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| id | title | publish_date ▲ | update_date | status | content_type | authors | topics | summary | pdf_url | html_url |
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| R49477 | Classwide Scheduling of Controlled Substances | 2026-10-02T04:00:00Z | 2026-10-03T05:08:04Z | Active | Reports | Lisa N. Sacco, Joanna R. Lampe | As new dangerous substances appear on the illicit drug market in the United States, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) may use its emergency scheduling authority to temporarily place those substances in Schedule I of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) if the agency deems it necessary to avoid imminent hazards to public safety. (DEA was given temporary scheduling authority in the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 [Title II of P.L. 98-473].) However, as DEA has worked alongside state and foreign authorities to control hazardous substances, new, yet similar, substances have been found to rapidly emerge. Chemists, often operating illicitly, slightly alter a regulated compound to create a similar substance that is in the same structural class, but is not specifically controlled. Law enforcement has described efforts to control each new substance as a game of “whack-a-mole.” The CSA classifies various substances in one of five lists known as “schedules” based on characteristics such as their medical use, potential for abuse, and safety or dependence liability. Schedule I is the most restrictive, containing substances with no accepted medical use and high potential for abuse, such as heroin. The CSA authorizes the Attorney General to schedule substances temporarily or permanently via an administrative rulemaking process, and the Attorney General has delegated that scheduling authority to DEA. Congress may also schedule substances via legislation. In 2018, when new fentanyl analogues were rapidly emerging, DEA issued a temporary scheduling order (TSO) that placed a class of fentanyl-related substances in Schedule I under the CSA for two years. Congress (and Presidents Trump and Biden) enacted legislation to extend the TSO 10 times before making the classwide scheduling permanent through the Halt All Lethal Trafficking of Fentanyl Act (HALT Fentanyl Act; P.L. 119-26). Until the 2018 TSO, DEA had never scheduled substances as a class, but Congress had previously done so. For example, Congress defined “cannabi… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49477/R49477.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49477.html | |
| R49457 | Measuring Housing Affordability | 2026-10-01T04:00:00Z | 2026-10-03T05:25:49Z | Active | Reports | Mark P. Keightley, Maggie McCarty | Housing Finance, Housing Tax Policy, Social Services, Housing Budget & Appropriations | Housing affordability is an area of interest for policymakers and the public. There are a variety of ways to measure housing affordability, with the most common being the housing-cost-to-income ratio approach (hereinafter, “ratio approach”). This approach considers housing “unaffordable” if housing costs exceed 30% of household income. Recently, the residual income approach—which defines housing as “affordable” if the difference between household income and housing costs is sufficient to pay for some socially acceptable basket of non-housing necessities—has gained attention from researchers due to its ability to address some of the shortcomings of the ratio approach. Understanding the conceptual and empirical differences between these approaches is important, because the concept of what is affordable influences subsidy levels in federal assistance programs, research on family economic well-being, and reports on the health of the nation’s housing market. This report compares the ratio and residual income approaches to measuring housing affordability. While these two measures often show similar overarching housing affordability patterns, they can generate different estimates of the extent of affordability challenges for certain subpopulations. Using data from the 2023 American Community Survey, CRS found the following among non-elderly U.S. households: Compared to the residual income approach, the ratio approach estimates lower rates of housing affordability challenges for all households, low-income households, and households with children. Approximately 53.0% of households did not face housing affordability challenges under either approach, 31.8% faced challenges under both approaches, and 15.2% faced challenges according to only one of the approaches. Under the residual income approach, it would require more than three times as much additional household income—from work or public subsidies—to alleviate housing affordability challenges than is required under the ratio approach. CRS analysis of the 2023 American H… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49457/R49457.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49457.html |
| IN12744 | Diesel Export Ban: Transportation Policy Considerations for Congress | 2026-10-01T04:00:00Z | 2026-10-02T18:08:01Z | Active | Posts | Ben Goldman | On September 21, 2026, the average price of diesel fuel for use in highway vehicles reached $6.529 per gallon, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration. In 2024, trucks and trains transported between two-thirds and three-quarters of all domestic freight (about 13 million of 17.7 million total tons transported), almost all using diesel-fueled engines. Shippers of perishable goods, which cannot be easily stored for later shipment, may be especially sensitive to high fuel costs. The Trump Administration and some Members of Congress are reportedly considering restrictions on the export of diesel fuel, with the goals of increasing domestic supply and reducing consumer product prices through lower shipping costs. One such bill (H.R. 10423) would immediately ban exports of diesel fuel until the end of the calendar year. Another (H.R. 10422) would automatically implement an export ban if the diesel fuel price averages more than $5.00 per gallon over a two-week period; the export ban would remain until the diesel fuel price was below $4.50 per gallon for 30 consecutive days. The United States is a major exporter of diesel fuel. If diesel fuel exports are restricted, refineries could be left with a temporary surplus, potentially leading to lower prices in the short term in some areas. Fluctuations in the price of diesel fuel could present various surface, maritime, and aviation transportation policy issues for Congress to consider. In response to a proposed export ban, industry analysts reportedly forecast that refineries could respond by reducing production of diesel until surpluses are depleted, depending on how any restrictions would be structured. Diesel fuel is produced by refining crude oil in a process that also produces gasoline, aviation fuel, and other products. A decline in the production of diesel could be accompanied by declines in the other types of fuel produced, potentially raising those prices depending on the overall supply and other factors. In the global market, countries accustomed to im… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12744/IN12744.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/HTML/IN12744.html | |
| R49432 | Online Scam Centers in Southeast Asia: Background and U.S. Responses | 2026-09-30T04:00:00Z | 2026-10-03T05:24:08Z | Active | Reports | Ben Dolven, William Piekos, Shelby B. Senger | In the past decade, cyber-enabled scam operations have proliferated across Southeast Asia, concentrated in Burma (Myanmar), Cambodia, and Laos. People operating from scam centers target individuals for cyber-enabled financial fraud using, for example, promises of fake cryptocurrency investment opportunities or romantic overtures to elicit payment from victims around the world. Scam centers are operated by and beneficial to a range of actors in the region, with criminal organizations from the People’s Republic of China (PRC, or China) the most common operators of scam compounds, according to the United Nations. Scams have had a significant and growing impact both in the United States and globally, though their illicit nature and underreporting by victims make it difficult to accurately measure their reach. The Global Anti-Scam Alliances estimated global losses at $442 billion in 2025. The Federal Bureau of Investigation estimated Americans lost $17.7 billion to online fraud in 2025, and U.S. officials have estimated Americans have lost $12.5 billion to scam centers in Southeast Asia specifically. The scam ecosystem also has implications for other forms of criminality, and many of the individuals involved in perpetrating scams are victims of human trafficking. The United Nations estimated that the scam workforce included as many as 300,000 people from 66 countries in early 2025; INTERPOL estimated human trafficking victims forced to conduct online fraud came from 80 countries in late 2025. Approximately 90% of the individuals who facilitated human trafficking for scam center purposes were from Asia, according to INTERPOL. Congress has considered and may consider a range of legislative and oversight options to reduce the impact of these scams on Americans and strengthen the U.S. government’s response against scam centers in Southeast Asia. In the 119th Congress, some Members have introduced legislation seeking to mitigate the harms of scams on U.S. citizens, sanction and pursue scam perpetrators and beneficiaries, a… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49432/R49432.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49432.html | |
| R49427 | Department of Homeland Security Appropriations: FY2027 State of Play | 2026-09-30T04:00:00Z | 2026-10-02T09:12:33Z | Active | Reports | William L. Painter | FY2027 marks the 24th annual appropriations cycle with a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appropriations measure. In six of the first seven years of its existence, the annual appropriations measure for DHS was enacted within a month of the beginning of the fiscal year it covered. Since FY2010, however, no annual DHS appropriations measure has been enacted within the first two months of its fiscal year, and twice DHS received its annual appropriations within the first fiscal quarter. Lapses in annual appropriations for the department lasting more than a week have occurred four times in since FY2010. This report is a quick reference for tracking the “state of play” for DHS appropriations from the end of the August 2026 district work period until the resolution of the annual appropriations measure. DHS appropriations 2027 Latest DHS appropriations DHS appropriations 2027 supplemental Homeland Security appropriations lapse 2026 DHS continuing resolution anomaly 2027 (This is an “In Brief” style report, and as such, should have its summary and TOC suppressed) | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49427/R49427.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49427.html | |
| R49421 | Connecting Constituents to Information About Census Bureau Surveys: Frequently Asked Questions | 2026-09-30T04:00:00Z | 2026-10-02T16:12:48Z | Active | Reports | Taylor R. Knoedl | The U.S. Census Bureau produces statistics on demographic and economic characteristics across the United States based on more than 130 different surveys, including the agency's largest products: the decennial census and the American Community Survey (ACS). Data from the decennial census are used for apportioning seats in the House of Representatives as well as for redistricting in the states. Other uses for census data include informing various policy decisions, guiding federal funding, offering the public insights on population trends, and helping the private sector make informed business decisions. To produce the statistics used in its data products, the Census Bureau surveys and samples the population of the United States and its territories. For these reasons, constituents across states and congressional districts may have questions regarding the Census Bureau and the surveys it conducts. This FAQ is intended to provide information on these potential questions to support district and state staff and other staff that interact with constituents in fielding questions on these topics. This report addresses several Census Bureau-related topics that may be of particular interest to constituents, including, but not limited to, how constituents may be contacted by the Census Bureau, how collected data are used, how data are kept private, and how Census data and other products can be accessed. | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49421/R49421.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49421.html | |
| R49419 | State-Law Climate Tort Suits and Suncor Energy (U.S.A.) Inc. v. County Commissioners of Boulder County: A Primer for Congress | 2026-09-30T04:00:00Z | 2026-10-01T12:23:24Z | Active | Reports | Andrew S. Coghlan | Over the last decade, state and local governments have filed dozens of state-law tort suits against energy companies, arguing that those companies are liable for the localized effects of climate change because they misled the public about their products’ impact on the climate, thereby inflating demand for fossil fuels, boosting atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases, and worsening climate-related harms. The City and County of Boulder, CO, filed one such suit, naming as defendants Suncor and Exxon Mobil. On October 5, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court is scheduled to hear oral arguments on whether Boulder’s suit can proceed. This case has generated substantial interest from Congress and other government actors. Nearly 200 members and more than 40 states have signed on to amicus briefs supporting either Boulder or Exxon Mobil and Suncor, and the U.S. Department of Justice has filed a brief siding with the energy companies. According to Suncor and Exxon Mobil, Boulder’s suit is an attempt to impose tort liability under Colorado law for greenhouse gas emissions occurring wholly outside Colorado’s borders, a form of extra-territorial regulation that exceeds the scope of state power in the federal system. Suncor and Exxon Mobil also argue that state-law tort claims like Boulder’s are preempted by the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q), which, they say, provides the exclusive means of addressing pollution that crosses state borders and thus precludes Boulder’s suit. Boulder argues that Suncor and Exxon Mobil lack standing to challenge Boulder’s suit, which has not yet proceeded to trial, and, according to Boulder, has not yet inflicted any legally cognizable harm. Boulder also contests the Supreme Court’s statutory jurisdiction to hear this case, arguing that there is no final state-court judgment for the Court to review. On the merits, Boulder contends that its suit is a constitutionally permissible exercise of state police power to regulate deceptive marketing and sales practices. Because the Clean Air Act ad… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49419/R49419.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49419.html | |
| R49408 | Overview of Fiscal Spending Projections: FY2027 Budget Cycle | 2026-09-30T04:00:00Z | 2026-10-01T08:53:06Z | Active | Reports | D. Andrew Austin | This In Brief summarizes projections for major components of the federal budget from the February 2026 Congressional Budget Office (CBO) budget outlook, the Trump Administration FY2027 budget submission issued in April 2026, and CBO’s June 2026 reestimate of Administration fiscal proposals. Scoring of legislative proposals compares the trajectory of spending and revenues relative to CBO baseline projections, which indicate the trajectory of federal spending under current law. Most CBO reestimates closely track Office of Management and Budget (OMB) levels for major budget aggregates. [Summary is suppressed.] | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49408/R49408.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49408.html | |
| IN12743 | International Conservation Funding, FY2023-FY2027 Request | 2026-09-30T04:00:00Z | 2026-10-01T09:38:05Z | Active | Posts | Pervaze A. Sheikh, Eric P. Nardi, Anthony R. Marshak | International Environmental Funding, International Natural Resource Issues | The United States provides foreign assistance to address international conservation in the form of financial, programmatic, and technical support. International conservation activities include protecting biodiversity, restoring habitat, supporting the management of protected areas, and promoting community-based conservation, among others. Several federal agencies administer these programs, including the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), the Department of the Treasury, and the Department of State (State), among others. Table 1 lists selected U.S. international programs that address conservation and their enacted funding levels for FY2023-FY2026 and the Administration’s budget request for FY2027. The funding in Table 1 is for specific programs, financial commitments to certain international treaties or organizations, and line items in appropriations laws or committee reports that identify funding for a set of activities. This list is not exhaustive; other programs where conservation may be a secondary objective may not be listed. Table 1 does not include funding provided outside of regular discretionary appropriations (e.g., supplemental appropriations). The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) was dismantled and ceased operations in July 2025. Some of the programs and activities it conducted were transferred to State. In these instances, both entities are noted in the column. Further, the appropriations reported in Table 1 do not reflect any potential rescission and reallocation of funding or dissolution of programs. Table 1. Enacted Appropriations from FY2023 to FY2026 and the FY2027 Budget Request for Selected Federal Programs that Address International Conservation (nominal, $ in millions) Program Description FY2023 FY2024 FY2025 FY2026 FY2027 Request U.S. Foundation for National Security and Counterterrorism The foundation was authorized under P.L. 118-159 as the Foundation for International Conservation. P.L. 119-75 changed the name to the U.S. Foundation for National Security and Counter… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12743/IN12743.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/HTML/IN12743.html |
| IF13324 | Crypto and Bank-Permissible Activities | 2026-09-30T04:00:00Z | 2026-10-01T13:23:18Z | Active | Resources | Marc Labonte | By law, banks can engage only in “the business of banking” and related or incidental activities. These limitations differentiate banks from other financial firms. The business of banking includes accepting customer deposits and making loans. But what else should be permitted? Over time, Congress and the federal bank regulators have permitted numerous and diverse activities that have broadened the scope of banking. Policymakers are currently debating whether activities involving cryptocurrencies and digital assets (crypto) should be considered bank-permissible activities. Since 2017, there has been a repeated pattern of federal bank regulators, with changes in presidential Administrations, reversing policies put in place by predecessors to allow or disallow these activities. Regulators use a two-prong test to decide whether to approve activities: (1) Are they related to the business of banking, and (2) do they pose safety and soundness risks to banks? There is disagreement on whether crypto meets either of those tests. Congress could continue to defer to regulators on which crypto activities should be permissible, pass legislation to allow or ban particular activities, or combine both approaches. Legislation would result in a more durable outcome, reducing the likelihood of frequent regulatory changes. But regulators have specialized expertise that might make them better placed to evaluate whether particular activities are unduly risky for banks and are sufficiently related to the business of banking. In the 119th Congress, the House and Senate have considered legislation that would expand the permissible crypto activities of banks differently. Background Following the stock market crash and banking crisis of the Great Depression, the Glass-Steagall Act (48 Stat. 162), among other things, separated banking and securities, with the goal of reducing the risk that banks would fail through speculative investments. To achieve this separation, the act restricted banks to banking activities. (Conversely, certain activi… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13324/IF13324.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13324.html | |
| R49436 | Digital Health Information Interoperability: Background and Selected Policy Considerations | 2026-09-29T04:00:00Z | 2026-10-03T05:24:09Z | Active | Reports | Nora Wells | Health Care Delivery, Health & Medical R&D, Technology & Innovation | Interoperability, essentially the ability of different technologies to speak with one another, is a key concept in the advancement of modernized digital health information exchange across a variety of health-related settings nationwide. Health information systems in part use health information technology (IT), a broad category of tools that may encompass electronic health records (EHRs), patient portals, medical imaging, and remote patient monitoring. Health IT may be used in a variety of ways in health-related settings, from underpinning individual patient care to population health improvement efforts such as disease tracking. Interoperable health IT can potentially allow for the rapid, seamless, and secure exchange of authorized digital health information between parties without special effort on the part of those exchanging it. Ultimately, a system of interoperable health IT may create an infrastructure that supports a learning health system. In a learning health system, a single longitudinal record of a patient’s care over the course of their lifetime can follow them from provider to provider, state to state. Such a system allows continuous learning cycles that can produce innovative knowledge that in turn improves health outcomes. Many offices and operating divisions within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) collaborate to further digital health information interoperability efforts, including primarily the Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology (ONC) and the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. Multiple other HHS actors, such as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the Office of Inspector General, serve roles as well. Digital health information interoperability in the United States is a long-term initiative spanning multiple decades. Modern digital health information interoperability has been advanced by a variety of laws and regulations building upon one another. In tandem with other supporting efforts, at least five laws and 18 regulatio… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49436/R49436.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49436.html |
| IN12742 | Suspension of Countervailing Duties on Phosphate Fertilizer: Options for Congress | 2026-09-29T04:00:00Z | 2026-10-01T10:23:07Z | Active | Posts | Christopher A. Casey, Stephanie Rosch, Benjamin Tsui | Agricultural Trade & Food Aid, Import Policy, Agricultural Trade | On June 29, 2026, President Donald J. Trump, citing Section 318(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1318(a)), proclaimed an emergency and authorized the Secretary of Commerce to suspend the collection of countervailing duties (CVDs; tariffs that offset foreign subsidies) on phosphate fertilizer from Morocco that have been in effect since 2021. Farmers commonly apply phosphate fertilizers to provide essential elements for the growth of corn, cotton, soybeans, wheat, and other crops. U.S. prices for certain phosphate fertilizers increased after the escalation of the U.S. conflict with Iran in February 2026 to their highest levels since September 2025. Some U.S. agricultural groups favor removing CVDs on fertilizer imports as a means of lowering U.S. fertilizer prices. In contrast, certain U.S. fertilizer manufacturers support the CVDs to address foreign government support of foreign phosphate fertilizer manufacturers. Citing costs to farmers, some Members of Congress have urged the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) to revoke the CVDs or supported their suspension through legislation (e.g., S. 4418, H.R. 8583). Other Members in prior years have supported the CVDs, citing unfair trade practices harming the U.S. fertilizer industry and the importance of ensuring U.S. food security. Phosphate Fertilizer Imports From 2016 to 2025, U.S. imports of phosphate fertilizers averaged nearly 3 million metric tons annually (Figure 1). Morocco, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Israel were the main foreign suppliers of phosphate fertilizers to the United States over this period. From 2016 to 2019, Morocco and Russia accounted on average for about 74% of U.S. phosphate fertilizer imports. In 2021, the United States imposed CVDs on phosphate fertilizers from Morocco and Russia. Following this action, U.S. imports of Moroccan and Russian phosphate fertilizer declined, and imports from Saudi Arabia, Israel, and other trading partners increased. Figure 1. U.S. Imports of Phosphate Fertilizers, by Country of Origin Calendar years 2… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12742/IN12742.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/HTML/IN12742.html |
| IF13323 | Defense Primer: U.S. Army Force Structure Development Process | 2026-09-29T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-30T11:08:11Z | Active | Resources | Andrew Feickert | Air, Land, Sea, Space & Projection Forces | Introduction The U.S. Army has changed the units and organizations comprising its force structure throughout its history, which dates to 1775. Force structure can be described as the number and types (infantry, artillery, engineer, etc.) of Army units containing soldiers, weapons, and equipment. Changes to Army force structure have occurred for various reasons, including evolution of national security requirements; introduction of new technologies and weapons; adoption of new tactics and techniques; assignment of new missions; and consideration of budgetary factors. Under Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution, Congress has the authority to “raise and support Armies” and “make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces,” among other powers pertaining to the armed forces. Congress typically considers annual legislation to authorize the size of the armed forces, including Army components, and to appropriate funding for defense. Under Title 10, Section 113, of the U.S. Code, Congress has generally delegated the daily administrative management of the U.S. military (including determination of force structure) to the Secretary of Defense, who is using “Secretary of War” as a “secondary title” under Executive Order (EO) 14347 dated September 5, 2025. Under Title 10, Section 7013, of the U.S. Code, the Secretary of the Army is responsible for the administration, training, equipping, and organization of the Army. Background The process of developing and fielding Army units is known as Force Management (FM), an administrative function translating strategic security requirements into resourced, trained, and ready forces. The FM process informs annual Army budget requests to Congress and guides budget implementation once Congress authorizes and appropriates funding and sets end strength. The Army uses an iterative, five-phase Force Development (FD) process (Figure 1) to design and authorize its units. This process is usually guided by the National Security Strategy (NSS), the National Defense St… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13323/IF13323.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13323.html |
| IF13322 | U.S. Measles Outbreaks 2025-2026: Overview and Issues for Congress | 2026-09-29T04:00:00Z | 2026-10-01T13:38:23Z | Active | Resources | Kavya Sekar, Alexandria K. Mickler | Public Health Emergency Preparedness & Response, Public Health Services & Special Populations, Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP), Vaccines & Immunization | As of September 24, 2026, the United States has seen the highest number of annual reported measles cases since 1991, according to Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) data. This 2026 total has already exceeded the 2025 total, which was also significantly higher than prior years. In 2000, the United States declared it had eliminated measles, meaning that no continuous spread had occurred in the United States across one year. CDC credited the measles elimination to a “highly effective vaccination program,” as well as better measles control in the Americas region. The United States may lose its decades-long measles elimination status this year due to ongoing outbreaks. Measles is a vaccine-preventable disease, meaning that the two-dose vaccine can protect against measles infection and disease. High measles vaccination rates (estimated 95% of the population and above) in a community can help establish herd immunity that limits the spread of the virus and protects those who cannot get vaccinated, including infants who are not yet eligible for vaccination and people with medical contraindications to measles vaccines. About Measles Measles, also referred to as rubeola, is a highly contagious virus that spreads from person to person through contact with respiratory and airborne droplets. It is characterized by a red rash that spreads from the hairline to the neck, torso, arms, legs, and feet. In addition to the rash, measles is often accompanied by a high fever, cough, and common complications like ear infections and diarrhea. More serious complications include pneumonia, encephalitis (swelling of the brain), long-term nervous system damage, and death from respiratory and neurologic complications. Measles complications are most common among children under five years of age and adults. Prior to the vaccine’s introduction in 1963, an estimated 3 to 4 million cases, 48,000 hospitalizations, and 500 deaths occurred annually in the United States due to measles. About 1,000 people annually developed chronic disab… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13322/IF13322.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13322.html |
| R49363 | Temporary Protected Status: History and Issues for Congress | 2026-09-28T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-30T14:38:33Z | Active | Reports | Jill H. Wilson | Asylees, Refugees & Other Humanitarian Concerns, Immigration Enforcement & Removal, Permanent Immigration, Temporary Immigration, Asylum, Temporary Protected Status (TPS) | The United States has long offered protection to foreign nationals who face jeopardy in their home countries. Various mechanisms have been incorporated into U.S. immigration law over the years to grant humanitarian protection. Asylum is a form of humanitarian protection available to foreign nationals who are physically present in the United States and who meet the definition of refugee—that is, someone typically outside his or her country of nationality who is unable or unwilling to return to that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution. Congress created temporary protected status (TPS) in 1990 to fill what it considered a gap in statutory protection for those in the United States who lacked the individualized finding of persecution necessary to qualify for asylum but whose home countries were experiencing armed conflict, natural disaster, or other extraordinary circumstances that prevented their safe return. The TPS statute gives the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) the authority to designate countries for TPS for periods of six to 18 months and the authority to extend such designations if conditions continue to be met. Foreign nationals present in the United States from designated countries at the time of the designation may apply for TPS. Those granted TPS are eligible for employment authorization, cannot be detained on the basis of their immigration status, and are not subject to removal from the United States while they retain TPS. At the beginning of the second Trump Administration, the number of designated countries (17) and the number of individuals covered by TPS (approximately 1.4 million) were at all-time highs. Since then, the Trump Administration has terminated TPS designations for 13 of the 17 countries and reduced the number of individuals covered by TPS to approximately 274,000. Throughout the history of the program, approximately 1.7 million people from 28 countries have been granted TPS. Some countries’ designations have lasted as little as … | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49363/R49363.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49363.html |
| LSB11485 | Artificial Intelligence Safety Collaboration and Antitrust Law | 2026-09-28T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-30T12:53:00Z | Active | Posts | Jay B. Sykes | Antitrust Law, Artificial Intelligence, Cybersecurity, Judicial Branch, Sherman Antitrust Act | On September 12, 2026, Anthropic chief executive Dario Amodei published a blog post arguing that the artificial-intelligence (AI) industry should slow the pace at which it develops frontier models to mitigate risks of catastrophic harm, including the loss of control of AI systems and misuse of AI for cyberattacks and bioterrorism. Amodei also proposed several measures to “pace the frontier,” including coordination among AI companies to establish common safety standards and “limits on the rate of unchecked AI progress.” He added, however, that “[s]ome forms of coordination that would be impactful for pacing are legally challenging, and will require government support,” potentially including “waivers of antitrust restrictions.” Amodei’s post—which was published amid heightened public discussion of potential AI safety risks—generated considerable commentary. Leaders of other AI labs endorsed his call to “pace the frontier.” House Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries called on Congress to take “decisive action” to slow AI development in the interest of safety. Other observers criticized Amodei’s proposals. Some contended that antitrust law permits AI firms to engage in many forms of safety collaboration, making antitrust waivers unnecessary and potentially harmful. Amodei’s post also generated antitrust litigation: On September 18, 2026, customers of several leading AI companies filed a putative class action alleging that the companies violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act by agreeing to slow the pace of AI innovation. This Legal Sidebar discusses antitrust issues raised by the prospect of AI safety collaboration. It begins with an overview of the antitrust principles that govern competitor collaboration. Next, it applies those principles to evaluate the legal risks that may accompany certain types of safety collaboration between competing AI developers. The Sidebar concludes with considerations for Congress. Competitor Collaboration and Antitrust Law: General Principles Per Se Illegality, the Rule of Reason, and “Qui… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB11485/LSB11485.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/HTML/LSB11485.html |
| IN12741 | Citizenship and Residence Criteria for the 2030 Census: Recent Developments | 2026-09-28T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-29T14:38:09Z | Active | Posts | Taylor R. Knoedl | The decennial census of housing and population is conducted every 10 years to count each resident of the United States and its territories, as well as military personnel and dependents abroad. The constitutionally mandated purpose of the decennial census is to determine the apportionment of the seats in the U.S. House of Representatives. Per Article I, Section 2, clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution, every 10 years an “actual [e]numeration” must be conducted “in such Manner as [Congress] shall by Law direct.” Recently, the Census Bureau published a notice of proposed rulemaking and requested comments on operational revisions to the decennial census for 2030. The proposed rule includes residence criteria that would exclude from the apportionment count all citizens of foreign countries who are not either also citizens of the United States or lawful permanent residents of the United States. The proposed rule also describes methods that might be used to determine a respondent’s citizenship status. The Federal Register notice indicates that comments on the proposed rule must be received by October 13, 2026. Who Does the Decennial Census Count? The Census Bureau aims to count every person during the decennial census only once and in the right place. To ensure individuals are counted at the right place, the Census Act of 1790 introduced the concept of a “usual residence.” In a document for the 2020 decennial census, the Census Bureau defined usual residence as “the place where a person lives and sleeps most of the time,” which may not necessarily be the person’s legal residence, voting residence, or where they may want to be counted. Residence criteria have varied over time. 2020 Residence Criteria The Census Bureau published the final residence criteria in the Federal Register in advance of the 2020 census. The criteria used to determine usual residence for 2020 indicated the definition of usual residence; how foreign citizens living in the United States are counted; that foreign citizens visiting the United States are e… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12741/IN12741.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/HTML/IN12741.html | |
| R49360 | The Second Amendment and Aliens Unlawfully Present in the United States | 2026-09-25T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-26T05:54:56Z | Active | Reports | Amin Aminfar | The Second Amendment to the Constitution protects “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms.” In New York State Rifle and Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 17 (2022), the Supreme Court explained that courts examining whether a law infringes on this right should look first to whether the text of the Second Amendment covers the regulated conduct—for example, whether an item covered by the regulation is covered by the term “Arms”—and, if it does, courts should then determine whether the law is consistent with the historical tradition of firearm regulation in the United States. If the law is not consistent with that tradition, then it is considered an unconstitutional infringement of the Second Amendment. This two-step framework has been applied by the Supreme Court and federal courts of appeals to numerous firearms regulations, including a federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922, that prohibits possession of firearms by nine categories of persons. One of the provisions in that statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(A), bars possession of firearms by aliens “illegally or unlawfully in the United States.” The Supreme Court has not addressed that provision with respect to the Second Amendment directly, but it has interpreted how other constitutional provisions apply to aliens unlawfully present in the United States. Some of these provisions have been interpreted as applying to aliens regardless of the legality of their presence in the United States, but the Supreme Court has nevertheless qualified the protection offered by those provisions, explaining that the “plenary” power that Congress generally enjoys over matters of immigration empowers it to legislate with respect to aliens in a manner that it could not with respect to citizens, at least in some circumstances. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976). In other cases, the Supreme Court has analyzed whether aliens are included within the scope of a constitutional provision at all, specifically, whether they should be considered among “the people” when that term is used … | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49360/R49360.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49360.html | |
| R49361 | Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) Standards | 2026-09-24T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-26T05:55:04Z | Active | Reports | Naseeb A. Souweidane | The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) administers Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards that regulate the fuel consumption of vehicles. These standards require automotive manufacturers to produce vehicles with greater fuel-efficiency with the stated goal to reduce energy consumption and limit dependence on foreign oil. Title 49, Section 32902, of the U.S. Code sets several statutory obligations for CAFE standards, including a mandate to set the maximum feasible standards for each model year and considerations to be used in making that determination. The stringency of CAFE standards has generally increased since their implementation in 1978. NHTSA sets separate CAFE standards each model year for light-, medium-, and heavy-duty vehicles. Light-duty vehicles are separated into three fleet or compliance categories: (1) domestic passenger vehicles, (2) imported passenger vehicles, and (3) light trucks. Manufacturers are required to meet CAFE standards for each fleet in which they produce vehicles. NHTSA expresses CAFE standards through a mathematical function represented as a curve. The CAFE curve sets a range for vehicles in a given fleet each model year, and the specific standards are dependent on footprint, a vehicle attribute that is a measurement of vehicle size. NHTSA and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) both have roles in the enforcement of CAFE standards. EPA verifies automotive manufacturers’ CAFE data, conducts tests to measure the fuel economy and emissions of vehicles, calculates manufacturers’ CAFE values, determines the average CAFE values, and issues final CAFE reports to manufacturers and NHTSA. NHTSA then identifies whether the fleet performance is greater than or equal to the standards set for a manufacturer’s fleet. Additionally, manufacturers are required to label certain fuel economy information on vehicles, and EPA and NHTSA coordinate to administer the labeling requirements. NHTSA offers several flexibilities for manufacturers to comply with CAFE standards… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49361/R49361.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49361.html | |
| IF13321 | Estimated Effects on Effective Tax Rates and Revenues of Increasing the 199A Deduction for Pass-Through Businesses | 2026-09-24T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-25T09:08:10Z | Active | Resources | Mark P. Keightley | Business & Corporate Tax, Pass-Through Businesses, Tax Rates | Under Section 199A of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC), owners of pass-through businesses are eligible to claim a deduction of up to 20% of a firm’s qualified business income, subject to certain limitations. The deduction was added to the tax code from 2018 to 2025 by the 2018 reconciliation law (P.L. 115-97). The 2025 reconciliation law (P.L. 119-21) made the deduction permanent and widened eligibility limits. According to the Joint Committee on Taxation’s (JCT’s) most recent estimates, the extension and changes to the deduction made by the 2025 reconciliation law are expected to reduce federal tax revenues by $736.5 billion from FY2025 to FY2034. This In Focus provides an overview of the 199A deduction, briefly examines selected key policy issues of the deduction generally, and presents estimated effects on effective tax rates and revenues of increasing the deduction to 25%. Increasing the deduction’s rate from 20% was considered during the debate over the 2025 reconciliation law. The chair of the House Ways and Means Committee reportedly expressed interest in increasing the deduction to 25%. Overview of the Deduction How a business is taxed at the federal level depends partly on how it is organized. A firm can be organized as either a C corporation or a pass-through entity (i.e., partnership, S corporation, limited liability company, or sole proprietorship). C corporation profits are taxed once according to the corporate tax system, and then potentially a second time at the shareholder level when corporate dividend payments are made or capital gains are recognized. Pass-through business profits are, in general, not subject to the corporate tax. Instead, the income of these businesses passes through to the individual owners who pay tax according to individual income tax rates. Under current law, the tax rate for corporate income is permanently set at a flat rate of 21% for tax years after 2017. Most corporate dividends and capital gains recognized by individual shareholders are subject to a maximum tax rate of 2… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13321/IF13321.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13321.html |
| R49359 | College Sports Media Rights: Background and Issues for Congressional Consideration | 2026-09-23T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-25T14:23:14Z | Active | Reports | Dana A. Scherer | The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), a voluntary, self-governing organization of four-year colleges and universities, includes intercollegiate athletics programs organized into divisions, subdivisions, and conferences. Division I (DI) schools compete at the highest level and can offer students full athletic scholarships. Within DI are an elite group of conferences, known as the Autonomy or Power Four conferences, that have autonomy to create their own rules. For schools within the Power Four conferences, sales of media rights for college sports represent the largest source of revenue. College sports media rights contracts have far-reaching effects on the finances of schools and the quality of life of student athletes. Schools have switched conference memberships to maximize media revenue in lieu of geographic proximity. As a result, student athletes spend an increasing portion of their time traveling thousands of miles to play games. Moreover, as a condition of the media contracts that generate revenue for schools’ athletics departments, schools must pay to construct and operate on-site production studios and rely on students to produce and transmit telecasts of sporting events to cable networks and streaming services. Congress may consider issues relating to media rights contracts, conference alignments, and funding for college sports broadcast production facilities. As one option, Congress could amend current law. An example of such legislation in the 119th Congress is the Protect College Sports Act of 2026 (PCSA; S. 4668), which Senator Ted Cruz sponsored and for which Senator John Thune submitted an amendment in the nature of a substitute, S.Amdt. 6776. The bill with the amendment was considered by the Senate on September 22, 2026 (hereinafter PCSA, as amended). Title II of the PCSA, as amended, would amend the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961 by giving an antitrust exemption to NCAA DI colleges and/or conferences to form and operate a new entity, known as a “covered entity,” to collectively n… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49359/R49359.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49359.html | |
| LSB11484 | The Protect College Sports Act of 2026: Potential Implications for Title IX | 2026-09-23T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-24T12:53:44Z | Active | Posts | Jared P. Cole, Whitney K. Novak | School & Campus Safety, Title IX | Calls from stakeholders for federal legislation regulating intercollegiate athletics have increased during a period of significant change in intercollegiate sports. Intercollegiate athletics regulators have faced uncertainty with respect to the enforcement of uniform rules on issues such as compensation for the use of an athlete’s Name, Image, and Likeness (NIL); eligibility; and transfers between institutions, due in part to years of litigation. One legislative proposal, the Protect College Sports Act (PCSA), has been characterized as a bipartisan solution to “end the disorder facing college athletics” stemming from a “conflicting patchwork of court decisions and state laws.” The revised Senate version of the PCSA addresses a wide range of issues related to intercollegiate athletics, including several provisions that explicitly address women’s sports. Some observers have raised questions about how the bill’s provisions, if enacted, would ultimately interact with existing requirements for university athletics programs under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (Title IX). Title IX prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex in education programs and activities that receive federal financial assistance. Among other things, the statute imposes significant requirements for university athletics programs with respect to the allocation of resources between the sexes. The PCSA does not directly amend Title IX, but it includes a Title IX “savings clause” that would clarify that nothing in the PCSA shall be construed to “override, modify, or amend the applicability of Title IX.” This Sidebar begins with a brief background on Title IX’s requirements for athletics programs. It continues by describing the PCSA and its provisions most relevant to university Title IX obligations. The Sidebar then examines how those provisions, if enacted, might interact with Title IX’s requirements for athletics. It concludes with some considerations for Congress. Title IX and Athletics Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (T… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB11484/LSB11484.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/HTML/LSB11484.html |
| IF13320 | Defense Contractors, Data Rights, and the “Right to Repair” | 2026-09-23T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-26T05:54:56Z | Active | Resources | Alexandra G. Neenan, Kevin J. Hickey | The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) often relies on private contractors to support its mission. (DOD is using a “secondary Department of War designation” under Executive Order 14347.) DOD works with these contractors to develop and field complex weapons systems that include technologies developed by the government, by private contractors, or by a combination of both. Private companies may have intellectual property (IP) rights in technologies that they developed, which grants them exclusive rights in, for example, data and software. DOD may therefore need contractual permission (i.e., a license) to access data or modify software to conduct necessary maintenance and repairs. A lack of DOD access to data may delay deployment of key DOD weapons systems and increase sustainment costs. For example, a 2026 DOD Office of the Inspector General (OIG) review of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program found that DOD did not “enforce a contract requirement for Lockheed Martin to identify and provide accurate data on Government property within its possession.” OIG stated that “inaccurate and incomplete inventory data could have a negative operational impact on the program and may lead to uninformed logistical and budgetary decisions.” Some Members of Congress and analysts are advocating for contractors to provide DOD access to technical data and software needed to repair and maintain acquired weapons systems. This stance is known as the right to repair. IP and DOD Data Rights IP law refers to various types of legal rights to exclude others from making, copying, or using intangible creations of the human mind. Generally, IP protections are intended to encourage innovation by providing incentives to generate new works and useful inventions. At the federal level, IP includes four main types of legal protection: patents, copyrights, trademarks, and trade secrets. These legal regimes each protect a distinct type of creation and grant the relevant IP owner rights that vary in scope and duration. For example, trademarks prote… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13320/IF13320.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13320.html | |
| IF13319 | Private Investments and Insurance Companies | 2026-09-23T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-24T15:38:10Z | Active | Resources | Eva Su, Baird Webel | Private investments’ involvement in the insurance industry often takes two forms: (1) private equity (PE) ownership of insurers and (2) insurance company holdings of private investment assets. Rapid growth in these activities and their associated risks have drawn attention from Congress and financial regulators. Private investments (also known as alternative investments, private placements, or private capital) generally are not available to the public and are exempt from certain regulatory requirements. They include private securities offerings and private funds. Common types of private funds include PE and private credit. This In Focus describes related trends and their policy implications. For general background on PE in selected industries, see CRS In Focus IF13214, Private Equity in Selected Industries: Policy Background, by Eva Su. PE Ownership and Insurer Private Assets PE ownership of insurers can be through (1) direct ownership, where the insurer is a subsidiary within a PE firm (e.g., Apollo Global Management’s direct ownership of Athene), or (2) portfolio company holdings, where PE funds invest in insurance companies. PE firms’ direct ownership of insurers generally focuses on capital-intensive life insurance and annuity providers that offer the insurers predictable premium payments coupled with long-term investment horizons and relatively low liquidity needs. An annuity is a common financial product offered by insurance companies to provide periodic payments for income during retirement, often for the life of the annuity holder. PE’s involvement in the life insurance sector dates to at least the 1980s and increased after the 2007-2009 global financial crisis. PE ownership of insurance companies has grown over the past decade, with the number of PE-owned insurers increasing from approximately 25 in 2017 to 139 in 2024 (Figure 1). In 2024, PE-owned insurers held approximately $700 billion in cash and invested assets, or 7.8% of the U.S. insurance industry total. Figure 1. Private Equity Ownership of the… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13319/IF13319.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13319.html | |
| IF13318 | Air Force MQ-9A Reaper: Background and Issues for Congress | 2026-09-23T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-24T15:23:07Z | Active | Resources | Daniel M. Gettinger | The MQ-9A Reaper is a multi-role uncrewed aircraft system (UAS, or drone) produced by General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc. Within the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), the Air Force operates the greatest number of Reapers; the Air National Guard and Marine Corps also operate the MQ-9A. (DOD is “using a secondary Department of War designation,” under Executive Order 14347 dated September 5, 2025.) The Air Force’s inventory of MQ-9A Reaper aircraft has declined as the Air Force has divested older-variant MQ-9As and lost aircraft in accidents and combat operations (see Figure 1). The Air Force has proposed developing a successor for the MQ-9A known as the Massed Modular Aircraft (MMA). As currently conceived, an MMA would cost less per unit than the Reaper, which has a unit cost of between $30 million and $50 million, and potentially perform many of the same missions. Some Members of Congress have expressed concern about the reported decrease in the Air Force inventory of MQ-9As and have introduced legislation that would, if enacted, prohibit the service from divesting the aircraft in most circumstances (e.g., H.R. 9119; S. 4677, 119th Congress). Background The Reaper is part of the Predator aircraft series, the origins of which date to the early 1980s, which has included the Air Force MQ-1A/B Predator (now retired), the Army MQ-1C Gray Eagle, and other variants. In 1999, General Atomics began developing a Predator B model as an internal project. In 2001, the Air Force awarded General Atomics a contract for work on developing the Predator B aircraft—later renamed the Reaper. The Air Force and Air National Guard began fielding the aircraft in 2007 and 2008, respectively, while the Marine Corps first leased Reapers for operations in 2018. In FY2021 and FY2022 budget requests to Congress, the Air Force proposed ending production of the MQ-9A and iteratively divesting older Block 1 variants of the MQ-9A in favor of the newer Block 5s. Air Force officials expressed concern that the Reaper “was not designed for o… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13318/IF13318.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13318.html | |
| R49358 | Analyzing the Incidence of the Corporate Income Tax: Models and Statistical Estimates | 2026-09-22T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-26T05:52:58Z | Active | Reports | Jane G. Gravelle | Who bears the burden of the corporate income tax (i.e., the incidence of the tax) is a perennial issue in debates about the corporate tax. This issue is crucial for determining the extent to which the corporate tax is progressive or regressive. If the tax falls on capital income, it is progressive because capital income is concentrated in higher incomes. To the extent it falls on wages, it can become a regressive tax, falling more heavily on lower incomes. Corporate taxes can fall on labor if they discourage the inflow of capital from abroad or reduce savings, thus reducing the capital stock and production, and therefore wages. They can also fall on labor if workers share in the taxes on rents (i.e., profits in excess of the amount needed to attract investment). Researchers have used two approaches to estimate the share of the corporate tax burden that falls on wages through capital flows: general equilibrium models and reduced form statistical estimates. General equilibrium models impose a structure on the findings and use estimates of how freely capital flows across borders, how easily capital can be substituted for labor, and how readily imports can be substituted for domestic products to determine labor’s share of the corporate tax burden. Reduced form statistical estimates use regression analysis to estimate the effect on wages of a change in corporate taxes. Rent shares are estimated by statistical methods, although the limits to the share of the burden that can fall on labor can be constructed based on estimates of the share of profits that is rent. Bargaining models indicate that while rents may be shared, the taxes on rent are not. A higher tax reduces the total after-tax rents available for sharing, potentially reducing wages, but also makes it cheaper to pay wages because the value of the tax deduction for wages increases. General equilibrium models of capital flows generally find that, with the assumptions most favorable to the corporate tax burden falling on labor, about 70% can fall on wages. How… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49358/R49358.3.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49358.html | |
| R49357 | Judiciary Appropriations, FY2026 | 2026-09-21T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-24T12:38:24Z | Active | Reports | Barry J. McMillion | Funds for the judicial branch are included annually in the Financial Services and General Government (FSGG) appropriations bill. The bill provides funding for the U.S. Supreme Court; the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit; the U.S. Court of International Trade; U.S. courts of appeals and district courts; the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts; the Federal Judicial Center; the U.S. Sentencing Commission; the federal defender organizations that provide legal representation to defendants financially unable to retain counsel in federal criminal proceedings; security and protective services for courthouses, judicial officers, and judicial employees; and fees and allowances paid to jurors. The federal judiciary’s FY2026 budget request was made public by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts on April 25, 2025, one week prior to the release of the President’s FY2026 “skinny budget” on May 2, 2025 (the President’s budget request was formally submitted to Congress on May 30, 2025). Historically, the judiciary’s appropriations request is released without change in a President’s annual budget submission to Congress. The judiciary requested $9.43 billion in discretionary funds for FY2026, an increase of 9.3% over the FY2025 enacted level of $8.63 billion in discretionary funds. The judiciary’s FY2026 budget request also included $872.4 million in mandatory funds to pay the salaries and benefits of certain types of federal judges, as well as provide for judicial retirement accounts. The House FSGG appropriations subcommittee held a hearing on the judiciary’s request on May 14, 2025, and it held a markup of the FSGG appropriations bill on July 21, 2025. The subcommittee recommended $8.94 billion in discretionary funding for the federal judiciary. The same amount was recommended by the House Appropriations Committee, which held its markup on September 3, 2025, and reported an original bill, H.R. 5166, on September 5, 2025. None of the 12 regular appropriations bills for FY2026, including the FSGG bill, w… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49357/R49357.3.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49357.html | |
| R49356 | Internal Revenue Service’s Statistics of Income (SOI): Current Available Tabulations by State and Local Area | 2026-09-21T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-26T05:55:06Z | Active | Reports | Tig Wartluft | Individual Tax | This report summarizes data currently available from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) on individual and estate tax filings tabulated by state, congressional district, ZIP code, county, and metro area. The IRS collection of U.S. population migration data through individual income tax filings is also discussed. This report reviews the methodology, data limitations, and expected publication schedules specific to each level of geography. Tables are provided listing the IRS form and line numbers of source data contained within each tabulation. This report is intended as a reference document to assist with navigation of the IRS’s SOI tables and to facilitate access to the data contained within. | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49356/R49356.3.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49356.html |
| LSB11483 | Federal Preemption of State Pesticide Failure-to-Warn Claims After Monsanto v. Durnell | 2026-09-21T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-23T13:23:07Z | Active | Posts | Jason O. Heflin | Federal Preemption, The Supreme Court of the United States, Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), Environmental Health Hazards, Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) | The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) is the primary federal law regulating the sale and use of pesticides, including herbicides. FIFRA prohibits the sale or distribution in the United States of any pesticide that has not been registered with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), a process which includes submission of the pesticide’s labeling. On June 25, 2026, in a case involving glyphosate-containing pesticides, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Monsanto v. Durnell that FIFRA’s express preemption provision preempts a state law failure-to-warn claim—that is, an allegation that a pesticide manufacturer failed to include a required warning on the label of its pesticide—where EPA has registered the pesticide with a label that does not include such a warning. Similar conflicts regarding the preemptive effect of federal regulatory schemes for products and state tort regimes have arisen in other contexts in recent years, including in the context of medical devices. A number of statutes contain preemption provisions similar to the FIFRA provision at issue in Monsanto. In addition to considerations specific to pesticide regulation, the Court’s opinion may raise considerations for Congress about the preemptive scope of those statutes. Further, the Court’s analysis of the language used in the FIFRA preemption provision may inform how Congress drafts preemption provisions in future legislation. This Legal Sidebar explains the context and background for the Supreme Court’s decision, the opinions of the Court and individual Justices, and selected considerations for Congress related to the case. Background: Preemption and FIFRA Requirements Preemption Under FIFRA The Constitution’s Supremacy Clause provides that federal law is the “supreme Law of the Land,” meaning where a federal law and state law conflict, federal law preempts state law. Congress has the authority to define a federal statute’s preemptive scope. A federal statute may preempt state law explicitly or by implication. A federal … | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB11483/LSB11483.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/HTML/LSB11483.html |
| IN12740 | SBA’s Proposed Expansion of Small Business Program Eligibility | 2026-09-21T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-24T17:08:04Z | Active | Posts | R. Corinne Blackford, Anthony A. Cilluffo | Overview In a proposed rule announced August 20, 2026, the Small Business Administration (SBA) set new size standards for defining firm size while simultaneously issuing a notice for comments on a revised methodology for establishing, reviewing, and modifying these size standards. Currently, the SBA’s size standards determine firm-size limits for various SBA services and contracting preferences by industry category that results in over 1,000 individual size standards. These size limits are generally expressed in terms of either average annual revenue or average number of employees, with revenue limits ranging from $2.25 million to $47 million and employee-count limits ranging from 100 employees to 1,500 employees (see the SBA table of size standards at 13 C.F.R. §121.201). Using the revised methodology, the proposed size standards would newly classify approximately 110,000–114,500 additional firms as “small.” Although robust analysis of the new proposal is unavailable to date, some researchers and economists have analyzed the impacts of prior expansions to the size standards. This Insight describes the proposed changes and issues that may be of congressional interest. Proposed Changes Fewer Size Standards Overall Under the August 2026 proposal, the number of size standards would shrink from around 1,000 to 338. This is a result of the revised methodology, which calculates size standards at a higher (less specific) industry level. The SBA’s 2024 methodology (and its prior methodologies issued in 2023, 2019, 2018, and 2009) defined size standards for the most specific industry category (categories are assigned a six-digit North American Industry Classification code [NAICS]). The proposed 2026 methodology sets size standards by four- and five-digit NAICS codes. An example of a four-digit NAICS code is 5417, Scientific Research and Development Services, which has five-digit codes within that category that include Research and Development (R&D) in the Physical, Engineering, and Life Sciences, as well as R&D in the S… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12740/IN12740.3.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/HTML/IN12740.html | |
| IN12739 | U.S. Space Academy Proposal: Considerations for Congress | 2026-09-21T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-22T16:37:55Z | Active | Posts | Kristy N. Kamarck, Rachel Lindbergh | On August 28, 2026, President Trump signed Executive Order (EO) 14423 establishing a Presidential Commission on the United States Space Academy, to be chaired by the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). The EO directs the commission to submit a report to the President proposing key details for the establishment of a U.S. Space Academy (USSA) within 120 days (i.e., by December 26, 2026). The stated purpose of the EO includes preparing “the next generation of astronauts, scientists, engineers, operators, entrepreneurs, civil servants, and warfighters.” The EO directs the commission to develop recommendations for the academy’s governance framework, curriculum, and candidate eligibility and service obligations, as well as processes for site location and coordination with existing federal programs. The commission is to report on administrative and legislative actions needed to establish an academy and an implementation strategy to achieve these actions. “Among the frameworks considered,” the commission is to evaluate establishing the academy within NASA. Existing Federal Service Academies In his remarks on signing the EO, President Trump compared the USSA concept to existing military service academies. In considering a proposal for a new academy, Congress may draw lessons from the creation of existing academies. There are currently five federal service academies; the U.S. Military Academy (USMA), Department of the Army; U.S. Naval Academy (USNA), Department of the Navy; U.S. Air Force Academy (USAFA), Department of the Air Force; U.S. Coast Guard Academy (USCGA), Department of Homeland Security; and U.S. Merchant Marine Academy (USMMA), Department of Transportation. The three military service academies and the USCGA require a minimum commissioned service obligation in the Armed Forces. USMMA graduates are required to accept a reserve officer commission, obtain and maintain merchant mariner licensure, and serve a minimum amount of time as an officer or a civilian employee in th… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12739/IN12739.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/HTML/IN12739.html | |
| IF13317 | Federal Wiretaps and the Fourth Amendment | 2026-09-21T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-22T17:38:01Z | Active | Resources | Tamsin G. Harrington | Wiretapping, Civil Rights & Liberties, Fourth Amendment, Jurisprudence, Privacy, Surveillance, Search & Seizure | The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures, generally requiring that law enforcement obtain a warrant from a neutral and detached magistrate upon a showing of probable cause. In 1928, the Supreme Court determined in Olmstead v. United States that projected voices passing over telephone wires beyond a person’s home were not protected by the Fourth Amendment, so no warrant was required for a wiretap installed outside of the home. Since the Olmstead decision, the case law and statutory framework governing law enforcement surveillance of real-time communications has changed significantly. This In Focus provides a brief history of the Fourth Amendment’s application to such surveillance, an overview of the federal Wiretap Act, selected caselaw interpreting the statute, and considerations for Congress. Selected Legal History In Olmstead, the Supreme Court determined the projection of voices outside the home by telephone to be outside the scope of the Fourth Amendment protections because the Court perceived the text of the Amendment to be focused on “material things—the person, the house, his papers or his effects.” By the 1967 case Berger v. New York, the Court’s views had shifted. The Court held that a state statute—which permitted a related type of surveillance, eavesdropping, when authorized by a court order—was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment. Explaining its concern about the development of “sophisticated electronic devices,” which “pick up whispers in a room,” the Court identified several aspects of the statute that did not “carefully circumscribe[]” the circumstances under which courts could authorize electronic eavesdropping to prevent so-called “general searches” through electronic listening devices. The Court held that the statute lacked the particularity required by the Fourth Amendment in that it did not require the applicant to describe a particular offense, particularly describe the property to be seized (i.e., the conversations sought), provide notice to parties, or obt… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13317/IF13317.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13317.html |
| IF13316 | Federal Role in Elections Policy: Selected Recent Developments | 2026-09-21T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-23T16:08:28Z | Active | Resources | R. Sam Garrett | More than 20 federal agencies play roles in federal campaigns and elections policy. Many of those roles are based primarily in statutory authority granted by Congress. Policy actions, such as executive orders (EOs) and rulemakings, also can affect agency roles. This CRS In Focus discusses selected developments in federal agency activity during the 2026 election cycle. CRS products linked below provide additional information on some topics. This In Focus does not contain legal analysis. Another CRS product addresses recent Supreme Court activity. The developments discussed below have produced varying responses, ranging from support to opposition from Members of Congress and from elections officials. Discussion of those competing perspectives is beyond the scope of this product. Some actions have been halted for 2026 by litigation. Regardless of how short-term questions about agency activities are resolved, understanding the scope of those activities could be relevant over the longer term as Members consider legislation or oversight related to federal roles in campaigns and elections—including for the 2028 cycle. Selected Executive Orders Two executive orders (EOs) issued during the 2026 election cycle specify agency priorities or expanded agency roles regarding elections. Neither EO has been fully implemented; both have been subject to litigation. Table 1 and Table 2 summarize selected agency roles specified in EO 14248, published in the Federal Register on March 28, 2025; and in EO 14399, published in the Federal Register on April 3, 2026. Table 1. Selected Agency Roles Specified in EO 14248 Primary Agency Selected Roles and Other Agencies Election Assistance Commission (EAC) Require documentary proof of citizenship on national mail registration form; condition federal funding on accepting federal form consistent with proof-of-citizenship requirement; update Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG) 2.0 and, if appropriate, recertify voting systems; condition federal funding on uniform election-day receipt da… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13316/IF13316.3.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13316.html | |
| R49355 | Fishery Resource Disaster Assistance | 2026-09-18T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-19T16:22:55Z | Active | Reports | Anthony R. Marshak | Oceans & Fisheries, Natural Resources Policy, Fishing Industry & Fisheries | Oceanic conditions, climate, human activities, and weather events can affect fishery resources and commercial infrastructure, such as boats, shoreside processing, and ports. Congress authorized the Secretary of Commerce (the Secretary) to provide disaster assistance to the fishing industry when fish populations decline or other disruptions cause economic losses. The governor of a state, the Secretary, or a representative of a fishing community (including through an official resolution of an Indian Tribe) may initiate a request for assistance. The National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), state agencies, and fishing communities compile the information needed to make a determination. When all necessary information has been obtained and reviewed, the Secretary determines whether a fishery failure or fishery resource disaster (also referred to as fishery disaster) has occurred. In most cases, Congress has appropriated funds to support the fishing industry and/or tribal fisheries following the Secretary’s determination. Since 1994, the Secretary has made 144 fishery disaster determinations, and Congress has appropriated nearly $2.1 billion for fishery disaster relief. As of August 2026, examples of fishery disaster determinations have included those made for salmon fisheries in the Pacific Northwest and Alaska, Alaskan crab fisheries, West Coast Dungeness crab fisheries, the New England Atlantic herring fishery, and fisheries affected by several hurricanes and other causes. NMFS, states, interstate marine fisheries commissions, and industry or fishing community representatives often work together to develop a spend plan for how assistance will be distributed to the fishing industry and allocated among potential projects. The criteria for the Secretary to determine whether a commercial fishery failure or fishery resource disaster has occurred is provided in Section 312(a) of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MSA; 16 U.S.C. §1861a(a)). In 2022, through the Fishery Resource Disasters Improveme… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49355/R49355.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49355.html |
| IN12738 | Federal Retirement Processing: Background and Recent Developments | 2026-09-18T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-22T11:38:09Z | Active | Posts | Katelin P. Isaacs, Tamar B. Breslauer | Retirement Services (RS) at the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) administers retirement benefits for civilian federal employees. In FY2026, an estimated 2,832,789 retiree and survivor annuitants will have received an estimated $114.8 billion in federal retirement benefits. Many in Congress have long expressed interest in OPM retirement processing, including the backlog of claims and delays experienced by former federal employees in receiving their full annuity payments. Previous congressional oversight focused on OPM’s goal of modernizing retirement processing. On July 1, 2026, after decades of paper-based processing, OPM announced the “Last Day of Paper,” “ending paper retirement processing for more than 95% percent of federal retirement applications and completing the agency’s transition to a fully digital retirement process.” Overview of Federal Retirement Processing OPM’s RS processes benefits and makes payments to federal retirees after employees’ federal agencies and payroll processors complete their employees’ retirement packages. OPM’s “Retirement Quick Guide” outlines the transfer of the claim from federal agencies to OPM, with the entire process estimated to take three to five months, including 30-45 days for federal agency and payroll processing, 10-15 days for OPM RS intake when a Retirement Claims number (CSA number) is assigned, and 10-90 days for OPM RS processing (i.e., reviewing and calculating benefits). When OPM RS receives retirement claims, it generally provides interim annuity payments to former federal employees. OPM states that these interim annuity payments are typically 60%-80% of the estimated net annuity (further reduced by federal income tax withholding). Once finalized, OPM provides an adjustment payment that makes up the difference between the interim and full annuity amount. No interest is payable for any period of interim annuity payments or delayed payments of finalized annuity payments. OPM Retirement Processing Data Table 1 provides monthly OPM retirement processing data f… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12738/IN12738.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/HTML/IN12738.html | |
| R49354 | The 21st Century ROAD to Housing Act (P.L. 119-101) | 2026-09-17T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-19T11:23:15Z | Active | Reports | Henry G. Watson, Katie Jones, Maggie McCarty | The 21st Century ROAD to Housing Act (P.L. 119-101) was enacted at a time of increasing concerns about the affordability of both rental housing and homeownership and the extent to which insufficient housing supply may be contributing to affordability pressures. Both the 118th and 119th Congresses held numerous hearings to explore these concerns. P.L. 119-101 represents a compromise between two bills that were separately introduced and considered in the House and Senate: the Renewing Opportunity in the American Dream to Housing Act of 2025 (S. 2651, also known as the ROAD to Housing Act of 2025); and the Housing for the 21st Century Act (H.R. 6644). Both of these bills included a number of sections that, in many cases, were similar or identical to standalone housing bills that had been introduced previously, often with bipartisan cosponsorship by members of the relevant authorizing committees. P.L. 119-101 was enacted on July 11, 2026, after passing with bipartisan support in both the Senate (85-5) and the House (358-32). The law contains 12 titles comprising 59 sections. It addresses a range of housing issues, including creating new incentives for permitting reform through community planning and development grants, addressing assisted housing inspection and environmental review procedures, removing the requirement that manufactured homes be built on a “permanent” chassis, and increasing Federal Housing Administration (FHA) multifamily loan limits. It authorizes or reauthorizes versions of several existing programs, including the HOME Investment Partnerships grant program, the Community Development Block Grant-Disaster Recovery (CDBG-DR) grant program, and a suite of rural multifamily housing preservation tools under the Multifamily Preservation and Revitalization demonstration. It also authorizes several new competitive grant programs and pilot programs, including an FHA Small Dollar Loan pilot, a Whole Home Repairs grant pilot, and a temperature sensor pilot for federally assisted housing. It revises several exi… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49354/R49354.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49354.html | |
| R49353 | Overview of Continuing Appropriations for FY2027 (Division A of P.L. 119-103) | 2026-09-17T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-18T15:24:25Z | Active | Reports | Drew C. Aherne | On September 2, 2026, the President signed into law H.R. 6500, the Continuing Appropriations and Extensions Act, 2027 (P.L. 119-103). Division A of the act—the Continuing Appropriations Act, 2027—provides continuing appropriations for FY2027 through December 11, 2026. Measures providing continuing appropriations are commonly referred to as “continuing resolutions,” or “CRs,” because they have historically been enacted in the form of a joint resolution. The Continuing Appropriations Act, 2027, provides appropriations for federal agencies funded through all 12 regular appropriations bills to continue operations from October 1, 2026, through December 11, 2026—a 72-day period covering roughly the first 10 weeks of FY2027. Congress must enact regular appropriations bills for FY2027 or an additional CR prior to the expiration of this CR to avoid a funding gap beginning on December 12, 2026, that may result in a shutdown of affected government activities. For most covered programs, projects, and activities, the CR provides funding at a rate for operations based largely on the funding amounts, authorities, and conditions provided for in regular appropriations acts enacted for FY2026. The CR includes several provisions that may further define or affect the amounts available for certain purposes. These include provisions establishing certain limitations on agency operations under the CR and provisions—known as “anomalies”—that establish exceptions to the CR’s general funding for specific accounts or programs. According to an estimate prepared by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), Division A of P.L. 119-103 is projected to provide a total annualized amount of $1.701 trillion in discretionary budget authority for FY2027. The CR includes several provisions that are specific to certain agencies or accounts. These include anomalies as well as other legislative provisions related to amending and/or extending existing provisions of law. The section of this report titled “Agency-, Account-, and Program-Specific Provisions” su… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49353/R49353.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49353.html | |
| R49351 | GENIUS Act (P.L. 119-27): Creating a Regulatory Framework for Stablecoins | 2026-09-17T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-19T16:52:51Z | Active | Reports | Paul Tierno, Marc Labonte | The Guiding and Establishing National Innovation for U.S. Stablecoins Act (GENIUS Act) was signed into law as P.L. 119-27 on July 18, 2025. The act creates a regulatory structure for payment stablecoins. Stablecoins are cryptocurrencies that aim to maintain a fixed value against some other asset, such as the U.S. dollar. Currently, they are used primarily to facilitate the trading of other cryptocurrencies, but proponents of the act believe that a regulatory framework could spur their adoption for retail payments and other non-crypto applications. However, depending on future rulemaking, various exemptions in the act combined with current market practices could limit how much of the existing market becomes subject to the act. The GENIUS Act mainly regulates issuers. Under the act, anyone can issue a stablecoin in the United States if they are approved and regulated by a federal regulator or a certified state regulator. Issuers can be divided into three groups—depository institutions, nonbank financial firms, and commercial firms. During the congressional debate before passage of the bill, its most contentious aspects involved its approach to certain policy issues, including the following: Preventing illicit finance. The act subjects issuers to anti-money-laundering laws, such as those mandating the monitoring and reporting of suspicious activity, and requires stablecoins issuers to be capable of complying with lawful orders. Given the pseudonymous nature of crypto, it is unclear how illicit activity can be effectively prevented in the secondary market to which issuers are not party. Foreign stablecoins. Foreign issuers are not required to be regulated under the U.S. regime. If they wish to be available to U.S. persons through intermediaries, they must be regulated in a country with a regulatory regime that the Treasury Secretary has certified as comparable to the U.S. regime, register with the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and be capable of complying with lawful orders. Eligibility of commercial fir… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49351/R49351.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49351.html | |
| IF13315 | Selected Federal Legislation on Search and Seizure Authority | 2026-09-17T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-19T12:08:00Z | Active | Resources | Cassandra J. Barnum, Tamsin G. Harrington, Andreas Kuersten | The Fourth Amendment protects the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures[.]” As interpreted by the Supreme Court, the Amendment imposes certain limits on searches and seizures by the government. Within these limits, Congress has the option to further restrict or explicitly authorize a variety of law enforcement activities by legislation. This In Focus identifies a selection of such laws Congress has previously enacted and provides considerations for Congress related to potential legislation in the realm of search and seizure authority. Fourth Amendment Backdrop Courts have determined that a Fourth Amendment search occurs if “the Government obtains information by physically intruding on a constitutionally protected area” or “when the government violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable.” The Supreme Court has said that “seizure’ of property occurs when there is some meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interests in that property.” If a law enforcement activity qualifies as a search or seizure, then the Fourth Amendment requires it to be reasonable, which ordinarily means that the search or seizure must be conducted pursuant to a warrant supported by probable cause and issued by a neutral magistrate (with some exceptions). To satisfy the probable cause standard to obtain a search warrant, law enforcement must generally show a likelihood that (1) the materials sought are “seizable by virtue of being connected with criminal activity,” and (2) the materials “will be found in the place to be searched.” The Fourth Amendment dictates that the resulting warrant must “particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” The purpose of this requirement is to prohibit “general searches” and not permit seizure of “one thing under a warrant describing another.” Federal Law Governing Search and Seizure Authority Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 4… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13315/IF13315.3.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13315.html | |
| IF13314 | The IRS Direct File Program | 2026-09-17T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-19T16:52:53Z | Active | Resources | Victoria M. Martinez | Individual Tax | The IRS Direct File (DF) program provided certain taxpayers with the option of electronically filing (e-filing) their federal tax return through a free, secure portal on the IRS website during the 2024 and 2025 filing seasons. The Department of the Treasury (Treasury) suspended the DF program in October 2025. This In Focus provides an overview of the DF program, including its implementation and expansion, preliminary findings from the pilot, and suspension of the program. Background on E-Filing Options E-filing provides faster delivery of refunds for taxpayers and lower processing costs for the IRS. E-filing and other means of lowering barriers to the tax filing process have been found to reduce tax evasion, which could increase the federal revenue generated from taxes. The IRS offers certain taxpayers several options for free e-filing. One option is the Free File program, a partnership that allows lower-income taxpayers to e-file free of charge through websites of participating tax software companies. The IRS also has two volunteer programs providing free e-filing and filing services for certain filers: (1) the Volunteer Income Tax Assistance (VITA) grant program, offered to low-income individuals, disabled individuals, and persons with limited English proficiency; and (2) the Tax Counseling for the Elderly program, offered to taxpayers 60 years of age and older. Another option is Free Fillable Forms, which allows taxpayers to self-prepare tax forms electronically and file directly with the IRS, albeit without guided assistance. Some private companies also offer free filing options outside of the Free File program for simple tax returns. Prior to 2024, the IRS had not offered taxpayers a guided option for filing directly through a secure portal on its website, an option known as “direct file.” Direct file became available under a pilot program for a limited number of taxpayers during the 2024 filing season. Later in 2024, the IRS announced the program would be made permanent. However, after the 2025 filing seas… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13314/IF13314.3.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13314.html |
| R49352 | Mongolia: In Brief | 2026-09-16T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-19T14:38:01Z | Active | Reports | Maria A. Blackwood | Mongolia is a landlocked, mineral-rich country about the size of Alaska with a population of 3.6 million; it shares borders with two powerful neighbors, Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC, or China). Mongolia has long sought to maintain good relations with Russia and China, while pursuing a “third neighbor” policy that emphasizes developing relationships outside of its immediate neighborhood, including with the United States. The United States and Mongolia upgraded their bilateral relationship to a Strategic Partnership in 2019. The Millennium Challenge Corporation has implemented two compacts with Mongolia (2008-2013 and 2021-2026). Mongolia has extensive deposits of minerals including copper, gold, coal, molybdenum, uranium, tin, and tungsten, and extractive industries account for over 90% of Mongolian exports. Mongolia has received international recognition for its peaceful transition to democracy in 1990, but some experts point to corruption and weak governance as chronic issues. This report provides an overview of U.S.-Mongolia relations, Mongolia’s relations with China and Russia, as well as Mongolia’s domestic politics and economy. | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49352/R49352.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49352.html | |
| IN12737 | Poverty in 2025 | 2026-09-16T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-18T15:24:27Z | Active | Posts | Joseph Dalaker | Annual Social & Economic Supplement (ASEC) of the Current Population Survey (CPS), Supplemental Poverty Measure (SPM), Poverty Measurement, Poverty | The official poverty rate in the United States, or percentage of people who live in poverty, fell to 10.2% in 2025, down from 10.7% the previous year. In 2025, 34.5 million people lived in poverty, down 1.5 million from the previous year. This decline in the national official poverty rate was reflected in poverty rate declines among children (13.4% in 2025, down from 14.4% in 2024), adults ages 18 to 64 (9.2%, down from 9.6%), persons living in the Northeast region (9.0%, down from 9.9%), and full-time year-round workers (1.6%, down from 1.8%). Additional poverty rates by demographic group may be viewed in Table 1 and Table 2 accompanying the Census Bureau’s annual report on poverty from September 2026. Statistically significant changes in poverty rates are marked with asterisks (rightmost two columns). Poverty is defined using dollar amounts called poverty thresholds that represent a low level of basic needs. Poverty status is determined using family income if a person lives in a family, or the individual’s own income otherwise. If a family’s or individual’s annual income is below the threshold, they are considered to be in poverty. The poverty thresholds are scaled by family size and composition and are updated annually for inflation. For a single individual under age 65 (not in a family), the official poverty threshold in 2025 was $16,749; for a family of four with two adults and two children, it was $32,649. These official poverty thresholds are the same nationwide. In official poverty statistics, income before taxes is used, which does not include refundable tax credits nor the value of noncash benefits such as those from the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) or housing subsidies. (Further details are available in CRS Report R44780, An Introduction to Poverty Measurement.) Another measure of poverty, the Supplemental Poverty Measure (SPM), tells a different story from the official poverty measure. The SPM registered a higher poverty rate (13.1% in 2025) than the official measure, with no sta… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12737/IN12737.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/HTML/IN12737.html |
| IN12736 | Health Insurance Exchanges: Sources for Enrollment Data | 2026-09-16T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-17T16:09:15Z | Active | Posts | Angela Napili, Kate M. Costin, Vanessa C. Forsberg | Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (P.L. 111-148, as amended), exchanges (sometimes called marketplaces) have been established in every state. Generally, states have two types of exchanges—individual exchanges and small business health options program (SHOP) exchanges—in which consumers and small businesses, respectively, can shop for private health insurance coverage. Different types of exchange enrollment data are released throughout the year by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). CMS data vary in whether they include all states or just the states that use the federal HealthCare.gov platform. This Insight provides links to some of the most frequently requested health insurance exchange data. It is not a comprehensive resource but includes an overview of the types of federal data available for the health insurance exchanges. For more information on the health insurance exchanges, including a discussion of enrollment data, see CRS Report R44065, Health Insurance Exchanges and Qualified Health Plans: Overview and Policy Updates. What is the difference between the types of enrollment statistics? Pre-effectuated enrollment data reflect individuals who have selected a plan but might not necessarily have paid their first premium. Pre-effectuated data are often released during or soon after the open enrollment period (OEP). Effectuated enrollment data reflect individuals who have selected a plan and have submitted the first premium payment. Effectuated data is typically released several months after the OEP. This data is available through data.cms.gov, and some older datasets are archived on the CMS Archive page. Where can I find health insurance exchange data? The following table provides links to some of the federal health insurance exchange datasets available. Table 1. Types of Individual Health Insurance Exchange Data from Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) Data Type of Enrollment Data Where to Find It What It Includes Current plan year enrollment Pre-effectuate… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12736/IN12736.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/HTML/IN12736.html | |
| TE10125 | Oversight Hearing - The Economy Act | 2026-09-15T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-16T09:24:08Z | Active | Testimony | Dominick A. Fiorentino | The Economy Act Expenditure Transfer 31 U.S.C. §§1535, 1536 Interagency Procurement Interagency Agreement IAA Determination and Findings D&F Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 Federal Acquisition Regulation 48 C.F.R. §17.5 | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/TE/PDF/TE10125/TE10125.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/TE/HTML/TE10125.html | |
| LSB11482 | EEOC’s Proposed Changes to the Federal-Sector Equal Employment Opportunity Complaint Process | 2026-09-15T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-16T09:24:33Z | Active | Posts | Abigail A. Graber | Congress has taken an active interest in the operation of equal employment opportunity (EEO) laws in the executive branch, periodically legislating to manage and gather information about how those laws apply in the federal sector. On August 28, 2026, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) to overhaul the process governing federal employee discrimination complaints. EEOC proposes to “streamline” the federal-sector EEO process by eliminating the pre-complaint counseling process (which is mandatory as of the time of this writing), administrative hearings at the agency level, and administrative class actions. EEOC instead proposes that federal employees with discrimination claims begin the administrative process by filing a complaint with their agency. Agencies would compile the record and resolve all complaints, without the option for a hearing before an EEOC-appointed administrative judge. Complainants would be able to appeal agency decisions to EEOC, as they can now. Under the proposed rule, EEOC could opt for an administrative judge to further develop a case on appeal. EEOC would decide whether to adopt the administrative judge’s conclusions, and in any case it would review the record without deference to resolve appeals. Parties would retain their statutory rights to file civil actions in court. Rather than process class complaints, the EEOC would accept such complaints only so that putative class representatives can exhaust administrative remedies on behalf of the class, and it would direct federal agencies to otherwise process complaints only for named individuals. The NPRM also proposes measures that appear designed to reduce attorney’s fee awards. Other proposed changes include limitations on monetary sanctions against agencies, more guidance on offers of resolution, and new complaint resolution timelines. EEOC also proposes measures to implement the Elijah E. Cummings Federal Employee Antidiscrimination Act of 2020 (Cummings Act). The proposed rev… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB11482/LSB11482.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/HTML/LSB11482.html | |
| IF13313 | An Overview of H.R. 3633, the CLARITY Act (Senator Lummis Draft) | 2026-09-15T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-16T09:24:16Z | Active | Resources | Paul Tierno | On September 14, 2026, Senator Cynthia Lummis published updated draft text for an amendment in the nature of a substitute for H.R. 3633, the Digital Asset Market Clarity Act (CLARITY Act) on her office’s website. The House passed its version of the bill on July 17, 2025. The recent text combines and modifies text from H.R. 3633, with amendments as reported by the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs on June 1, 2026, and S. 3755, as reported by the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry on February 2, 2026. The bill would provide a regulatory framework for cryptocurrency (or digital asset) activities and categories of industry participants (such as asset originators and exchanges). Generally, the bill would give the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) a central role in regulating digital commodities and related intermediaries while preserving certain aspects of Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) authority over primary market sales of ancillary assets, subject to a limited exemption from SEC registration. A summary of the major provisions of the bill is below. (For more on crypto policy issues, see CRS Report R48963, Cryptocurrency: Regulatory and Legislative Policy Issues.) SEC Jurisdiction and “Regulation Crypto” The bill would require the SEC to adopt a series of rules, collectively called “Regulation Crypto,” under the securities laws. These rules would provide a qualified exemption from the securities registration requirements for “an offer, sale, or distribution of an investment contract involving an ancillary asset.” The bill would define ancillary asset as a network token whose value would be “dependent upon the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of an ancillary asset originator or a related person.” Network token would be defined as a form of digital asset intrinsically linked to and that derives its value from the use of a distributed ledger system; under the bill, network tokens would not be treated as securities. Originators would be limited to raisi… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13313/IF13313.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13313.html | |
| R49350 | National Ambient Air Quality Standards and Selected Issues for Congress | 2026-09-14T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-16T09:25:12Z | Active | Reports | Jonathan D. Haskett, Omar M. Hammad | National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS), Air Quality | Congress passed the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 to provide “a more effective program to improve the quality of the Nation’s air.” This legislation included provisions that helped regulate criteria air pollutants present nationwide in the ambient (outdoor) air, based on the criteria that they were a danger to public health or welfare and were emitted from “numerous diverse mobile or stationary sources.” The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has designated six criteria air pollutants: particulate matter (PM), ozone (O3), nitrogen dioxide (NO2), sulfur dioxide (SO2), carbon monoxide (CO), and lead (Pb). For each of these pollutants EPA has established primary and secondary National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS), uniform nationwide standards that define EPA air quality goals. EPA sets standards at a level requisite to prevent adverse effects, including for sensitive populations, with an adequate margin of safety. EPA is precluded from considering cost when establishing or revising a NAAQS, but NAAQS determinations can affect pollution control costs; State Implementation Plans (SIPs), which outline states’ control strategies to achieve or maintain compliance with air quality standards; and individual facility emissions permits—as well as morbidity and mortality. To ensure that air pollution from new or expanded stationary criteria-air-pollution emissions sources is sufficiently controlled so an area can attain and maintain the new or revised NAAQS, EPA and the states administer the New Source Review (NSR) permitting program. The NSR program requires preconstruction air permits for new or modified sources such as petroleum refineries and chemical plants. The NSR program includes a minor NSR program required for minor new sources or minor modifications at existing sources that do not exceed certain emissions thresholds, a Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) NSR program required for new major sources or major modifications at existing sources in attainment areas, and a nonattainment NSR p… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49350/R49350.3.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49350.html |
| R49349 | U.S. Tariffs on Canadian Imports: Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930 | 2026-09-14T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-16T09:24:36Z | Active | Reports | Kyla H. Kitamura | Tariffs, U.S. Trade Policy, Latin America, Caribbean & Canada, Import Policy, Major Economies & U.S. Trade Relations | On July 20, 2026, President Trump announced he would impose 50% tariffs on certain Canadian goods starting August 19, 2026, to “offset Canadian discrimination against the commerce of the United States with respect to” alcoholic beverages, dairy, and motor vehicles (the “Section 338 Canada Tariffs”). President Trump stated he would impose these tariffs under Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. §1338)—the first time a President has expressly cited this statute to impose tariffs. On August 18, 2026, President Trump suspended the tariffs until August 22, citing progress in negotiations. After the two sides were unable to reach an agreement, the Section 338 Canada Tariffs went into effect on August 22, 2026. The Canadian government imposed retaliatory tariffs on C$27.6 billion (US$20 billion) worth of U.S. goods starting September 8, 2026. On September 8, the Trump Administration announced import bans for certain Canadian goods under Section 338 (effective September 29) and changes to the lists of products covered by the Section 338 Canada Tariffs (effective September 15). President Trump directed the General Services Administration (GSA), working with the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) to remove Canadian products’ access to U.S. government procurement programs. Some Members of Congress have expressed concerns about increased costs due to tariffs, a broader lack of stability in the U.S.-Canada trade relationship, and President Trump’s statements toward Canada. Others have urged the Administration to use tariff measures and the review of the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) as leverage to address U.S. trade issues with Canada. Congress has constitutional authority over foreign commerce and tariffs and could consider whether and, if so, how to codify, curb, or modify trade restrictions on Canadian imports and monitor potential implications for U.S.-Canada trade relations. Congress could also consider whether to engage with U.S.-Canada tariff and trade issues through the USMCA re… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49349/R49349.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49349.html |
| R49347 | Overview of the Department of Veterans Affairs FY2027 Appropriations | 2026-09-14T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-16T08:54:32Z | Active | Reports | Sidath Viranga Panangala | Veterans Budget & Appropriations | The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) administers numerous programs that provide benefits and services to eligible veterans and their families. These benefits include medical care, disability compensation, Dependency and Indemnity Compensation (DIC), pensions, education, vocational rehabilitation and employment services, assistance to homeless veterans, home loan guarantees, and administration of life insurance, as well as traumatic injury protection insurance for servicemembers and benefits that cover burial expenses. On April 3, 2026, President Trump released his FY2027 budget request for VA. The President’s FY2027 request for VA is $481.88 billion, a $36.4 billion (+8.17%) increase above the FY2026 enacted level. This includes a discretionary budget request of $144.72 billion, an $11.53 billion (+8.66%) increase above the FY2026 enacted amount, and a mandatory budget request of $337.16 billion, a $24.86 billion (+7.96%) increase over the FY2026 enacted level. The President’s budget also proposes to restructure the four medical care accounts (medical services, medical community care, medical support and compliance, and medical facilities) into two new account categories, beginning with the FY2028 budget cycle, known as the “direct care” and “community care” accounts. On April 17, 2026, the House Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Subcommittee marked up a draft version of the FY2027 Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies (MILCON-VA) appropriations bill. On April 21, the full House Appropriations Committee marked up the FY2027 MILCON-VA appropriations bill and reported it to the House (H.R. 8469; H.Rept. 119-622). On May 15, the House passed its version of the FY2027 MILCON-VA appropriations bill. The House-passed bill would provide $474.40 billion for VA for FY2027, a $7.48 billion (-1.55%) decrease compared with the President’s request. This includes $336.97 billion in mandatory funding, a $197 million (-0.06%) decrease from the FY2027 request, … | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49347/R49347.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49347.html |
| LSB11481 | Standing to Sue for Informational Injuries | 2026-09-14T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-15T11:23:05Z | Active | Posts | Peter J. Benson | Some statutes authorize private parties to file a lawsuit seeking information. The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) is a prominent example. FOIA provides that federal agencies “shall make available to the public [certain] information,” and it grants federal courts “jurisdiction to . . . order the production of any agency records improperly withheld.” According to the Department of Justice (DOJ), members of the public file hundreds of FOIA lawsuits each year. Courts have described lawsuits brought under FOIA and similar laws as suits that “seek[] to vindicate a statutory right to information.” Even when Congress creates a right to information, though, a private party who files a lawsuit in federal court must meet the standing requirements imposed by Article III of the U.S. Constitution. One of those constitutional requirements is that the party suing has to have suffered a concrete injury. Suits to enforce informational rights therefore require courts to decide when the “denial of information” amounts to a sufficiently concrete injury to support constitutional standing. That question has divided the federal courts of appeal (i.e., created a “circuit split”). Some courts have held that a plaintiff alleging an informational injury must “assert downstream consequences’” that result from the denial of information, causing harm to the plaintiff. Other courts have held that a plaintiff need only allege that they did not receive “information which must be publicly disclosed pursuant to a statute.” For the latter group of courts, no additional injury is required. This Legal Sidebar analyzes the circuit split. It begins with a discussion of cases in which the Supreme Court has found standing to sue for informational injuries. It then analyzes more recent Supreme Court case law that addresses Article III’s concrete injury requirement, and it describes how courts have applied the recent case law in informational injury cases. The Sidebar concludes by examining some considerations for Congress. Background on Standing for I… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB11481/LSB11481.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/HTML/LSB11481.html | |
| IG10101 | Surface Transportation Authorization Legislation: Timelines and Extensions | 2026-09-14T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-15T12:38:03Z | Active | Infographics | Lena A. Maman, Kezee Procita | Transportation Funding | / Surface transportation authorization acts are multiyear legislation that authorize spending on federal highway and public transportation programs, surface transportation safety and research, and, since 2015, intercity passenger rail programs. The most recent authorization from FY2022 through FY2026 was part of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA; P.L. 117-58). Congress has extended the IIJA authorizations through December 11, 2026 (P.L. 119-103). Historically, Congress has extended surface transportation authorizations beyond their expiration dates before passing new authorization bills. This infographic compiles timing and voting information on enacted surface transportation authorization legislation as well as related extensions since 1991. H.R. 3684 Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) 2022-2026 P.L. 117-58 H.R. 22 Fixing America's Surface Transportation (FAST) Act P.L 114-94 H.R.4348 Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century (MAP-21) Act P.L. 112–141 H.R. 3 Safe, Accountable, Flexible and Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU) P.L. 109-59 H.R. 2400 Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21) P.L 105-178 H.R.2950 Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA) P.L. 102-240 The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) does not provide information on the ISTEA extension between April 1 and June 9, 1998, when TEA-21 was enacted. FHWA does not provide information on the SAFETEA-LU extension between May 30 and July 6, 2012, when MAP-21 was enacted. Source: CRS, using data from Congress.gov and FHWA, "Funding Federal-Aid Highways," January 2017, https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policy/olsp/fundingfederalaid/02.cfm. Information as of September 14, 2026. Prepared by Lena A. Maman, Senior Research Librarian; Kezee Procita, Section Head, Research and Library Services; and Juan Pablo Madrid, Visual Information Specialist. | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IG/PDF/IG10101/IG10101.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IG/HTML/IG10101.html |
| IF13312 | The Small Business Administration’s (SBA’s) Women’s Business Centers Program | 2026-09-14T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-16T09:24:02Z | Active | Resources | Adam G. Levin | The Small Business Administration’s (SBA’s) management and technical assistance programs offer free counseling, training, and resources to small business owners and entrepreneurs. Although these programs are open to any type of small business owner and entrepreneur, some management and technical assistance providers target specific demographics. Among those are Women’s Business Centers (WBCs). SBA funds WBCs through grants and cooperative agreements, and the WBCs are operated by the third-party entities receiving federal awards. Congress initially authorized a version of the WBC program as a pilot program in the Women’s Business Ownership Act of 1988 (P.L. 100-533) and permanently authorized the program in its current form in the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007 (P.L. 110-28). By statute, WBCs must offer small businesses: technical assistance, including counseling for obtaining business credit and investment capital (SBA and WBCs do not provide direct financial assistance to small businesses); management assistance, including guidance with general business planning, organizing, and staffing; and marketing assistance, including help identifying market opportunities, preparing marketing plans, and developing pricing strategies. According to a 2025 evaluation of the WBC program commissioned by SBA, there were 168 WBCs in 2024. Women-owned businesses may also seek assistance through other SBA programs, including Small Business Development Centers (SBDCs), Veterans Business Outreach Centers (VBOCs), and SCORE chapters (a mentoring program formerly known as the Service Corps of Retired Executives). Collectively, these providers (which SBA calls “resource partners”) seek to improve access to entrepreneurial education and assist with business formation and expansion. History As noted, Congress initially established the Women's Business Demonstration Pilot Program in P.L. 100-533. The act directed SBA to provide assistance to private, nonprofit orga… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13312/IF13312.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13312.html | |
| R49348 | U.S. Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program: Overview and Considerations for Congress | 2026-09-11T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-16T09:24:34Z | Active | Reports | Kathryn G. Kynett | Greenhouse Gases (GHGs), Climate Change, Environmental Policy, Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) | The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) established the Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program (GHGRP) in 2009 in response to a congressional directive mandating economy-wide reporting of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. EPA described the program’s purpose as gathering comprehensive emissions data to inform the development of future climate change policies. The GHGRP requires reporting from three broad groups of covered entities. Direct-emitting facilities in covered source categories report the GHG emissions released directly from their on-site processes and fuel combustion. Suppliers of fuels and industrial gases report the potential emissions associated with their products if combusted, released, or oxidized. Facilities that inject carbon dioxide (CO2) underground must report the quantities of CO2 injected or sequestered underground. Reporting is generally subject to emissions thresholds for both direct-emitting facilities and suppliers, primarily a threshold of 25,000 metric tons of CO2 equivalent (MTCO2e) per year, although certain source categories are required to report regardless of their emissions levels. There is no threshold for CO2 injection facilities, which must report all quantities of CO2 sequestered or injected underground. EPA began collecting GHGRP data in 2011 and has since collected data annually from approximately 8,000 direct-emitting facilities, suppliers, and CO2 injection facilities nationwide. EPA states these data represent 85%-90% of annual U.S. GHG emissions. The GHGRP requires covered entities to calculate and report annual GHG emissions using methodologies specified in regulation, tailored to each source category. Covered entities must report data on the following GHGs: CO2, methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), sulfur hexafluoride (SF6), perfluorinated compounds (PFCs), and other fluorinated gases. The program also includes verification and recordkeeping requirements. EPA generally makes reported emissions data publicly available. According to EPA, the G… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49348/R49348.3.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49348.html |
| R49346 | Temporary Protected Status Terminations, 2025-2026: Fact Sheet | 2026-09-10T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-16T09:24:10Z | Active | Reports | Jill H. Wilson | Immigration Enforcement & Removal, Temporary Immigration | Congress created Temporary Protected Status (TPS) in 1990 to provide safe haven to noncitizens in the United States, regardless of immigration status, who are nationals of countries experiencing armed conflict, natural disaster, or other extraordinary circumstances that prevent their safe return. The second Trump Administration has announced terminations for 13 of the 17 countries designated for TPS. For each of these countries, this Fact Sheet provides the termination date and the estimated number of beneficiaries as of June 25, 2026. Additional keywords: Afghanistan, Burma, Cameroon, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Haiti, Honduras, Lebanon, Nepal, Nicaragua, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Ukraine, Venezuela, Yemen, INA §244, 8 U.S.C. §1254a. | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49346/R49346.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49346.html |
| R49343 | Agriculture and Related Agencies: FY2027 Appropriations | 2026-09-10T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-12T05:08:00Z | Active | Reports | Jim Monke | Agriculture Appropriations, Agriculture Budget & Appropriations | The Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act (Agriculture appropriations) funds the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)—except for the U.S. Forest Service—and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA, in the Department of Health and Human Services). It also carries the funding for the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) in alternating fiscal years; jurisdiction for CFTC appropriations is with Agriculture appropriations in the House and a different subcommittee in the Senate. Agriculture appropriations acts include both discretionary and mandatory funding, which differentiates Agriculture appropriations from some other appropriations acts. Congressional debate on appropriations is primarily about discretionary spending. Appropriations for mandatory spending programs, although not usually debated, are necessary to technically make funds available for those programs (e.g., entitlement programs, such as farm safety net and nutrition assistance programs, that were previously enacted under separate budget enforcement procedures). The primary discretionary spending accounts are for the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC); agricultural research; rural development loans and grants; the FDA; foreign food assistance and trade promotion; farm agency salaries and loans; food safety inspection; animal and plant health programs; and conservation program technical assistance. Below is an overview of the legislative actions and amounts in FY2027 Agriculture appropriations compared with prior years. The Trump Administration released its budget request on April 3, 2026. The Administration proposed $22.055 billion for discretionary appropriations in the jurisdiction of Agriculture appropriations, a reduction of $4.923 billion from FY2026 (-18.2%). The largest reductions would eliminate appropriations for Foreign Agricultural Service Food for Peace (FFP) Title II international food aid grants (-$1.2 billion, -100.0%), the Rur… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49343/R49343.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49343.html |
| LSB11480 | SEC Proposes ”Regulation Crypto Assets” | 2026-09-10T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-11T15:09:13Z | Active | Posts | Jay B. Sykes | Blockchain & Cryptocurrencies, Securities, Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) | On August 18, 2026, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued a proposed rule that would create a tailored offering and disclosure framework for certain types of crypto assets. In announcing the proposal—titled Regulation Crypto Assets (Reg CA)—SEC Chairman Paul Atkins described it as “the most historic step yet to modernize federal securities regulations for crypto assets.” The proposed rule includes new exemptions from securities law registration requirements for crypto asset offerings, a bespoke disclosure regime for issuers that rely on the new exemptions, and a safe harbor codifying SEC guidance as to when crypto assets issued pursuant to an investment contract are no longer subject to SEC oversight. This Legal Sidebar provides an overview of proposed Reg CA and discusses issues that may be of interest to Congress, which is considering comprehensive crypto market-structure legislation. Background The status of crypto assets under federal securities law has been a point of contention for some time. The federal securities laws define the term “security” to include a range of traditional financial instruments such as stocks and bonds, in addition to “investment contracts”—a category that courts have used to evaluate whether “[n]ovel, uncommon, or irregular” arrangements fall within the SEC’s jurisdiction. Under the Supreme Court’s 1946 decision in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., an arrangement qualifies as an “investment contract” if it involves a “contract, transaction or scheme” whereby a person invests money in a common enterprise with an expectation of profit derived from the efforts of others. The SEC and federal courts have generally used the Howey test to evaluate whether specific crypto assets are subject to the securities laws. Crypto assets include a diverse range of instruments, ranging from Bitcoin to stablecoins to “meme coins.” Many of the core disputes involving crypto and securities law, however, involve something like the following fact pattern: A developer seeks to raise capital to create a… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB11480/LSB11480.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/HTML/LSB11480.html |
| LSB11479 | The Sixth Amendment’s Right to Assistance of Counsel and the Risk of Denaturalization: Federal Circuit Courts Are Split | 2026-09-10T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-11T14:39:31Z | Active | Posts | Alejandra Aramayo | Immigration, Immigration Law, Right to Counsel, Sixth Amendment | Until the Supreme Court decided Padilla v. Kentucky in 2010, immigration consequences of guilty pleas were generally treated by reviewing courts as exempted from the Sixth Amendment’s requirement to provide effective assistance of counsel. In Padilla, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment requires a criminal defense attorney to advise an alien client as to whether pleading guilty to a particular offense carries a risk of being placed in removal proceedings. The majority reasoned that removal is a severe penalty; that historically, removal had been closely associated with criminal prosecutions; and that it was difficult to separate “the penalty from the conviction” because changes to immigration law had raised the stakes of criminal convictions for criminal alien defendants. Both before and following Padilla, in ineffective assistance of counsel claims where a defendant argues that a plea was not valid, lower courts have determined that defendants must be made aware of any direct consequences of the plea—such as the punishment that can be imposed—and that criminal defense attorneys have no duty to advise defendants of the collateral consequences of the plea. The Supreme Court has yet to endorse or reject this framework. The lower courts have often treated Padilla as recognizing a “narrow deportation exception to the otherwise chink-free wall between direct and collateral consequences.’” Recently, a split has emerged among federal appeals courts as to whether a similar exception exists when a criminal naturalized defendant faces a risk of denaturalization when pleading guilty to a criminal offense. In 2024, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (Second Circuit) held that, because the risk of denaturalization is similar to the risk of removal that the Supreme Court identified in Padilla, a criminal defense attorney must advise the naturalized client of the risk of denaturalization. Conversely, in 2026, the Sixth Circuit held that because the risk of denaturalization is a collateral—and not a direct—con… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB11479/LSB11479.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/HTML/LSB11479.html |
| IF13311 | Overview of the 340B Drug Discount Program | 2026-09-10T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-11T14:26:24Z | Active | Resources | Hannah-Alise Rogers, Laura A. Wreschnig | Drug Pricing, Health Resources & Services Administration (HRSA), Medicare, Prescription Drugs, Drug Affordability | Congress established the 340B Drug Discount Program in Section 340B of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. §256b) through the Veteran’s Health Care Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-585) to enable certain safety net health care providers (“covered entities”) that serve low-income and uninsured patients to purchase drugs at discounted prices. The 340B statute requires manufacturers to offer these covered entities certain covered outpatient drugs (CODs) at discounted prices as a condition of their participation in the Medicaid and Medicare programs. The Health Resources & Services Administration (HRSA), part of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), administers the program. The scale of the program has increased from less than 30,000 registered sites in 2014 to over 60,000 in February 2025. In 2025, covered entities made approximately $100 billion in COD purchases through the program. The program’s growth has sparked congressional debate over its scope and HRSA’s authority to regulate it. 340B Program Discount and Participants The 340B statute requires the HHS Secretary to enter into purchase price agreements with drug manufacturers as a condition of their products’ coverage under Medicaid and Medicare Part B. The terms of these agreements require manufacturers to sell CODs to covered entities at a “ceiling price,” calculated based on a statutory formula derived from the rebate formulas under the Medicaid Drug Rebate Program (MDRP). Manufacturers may not charge covered entities more than the ceiling price if they sell the drug to any other purchaser at any price, although covered entities may be able to negotiate sub-ceiling price discounts. The providers that qualify as covered entities are listed in the 340B statute and include federal grantees such as Federally Qualified Health Centers, Tribal and Urban Indian Organizations, Ryan White HIV/AIDS Program grantees, and other types of health centers and specialized clinics. Certain hospitals are also eligible for the program, including Critical Access Hos… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13311/IF13311.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13311.html |
| R49345 | Implementation of the Whole Milk for Healthy Kids Act of 2025 (P.L. 119-69): In Brief | 2026-09-09T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-12T05:09:57Z | Active | Reports | Kara Clifford Billings, Randy Alison Aussenberg | The Whole Milk for Healthy Kids Act of 2025 (P.L. 119-69) was enacted on January 14, 2026. The act allows whole and reduced-fat (2%) milk in federally funded school lunches and exempts milk from federal saturated fat limits. Such milks were previously prohibited from the National School Lunch Program (NSLP) since school year (SY) 2011-2012, following a change made by the Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-296) to align milk served in NSLP with the Dietary Guidelines for Americans (DGAs). P.L. 119-69 also expands nondairy milk alternatives in the program. After publishing initial guidance implementing the law for NSLP, the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA’s) Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) (now the Food and Nutrition Administration [FNA]) published a final rule on May 8, 2026, implementing the milk-fat related provisions in the law (not the nondairy-related provisions). In addition to NSLP, the final rule allows whole and 2% milk in other child nutrition programs including the School Breakfast Program (SBP), Child and Adult Care Food Program (CACFP), and Special Milk Program (SMP), citing the updated 2025-2030 DGAs (released in January 2026) as a basis for the change. This report begins with a brief history of milk in the school meals programs. It then summarizes the provisions in P.L. 119-69, discusses USDA’s implementation of the law, and concludes with some considerations for this policy area. | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49345/R49345.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49345.html | |
| R49340 | Budgetary Effects Excluded or Eliminated from the Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Scorecards | 2026-09-09T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-12T05:07:54Z | Active | Reports | Tori Gorman | Statutory PAYGO, Office of Management & Budget (OMB), Federal Budget Deficit | The Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010 (Statutory PAYGO, P.L. 111-139, 2 U.S.C. §§931-939) is a budget enforcement mechanism intended to ensure that laws affecting direct (mandatory) spending or revenues do not, in aggregate, increase budget deficits. Under the act, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is required to maintain two scorecards that record the estimated average annual net effects on the deficit of enacted PAYGO legislation over 5 years and 10 years, respectively. The scorecards are cumulative—they keep a running total of net deficit effects across successive sessions of Congress. OMB is required to finalize the scorecards at the end of each congressional session. If either scorecard shows a positive balance in the budget year (a “debit,” representing a net increase in the deficit), the President is required to issue a sequestration order within 14 days, implementing across-the-board reductions in non-exempt mandatory spending programs sufficient to eliminate the debit. Since adoption of the Statutory PAYGO Act, laws estimated to increase federal budget deficits have been enacted, but a sequester under the law has never been ordered—an outcome attributable to congressional actions to exclude or eliminate the budgetary effects of legislation from the scorecards. Between 2010 and 2024, nearly $12.07 trillion was excluded or eliminated from the 5-year Statutory PAYGO scorecard and $17.07 trillion was excluded or eliminated from the 10-year scorecard (as measured in nominal dollars) in the following manner: Exclusions provided in the original Statutory PAYGO Act. The 2010 law excluded from the scorecards the budgetary effects of legislation that would extend certain policies current at that time (relating to certain tax policies and Medicare). The law also excluded the projected budgetary savings anticipated from repeal of the Community Living Assistance Services and Supports Act (CLASS Act), and any provision designated by Congress as an emergency. In total, between 2010 and 2025 these original pr… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49340/R49340.3.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49340.html |
| IF13310 | Tech Hubs and Build to Scale (B2S) Program Updates and Considerations | 2026-09-09T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-12T05:08:27Z | Active | Resources | Julie M. Lawhorn | The Economic Development Administration (EDA), a bureau of the U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC), administers grants to assist state and local stakeholders with developing the conditions and amenities necessary to grow businesses, create jobs, and expand local opportunities for private investment. Regional Technology and Innovation Hubs (Tech Hubs) and Build to Scale (B2S) are two EDA programs that focus on fostering innovation and technological advancement as a means to drive economic development and growth. The programs are often referred to as regional innovation programs and are authorized under the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980, as amended (15 U.S.C. §§3701 et seq.). This In Focus provides a comparison of the programs’ roles, structure, and activities. This report also summarizes the two programs’ appropriations and other funding from FY2023 through FY2026, recent award activity, and select issues for Congress. Background and Program Comparisons EDA’s B2S and Tech Hubs programs are viewed as complementary because they support similar policy objectives through different types of investments. Both programs focus on activities that contribute to regional economic development and innovation objectives, with Tech Hubs having additional economic and national security goals. Both programs focus on the expansion of businesses in key technology focus areas such as biotechnology, quantum information sciences, semiconductors, and advanced materials science, among others. B2S supports organizations that assist entrepreneurs with innovation and technology development, including capital access as well as the processes of adopting, demonstrating, commercializing, and deploying new technologies. Similarly, the Tech Hubs strategy implementation grants (SIGs) may be used to support technology development as well as entrepreneurship development activities. SIGs may fund site connectivity infrastructure and workforce training activities, which B2S does not directly support. The two programs vary in award… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13310/IF13310.4.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13310.html | |
| R49344 | Status of FY2027 Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education Appropriations: In Brief | 2026-09-08T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-12T05:08:29Z | Active | Reports | Karen E. Lynch, Jessica Tollestrup | This report provides an overview of FY2027 Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies (LHHS) appropriations, including relevant congressional actions and a top-line comparison of discretionary funding proposed for FY2027 versus prior-year funding for FY2025 and FY2026. It also provides background on the scope of the bill and context for congressional budgetary decisionmaking. Full-year FY2027 LHHS appropriations have not been enacted. In the interim, FY2027 funding has been provided on a temporary basis through a continuing resolution (CR). The FY2027 CR (H.R. 6500; P.L. 119-103) was signed into law on September 2, 2026, following earlier passage by the Senate (90-6) on August 8, 2026, and by the House (370-48) on September 1, 2026. The CR provides continuing appropriations for all 12 annual appropriations acts (including LHHS) through December 11, 2026. In general, the CR funds discretionary LHHS programs at the same rate and under the same conditions as in FY2026, and it funds annually appropriated LHHS entitlements at their current law levels. Prior to enactment of the FY2026 CR, on June 9, 2026, the House Appropriations Committee voted to report its version of the FY2027 LHHS bill (34-28). The measure was subsequently reported on June 11, 2026, as H.R. 9260 (H.Rept. 119-696). The FY2027 House committee bill would provide $189.3 billion in regular discretionary appropriations, which is $5.6 billion (-2.9%) less than the FY2026 enacted level. The Senate Appropriations Committee has not marked up its version of the FY2027 LHHS bill. No further congressional action on annual LHHS appropriations has occurred as of the cover date of this report. | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49344/R49344.3.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49344.html | |
| R49339 | The United States and United Nations Reform: In Brief | 2026-09-08T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-10T16:53:01Z | Active | Reports | Luisa Blanchfield | The United Nations (UN) system comprises a range of interconnected entities, such as the United Nations, specialized agencies, peacekeeping operations, and funds and programs. UN member states and past and current UN secretaries-general have repeatedly attempted to reform different parts of the organization. These efforts tend to be cyclical, with member states considering reform proposals every 5 to 10 years. Primary areas of focus have included (1) UN inefficiencies and lack of accountability; (2) duplication and redundancy in UN mandates and activities; and (3) mismanagement of UN resources. The United States led in the creation of the United Nations in 1945 and has historically supported the organization, including UN reform efforts. Both Congress and the executive branch play key (and sometimes overlapping) roles in shaping U.S. approaches to UN reform. Over the decades, Congress has, at times, tied U.S. funding to progress on specific UN reforms and/or withheld funding from certain UN activities or entities with which it did not agree. Some U.S. Administrations have fully supported U.S. participation in and funding of the United Nations, while others have sought to limit U.S. engagement. Most recently, the second Trump Administration has expressed support for UN reform while at the same time withdrawn the United States from more than 30 UN entities and delayed or halted payments to some UN bodies, including the UN regular budget and peacekeeping missions. The most recent UN system-wide reform effort, referred to as the “UN80 Initiative” (UN80), was proposed by UN Secretary-General (UNSG) António Guterres in March 2025. It aims broadly to improve the effectiveness of the UN Secretariat, review the status of UN mandates, and realign certain UN programs and structures. Some UN80-related reforms have been adopted, while others are still being considered. UN80 is being pursued against the backdrop of shifting U.S. policy toward the United Nations and UN budget shortfalls due mainly to the accumulation of arrears… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49339/R49339.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49339.html | |
| IF13309 | Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Small Business Contracting Program | 2026-09-08T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-11T17:52:49Z | Active | Resources | R. Corinne Blackford | Among federal small business contracting programs (see CRS Report R45576, An Overview of Small Business Contracting) that provide contracting preferences to small businesses, the federal preference for small businesses owned by veterans is specifically for those who are service-disabled, known as the service-disabled veteran-owned small business (SDVOSB) contracting program. Separately, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) administers a unique program limited to its agency that provides contracting preferences for nondisabled veteran-owned small businesses (VOSBs) but grants priority consideration to SDVOSBs. This In Focus describes SDVOSB program features and requirements, briefly summarizes the VA’s VOSB program, and highlights recurring congressional issues of interest related to the promotion of federal contracting with veteran-owned small businesses. For an in-depth discussion of SDVOSB and VOSB policy, see CRS Report R47226, Federal Contracting by Veteran-Owned Small Businesses: An Overview and Analysis of Contemporary Issues. SDVOSB Program Background Government-wide SDVOSB Contracting Goal and Preferences Granted to SDVOSBs The Veterans Entrepreneurship and Small Business Development Act of 1999, P.L. 106-50, created a 3% government-wide annual procurement goal for SDVOSBs, applicable to prime contracts (made directly to a business from a government agency) and subcontracts (made between prime contractors and other businesses). The dollar value of SDVOSB contracts has increased each year since FY2003, and the 3% goal was met for the first time in FY2012. The goal was increased to 5% in P.L. 118-31, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2024. Agencies surpassed 5% in FY2023, FY2024, and FY2025. The percentage of subcontract dollars awarded to SDVOSBs has not met the 3% goal (recent data is available from the SBA’s annual procurement “scorecards”). To help the government reach its goal, federal contracting officers may limit competition for contracts for SDVOSBs under specified … | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13309/IF13309.3.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13309.html | |
| IF13308 | Overview of FY2027 Budget Request for the Census Bureau | 2026-09-08T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-10T11:23:13Z | Active | Resources | Taylor R. Knoedl | Introduction As a Department of Commerce agency, the U.S. Census Bureau is primarily funded through the annual Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies (CJS) appropriations bill. This In Focus provides an overview of the FY2027 budget request for the U.S. Census Bureau, certain comparisons to previous years' appropriations, and congressional action to date. Information is drawn from the Census Bureau's FY2027 Congressional Budget Justification and other relevant Congressional resources. The FY2027 budget request is divided between two accounts: Current Surveys and Programs, and Periodic Censuses and Programs. For these two accounts, comparisons are made here between the FY2027 request and enacted amounts for FY2026. The FY2027 budget justification also includes requested amounts below the account level in more detail; these amounts are compared here to the corresponding FY2026 enacted levels indicated in the Census Bureau’s FY2027 budget request materials. Figure 1. Census Budget Figure is interactive in the HTML report version / Source: CRS, data from U.S. Census Bureau, FY2027 Congressional Budget Justification. FY2027 Budget Request The Trump Administration’s FY2027 budget request for the Census Bureau is $2.012 billion, which is a $522 million increase from the FY2026 enacted level of $1.490 billion. Current Surveys and Programs The Administration requested $289 million for Current Surveys and Programs in FY2027, a decrease of $30 million from the FY2026 enacted amount of $319 million. This account includes Current Economic Statistics and Current Demographic Statistics. Current Economic Statistics Current Economic Statistics include business, construction, manufacturing, general economic, foreign trade, and government statistics. According to the FY2027 budget justification for the Census Bureau, the “Economic Statistics programs provide timely, accurate, and essential data on the structure and performance of the U.S. economy, supporting the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) estimation, fiscal and monetar… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13308/IF13308.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13308.html | |
| IF13307 | The Private Nondelegation Doctrine | 2026-09-08T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-09T10:23:04Z | Active | Resources | Victoria L. Killion | To preserve the separation of powers inherent in the U.S. constitutional structure, the Supreme Court has recognized legal doctrines prohibiting one branch of government from giving away its powers to another branch or entity. The private nondelegation doctrine is one such principle and is potentially implicated whenever the federal government—be it Congress, the President, or an agency—grants federal powers or assigns governmental duties to an individual or entity outside of the government (i.e., a private actor). Essentially, the doctrine provides that the government may not confer unsupervised governmental authority on a private actor. The government may enlist the assistance of private actors only if they “function subordinately to” a federal agency that “has authority and surveillance over [their] activities.” Unsupervised delegations of governmental authority to a private entity can, in addition to raising separation-of-powers concerns, violate the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. That Clause prohibits the federal government from “depriv[ing]” a person of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” The Supreme Court has said that allowing a few private businesses to choose the rules that govern their industry, for example, risks subjecting the “personal liberty and private property” of other industry members to the whims of competitors with potentially “conflicting” or “even antagonistic interests.” Origins of the Private Nondelegation Doctrine Two Supreme Court cases define the basic contours of the private nondelegation doctrine. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., a 1936 decision, involved a federal statute that set minimum wage and maximum hours requirements for coal miners based on agreements to be negotiated between the country’s largest coal producers and mine workers in their districts. The Court called this arrangement “legislative delegation in its most obnoxious form; for it is not even delegation to an official or an official body, presumptively disinterested, but to private persons… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13307/IF13307.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13307.html | |
| R49342 | Department of Homeland Security Appropriations: FY2027 Provisions | 2026-09-05T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-12T05:08:24Z | Active | Reports | William L. Painter | Through appropriations legislation, Congress provides not only budget authority for federal agencies and departments to operate, but also legally binding direction on how that budget authority can (or cannot) be used. These directions may appear in three places in an appropriations act: in the language of individual appropriations; in administrative provisions at the end of a title; and in general provisions at the end of a bill (or division, in the case of a consolidated measure, where multiple bills are combined in one). Some of these directions directly relate to the management of budget authority enacted in the measure, while others relate to policy or operational matters. Sometimes enacted appropriations measures include authorizing (or “legislative”) provisions as well. As with any legislation, these provisions are not unchanging. Due to the passage of time or other legislative developments, a provision may require adjustment or lose its relevance. Provisions enacted in appropriations legislation are a focus of negotiations between the parties and between the chambers during the appropriations process and may evolve until a compromise is reached in the final measure. Rather than detailing the entire catalog of administrative and general provisions in each of the various versions of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Appropriations Act, 2027 (H.R. 9310, 119th Congress), this report focuses on the proposed substantive changes from the FY2026 baseline (current law), as established by the DHS Appropriations Act, 2026 (P.L. 119-86). This report discusses potential changes from that baseline, as reflected in the detailed proposals for administrative and general provisions made in the Trump Administration’s FY2027 Budget Appendix outlining the appropriations request for DHS; and administrative and general provisions in House Appropriations Committee (HAC)-reported H.R. 9310. | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49342/R49342.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49342.html | |
| R49338 | Air Force Fighter Force Structure: Background and Issues for Congress | 2026-09-04T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-05T05:54:34Z | Active | Reports | Jennifer DiMascio | Since the U.S. Air Force’s establishment in the National Security Act of 1947 (P.L. 80-253, Title II, §207), Congress has provided oversight of the size and composition of Air Force aircraft fleet. The service’s aircraft fleet includes tactical fighter aircraft for various missions, including air-to-air combat, air-to-ground attack, air interdiction, suppression or destruction of enemy air defenses, close air support, strike control and reconnaissance, combat search and rescue support, and airborne forward air control. U.S. fighter inventories have varied across eras, reflecting changes in strategic demands, operational concepts, technology, and aircraft complexity. During World War II, the U.S. Army Air Forces fought a two-front global war and worked with defense contractors to build more than 100,000 fighters. During the Cold War, technological advancements made fighter aircraft more capable. The Air Force maintained smaller inventories while leveraging foreign military sales to allied air forces to bolster coalition airpower and interoperability. The Air Force fleet in 2025 contained what the service calls “legacy aircraft” (e.g., F-16, F-15) equipped with engines designed for high maneuverability and speed and advanced radar and weapons, as well as “fifth-generation” (e.g., F-22 and F-35) fighter aircraft differentiated by stealth features, electronic warfare capability, and improved avionics. Potential threats in the Pacific theater would require aircraft to operate at longer ranges and to counter advanced air defense and electronic warfare threats. In consideration of such requirements, the Air Force is developing more advanced fighter aircraft that could operate with collaborative combat aircraft affordable enough to buy in large numbers. Congress in Title 10, Section 9062, of the U.S. Code requires the U.S. Air Force to maintain a total primary mission aircraft inventory of not less than 1,145 fighter aircraft. Congress also has established a statutory requirement in Title 10, Section 9062a, of the U.S. … | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49338/R49338.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49338.html | |
| R49337 | Fertilizer Transportation: In Brief | 2026-09-04T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-05T05:53:32Z | Active | Reports | John Frittelli | The cost and supply of chemical fertilizers used by farmers has been an issue of interest to certain Members in the 119th Congress. Several bills have been introduced to either address fertilizer prices or seek to promote more domestic fertilizer production. The Trump Administration has taken a number of actions to try to ease the flow of goods domestically, including fertilizer. This includes a five-month waiver of the Jones Act, a law requiring vessels transporting cargo between U.S. points to be U.S. built, and waivers for certain regulations on truck drivers delivering fertilizer. The Secretary of Agriculture has stated a desire to reshore fertilizer production and has announced funding for this effort. Thus, a review of how fertilizer is transported to and within the United States and what federal policies impact its transportation may be timely. The three main types of fertilizer are nitrogen, phosphate, and potassium and can be transported in solid form (prill), liquid form, or as a compressed gas. Trucks are typically used to transport fertilizers over short distances, such as less than 500 miles, and to agriculture retail facilities and farms. Railroads are often used to transport fertilizers longer distances, such as from one region of the country to another, and to carry fertilizer raw material inputs in large quantities from mines or manufacturing facilities and to and from ports or land border crossings. River barges, such as those carrying cargo on the Mississippi River system and Columbia-Snake system, are a competitive alternative to rail. Oceangoing ships are primarily used to import and export fertilizers but are often not price competitive for moving fertilizers domestically along U.S. coastlines. A 1,700-mile pipeline transports anhydrous ammonia (a nitrogen-based fertilizer) north from terminals along the Mississippi River in Louisiana to Missouri, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, and Nebraska. Issues with rail service and domestic coastal shipping may limit the efficacy of increasing domestic prod… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49337/R49337.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49337.html | |
| LSB11478 | No NIETCs: U.S. Department of Energy Suspends Efforts to Designate “National Interest Electricity Transmission Corridors” | 2026-09-04T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-09T13:53:13Z | Active | Posts | Adam Vann | A decades-old effort to alter the federal role in permitting large-capacity interstate electricity transmission facilities took a new turn this summer, as the Department of Energy (DOE) announced that it would halt its ongoing efforts to designate three areas as “National Interest Electricity Transmission Corridors” (NIETCs) in which the federal government could exercise limited transmission facility permitting authority. This is the latest policy shift in an ongoing struggle over the nature and extent of the federal government’s authority to supersede state and local governments and authorize interstate electricity transmission construction and operation. This Legal Sidebar provides an overview of the legal authorities underlying NIETC designation, discusses actions taken by DOE and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), and concludes with considerations for Congress. The Federal Power Act and NIETCs Title II of the Federal Power Act (FPA) establishes the federal role in overseeing and regulating electric power in the United States. Since its adoption as Title II of the Public Utility Act of 1935, Title II of the FPA has limited FERC’s authority to wholesale sales and interstate transmission pricing and allocation. The physical siting of transmission facilities, as well as authorization of entities to construct and operate those facilities, have traditionally been left to the states except in cases where the facilities are located on federal land. As the electricity grid expanded and became more interconnected and interdependent, its operation and reliability became a more significant national concern. However, the federal government lacked the authority to direct or authorize new transmission capacity on private lands. In order to accommodate the expansion of the increasingly interdependent electric power grid, Congress sought to carve out a role for the federal government in siting transmission facilities on private lands. Section 1221 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct) enacted a new Section 21… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB11478/LSB11478.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/HTML/LSB11478.html | |
| R49341 | Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies (THUD) Appropriations for FY2027 | 2026-09-03T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-11T10:38:19Z | Active | Reports | Maggie McCarty, Jennifer J. Marshall | The House and the Senate Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies (THUD) Appropriations Subcommittees are charged with providing annual appropriations for the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and certain related agencies. Of the 12 regular appropriations bills, THUD is typically the fourth largest in terms of discretionary funding. In terms of the distribution of funding within the bill, including both mandatory and discretionary funding, DOT’s budget is generally larger than that of HUD’s, and the related agencies make up a small share (<1%) of total funding. Conversely, when looking only at net discretionary budget authority—the funding that counts for congressional scorekeeping purposes, which accounts for savings from offsets and rescissions but excludes mandatory funding—HUD’s share of total funding is typically larger than DOT’s share. President’s Budget The annual appropriations process generally begins with the release of the President’s budget in February. The Trump Administration’s FY2027 budget was released on April 3, 2026. For the agencies that comprise the THUD budget, the President’s FY2027 budget requested the following: For DOT, $25.1 billion in net new discretionary funding (-0.2% relative to FY2026 enacted). When paired with $85 billion in mandatory funding, total DOT funding would be $110 billion in FY2027 (+1.5% relative to FY2026 enacted). For HUD, $64.9 billion in net new discretionary funding (-16.0% relative to FY2026 enacted). The President’s budget proposed eliminating funding for a number of HUD grant programs, including the Community Development Block Grant and HOME Investment Partnerships grant programs. For the related agencies funded in the THUD bill, $322 million (-24.3% relative to FY2026 enacted). House Committee Action On June 3, the House Appropriations Committee marked up and ordered reported its FY2027 THUD appropriations bill (H.R. 9170; H.Rept. 119-606), following subcommittee m… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49341/R49341.6.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49341.html | |
| R49336 | Understanding State Capacity for Emergency Management | 2026-09-03T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-05T05:53:41Z | Active | Reports | Shawn Reese, Elizabeth M. Webster, Lauren R. Stienstra, Bruce R. Lindsay, Diane P. Horn, Erica A. Lee | Both Congress and the executive branch are actively considering reforms to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The proposals being discussed could significantly alter the current, federalized emergency management system that governs how disaster aid is delivered both during and after an incident. And while the bills Congress is debating often diverge from the recommendations made by President Donald J. Trump’s FEMA Review Council, both efforts share a common theme: states may need to play a larger role in supporting disaster response and recovery efforts within their jurisdictions. All states and territories have emergency management agencies (EMAs) charged with executing emergency management functions within their state’s borders. These agencies coordinate response and recovery activities to a large number of incidents, most of which never receive federal support. To assess whether these agencies have capacity to take on additional responsibility (some of which may have been previously performed or funded by federal agencies), consideration may be given to key governance, finance, and program features of a state, such as organization, staffing, and funding of EMAs; ability and experience with receiving federal assistance; established mutual aid agreements; and insurance strategies, amongst others. The exploration of state capacity in this report is presented to allow the reader to develop an understanding of a particular state’s approach to emergency management and disaster assistance, in order to facilitate assessment of the effect of proposed changes to federal programs and practices. Some state data is provided as illustrative example or to demonstrate a range of possibilities, but this report does not provide a full state-by-state survey of every feature discussed. A worksheet to assist the reader in documenting individual state features is provided in the Appendix. | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49336/R49336.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49336.html | |
| R49335 | Taxation of Social Security Benefits for Disabled Beneficiaries Aged 25 to 59 | 2026-09-03T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-05T05:53:45Z | Active | Reports | T. Lynn Sears | Social Security, Tax Reform | Social Security is a self-financing program that provides monthly cash benefits to eligible retired or disabled workers and their family members and to the eligible family members of deceased workers. Much of the discussion about taxation of Social Security benefits has been focused on beneficiaries collecting benefits based on their status as a retired worker, spouse, or widow(er). This report addresses how taxation of benefits occurs among beneficiaries receiving benefits on the basis of disability by restricting its analysis to beneficiaries aged 25-59. At age 60, individuals may become eligible as a widow(er) of a deceased worker based on age. Eligibility for benefits as a retired worker or as a spouse based on age begins at age 62. Nearly 98% of beneficiaries aged 25-59 are eligible for Social Security on the basis of their disability as a disabled worker (on their own record) or as an auxiliary beneficiary (on another person’s record), including disabled workers, disabled adult children, and disabled widow(er)s. To meet the statutory definition of disability, a worker must be unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity (SGA) due to any medically determinable physical or mental impairment that (1) is expected to result in death or (2) has lasted, or is expected to last, for at least 12 consecutive months. Approximately 78% of beneficiaries aged 25-59 are disabled workers, while 18% are disabled adult children whose disability began prior to age 22. Taxation of Social Security benefits began with the Social Security Amendments of 1983. The rationale for taxing Social Security benefits included improving tax equity by treating Social Security benefits more like other forms of retirement income and other income designed to replace lost wages. Further, it provided revenue to strengthen the financial solvency of the Social Security trust funds. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that in 2026, income taxes on Social Security benefits will total $120 billion, an amount equal to 7.1% of total Social… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49335/R49335.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49335.html |
| LSB11475 | State Marijuana Laws and the Dormant Commerce Clause | 2026-09-03T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-05T05:53:45Z | Active | Posts | David H. Carpenter | Federal law classifies marijuana as a controlled substance under the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA) and, thus, criminalizes many marijuana-related activities. Despite these federal prohibitions, a majority of U.S. states have adopted laws permitting certain types of marijuana sales and other marijuana-related activities. The state and local laws authorizing marijuana-related activities vary considerably. Some favor local residents over nonresidents by, for instance, only allowing or prioritizing the approval of licenses to operate marijuana dispensaries for individuals who have resided in the state for a certain period of time. Some of these state and local marijuana laws that favor local residents have been challenged as unconstitutional under the “Dormant” Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which bars states from implementing protectionist commercial policies. This Legal Sidebar provides an overview of federal regulation of marijuana, including the Department of Justice’s (DOJ’s) April 2026 final order easing some federal restrictions on medical marijuana. It then provides an overview of Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence and analyzes several conflicting U.S. Court of Appeals decisions assessing the constitutionality of state and local marijuana laws that favor in-state residents under the Dormant Commerce Clause. Federal Regulation of Marijuana Congress passed the CSA in 1970 to establish a uniform legal framework over drugs and other substances that pose a risk of abuse and dependence. The CSA classifies covered substances into one of five schedules, where Schedule I substances are subject to the most stringent restrictions and substances in Schedules II-V are subject to decreasing levels of restriction. In 1970, Congress classified marijuana as a Schedule I controlled substance. Schedule I drugs are statutorily considered to have “a high potential for abuse” with “no currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States.” The CSA criminalizes the manufacture, sale, possession, a… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB11475/LSB11475.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/HTML/LSB11475.html | |
| LSB11474 | Tariff Authorities in the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026 | 2026-09-03T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-04T08:25:56Z | Active | Posts | Christopher T. Zirpoli | Economic Sanctions, Import Policy, Tariffs | On August 7, 2026, the Senate passed the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026 (the Sanctioning Act). In addition to authorizing various sanctions against the government of the Russian Federation and Russian individuals and entities, the Sanctioning Act authorizes new tariffs on imports from Russia and a certain number of additional countries that either import crude oil or natural gas originating in Russia or facilitate Russian oil sanctions evasion. A sunset clause provides that the law would terminate five years after its enactment, except for a provision extending the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996. Article I of the U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power to impose import tariffs and regulate foreign commerce. Congress, in turn, has enacted several laws authorizing the executive branch to impose tariffs under various circumstances. The second Trump Administration has utilized these laws to impose several tariffs, including tariffs on steel and aluminum, automobiles and parts, and other specific products using Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (Section 232, 19 U.S.C. § 1862), tariffs on imports from many countries using Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (Section 301, 19 U.S.C. § 2411), tariffs on certain imports from Canada using Section 338 of the Trade Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. § 1338), and a temporary, now-expired global tariff using Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 (Section 122, 19 U.S.C. § 2132). Some of these tariff actions are subject to ongoing legal challenges. Certain states and other plaintiffs have filed lawsuits challenging multicountry tariffs the Trump Administration has imposed under Section 301, and the Administration is currently appealing a court decision invalidating the tariff it imposed under Section 122. If enacted, the Sanctioning Act would delegate additional tariff authority to the executive branch, authorizing tariffs on imports from Russia and other countries that meet specified conditions. This Legal Sidebar provides an analysis of the tariff pr… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB11474/LSB11474.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/HTML/LSB11474.html |
| IN12735 | Federal Legislation and Oversight of Law Enforcement Use of Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs) | 2026-09-03T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-04T16:38:54Z | Active | Posts | Kristin Finklea | Law enforcement use of automated license plate readers (ALPRs) is relatively commonplace in many jurisdictions. Law enforcement agencies use ALPRs for a variety of proactive and reactive policing purposes, including gathering intelligence and evidence, helping identify potential suspects, and facilitating crime scene analysis. Use of ALPRs by law enforcement has come under heightened scrutiny following reports of their misuse. This Insight outlines how ALPRs may be used by law enforcement and highlights legislative proposals the 119th Congress and possible issues for congressional oversight of this technology. How ALPRs Work ALPR systems work by automatically capturing images or videos of passing vehicles. A computer algorithm then detects, reads, and converts the license plate characters within the image into readable data. ALPR technology can also identify and retain associated information in the images, including vehicle type and color, global positioning system (GPS) location data, and date and time. Individuals in the images/videos collected with ALPRs may also be able to be identified using facial recognition technology (FRT). ALPR systems allow law enforcement to compare data from the images/videos against various databases, including hot lists that contain license plates linked to vehicles of interest and alert an officer when there is a match. Data retained from ALPR systems may also help law enforcement track vehicle location over time, depending on agencies’ data collection, retention, and sharing policies. ALPR Use by Law Enforcement According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, larger law enforcement agencies are more likely to use ALPR technology than smaller agencies—nearly 90% of sheriffs’ offices with 500 or more sworn deputies, compared to 20% of all sheriffs’ offices regardless of size, and 100% of police departments serving over 1 million residents, compared to nearly 22% of all police departments regardless of size, reported using the technology. ALPRs are used by public safety and private … | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12735/IN12735.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/HTML/IN12735.html | |
| IF13306 | Congressional Authority to Regulate Data Centers | 2026-09-03T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-10T13:38:05Z | Active | Resources | Andrew S. Coghlan | Artificial Intelligence, Electricity Generation & Power, Commerce Clause, Cloud Computing, Congressional Power, Environmental Law, Takings Clause | Data centers are facilities that house computer systems for managing and transmitting digital information. They are integral components in the development and use of artificial intelligence (AI), and large-scale investment in AI has led to rapid buildout of “hyperscale” data centers that consume large amounts of electricity and water. Concerns about those resource impacts, and related financial impacts on ratepayers, have sparked opposition to data center development and prompted calls for increased regulation, including state-level moratoriums on new data centers. Construction and operation of data centers and their associated infrastructure can trigger requirements under existing federal environmental laws, such as the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act. However, “[r]egulation of land and water use lies at the core of traditional state authority,” and private development on nonfederal land is primarily regulated by state and local governments. Retail water and electricity rates are also established through state and local proceedings. Thus, at present, debates about data center development and mitigating impacts of that development largely implicate nonfederal legal regimes. If desired, Congress could assert a greater federal role in regulating data centers’ environmental and economic impacts by acting pursuant to its constitutional powers under Article I, Section 8’s Commerce, Taxing, and Spending Clauses. This In Focus briefly summarizes those powers and illustrates their application using examples of proposed data-center-related legislation introduced in the 119th Congress. The Commerce Power The Commerce Clause authorizes Congress to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.” According to the Supreme Court, this grant of authority gives Congress power over (1) “channels of interstate commerce,” (2) “instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce,” and (3) activities that “substantially affect interstate commerce… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13306/IF13306.3.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13306.html |
| R49334 | Judicial and Administrative Developments in the Tax Treatment of Digital Assets | 2026-09-02T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-04T12:10:33Z | Active | Reports | Milan N. Ball | Executive Branch, Individual Tax, Jurisprudence, Nonprofits & Tax-Exempt Organizations, Tax Reform | In 2021, Section 80603 of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA, Pub. L. No. 117-58) defined the term “digital asset” in the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) for tax purposes. Several years before the codified tax definition, however, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) had begun issuing guidance on how cryptocurrency should be treated for tax purposes. The IRS treats digital assets as property, which means that the tax treatment of digital assets is generally guided by the tax principles applicable to property transactions. These principles cover sales, exchanges, the timing of income recognition, substantiation, and valuation. Detailed judicial decisions and administrative guidance discussing the tax treatment of digital assets remain limited. Since the enactment of the IIJA, federal taxing authorities have concentrated on providing stakeholders with significant digital asset reporting compliance resources. Federal materials that focus on the tax consequences of digital asset transactions have largely addressed foundational concepts and been preliminary. When detailed tax guidance exists, it has generally been fact-specific and limited in scope. Judicial decisions concerning digital assets exhibit similar constraints, which might limit broader applications. The few detailed decisions and administrative materials on digital assets taxation often turn on a digital asset’s characteristics and the facts and circumstances surrounding a particular digital asset transaction. Courts and federal taxing authorities typically look for analogies among traditional asset classes and transactions to assess whether similar tax treatment is warranted. Courts have issued decisions and the IRS has issued guidance and rulings on the tax treatment of digital assets in specific contexts, such as hard forks, airdrops, mining, staking, and non-fungible tokens (NFTs). Federal lawmakers have proposed legislation aimed at clarifying the existing tax treatment of digital assets and altering the tax treatment of digital assets in ce… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49334/R49334.3.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49334.html |
| LSB11477 | Congressional Court Watcher: Circuit Splits from July 2026 | 2026-09-02T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-05T05:53:34Z | Active | Posts | Michael John Garcia | The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the thirteen “circuits” issue thousands of precedential decisions each year. Because relatively few of these decisions are ultimately reviewed by the Supreme Court, the U.S. Courts of Appeals are often the last word on consequential legal questions. The federal appellate courts sometimes reach different conclusions on the same issue of federal law, causing a “split” among the circuits that leads to the nonuniform application of federal law among similarly situated litigants. This Legal Sidebar discusses circuit splits that emerged or widened following decisions from July 2026 on matters relevant to Congress. The Sidebar does not address every circuit split that developed or widened during this period. Selected cases typically involve judicial disagreement over the interpretation or validity of federal statutes and regulations, or constitutional issues relevant to Congress’s lawmaking and oversight functions. The Sidebar includes only cases where an appellate court’s controlling opinion recognizes a split among the circuits on a key legal issue resolved in the opinion. This Sidebar refers to each U.S. Court of Appeals by its number or descriptor (e.g., “D.C. Circuit” for “U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit”). Some cases identified in this Sidebar, or the legal questions they address, are examined in other CRS general distribution products. Members of Congress and congressional staff may click here to subscribe to the CRS Legal Update and receive regular notifications of new products and upcoming seminars by CRS attorneys. Administrative Law: A divided Ninth Circuit panel held that the lower court erred in dismissing a challenge to the Forest Service’s decision that the Healthy Forest Restoration Act (HFRA) exempted a restoration project from full National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) review, even though the plaintiffs did not challenge the agency’s reliance on HFRA when the Service solicited public feedback on the scope of the planned project. The majority held that it was… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB11477/LSB11477.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/HTML/LSB11477.html | |
| LSB11473 | Two Years After SEC v. Jarkesy: Overview of Selected Appellate Decisions | 2026-09-02T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-04T14:08:55Z | Active | Posts | Daniel T. Shedd, Wen W. Shen | In 2024, the Supreme Court decided Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) v. Jarkesy. The Court held that the Seventh Amendment—which provides a right to jury trial in common law actions—prohibits the SEC from imposing civil penalties for securities fraud by way of a jury-less, in-house adjudication. Under Jarkesy, SEC instead must litigate such enforcement actions in Article III courts, where jury trials are available in cases subject to the Seventh Amendment and where different evidentiary and procedural rules apply. While the case specifically concerned SEC enforcement actions related to securities fraud, the Court did not cabin its holding to such actions. Thus, the decision raised potential questions regarding the constitutionality of numerous other enforcement schemes enacted by Congress that authorize agencies to pursue, through in-house tribunals, civil penalties and other remedies for noncompliance. In 2026, the Court issued a decision in Federal Communications Commission (FCC) v. AT&T that determined that agency-issued orders to pay monetary fines are only subject to the Seventh Amendment constraints if they are binding. AT&T did not, however, provide additional guidance on determining whether a particular action is required to be heard in an Article III court in the first instance. In the two years since the Jarkesy decision, several appellate courts have considered Jarkesy-based challenges brought by various regulated entities subject to enforcement actions carried out through in-house adjudication proceedings. While some courts have rejected these challenges, other courts have concluded that certain enforcement schemes violate the Seventh Amendment or Article III of the Constitution under Jarkesy. This Sidebar begins with a background on the Seventh Amendment, its jury trial requirement and the public rights exception thereto, and Jarkesy. The Sidebar then provides an overview of selected post-Jarkesy appellate decisions and selected considerations for Congress. Background on the Seventh Amendment… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB11473/LSB11473.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/HTML/LSB11473.html | |
| IN12734 | U.S.-Canada Relations: Current Tensions and Issues for Congress | 2026-09-02T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-03T14:10:23Z | Active | Posts | Peter J. Meyer | U.S.-Canada relations have sharply deteriorated under the second Trump Administration. After several decades of deepening integration, officials in both countries are reevaluating bilateral ties. Congress, which historically has sought to foster cross-border collaboration, may assess whether and—if so—how to guide U.S.-Canada relations through current tensions, drawing on its constitutional authority over tariffs and other aspects of foreign policy. Shifts in Bilateral Relations Shared history, geography, and values have underpinned U.S.-Canada relations. The countries share mutual security commitments under NATO; cooperate on continental defense through the binational North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD); and coordinate on law enforcement efforts, with a particular focus on securing their shared 5,525-mile border. The U.S.-Canada trade relationship is among the largest in the world, bolstered by nearly four decades of trade liberalization and integration under a series of free trade agreements (FTAs), most recently the 2020 United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). The United States and Canada also collaborate on cross-border environmental and natural resources issues, including through state-provincial initiatives. Nevertheless, with a population and economy that are roughly one-eighth and one-thirteenth the size, respectively, of those of the United States, Canada historically has sought to protect its autonomy and national identity. The second Trump Administration argues that Canada has been “ripping off the United States for decades.” The Administration asserts that Canda has “extracted a persistent annual goods trade deficit” through unfair treatment, including “discrimination” against U.S. producers in dairy and other sectors. The Administration also has claimed that Canada has failed to stem drug trafficking across the border and echoed long-standing U.S. concerns that Canada has not dedicated sufficient resources to defense. Citing these issues and other objectives, such as repatriating … | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12734/IN12734.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/HTML/IN12734.html | |
| IF13304 | National Infrastructure Bank: Proposals in the 119th Congress | 2026-09-02T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-03T09:56:14Z | Active | Resources | William J. Mallett | Transportation Funding | Introduction The term infrastructure generally refers to long-lived, capital-intensive systems and facilities in the areas of transportation, energy, water, and telecommunications. Some broader definitions also include facilities for education, recreation, and health. The condition and performance of these systems are generally thought to be important for the nation’s well-being, but there is less agreement on the optimal level of infrastructure investment, how to maximize the effectiveness of spending, and the appropriate role of the federal government in the development of infrastructure and its operations and maintenance (O&M). State and local governments and the private sector provide the bulk of infrastructure investment in the United States. The federal role in infrastructure investment is limited in size and scope. In 2023, the federal government was responsible for 31% of government capital spending on transportation and water infrastructure and 13% of O&M spending. The federal government supports infrastructure investment in four ways: (1) direct investment in federally owned infrastructure; (2) grants to nonfederal entities, especially state and local governments; (3) tax preferences that forgo federal revenue to provide incentives for nonfederal investment in infrastructure; and (4) loans and other types of credit assistance to nonfederal entities. National Infrastructure Bank A national infrastructure bank is typically seen as a way for the federal government to provide loans, loan guarantees, and lines of credit to support infrastructure projects carried out by nonfederal entities. Many different formulations have been proposed over the years, but policy choices typically include Infrastructure type. Some proposals focus on one type, such as transportation or energy, but most would support a wider spectrum of sectors. Institutional form and governance. Most current proposals would create a wholly owned government corporation overseen by a board whose members are selected by the President or Congress.… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13304/IF13304.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13304.html |
| R49328 | Chile in Brief: Overview and U.S. Relations | 2026-09-01T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-03T16:24:56Z | Active | Reports | Peter J. Meyer | Latin America, Caribbean & Canada, Chile | Chile traditionally has been a close U.S. partner in Latin America. Since Chile’s 1990 return to democracy, the United States and Chile have maintained close economic and security ties, worked to promote democracy and human rights, and cooperated on scientific research and in other areas. Congress has helped shape the bilateral relationship at times, including through the imposition of restrictions on arms sales and military assistance to Chile during the country’s 1973-1990 dictatorship (e.g., P.L. 94-329, §406), the approval and implementation of the U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement in 2003 (P.L. 108-77), and Senate consent to the ratification of a bilateral tax treaty in 2023 (Treaty Doc. 112-8). Chile’s Domestic Situation President José Antonio Kast of the right-wing Republican Party was inaugurated to a four-year term on March 11, 2026, succeeding President Gabriel Boric of the left-wing Broad Front (2022-2026). Kast’s 2025 electoral victory was the fifth consecutive presidential election in which Chileans voted out the incumbent political coalition. The Kast administration has begun to implement business-friendly economic reforms, more restrictive immigration policies, and various initiatives intended to suppress crime and violence. Kast has needed to secure the support of unaffiliated and/or opposition legislators to enact his legislative agenda since the center-right and right-wing political coalitions incorporated into his government lack majorities in both houses of the Chilean congress. Since taking office, Kast’s approval rating has declined from 57% to 38%, and his disapproval rating has climbed from 34% to 59%, driven primarily by a deterioration in economic conditions. U.S.-Chile Relations The second Trump and Kast administrations have sought to reset the U.S.-Chile relationship, which was somewhat strained during the final year of the Boric administration due to disagreements over U.S. tariffs and military operations in the Western Hemisphere, among other policy differences. The U.S. and Chilean go… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49328/R49328.3.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49328.html |
| R49327 | Army Corps Provisions in Water Resources Development Act of 2026 (WRDA 2026) Legislation: In Brief | 2026-09-01T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-04T15:53:55Z | Active | Reports | Nicole T. Carter | The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) is an agency in the Department of Defense that develops water resources projects, among other civil and military missions. Congress often, but not always, considers on a biennial schedule omnibus legislation to authorize USACE water resources studies and projects and to refine congressional policy direction for the agency’s water resources activities. Congress commonly refers to such legislation as a Water Resources Development Act (WRDA). The primary purposes of USACE water resources studies and projects historically have been (1) improving navigation, (2) reducing inland and coastal flood risk, and (3) restoring aquatic ecosystems. USACE projects may additionally support water supply storage, recreation, and hydropower, among other benefits. USACE typically conducts project planning and manages construction, and for navigation and multipurpose projects, it may be responsible for operation and maintenance. Congress also has authorized USACE to assist nonfederal public entities with their environmental infrastructure (EI; e.g., design and construction assistance for public drinking water and wastewater infrastructure) in designated communities, counties, and states. The two chambers’ Water Resources Development Act of 2026 (WRDA 2026) are H.R. 9497, ordered to be reported in July 2026 by the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure (House T&I) and S. 4949, reported in July 2026 by the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works (Senate EPW). In the 119th Congress, each of these committees held WRDA-related hearings and in early 2026 solicited Member input on priorities for WRDA 2026. H.R. 9497, as introduced, has five titles. Four titles are focused on USACE. The fifth title relates to FEMA’s National Dam Safety Program, which is in the jurisdiction of both House T&I and Senate EPW. T&I has ordered reported the bill after a markup on July 14, 2026, when a manager’s amendment and other amendments were adopted. S. 4949 is divided into Division A principally … | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49327/R49327.3.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49327.html | |
| R49326 | Data Centers and the Electricity Grid: Frequently Asked Questions | 2026-09-01T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-02T12:16:51Z | Active | Reports | Ashley J. Lawson, Paul W. Parfomak, Martin C. Offutt | Artificial Intelligence, Electricity Generation & Power, Electricity, R&D Programs & Policies, Strategy, Operations & Emerging Threats, Technology, Information & Cyber Defense | A data center is a physical facility that houses computer systems for managing and transmitting data. The federal government has been pursuing policies to promote data center development, particularly as a primary component of artificial intelligence (AI), a “critical and emerging technology” with enormous data storage and processing requirements. Data centers require large quantities of electrical power. To date, data centers have generally secured power from their local electric utilities, utilizing existing transmission and distribution infrastructure (i.e., the grid). Many observers anticipate a need for new power plants and grid infrastructure to meet the needs of data centers in addition to other growing sources of electricity demand. The anticipated pace of U.S. electricity demand growth exceeds that of the last 20 years, raising questions of whether existing regulatory requirements and processes are suited for such development. Congress has an ongoing interest in the development of data centers, generally, and their impacts on the electricity grid, specifically. Hearings in the 119th Congress have examined data center and grid-related issues. Ensuring data centers do not raise costs or affect grid reliability for other electricity consumers, especially residential consumers, has been a focus of legislative activity in the 119th Congress. This report discusses frequently asked questions about data center electricity use, the potential impacts of data center growth on the electric grid, and government actions related to data center development. This report is intended as an introduction to data center electricity issues and does not provide in-depth coverage of all data-center- and electric-grid-related issues. CRS has several other published products that may be helpful in further examining specific data-center-related energy policy issues. | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49326/R49326.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49326.html |
| IF13305 | Trump Accounts and the U.S. Territories | 2026-09-01T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-03T10:26:21Z | Active | Resources | Brendan McDermott | Individual Tax, Poverty Reduction Tax Policy, Savings & Investment Tax Policy, Tax Reform | Trump Accounts are a new type of tax-deferred savings vehicle for the benefit of children, created by the 2025 reconciliation law (P.L. 119-21; also known as the One Big Beautiful Bill Act). Certain individuals can open Trump Accounts on behalf of qualifying children. Individuals can open accounts on behalf of children who are residents of the territories. Residents of the territories may benefit from Trump Accounts less than residents of the mainland due to differences in eligibility to contribute during adulthood and eligibility for contributions from governments. Limits on allowable investments may also constrain the impact that the accounts have on investment in businesses located in the territories. Overview of Taxation of Territories There are five inhabited U.S. territories: Puerto Rico (PR), Guam, U.S. Virgin Islands (USVI), American Samoa (AS), and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI). Residents of these territories are not generally subject to the tax law of the United States on the income they generate within the territories. Instead, these territories impose their own local tax laws. The U.S. Internal Revenue Code (IRC) serves as the local tax law in four of the territories. Through a mirror-code system, three territories (USVI, Guam, and the CNMI) substitute their names for the “United States” to give the IRC the proper effect in law. AS is not bound by the mirror system but has adopted much of the IRC for its income tax. PR has its own income tax system that is not based on the IRC. The U.S. income tax generally applies to income generated on citizens, residents, and corporations of the United States, based upon their worldwide income. However, while bona fide residents of U.S. territories are U.S. citizens or nationals, they are taxed similarly to foreign citizens because their income earned from territorial sources is treated as foreign-source income. An individual is generally considered a bona fide resident of a territory if they meet a physical presence test (e.g., are p… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13305/IF13305.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13305.html |
| IF13303 | Large Retirement Account Balances: An Overview | 2026-09-01T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-03T08:56:36Z | Active | Resources | Elizabeth A. Myers | Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs), Retirement Income Adequacy, Pensions & IRAs | Congress has authorized tax advantages to encourage employers to offer retirement plans, such as defined contribution (DC) plans, and individuals to save for retirement through such plans, or through individual retirement accounts (IRAs). Contributions to DC accounts and IRAs can be made on a pretax (traditional) basis or an after-tax (Roth) basis. Investment earnings in pretax accounts grow on a tax-deferred basis; investment earnings in Roth accounts grow on a tax-free basis. Retirement accounts are one of the largest tax expenditures for the federal government: The Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) estimated expenditures for DC accounts and IRAs to be $250 billion in FY2026. In 2022, about 54% of U.S. households had savings in DC accounts or IRAs (collectively referred to throughout this In Focus as retirement accounts). The median balance in these accounts was $87,000; the average balance was $334,000. Many policy discussions about retirement accounts focus on increasing access and savings; recent congressional actions aim to increase such outcomes. At the same time, some discussions focus on a comparatively small number of individuals who have been able to accumulate very large retirement account balances, which some believe conflict with congressional intent for tax-preferred savings; recent congressional proposals would limit retirement asset accumulation for certain individuals. This In Focus describes DC plans and IRAs and explains how individuals might have accumulated very large balances in such accounts. It also discusses recent policy changes that could result in greater asset accumulation, as well as policy proposals that would limit asset accumulation in these accounts. Defined Contribution Plans In DC plans, workers have individual pretax or designated Roth accounts funded by their own contributions, contributions from their employers, or both. Contributions (including “catch-up” contributions for those aged 50 and older) to DC accounts by employees and employers in a year may not exceed specifie… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13303/IF13303.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13303.html |
| R49329 | State Actions to Lower Drug Prices: Selected Legal Issues | 2026-08-31T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-03T17:24:47Z | Active | Reports | Hannah-Alise Rogers, Jennifer A. Staman | Drug Affordability, FDA Product Regulation & Medical Research, Jurisprudence, Prescription Drugs | As federal lawmakers engage in efforts to target high prescription drug prices, states have also taken actions intended to reduce drug prices and make drugs more affordable for consumers. States have enacted a variety of legislative measures, including some that restrict drug manufacturers from pricing their drugs at certain levels, and others that regulate the business practices of pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs), pharmacies, and other participants in the pharmaceutical supply chain. In some instances, pharmaceutical manufacturers and other stakeholders have sued to challenge various state drug pricing laws, and in general, plaintiffs in these cases claim that such laws violate certain constitutional provisions and doctrines that restrict state authority and sovereignty. This report reviews selected state efforts to enact prescription drug pricing legislation and analyzes related legal challenges. To combat excessive or so-called “unconscionable” prescription drug prices, some states have enacted laws prohibiting drug manufacturers from increasing their prices beyond certain levels. Drug manufacturers and pharmaceutical trade associations have challenged at least three state “price-gouging” laws on the basis that they are unconstitutionally vague and invalid under the Dormant Commerce Clause. In one case, an appeals court held that a Maryland state law was unconstitutional under the extraterritoriality principle of the Dormant Commerce Clause, because the state law regulated wholly out-of-state transactions. See Association for Accessible Medicines (AAM) v. Frosh, 887 F.3d 664 (4th Cir. 2018). By comparison, in a different lawsuit, an Illinois district court has denied a motion to preliminarily enjoin an Illinois price-gouging law, finding that the plaintiff was not likely to succeed on the merits of its case because the state law did not violate the extraterritoriality principle of the Dormant Commerce Clause. See AAM v. Raoul, 805 F. Supp. 3d 854 (N.D. Ill. 2025). Prescription Drug Affordability Boards (PDAB… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49329/R49329.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49329.html |
| R49325 | The Horse Protection Act: Background and Considerations for Congress | 2026-08-31T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-02T17:47:31Z | Active | Reports | Eleni G. Bickell | Animal Agriculture | The Horse Protection Act (HPA; 15 U.S.C. §§1821-1831, P.L. 91-540, as amended) was enacted in 1970 to prohibit the exhibition, sale, auction, or transportation of horses that are sore. The statute defines a sore horse as one subjected to specified substances, devices, injuries, or practices that cause, or can reasonably be expected to cause, physical pain or distress, inflammation, or lameness when the horse is walking, trotting, or otherwise moving. Soring has been used primarily in the training of certain Tennessee Walking Horses and racking horses to produce an exaggerated high-stepping gait known as the “big lick.” Congress amended the HPA in 1976 (P.L. 94-360) to expand federal enforcement authority, establish civil penalties and disqualification provisions, and authorize horse show and exhibition management to appoint qualified inspectors meeting U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)-established standards. This framework led to an inspection system relying on industry-associated Designated Qualified Persons (DQPs), while retaining federal oversight and enforcement authority for USDA. USDA’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) reported higher HPA noncompliance rates in inspections conducted by APHIS personnel than in inspections conducted solely by DQPs during FY2017-FY2022, particularly among performance horses. USDA cited these differences, together with concerns regarding inspector independence and enforcement consistency, in adopting regulations intended to replace DQPs with APHIS-authorized Horse Protection Inspectors (HPIs). In May 2024, USDA issued the first comprehensive revision of the HPA regulations since 1976. The final rule sought to replace DQPs with HPIs, revise inspection procedures, prohibit certain equipment and substances associated with soring, replace the existing “scar rule” with a new Dermatologic Conditions Indicative of Soring (DCIS) provision, and modify administrative review procedures. Litigation changed the status of the 2024 final rule. In January 2025, the U.S. D… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49325/R49325.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49325.html |
| IN12733 | Immigration Enforcement Fines for Immigrants with Final Removal Orders | 2026-08-31T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-02T12:16:51Z | Active | Posts | Holly Straut, Audrey Singer | Immigration Enforcement & Removal | According to a press release from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), foreign nationals (aliens) who have been ordered removed from the United States and have not left the country have been issued fines, which in some cases reportedly total as much as $1.8 million per alien. Civil penalties for failure to depart were authorized in the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 but the provision was not enforced until 2018. In July 2025, Congress established a new $5,000 minimum fee for aliens who fail to appear for removal proceedings and are later arrested by DHS’s Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Individuals may be responsible for interest, administrative costs, and late payment charges associated with their fines. As of July 2026, DHS issued more than 103,000 fines totaling more than $84 billion; it has reportedly collected $1.2 million. Removal Process Any person in the United States who is not a U.S. citizen or national may be subject to removal if they fall within one of the Immigration and Nationality Act’s (INA’s) grounds of inadmissibility or deportability. Individuals who have been charged with such grounds by DHS may be placed in removal proceedings, which are adjudicated by immigration judges in the Department of Justice’s Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR). Those determined to be removable and ineligible for relief (e.g., asylum) or protection from removal (e.g., withholding of removal) are typically issued an order of removal (an appeals process is available). Failure to attend a hearing may result in an in absentia removal order. ICE is responsible for the detention and removal of individuals with final removal orders. Because of DHS resource constraints and humanitarian concerns, recent Administrations routinely have set immigration enforcement priorities; typically focused on public safety, national security, and border security threats. Past Administrations often used prosecutorial discretion to deprioritize removal of individuals who were s… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12733/IN12733.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/HTML/IN12733.html |
| IF13302 | FEMA Review Council Recommendations for the National Flood Insurance Program | 2026-08-28T04:00:00Z | 2026-08-29T05:38:26Z | Active | Resources | Diane P. Horn | Executive Order (EO) 14180 established the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Review Council (FRC) in January 2025 to evaluate FEMA’s future role in federal emergency management. The FRC issued its final report on May 7, 2026, offering 10 recommendations to reorient FEMA’s role. This In Focus addresses the recommendations related to the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP); another CRS report gives an overview of the FRC’s other recommendations. The NFIP Today Flooding is the most frequent and expensive natural hazard in the United States. The NFIP is the primary source of flood insurance coverage for residential properties in the United States, providing over $1.3 trillion in coverage and collecting about $4.6 billion in revenue from policyholders’ premiums, fees, and surcharges. Nationally, over 22,000 communities in 56 states, territories, and jurisdictions participate in the NFIP. Long-term reauthorization of the NFIP is a perennial congressional agenda item: since the end of FY2017, 35 short-term NFIP reauthorizations have been enacted. FEMA estimates that about 4% of homeowners have flood insurance. Property owners are required to purchase flood insurance if their property is identified as being in a Special Flood Hazard Area, as mapped by FEMA, and is in a community that participates in the NFIP. FEMA can only deny NFIP coverage to properties which have been declared by a state or community to be in violation of floodplain management regulations. The private sector covers a small, but growing, amount of flood risk. As of May 2026, private companies wrote 643,467 flood insurance policies, compared to the NFIP’s 4.55 million policies. For many years, FEMA has expressed the view that both the NFIP and an expanded private market will be needed in order to increase flood insurance coverage and reduce uninsured losses. Increased private coverage could potentially reduce the overall financial risk to the NFIP after major disasters. A key design feature of the NFIP is that policyholders’ payments are i… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13302/IF13302.5.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13302.html | |
| IF13301 | AI Investments and Potential Government Stakes in Private AI Firms | 2026-08-28T04:00:00Z | 2026-08-29T05:53:02Z | Active | Resources | Eva Su | The rapid build-out of artificial intelligence (AI) infrastructure and capacity has prompted policy inquiries relating to (1) the significance of AI investments, (2) the potential impact of AI on the economy and society, and (3) policymakers’ role in shaping how AI-generated productivity and wealth may be distributed across society. This In Focus provides background on these issues, focusing on asset allocation and wealth distribution in the context of potential government stakes in private AI firms. AI-Related Investment Surge AI-related capital expenditure (capex) is fueling what some observers describe as the largest technology-driven investment boom in history. In 2025, major U.S. technology companies (e.g., Amazon, Google, Meta, and Microsoft) spent an estimated approximately $420 billion on AI infrastructure. In 2026, AI-related investment is projected to exceed $1 trillion globally and close to $600 billion in the United States. One investment manager estimates that the cumulative incremental global AI capex from 2026 through 2030 will total approximately $7.5 trillion, roughly equivalent to the combined gross domestic product of Japan and France in 2025. Another investment firm places its baseline aggregate AI capex estimates to be approximately $7.6 trillion from 2026 through 2031 across AI infrastructure, including computing, data centers, and power systems to meet energy demands. Studies of AI investment and other historical technology-driven investment cycles indicate that, from the U.S. canal mania of the 1830s and the British railway mania of the 1840s to the roaring twenties and the dot-com boom of the late 1990s—transformative technologies often accompany periods of excessive investment followed by adverse market corrections, sometimes with broader economic repercussions (Figure 1). This history may inform debates regarding AI investment. Figure 1. AI Investment Boom and Historical Episodes / Source: Bank for International Settlements, The AI Investment Race, July 2026. AI’s Potential Financial … | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13301/IF13301.3.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13301.html | |
| IG10100 | The No Surprises Act Independent Dispute Resolution (IDR) Process | 2026-08-27T04:00:00Z | 2026-08-28T14:38:56Z | Active | Infographics | Wen W. Shen, Ryan J. Rosso | Private Health Insurance, Surprise Billing | / The No Surprises Act Independent Dispute Resolution (IDR) Process The No Surprises Act (NSA, P.L. 116-260 Div. BB, Title I) established certain federal consumer protections related to surprise billing—that is, circumstances in which individuals receive large, unexpected medical bills when they are unknowingly, and potentially unavoidably, treated by out-of-network (OON) providers. In those situations, the law generally (1) limits the amount consumers pay to what they would have paid had the care been provided by an in-network provider and (2) establishes a federal IDR process (before a private arbitrator (IDR entity)) that may be used to determine how much insurers must pay OON providers for the care. This Infographic summarizes the federal IDR process, incorporating a June 2026 final rule(91 Fed. Reg. 33900) aimed at improving the IDR process functionality. What are the surprise billing circumstances to which NSA’s protections apply? OON emergency services OON nonemergency services Provided at an in-network facility OON air ambulance services What happens after an OON provider furnishes care in these circumstances? OON provider bills patient’s insurer Day 1* Insurer pays or denies claim Day 30* If provider is unsatisfied with payment amount or denial Open negotiation Between provider and insurer Day 71* No agreement Proceed to IDR process Day 110* IDR Process IDR initiated When either party (typically the OON provider) submits notice to the other party and the IDR portal maintained by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) Day 116* Non-initiating party responds Day 121* Preliminary joint selection or random assignment of IDR entity Day 124* IDR entity determines dispute eligibility Day 137* Final IDR entity selection and parties pay administrative fee to CMS Day 130* IDR entity attests to no conflict of interest Day 129* If eligible, each party submitsa payment offer Each party also pays the IDR entity fee Day 144 IDR entity selectsbetween offers Selection must be based on(1) QPA** and (2) other sp… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IG/PDF/IG10100/IG10100.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IG/HTML/IG10100.html |
| IF13300 | FY2027 NDAA: National Guard Military Technician Phaseout | 2026-08-27T04:00:00Z | 2026-08-29T05:08:14Z | Active | Resources | Nicholas M. Munves | National Guard Military Technician Phaseout Provision in an FY2027 NDAA Section 1105 of the House-passed version of a FY2027 NDAA (H.R. 8800) would amend 32 U.S.C. §709 to replace National Guard military technicians (MTs) with a mix of Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) and civilian personnel over a ten-year period. It would do so by: Instituting a hiring freeze on MTs starting in FY2028; Authorizing the Secretary of Defense, who is using “Secretary of War” as a “secondary title” under Executive Order 14347 dated September 5, 2025, to convert MTs to AGR or civilian positions with the consent of the affected employee; Authorizing the Secretary to provide states with funding to rehire MTs as state employees; and Implicitly allowing MTs who do not accept these options to retire or seek other employment. This provision would also repeal 32 U.S.C. §709 at the beginning of FY2039. Section 513 of the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC)-reported version of an FY2027 NDAA (S. 4784) would authorize a similar phaseout. The report accompanying the SASC version of an NDAA requires the Secretary of Defense to submit a report to Congress analyzing the potential impact of the MT phaseout on “readiness, workload, military force structure, lethality, operational effectiveness, stress on the military force, State disaster relief capabilities, and the fully burdened costs associated with such conversions or transfers.” Full-Time Support to Reserve Components The reserve components of the Armed Forces consist of the Army National Guard, Army Reserve, Navy Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, Air National Guard, Air Force Reserve, and Coast Guard Reserve. These components are primarily staffed by traditional reservists: personnel who are required to serve one weekend a month and two weeks a year, but who may be called to active service for sustained periods. The reserve components also include full-time military and/or civilian employees. Per Department of Defense (DOD) policy, these employees, known as full-time support (FTS) personnel, ar… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13300/IF13300.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13300.html | |
| IF13299 | U.S. Army’s Patriot Air and Missile Defense System | 2026-08-27T04:00:00Z | 2026-08-28T13:38:35Z | Active | Resources | Andrew Feickert | Air & Missile Defense (AMD), Air, Land, Sea, Space & Projection Forces | The Patriot air and missile defense (AMD) system (see Figure 1) is an Army ground-based mobile system designed to detect, track, and engage aircraft, uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs), cruise missiles, and short-range or tactical ballistic missiles. Some Members of Congress have expressed interest in the cost, availability, and production of Patriot systems and interceptors, particularly in view of conflicts in Iran and Ukraine. Background Patriot is an acronym for Phased Array Tracking Radar to Intercept on Target. Beginning development in the 1960s, the first Patriot battalion was activated in May 1982. Originally designed to defend against high-performance aircraft, according to the Army, in January 1991, “Patriot successfully intercepted and destroyed an Iraqi SCUD missile fired at Saudi Arabia. This was the first combat use of the Patriot, and the first time an air defense system destroyed a hostile tactical ballistic missile.” Figure 1. Patriot AMD Launcher and Transport / Source: Janes, Land Warfare Platforms: Artillery & Air Defence, updated January 21, 2026, via CRS electronic subscription. Patriot Components and Capabilities According to the Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance (MDAA) and information from Land Warfare Platforms: Artillery & Air Defence (accessed by CRS via electronic subscription) by Janes, an unclassified defense intelligence company, the Patriot system generally consists of the following components: a radar set, engagement control station (ECS), missile launchers, and Patriot missiles. The radar set is made up of an AN/MPQ-53/65 C-band, multifunction phased array radar system that is remotely controlled by the AN/MSQ-104 ECS. RTX (formerly Raytheon) is the prime contractor for the system; Lockheed Martin makes a new type of interceptor missile. The radar can detect, track, and prioritize more than 100 potential targets and has a range of over 100 kilometers (km). The ECS is the only crewed element of a Patriot unit (typically by three operators) and is designed to communicate with the laun… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13299/IF13299.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13299.html |
| IF13298 | July 2026 Water System Cyber Incidents: Considerations for Congress | 2026-08-27T04:00:00Z | 2026-08-28T08:38:30Z | Active | Resources | Elena H. Humphreys | Water Quality, Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) | Reports of cyberattacks on water systems in at least seven states in July 2026 have increased attention on the security of the nation’s municipal water infrastructure. These and other cyber incidents have raised questions about the effectiveness of existing approaches to address water sector cybersecurity. Municipal water systems and wastewater systems are paired together as a type of critical infrastructure (CI) covered by broader efforts to improve CI security. Executive Order 13636 designated the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) as the sector risk management agency (SRMA) for water sector cybersecurity. Federal efforts to address the cybersecurity of the water sector have primarily focused on drinking water systems rather than wastewater systems. Authorized through the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), these federal efforts have generally involved specific vulnerability assessment requirements for larger drinking water systems and technical and financial assistance for smaller systems. This In Focus discusses EPA efforts under SDWA to address cybersecurity. It does not include information on Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) authorities or EPA’s SRMA role. Regulated Water Systems SDWA applies to the nearly 144,000 privately and publicly owned public water systems, which provide piped water to at least 15 service connections or that regularly serve at least 25 people. Nearly 49,500 of these regulated public water systems (35%) are community water systems, which serve the same residences year-round. These systems provide water to more than 324 million people. EPA defines 81% of community water systems as “small,” serving 3,300 or fewer individuals. These systems provide water to 7% of the total population served by community water systems. Less than 10% of community water systems serve populations of 10,000 or more, but these larger systems provide water to 84% of community water system customers. SDWA Assessments and Response Plans In 2002, Congress amended SDWA to require communit… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13298/IF13298.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13298.html |
| R49321 | Reforming the Energy Policy and Conservation Act: Balancing Costs and Benefits and Curating the Law’s Energy Standards | 2026-08-26T04:00:00Z | 2026-08-28T13:08:35Z | Active | Reports | Martin C. Offutt | Electricity, Renewable Energy & Efficiency | The Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA; P.L. 94-163), as amended, authorizes a national standards program in which the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) issues legally binding standards for the maximum rate or amount of energy used by appliances and industrial equipment. Divergent viewpoints on several issues surrounding how the program is administered and whether the costs and benefits are optimal have been expressed in DOE rulemakings, court cases, and congressional hearings and legislation. EPCA establishes a number of criteria for DOE’s stewardship of the program including that DOE periodically review standards, typically six years after the final rule of the previous amendment process. A March 4, 2019, hearing in the House Energy and Commerce Committee’s Energy Subcommittee drew attention to 16 standards that were overdue for EPCA-mandated review, as did a 2021 report to Congress by DOE. EPCA also requires that any new or amended standard issued by DOE be economically justified. A bill in the 119th Congress, H.R. 4626, as passed by the House, would amend the “economically justified” criterion to include a quantitatively defined, minimum amount of energy savings associated with a new or amended standard. DOE is also contemplating changes to the program at the administrative level. In May 2025, DOE announced that it would be “proposing the elimination or reduction of 47 regulations,” including 24 regulatory actions to amend efficiency standards, in many cases citing the current standard as not being economically justified. In contrast, the rulemakings amending the standards in the first place had found they were economically justified. Recent congressional action in response to certain efficiency standards includes three disapproval resolutions, per the Congressional Review Act (5 U.S.C. §§801-808), revoking DOE’s revisions to standards that would have made them more stringent. The program could continue as currently authorized in law, or—should Congress see a need to reform EPCA—potential options could i… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49321.html | |
| IF13297 | USPS Ballot Mail Rule: Overview and Potential Impact | 2026-08-26T04:00:00Z | 2026-08-27T17:08:19Z | Active | Resources | Michelle D. Christensen | On March 31, 2026, President Donald Trump issued Executive Order (EO) 14399, “Ensuring Citizenship Verification and Integrity in Federal Elections.” The order states “unique ballot envelope identifiers, such as bar codes, enable confirmation that only citizens receive and cast ballots, reducing the risk of fraud and protecting the integrity of Federal elections.” In addition to provisions for other agencies, the order directs the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) to issue regulations establishing uniform standards for mail-in or absentee ballots for federal elections. These standards include many of the election mail guidelines that USPS has recommended but has not required. On August 26, 2026, USPS issued a final rule, “Ballot Mail for Federal Elections,” effective August 21, 2026. The rule adds a new section to USPS’s Domestic Mail Manual (DMM) and includes many of the standards and procedural changes addressed in the EO. Under the rule, outbound federal ballot mailings that do not comply with the rule’s design standards or that are addressed to individuals not on the state’s mail-in and absentee participation list, as submitted to USPS, “will not be accepted” for delivery by USPS. USPS notes in publishing this final rule that two injunctions were in place prohibiting it from fully implementing the EO and that while the rule is final and in effect, it “will not take actions to implement the rule specifically for the 2026 election unless and until the government obtains relief from those injunctions.” On August 24, 2026, one injunction was stayed by the Supreme Court, and on August 26, 2026, the other was vacated by the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. USPS Ballot Mail Guidelines Prior to issuing the ballot mail rule, USPS has issued guidance addressing ballot-mail-specific issues, provided certain election-specific procedures and products, and encouraged election officials to follow its recommended practices related to ballot mail. However, adoption of these practices by election officials has n… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13297/IF13297.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13297.html | |
| R49319 | China’s Diplomacy: Selected Issues for Congress | 2026-08-25T04:00:00Z | 2026-08-28T14:38:48Z | Active | Reports | Ricardo Barrios | The People’s Republic of China (PRC or China) uses diplomacy to influence governments, publics, international organizations, and international affairs across the world. Under Communist Party of China (CPC) General Secretary Xi Jinping (2012-present), the PRC has adopted a more dynamic, expansive foreign policy vision than that which the PRC had articulated since the 1990s. This more dynamic vision has led the PRC to launch multiple large-scale global initiatives that aim to influence development, security, and values internationally. Increasingly, PRC efforts to shape the landscape in these areas, and others, have implications for U.S. foreign policy and interests. A socialist state under the leadership of the CPC, the PRC appears to be pursuing several goals by diplomatic means, according to scholars and analysts. These goals include safeguarding a broadly defined conception of national security; blunting U.S. power and influence relative to the PRC’s own, such as by promoting multipolarity; using diplomacy to isolate Taiwan, to unify the PRC with the self-ruling island; reforming international institutions; and fostering economic growth and technological development, which may in turn enhance the PRC’s diplomatic capabilities. Policymakers, scholars, and analysts hold divergent views with regard to the PRC’s ultimate foreign policy goals. Some argue that the PRC seeks global hegemony and to usher in an “antidemocratic order” with itself at the center. Others contend that the PRC wants “status and authority without responsibility” and is “more inwardly focused than externally oriented.” Others yet suggest that the PRC seeks regional primacy in the Indo-Pacific, but has more modest ambitions globally. In his address at the CPC’s 20th National Congress in 2022, Xi articulated the goal of building the PRC “into a great modern socialist country that leads the world in terms of composite national strength and international influence by the middle of the century.” Although the PRC’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs conduct… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49319/R49319.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49319.html | |
| LSB11472 | Public Service Loan Forgiveness: Recent Legal Developments | 2026-08-25T04:00:00Z | 2026-08-27T17:53:10Z | Active | Posts | Sean Stiff | Public Service Loan Forgiveness Program (PSLF), Postsecondary Education | For nearly 20 years, Section 455(m) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA), as amended, has authorized a benefit for borrowers of federal Direct Loan program student loans commonly known as Public Service Loan Forgiveness (PSLF). First established by the College Cost Reduction Act of 2007 (CCRA), the PSLF program requires the Secretary of Education (Secretary) to cancel the outstanding loan balance of borrowers who have pursued public service. To receive this benefit, a borrower must have made 120 monthly loan payments under a qualifying repayment plan. A loan payment counts toward PSLF forgiveness if the borrower made the payment while employed in a “public service job.” The borrower must also hold a “public service job” when applying for forgiveness. The statutory category of “public service job” is thus key to administering the PSLF program. Congress did not leave the term undefined. In the CCRA and a 2008 amendment, it defined “public service job” to mean a full-time job in one of 18 categories, ranging from emergency management and law enforcement to employment with a nonprofit organization described in Internal Revenue Code Section 501(c)(3) (501(c)(3) organization).The Secretary has promulgated agency rules that further elaborate on elements of the statute’s definition. The regulations have long specified, for example, that a “borrower may obtain loan forgiveness” under the PSLF program if, among other things, they make the requisite number of qualifying monthly payments while working for a “qualifying employer.” The rule’s “qualifying employer” category, in turn, has long included governmental agencies, Section 501(c)(3) organizations, and nonprofit organizations that provide a nongovernmental public service, such as early childhood education, to name a few, with added detail about program eligibility (e.g., when employment counts as “full-time” employment). Through April 2026, the Department of Education (ED) provided forgiveness to approximately 1.254 million borrowers, totaling $93.4 billion in stud… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB11472/LSB11472.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/HTML/LSB11472.html |
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