric Petersen | Members of Congress are authorized by law to nominate candidates for appointment to four U.S. service academies. These schools are the U.S. Military Academy (USMA); U.S. Naval Academy (USNA); U.S. Air Force Academy (USAFA); and U.S. Merchant Marine Academy (USMMA). A fifth service academy, the U.S. Coast Guard Academy (USCGA), does not require a congressional nomination for appointment. Although it is an essential component of the appointment process, a congressional nomination does not guarantee an individual’s admission or appointment to a service academy. Each academy requires the submission of a preliminary application to initiate the admissions process. In addition to requesting a nomination from a Member of Congress or another nominating official, an individual seeking appointment to a service academy must separately apply to the service academies to which he or she seeks to be appointed. Even when a candidate meets all these requirements and is deemed to be qualified for admission, he or she may not receive an official appointment, due to the limited number of spaces available at each service academy. This In Focus provides applicant qualification information for USMA, USNA, USAFA, USMMA, and USCGA; a timeline of actions for prospective nominees (Figure 1); and discussion of noncongressional appointment authorities to some service academies. It can be used to inform congressional staff of basic candidate qualifications or be provided to constituents who aspire to enroll in a service academy and seek a congressional nomination. Additional information for congressional offices is available in CRS In Focus IF13220, Congressional Nominations to U.S. Service Academies: Member Office Management Considerations, CRS Report RL33213, Congressional Nominations to U.S. Service Academies: An Overview and Resources for Outreach and Management, and CRS Infographic IG10096, U.S. Service Academy Nominations: Timelines. Acceptance and successful completion of a service academy appointment requires at least a nine-year obli… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13219/IF13219.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13219.html | |
| R48939 | National Security, Department of State, and Related Programs Appropriations: A Guide to Component Accounts | 2026-05-07T04:00:00Z | 2026-05-09T05:54:53Z | Active | Reports | Carlos Acevedo, Emily M. McCabe, Cory R. Gill | Foreign Affairs, Foreign Affairs Budget & Appropriations | National Security, Department of State, and Related Programs (NSRP) appropriations legislation funds many U.S. nondefense international affairs activities. Between FY2008 and FY2025, the bill was titled Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS) appropriations. Within NSRP appropriations, the Department of State and Related Programs (Title I) portion makes up about one-third of the funding, and the various foreign assistance accounts compose the remainder. For FY2026, NSRP is one of 12 appropriations acts that fund the federal government. Congress appropriated NSRP funds for FY2026 in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2026 (Division F of P.L. 119-75). Division F of the act is divided into seven titles. Each title funds a variety of government activities, ranging from government agencies’ operational and administrative costs to direct grant funds for private nonprofit or multilateral organizations. By title, NSRP provisions set out activities as follows: Title I—Department of State and Related Programs funds State Department diplomatic programs and general operations, including Foreign and Civil Service personnel salaries and training, public diplomacy and cultural exchange programs, information technology maintenance and modernization, dues to the United Nations (UN) and other international organizations, international broadcasting, and embassy construction and diplomatic security. It also provides funding to U.S. diplomacy-focused nongovernmental organizations and legislative commissions. Title II—Administration of Assistance funds general operations and oversight of foreign assistance but not foreign assistance programs. Title III—Bilateral Economic Assistance is the primary funding source for the U.S. government’s humanitarian and international development programs. It includes bilateral assistance for disaster relief, global health, and economic development activities, as well as funding for several independent development-oriented agencies, notably the Millennium Challenge Corp… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48939/R48939.3.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48939.html |
| R48937 | Congressional Votes on Surface Transportation Authorizations, 1978-2021 | 2026-05-07T04:00:00Z | 2026-05-09T05:53:59Z | Active | Reports | Lena A. Maman | Transportation Funding | Prior to 1978, Congress enacted separate highway and public transportation authorization acts. Congress began passing multiyear surface transportation authorization acts in 1978. These acts were often extended prior to the passage of subsequent multiyear acts. This report compiles congressional votes on enacted multiyear legislation related to surface transportation authorizations as well as information regarding the extensions of these acts. CRS obtained the information presented in this report from Congress.gov, the Congressional Quarterly Almanac, and the Federal Highway Administration. The current surface transportation authorization, which is Division A of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (P.L. 117-58), expires on September 30, 2026. | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48937/R48937.4.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48937.html |
| LSB11430 | Congressional Court Watcher: Circuit Splits from April 2026 | 2026-05-07T04:00:00Z | 2026-05-09T05:54:56Z | Active | Posts | Michael John Garcia, Alexander H. Pepper | Jurisprudence | The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the thirteen “circuits” issue thousands of precedential decisions each year. Because relatively few of these decisions are ultimately reviewed by the Supreme Court, the U.S. Courts of Appeals are often the last word on consequential legal questions. The federal appellate courts sometimes reach different conclusions on the same issue of federal law, causing a “split” among the circuits that leads to the nonuniform application of federal law among similarly situated litigants. This Legal Sidebar discusses circuit splits that emerged or widened following decisions from April 2026 on matters relevant to Congress. The Sidebar does not address every circuit split that developed or widened during this period. Selected cases typically involve judicial disagreement over the interpretation or validity of federal statutes and regulations, or constitutional issues relevant to Congress’s lawmaking and oversight functions. The Sidebar includes only cases where an appellate court’s controlling opinion recognizes a split among the circuits on a key legal issue resolved in the opinion. This Sidebar refers to each U.S. Court of Appeals by its number or descriptor (e.g., “D.C. Circuit” for “U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit”). Some cases identified in this Sidebar, or the legal questions they address, are examined in other CRS general distribution products. Members of Congress and congressional staff may click here to subscribe to the CRS Legal Update and receive regular notifications of new products and upcoming seminars by CRS attorneys. Bankruptcy: The Fourth Circuit held that a Chapter 13 plan’s technical compliance with the “means test” calculation of disposable income under 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) did not immunize the plan from the requirement in Section 1325(a) that the plan be proposed “in good faith,” as the two are separate, independent requirements. Chapter 13 debtors generally must devote their disposable income to paying unsecured creditors. Prior to 2005, bankruptcy courts evaluated… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB11430/LSB11430.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/HTML/LSB11430.html |
| IG10097 | The Decennial Census | 2026-05-07T04:00:00Z | 2026-05-08T13:53:05Z | Active | Infographics | Taylor R. Knoedl | U.S. Census Bureau, Decennial Census | / Information as of May 7, 2026. Prepared by Taylor R. Knoedl, Analyst in American National Government and Jamie Bush, Visualization Information Specialist. For more information see CRS Report IF12909, The Decennial Census of Population and Housing: An Overview. The Decennial Census The U.S. Census Bureau provides statistical data about the nation's people and economy through over 130 different surveys, including its foundational survey: the decennial census. The decennial census is mandated by Article I, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution, in order to determine each state's apportionment of seats in the House of Representatives. Preparing for and conducting the decennial census typically takes over ten years, beginning the prior decade and extending into the next decade. Phone Mail Enumerators went door-to-door to complete the Census Bureau’s nonresponse follow up (NRFU) operation for respondents that did not self-respond to the survey. Online Determine initial timelines and testing schedule Other relevant research to support decennial census operations Begin initial design research and testing Engage with public on planning Complete initial operations design Continue research and testing, including large-scale tests Finalize operational planning, supported by results from large-scale testing Conduct the decennial census; initial release of data and products, including reapportionment totals and redistricting data Conduct close-out activities, including the post-enumeration survey (PES) Data Collection The Census Bureau collected responses to the decennial census survey using three initial methods in 2020. Collected data are protected by confidentiality standards in Titles 13 and 44 of the U.S. Code. 67% Data Tabulation and Product Release The Census Bureau aims to enumerate every person within the United States and its territories. Census Bureau President Congress State Population Counts for Reapportionment 13 U.S.C. §141(b) Post-Enumeration Survey (PES) The Census Bureau conducts a Post-Enumeration Su… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IG/PDF/IG10097/IG10097.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IG/HTML/IG10097.html |
| IN12690 | The FY2027 President’s Budget in Historical Context: Revenues | 2026-05-06T04:00:00Z | 2026-05-09T05:56:17Z | Active | Posts | D. Andrew Austin | Budget, Public Finance & Taxation, Legislative & Budget Process, Executive Budget Process | On April 3, 2026, the Trump Administration submitted its budget for FY2027, which proposes to constrain nondefense spending, maintain spending on border security and immigration enforcement, and increase defense spending. In February 2026, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) issued its budget and economic outlook along with its current-law baseline projections. This Insight discusses the Administration’s fiscal proposals in the context of longer-term budgetary trends and highlights selected events and legislation. Revenue Trends Figure 1 shows federal receipts by major category as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) since FY1962. Federal receipts exceeded outlays (gray line) in five years (FY1969, FY1998-FY2001). In all other years, the government ran a deficit, which required borrowing through the sale of Treasury securities. Economic conditions and employment levels affect tax receipts, as do major tax measures. Individual income tax collections reflect economic conditions, rising when employment and asset values increase and fall during recessions, and they are also the largest component of federal receipts, accounting for an estimated 8.6% of GDP in FY2026. Payroll taxes, such as for Social Security and Medicare, are the next largest revenue source, accounting for an estimated 5.7% of GDP in FY2026. Corporate income taxes as a share of GDP fell from 3.5% in FY1962 to an estimated 1.2% in FY2026. Major Tax Legislation The Revenue Act of 1964 (P.L. 88-272) lowered high Korean War-era marginal tax rates. Acts in the 1970s adjusted the tax code to offset bracket creep, where inflation pushed households into higher tax brackets. The 1981 Kemp-Roth act (P.L. 97-34) indexed brackets and cut marginal rates by about a quarter. A 1983 act (P.L. 98-21) aimed to stabilize Social Security’s finances for the coming 75 years by raising Social Security tax rates, phasing in a two-year increase in the full retirement age, and curtailing certain benefits. The 1986 Tax Reform Act (P.L. 99-514) lowered marginal rates and… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12690/IN12690.3.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/HTML/IN12690.html |
| IN12689 | Colombia’s 2026 Presidential Election | 2026-05-06T04:00:00Z | 2026-05-08T11:38:08Z | Active | Posts | Clare Ribando Seelke | Colombia, South America, Latin America, Caribbean & Canada | On May 31, Colombia, a top U.S. security partner in Latin America, is scheduled to convene an election to replace President Gustavo Petro (2022-present), who is constitutionally barred from seeking reelection. U.S. officials and some Members of Congress have expressed concerns about the Petro government’s counterdrug and security policies. The 119th Congress has reduced foreign assistance to Colombia and placed additional conditions on that assistance. Some Members of Congress also have expressed concerns about political violence in Colombia since the June 2025 assassination of a presidential hopeful and threats against other candidates. The three main candidates are Iván Cepeda of Petro’s leftist Historic Pact (PH) and two conservative rivals—Paloma Valencia of the Democratic Center (CD) and independent Abelardo De la Espriella. Members of Congress may examine these candidates’ platforms and assess their possible implications for relations with the United States. If no candidate captures more than 50% of the vote, a runoff election is scheduled for June 21; the winner is to take office on August 7. Domestic Context and Campaign The legacy of outgoing President Petro, a polarizing figure whose popularity has risen since November, has influenced the elections. Supporters have praised Petro’s focus on reducing inequality through labor reform and historic minimum wage increases despite his government’s corruption scandals. The Petro administration’s deemphasis of coca eradication has coincided with record cocaine production. Also, the government’s “total peace” negotiations involving ceasefires with illegally armed groups may have bolstered the power of such groups and fueled violence. Increased violence could inhibit voting in some regions as armed groups seek to influence the election results. The results of Colombia’s March 8 legislative elections illustrated a left-right division among voters regarding how best to address violence, corruption, and economic issues but also the continued relevance of traditional… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12689/IN12689.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/HTML/IN12689.html |
| IN12688 | DFC Shipping Reinsurance Facility: Iran Conflict and Strait of Hormuz | 2026-05-06T04:00:00Z | 2026-05-08T09:08:43Z | Active | Posts | Shayerah I. Akhtar, Nick M. Brown | Background In February 2026, U.S. and Israeli forces initiated military operations against Iran. Iran responded with retaliatory attacks and threats against commercial shipping transiting the Strait of Hormuz, through which more than one-quarter of crude oil and petroleum maritime trade transited to global markets. Hostilities and related developments contributed to a near-stoppage of maritime energy and other commerce through the Strait. On March 3, 2026, President Trump ordered the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) “to provide, at a very reasonable price, political risk insurance and guarantees for the Financial Security of ALL Maritime Trade, especially Energy, traveling through the Gulf.” He also stated naval escorts could be provided for transiting vessels. DFC announced a reinsurance facility on March 6, pledging an unprecedented $20 billion—almost ten-fold larger than any active DFC commitment—to help alleviate the maritime commerce disruptions. DFC indicated further details would be forthcoming. It is unclear if DFC has provided any coverage yet. The facility’s potential consequences for DFC’s strategic focus, operations, and risk profile raise issues for possible congressional oversight. DFC announcements indicate a $40 billion facility ($20 billion each from DFC and from private partners), focusing initially on “Hull & Machinery and Cargo.” DFC announced seven U.S. insurance partners, naming Chubb, a global property and casualty insurer, as the lead underwriter. Chubb is to “manage the facility, determine pricing and terms, assume risk, and issue policies” and “manage all claims.” DFC indicated a forthcoming application portal, meanwhile listing some key applicant information it would require to determine eligibility. DFC Background DFC is a federal agency that provides political risk insurance (PRI), direct loans, loan guarantees, and equity to promote private investment overseas to advance global development and U.S. foreign policy. DFC’s PRI program aims to cover risk of inve… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12688/IN12688.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/HTML/IN12688.html | |
| IF13218 | Endangered Species Committee (“God Squad”) Exemption of Oil and Gas Activities in the Gulf of America | 2026-05-06T04:00:00Z | 2026-05-07T16:53:12Z | Active | Resources | Anthony R. Marshak, Pervaze A. Sheikh, Laura B. Comay | Introduction On March 31, 2026, the Endangered Species Committee (ESC; also known as the “God Squad”) voted to issue an exemption from Section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) for oil and gas exploration, development, and production activities in the Gulf of America (GoA). In accordance with Sections 7(h) and 7(j) of the ESA, the ESC exempted these oil and gas activities from the ESA requirements known as Section 7 consultation after the Secretary of Defense—who is using “Secretary of War” as a “secondary title” under Executive Order 14347 dated September 5, 2025—notified the Secretary of the Interior (the ESC chair) that an exemption was necessary for reasons of national security. This exemption was the first issued for national security reasons. To date, GoA oil and gas companies have abided by reasonable and prudent alternatives (RPAs) and other measures to mitigate effects on ESA-listed species and critical habitat when carrying out activities, as required in a 2025 National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) biological opinion (BiOp) and 2018 and 2025 BiOps from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS). In the request for an exemption, the Secretary of Defense stated that ongoing litigation related to endangered species threatens to halt oil and gas production in the region and that litigation diverts resources away from approving permits; limits agency discretion, leading to more restrictive operations; and creates instability and uncertainty that might discourage long-term development. Further, the Secretary asserted that if oil and gas exploration and development were halted, U.S. military operations and readiness would be disrupted, and U.S. adversaries such as Iran and Russia would benefit. In light of the Secretary’s determination under Section 7(j), the ESC granted the exemption. Several stakeholder groups have filed lawsuits regarding the ESC’s findings. Congress may be interested in how this exemption from Section 7 consultation could affect ESA-listed species (e.g., Rice’s whales, certai… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13218/IF13218.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13218.html | |
| R48936 | The Electoral College: Frequently Asked Questions | 2026-05-05T04:00:00Z | 2026-05-08T14:52:54Z | Active | Reports | R. Sam Garrett | Individual voters in the United States do not directly elect the President and the Vice President. Instead, their votes select intermediaries, known as electors, to cast votes for a presidential ticket on their behalf. Those electors make up the electoral college, which elects the President and the Vice President. Provisions in Article II and in the Twelfth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution establish the electoral college. The frequently asked questions discussed in this report provide a resource for Members of Congress and congressional staff as they conduct oversight, consider legislation, and address constituent questions related to policy issues concerning the electoral college. The report does not contain legal analysis. Some Members of Congress have occasionally proposed constitutional amendments to abolish or alter the electoral college. As of this writing, such proposals have not substantially advanced beyond introduction in recent Congresses. Throughout American history, one candidate has almost always won both the popular vote and the electoral college. On four occasions, the electoral college has produced a presidential winner inconsistent with the national popular vote. Currently, to win the presidency or vice presidency, a candidate must receive at least 270 of 538 electoral votes to achieve an electoral college majority. A contingent election would occur if no candidate won a majority in the electoral college. In such an instance, the House of Representatives would elect the President and the Senate would elect the Vice President. This report will be updated in the event of substantial legislative activity concerning the electoral college. | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48936/R48936.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48936.html | |
| LSB11429 | Artificial Intelligence and the Fourth Amendment: Two Emerging Legal Issues | 2026-05-05T04:00:00Z | 2026-05-07T12:53:04Z | Active | Posts | Peter G. Berris | Various law enforcement components at the federal, state, and local levels report using artificial intelligence (AI) for some functions. Legislatures at the state and federal level have considered a variety of proposals relevant to the intersection of law enforcement, crime, and AI. Legal commentary has focused on the potential impact of AI on criminal justice, including everything from the admissibility of AI evidence, to sentencing, to AI-powered robot police officers, to the Fourth Amendment. Precise conceptualizations of AI vary, but the FBI has used the definition from the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act. That legislation defines AI to include, among other things, artificial systems “designed to think or act like a human,” or that “perform[] tasks under varying and unpredictable circumstances without significant human oversight,” or that “can learn from experience and improve performance when exposed to data sets.” Another federal statute defines AI as “a machine-based system that can, for a given set of human-defined objectives, make predictions, recommendations or decisions influencing real or virtual environments” and that uses human or machine inputs to perceive environments, abstract its perceptions, and thereby “formulate options for information or action.” This Legal Sidebar focuses on the potential Fourth Amendment implications of AI in two contexts. The first pertains to law enforcement seeking to obtain data generated from consumer use of AI products such as chatbot conversation histories and related data. The second context involves law enforcement use of surveillance tools augmented with AI, with a particular focus on Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs). This Legal Sidebar begins with a brief overview of Fourth Amendment concepts relevant to both topics and concludes with considerations for Congress. For a list of additional CRS products covering other aspects of AI, see CRS Insight IN12458, Artificial Intelligence: CRS Products, by Laurie Harris and Rachael D. Roan (2025). The Fourth… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB11429/LSB11429.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/HTML/LSB11429.html | |
| IN12687 | Argentine Beef Import Quota Expansion | 2026-05-05T04:00:00Z | 2026-05-06T16:07:58Z | Active | Posts | Benjamin Tsui, Christine Whitt | In February 2026, the average price cattle producers received for their cattle reached a record high. The price increase was in part due to the year-over-year decreases in U.S. cattle inventory, suspended cattle imports from Mexico due to New World Screwworm, and slower pace of U.S. cattle slaughter. The reduction in cattle inventory led to an increase in the retail price of beef across the United States. The U.S. beef cattle supply chain is made up of interconnected links. The supply chain comprises cattle producers that raise beef cattle, processors that slaughter the beef cattle to develop beef products, and entities that sell the beef products to U.S. consumers directly or through intermediaries. Typically, if the price the cattle producer receives for the cattle increases, the price for beef products that U.S. consumers purchase also would increase. This price dynamic may sometimes contribute to entities along the U.S. beef supply chain and U.S. consumers of beef products having different perspectives on policies affecting domestic production of cattle and U.S. beef prices, particularly in periods of rising cattle and U.S. retail beef prices. On February 6, 2026, President Trump issued a proclamation to address the high U.S. beef prices for American consumers by temporarily increasing the volume for the U.S. beef tariff-rate quota (TRQ) for imported Argentine beef. Under TRQs, a certain volume of imports enter in-quota and face lower or no duties. Imports that enter outside of the in-quota volume (i.e., out-of-quota) face higher duties. The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the authority to regulate foreign commerce and impose tariffs. Congress delegated authority to administer agricultural TRQs to the President, including for beef imports, under Section 404 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (P.L. 103-465, 19 U.S.C. §3601). Additionally, the President “may temporarily increase the quantity of imports” under the in-quota rate of an agricultural product TRQ if existing supplies are inadequate to “meet domes… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12687/IN12687.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/HTML/IN12687.html | |
| IF13217 | Federal Government and Anthropic: Considerations for AI Innovation and Competition | 2026-05-05T04:00:00Z | 2026-05-07T09:38:00Z | Active | Resources | Laurie Harris, Clare Y. Cho | Artificial Intelligence, Telecommunications & Internet Policy, Competition Policy & Law, Technology & Innovation | On February 27, 2026, President Trump directed federal agencies to stop using technology developed by the U.S. artificial intelligence (AI) company Anthropic, and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth announced he was directing the Department of Defense (DOD) to designate Anthropic a “Supply-Chain Risk to National Security.” (DOD and the Secretary are now using “Department of War” and “Secretary of War,” respectively, as “secondary” designations per Executive Order 14347.) These actions followed a reported months-long dispute between DOD and Anthropic regarding certain uses of its AI technologies. The national security risk designation and use prohibitions may have implications for AI innovation and competition, including at Anthropic and other domestic AI companies. This In Focus provides information on the AI models under debate, actions taken by the U.S. government (USG), the potential implications of those actions, and considerations and questions for Congress. Frontier AI Models: Potential Capabilities and Limitations Frontier AI models are the most advanced foundation models—general-purpose AI models pretrained on large datasets that can be used for many applications. Anthropic’s Claude model, one such frontier model, reportedly has been deployed across DOD and national security agencies for such applications as intelligence analysis, operational planning, and cyber operations. In June 2024, Anthropic stated it was the first AI company to deploy frontier models in classified USG networks. In July 2025, four U.S. AI companies entered into contracts with DOD to “accelerate [DOD] adoption of advanced AI capabilities to address critical national security challenges.” DOD awarded up to $200 million each to Anthropic, Google, OpenAI, and xAI. The Pentagon reportedly agreed to the use in classified systems of xAI’s Grok model, Google’s Gemini model, and six other tech companies’ AI models, as of May 1, 2026. While asserting a belief in “the existential importance of using AI to defend the United States and other de… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13217/IF13217.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13217.html |
| R48935 | Facial Recognition Technology: Definitions, Applications, and Policy Considerations for Congress | 2026-05-04T04:00:00Z | 2026-05-06T14:38:04Z | Active | Reports | Dominique T. Greene-Sanders | Facial recognition technology (FRT) is a type of biometric technology designed to identify or verify an individual by analyzing unique and measurable facial features. FRT has received attention from policymakers and the public, in large part because of technical advances and use by both public and private sector entities. FRT usage has the potential to optimize performance, enhance security, and increase the speed of tasks that were once handled by humans (e.g., identity verification in airports). The use of FRT has raised issues regarding data privacy and disclosure of its use, as well as bias and accuracy—particularly across different demographic groups. There is no universally accepted definition of FRT, and disagreement persists among technology developers, policymakers, and academics regarding what the term includes when used in various contexts. Legislation and guidelines have offered differing definitions of FRT, ranging from narrow ones focused on verification and identification to broader interpretations that include emotion detection, age estimation, and facial characteristic classifications. Different definitions may affect which technologies are categorized as FRT. FRT is employed across a wide range of sectors, including the military, law enforcement, financial services, public health, and education, as well as in activities such as employment decisions and immigration enforcement. FRT usage offers several potential benefits, such as increased security, efficiency, and convenience. Additionally, FRT usage raises concerns, for example, whether FRT systems are designed and deployed in ways that avoid or mitigate bias and are transparent and accurate—particularly across different demographic groups. FRT applications in three particular sectors—transportation and airport security, housing, and law enforcement—have garnered specific interest from the public, Congress, and industry, based on perceptions of the frequency of FRT’s use and its potential risks and benefits. Some state and local governments ha… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48935/R48935.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48935.html | |
| R48934 | Introduction to Tribal Forestry | 2026-05-04T04:00:00Z | 2026-05-06T16:23:03Z | Active | Reports | Mariel J. Murray, Anne A. Riddle | Native American Lands & Resources, Federal Land Management | The United States and federally recognized Tribes (“Tribes”) have a unique relationship that affects federal policies regarding forestry on tribal lands. In particular, the United States has a federal trust responsibility, which is a legal obligation under which the United States, through treaties, acts of Congress, and court decisions, “has charged itself with moral obligations of the highest responsibility and trust” toward Tribes and tribal citizens. This responsibility can include federal obligations to protect tribal trust assets, which are tribal trust lands, natural resources, trust funds, or other assets held by the federal government in trust for Tribes and tribal citizens. The Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) within the Department of the Interior (DOI) is the lead agency charged with managing tribal trust assets, including tribal forests. Forested tribal lands can be described in different ways. For consistency throughout this report, CRS primarily uses the term Indian forest land as defined by the National Indian Forest Resources Management Act (NIFRMA). NIFRMA defines the term Indian forest land as including tribal trust or restricted fee lands that are commercial and noncommercial timberland and woodland, and are “considered chiefly valuable for the production of forest products or to maintain watershed or other land values enhanced by a forest cover.” These include lands both within and outside of tribal reservation boundaries. According to the most recent periodic assessment of tribal forests and forest management in the United States, as of 2019, there were 19.4 million acres of tribal forest. Tribal forest acres are highly concentrated within a few states, and with a few Tribes. For example, 5.4 million acres (28%) of tribal forests belong to a single Tribe, the Navajo Nation, Arizona, New Mexico & Utah. Accordingly, 8.4 million acres (43%) of tribal forests are located in Arizona and New Mexico, including Navajo forests and forests belonging to other Tribes. Overall, almost all tribal forest acre… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48934/R48934.3.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48934.html |
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