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| id | title | publish_date ▲ | update_date | status | content_type | authors | topics | summary | pdf_url | html_url |
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| IF13336 | Removing PRC Artificial Intelligence Models from Federal Agencies | 2026-10-23T04:00:00Z | 2026-10-24T05:39:51Z | Active | Resources | Chris Jaikaran | On October 20, 2026, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued a Notice of Order Regarding Exclusion and Removal of DeepSeek Products from Federal Civilian Executive Branch Information Technology Systems and Procurements in the Federal Register. This notice requires federal civilian executive branch (FCEB) departments and agencies to bar products made by the People’s Republic of China (PRC)-headquartered firm DeepSeek from their networks, and to remove any DeepSeek products that may have already been deployed. The DHS order follows a similar action made by the Department of Defense (DOD, which is “using a secondary Department of War designation,” under Executive Order 14347) on September 8, 2026. The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) issued a similar order concurrently with DHS. This In Focus discusses these actions and their implications related to supply chain security. Overview of DeepSeek Hangzhou DeepSeek Artificial Intelligence Basic Technology Research Co., Ltd. (DeepSeek) is an artificial intelligence (AI) company located in the PRC. DeepSeek develops open-weight large language models (LLM), such as (the eponymously named) DeepSeek and DeepSeek-R1. DeepSeek’s AI products have been noted for their general and cost efficiency. While their models are not as powerful as U.S. models, DeepSeek’s models have cheaper token costs, can perform tasks quickly, and can be downloaded, hosted, and customized. Because of their price-to-performance advantage, DeepSeek’s (and other PRC AI) models have been adopted by some U.S. companies. The U.S. government issued warnings about the risks of PRC AI models and their adoption. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the National Security Agency (NSA) have said that DeepSeek and its peer companies have carried out large-scale distillation campaigns (e.g., the systemic querying of an AI model and using its responses without authorization to train another model) on U.S. models to develop th… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13336/IF13336.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13336.html | |
| IF13335 | Student Loans: Late Payment Trends, Servicing Practices, and Credit Reporting Issues | 2026-10-23T04:00:00Z | 2026-10-24T05:09:25Z | Active | Resources | Alexandra Hegji, Darryl E. Getter | Student Loans, Consumer Finance Protection, Postsecondary Education | Introduction A federal student loan made under Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (P.L. 89-329), as amended, is considered delinquent the first day after a borrower fails to make a scheduled payment. The Department of Education (ED), through its contracted loan servicers, reports delinquencies to the nationwide, private consumer reporting agencies (CRAs; i.e., Equifax, Experian, TransUnion, Innovis) after 90 days or more of delinquency. Generally, a loan is in default after 270 days of a missed scheduled payment, which is reported to CRAs. Since 2020, the portfolio of ED-held federal student loans (ED-held loans) has experienced unusual fluctuations in delinquency and default trends. This In Focus highlights these trends and how various loan-servicing-related issues may have affected these patterns and borrower credit scores. For purposes of this In Focus, loan servicing refers to daily management of a loan. The tasks associated with loan servicing are typically performed by ED-contracted servicers. Their duties include issuing billing statements, collecting regular payments, administering forbearances and alternative repayment plans for past-due borrowers, and reporting loan status to CRAs. Delinquency and Default Trends Borrowers of ED-held loans were afforded up to two periods of loan repayment relief in response to and following the COVID-19 pandemic. First, a series of congressional- and Administration-authorized forbearances suspended borrowers’ monthly payment obligations between March 2020 and August 2023 (the payment pause). Second, after P.L. 118-5 ended the payment pause, ED instituted an on-ramp policy, from September 2023 through September 2024. Under this policy, monthly student loan payments were due, but ED placed borrowers more than 90 days delinquent in a retroactive administrative forbearance. This placed a loan’s status to “current repayment” (i.e., not delinquent) and delayed certain consequences of loan delinquency, such as negative credit reporting, until January 2025. In light … | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13335/IF13335.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13335.html |
| R49491 | Federal Government Shutdowns and the Impact on Civil Aviation | 2026-10-22T04:00:00Z | 2026-10-24T05:08:55Z | Active | Reports | Rachel Y. Tang, Bart Elias | When federal agencies and programs do not receive funding after full-year or interim appropriations expire, they experience a “funding gap.” If funding does not resume in time to continue government operations, the government generally begins a “shutdown” of affected activities. Shutdowns can be government-wide or partial (i.e., affecting certain federal agencies and programs) depending on which appropriations lapse. The federal government plays a key role in operating the National Airspace System, providing air traffic control and air navigation services, and conducting aviation security operations at the nation’s airports. Shutdowns can affect some civil aviation programs that are administered by the Department of Transportation (DOT), mostly those managed by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), as well as aviation security functions carried out by other federal entities, particularly the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) under the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Shutdowns over the past decade have been lengthier than those during previous lapses in appropriations and have directly impacted civil aviation operations. Federal workers who perform functions integral to these civil aviation operations are generally excepted from furlough during shutdowns. These workers typically are not paid during a shutdown, which has demonstrated impacts on absenteeism and resignations, potentially affecting the federal government’s ability to provide full aviation services without disruption or degradation. Quantifiable indicators of these impacts include increased flight delays and cancellations, extended wait times at airport security checkpoints, temporary FAA-mandated flight reductions at major U.S. airports, and forgone revenues for airlines, airports, and related businesses. Some Members of Congress introduced bills that would have ensured the continuation of aviation operations until funding through normal appropriations was restored during the lapses in FY2026. Some of those bills in the 119th … | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49491.html | ||
| LSB11493 | The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978: Preemption of State Law | 2026-10-21T04:00:00Z | 2026-10-24T05:39:51Z | Active | Posts | Bryan L. Adkins | The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) has implemented a number of measures during the second Trump Administration to promote economic deregulation of the airline industry. For example, in November 2025, DOT withdrew an advance notice of proposed rulemaking on airline passenger rights initiated during the Biden Administration, which would have required airlines to provide cash compensation, meals, lodging, and other amenities to airline consumers experiencing significant flight disruptions. In July 2026, DOT issued a notice of proposed rulemaking to amend the agency’s existing rule on air fare advertising to provide “greater flexibility for regulated entities in how air fare is displayed.” DOT’s recent deregulatory actions have drawn attention to the respective roles of the federal government and state governments in policing airline business practices. When Congress enacted the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (ADA), it included an express preemption provision “[t]o ensure that the States would not undo federal deregulation with regulation of their own.” That provision, as amended, preempts state laws “related to” an airline’s “price, route, or service.” Under Supreme Court precedent, the ADA’s preemption provision applies broadly and can preempt even generally applicable state laws that indirectly affect airline prices, routes, or services. This Legal Sidebar provides background on the ADA and its preemption provision, examines the provision’s scope, and discusses considerations for Congress. Background Prior to Congress enacting the ADA in 1978, federal law subjected the airline industry to a “system of detailed economic regulation” in which airlines “operate[d] like a public utility.” Under the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, the now-abolished Civil Aeronautics Board “closely regulated” air carrier prices, routes, and services. In enacting the ADA, Congress sought to “plac[e] maximum reliance on competitive market forces” and encourage “an air transportation system relying on actual and potential comp… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB11493/LSB11493.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/HTML/LSB11493.html | |
| IF13334 | ANC, Tribal, NHO, and CDC Participation in the 8(a) Business Development Program | 2026-10-21T04:00:00Z | 2026-10-24T05:39:43Z | Active | Resources | R. Corinne Blackford | Introduction Congress has historically sought to help small, “socially and economically disadvantaged” business owners overcome barriers to participating in federal contracting and compete in the national economy through the Small Business Administration’s (SBA's) 8(a) Business Development Program, (commonly known as the “8(a) program”). Congress has also established annual goals for small business participation in federal contracting, including a goal of awarding 5% of prime and subcontract awards to small, disadvantaged businesses (see CRS Insight IN12018, Federal Small Business Contracting Goals, by R. Corinne Blackford). For eligible businesses, 8(a) program participation offers federal contracting preferences such as federal contract set-asides and sole-source contracts. 8(a) program participants also receive dedicated business development support, including mentorship, training, and counseling designed to enhance the competitiveness of participant businesses and their long-term viability. For background on the 8(a) program, see CRS Report R44844, SBA’s 8(a) Business Development Program: Legislative and Program History, by R. Corinne Blackford. Although the 8(a) program was authorized in 1978 for the benefit of small businesses owned by disadvantaged individuals, Congress expanded the program in the 1980s to include entity-owned small businesses, owned by disadvantaged groups. The eligible groups or entities include Community Development Corporations (CDCs) Alaska Native Corporations (ANCs) Indian tribes Native Hawaiian Organizations (NHOs) This In Focus highlights group- or entity-owned firm participation in the 8(a) program because these firms participate under somewhat different terms than small businesses owned by individuals. Legislation Expanding 8(a) Program Eligibility to Groups/Entities CDC Eligibility CDCs were the first type of entity made eligible for the 8(a) program. Congress created CDCs through the Community Economic Development Act of 1981 and instructed the SBA to issue regulations ens… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13334/IF13334.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13334.html | |
| IF13333 | Fair Labor Standards Act Overtime Pay Requirements | 2026-10-21T04:00:00Z | 2026-10-23T09:38:07Z | Active | Resources | Sarah A. Donovan | Wages & Benefits | Introduction The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) was enacted in 1938 with the goal of establishing minimum national labor standards, including for weekly hours of work. To that end, the FLSA requires that employers pay covered, nonexempt employees at a rate of one-and-a-half times their regular rate of pay for hours worked in excess of 40 per week in a given job. This In Focus provides an overview of the FLSA overtime pay requirements and recent legislative proposals to amend them. General Provisions Section 7(a)(1) of the FLSA (29 U.S.C. §207(a)(1)) provides the following: Except as otherwise provided in this section, no employer shall employ any of his employees who in any workweek is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or is employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, for a workweek longer than forty hours unless such employee receives compensation for his employment in excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed. The Regular Rate of Pay An employee’s regular rate of pay is calculated in each workweek in which the employee is entitled to overtime pay. It is an hourly rate determined using the following formula: / The regular rate must include all compensation “for employment paid to, or on behalf of, the employee” in the workweek in which overtime hours occur. Total compensation includes the worker’s hourly rate of pay and other employment-related payments received during the workweek, such as nondiscretionary bonuses (e.g., productivity-based bonuses), on-call pay required by state and local laws, and the reasonable value of meals or lodging provided as compensation to employees. Some payments to employees are not considered to be compensation, and the act explicitly excludes them from the regular rate. These statutory exclusions include certain employer gifts, paid leave (e.g., paid sick leave, paid holidays), employer contributions to the employee’s heal… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13333/IF13333.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13333.html |
| IF13332 | Opportunities for Tribal Engagement in National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) Reviews | 2026-10-21T04:00:00Z | 2026-10-23T16:38:27Z | Active | Resources | Heather McPherron, Mariel J. Murray | The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA; 42 U.S.C. §§4321 et. seq.) sets forth a national policy with respect to environmental quality and a procedural framework for integrating environmental considerations into federal decisionmaking (i.e., through environmental review). The range of federal agencies and actions subject to NEPA is broad and includes activities such as resource management decisions, issuing permits, and funding infrastructure projects. Under NEPA, federal agencies must evaluate reasonably foreseeable adverse environmental effects, consider a reasonable range of alternatives, and prepare required documentation (i.e., environmental documents) for “major [f]ederal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.” Federal agencies may also engage other governmental entities, project applicants (i.e., project sponsors), and members of the public to identify issues, obtain relevant information, and inform environmental analyses. Federally recognized Tribes (Tribes) may participate in environmental reviews for various reasons. In some circumstances, federal action may arise because a Tribe proposes an activity that requires federal agency approval or involves an associated federal authorization. In other circumstances, federal action may occur on or affect tribal lands, treaty-protected rights, or resources in which the United States has responsibilities under applicable federal law. This In Focus provides an overview of the various ways in which Tribes may engage in the environmental review process under NEPA. Tribal Roles and Participation in NEPA Reviews A Tribe’s role in an environmental review varies depending on whether it proposes an activity requiring federal action or participates in the review of an action proposed by another entity. Potential tribal roles are outlined in this section. Project Sponsor A Tribe may serve as a project sponsor when it proposes an activity that requires a federal agency decision. In these circumstances, the Tribe may provide project inform… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13332/IF13332.3.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13332.html | |
| R49490 | Algorithmic Discrimination: Legal Principles | 2026-10-20T04:00:00Z | 2026-10-22T07:37:56Z | Active | Reports | Abigail A. Graber | Artificial Intelligence | As automated tools for decisionmaking, including those using artificial intelligence (AI), have grown in popularity and sophistication, they raise questions about how their use intersects with federal antidiscrimination laws. Federal laws address various kinds of discrimination, including disparate treatment and disparate impact. Disparate treatment generally occurs when a person makes a decision or classifies people on the basis of a protected trait, such as race, sex, religion, or another characteristic. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977). Disparate impact occurs when a person makes a decision using neutral criteria, but the decision adversely and disproportionately affects members of a protected group, and either the decisionmaker cannot put forth a legally adequate justification for using the criteria, or an alternative exists that would serve the decisionmaker’s purposes with less of a disparate impact. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affs. v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 576 U.S. 519, 524–25 (2015). How disparate treatment and disparate impact frameworks apply to decisionmaking via automated, algorithmic tools (including AI) is not always clear. Some situations involving algorithmic decisionmaking would clearly be disparate treatment under present law. For example, a person covered by antidiscrimination law who intentionally designs an algorithm to discriminate on the basis of a protected characteristic, or who selects an algorithm because of its discriminatory effect on a protected group, engages in disparate treatment. See Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979). However, the law is unsettled on how to evaluate cases where no human consciously chooses to discriminate, and yet an automated system classifies people on the basis of protected characteristics. There is also substantial uncertainty over when an algorithmic system could be said to engage in disparate treatment via proxy—that is, classification based on a facially neutral trait that is closely … | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49490/R49490.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49490.html |
| R49489 | Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA): History and Finances | 2026-10-20T04:00:00Z | 2026-10-22T17:52:59Z | Active | Reports | D. Andrew Austin | The finances and operations of the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA)—a public power utility owned by the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico—have attracted serious concern for many years. High electricity prices and the unreliability of the electricity grid resulting from underinvestment in and poor maintenance of the island’s generation, transmission, and distribution infrastructure have hindered the island’s economy and the well-being of its residents. Public corporations have been central to Puerto Rico’s economic development and have issued most of Puerto Rico’s public debt. In 2014, frustration with PREPA led Puerto Rico to enact an energy policy reform (ALIVIO; Act 57-2014). At the time, PREPA was struggling to pay its fuel costs. In August 2014, it reached an agreement with creditors to maintain its access to fuel and accepted an outside manager. Federal courts struck down a 2014 local bankruptcy law that sought to reduce PREPA’s debts. In 2015, the Puerto Rican governor stated that its debts were “unpayable.” In 2016, the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA; P.L. 114-187) established a Financial Oversight and Management Board (FOMB or Oversight Board) and two processes (Titles III and VI) to restructure Puerto Rico’s public debts, including the $9 billion PREPA owed. The Title III process draws on the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. The Title VI process resembles sovereign debt workouts. In July 2017, the Oversight Board rejected the existing agreement with creditors and initiated a Title III debt restructuring process. While major portions of the island’s debts have been restructured, PREPA’s debt restructuring process continues. In September 2017, Hurricanes Irma and María hit Puerto Rico and exposed widespread weaknesses in PREPA’s operations. Most of the island remained without electric power for months afterward. In 2020, earthquakes and the COVID-19 pandemic created new challenges and delayed the debt restructuring process. Congress provided substantial funding for PREP… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49489/R49489.6.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49489.html | |
| LSB11492 | The Fourth Amendment and the Speech or Debate Clause | 2026-10-20T04:00:00Z | 2026-10-22T10:08:06Z | Active | Posts | Cassandra J. Barnum, Todd Garvey | Fourth Amendment, The Supreme Court of the United States, U.S. Congress | Various searches by federal agents of sitting Members of Congress can raise questions about the intersection of Fourth Amendment principles and the privilege held by Members under the Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution. In one of these examples, reporting indicates that agents from Homeland Security Investigations seized documents and the Member’s cellphone and laptop as part of an immigration-related investigation. It has also been reported that the search in the previous example was executed pursuant to a warrant and that the issuing judge imposed special procedural requirements on law enforcement in light of the Member’s constitutional protections under the Speech or Debate Clause. The Member has reportedly alleged that some of those protocols were not followed, including a requirement that the Member and the House General Counsel be notified prior to execution of the warrant. Similar questions regarding the Fourth Amendment and the Speech or Debate Clause were raised in September 2026 in an interim staff report detailing the Department of Justice’s (DOJ’s) access to Member phone records during Special Counsel Jack Smtih’s investigation of the events of January 6, 2021. This Legal Sidebar discusses the intersection of the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures, the search warrant requirement under that Amendment, and the sometimes-countervailing protections afforded by the Speech or Debate Clause. Fourth Amendment Background The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. As a result, law enforcement generally must obtain a search warrant from a “neutral and detached magistrate” before entering a private space to look for evidence. The Amendment states that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” The Supreme Court has characterized the probable-cause standard as “the kind of fair probability’ on which reasonable an… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB11492/LSB11492.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/HTML/LSB11492.html |
| IF13331 | Geothermal Resources for Energy Development in the United States | 2026-10-20T04:00:00Z | 2026-10-22T14:53:04Z | Active | Resources | Linda R. Rowan | The U.S. Geological Survey, a science agency in the Department of the Interior, assesses geothermal resources (Earth heat sources) for the development of geothermal energy in surface and subsurface geologic formations (i.e., layers of rock) in the United States as part of its mission and guided by direction in the Geothermal Steam Act of 1970, the Energy Policy Act of 1992, the Energy Policy Act of 2005, and the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007. Some older USGS assessments (such as those published in 1970, 1971, 1975, 1979, and 2008) assessed domestic geothermal resources. The Energy Act of 2020 directed the USGS to update its 2008 assessment and consider potential resources using other geothermal technologies. In 2025, the USGS published preliminary assessments for enhanced geothermal systems (EGS) and reservoir thermal energy storage systems (RTES) in some areas. According to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), geothermal resources represent a vast and largely untapped, underground resource that may provide electricity, heating, cooling, and energy storage on or off the grid. Some of this potential may require technological development, and DOE’s Office of Geothermal supports innovations in technology to reduce the risks and costs of geothermal energy development. Innovations in geothermal energy technologies may also lead to coproduction of geothermal, oil, gas, and minerals, especially critical minerals (such as in the Salton Sea Geothermal Field in California and the Smackover Formation project in Texas). Congress may consider whether geothermal resource assessments should be advanced and prioritized as the USGS has completed some preliminary assessments in some areas. The USGS assessments may enhance understanding of the nation’s geothermal energy and coproduction capacity to support growing demand for electricity, heating, cooling, and energy storage for buildings, infrastructure, industrial applications, and the growing number of data centers. Assessing geothermal resources may support mana… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13331/IF13331.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13331.html | |
| LSB11491 | IRS Proposed Regulations on Racial Nondiscrimination in Private Schools | 2026-10-19T04:00:00Z | 2026-10-21T10:23:03Z | Active | Posts | Justin C. Chung | Education Tax Policy, Elementary & Secondary Education, Nonprofits & Tax-Exempt Organizations, Postsecondary Education, Religious Organizations & Tax-Exempt Status | On September 4, 2026, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) published proposed regulations that would add a rule to provide that “all forms of racial discrimination in education, regardless of the intent behind or the legality of such discrimination” are against “fundamental public policy” and, thus, grounds for a private school to lose federal tax exemption. The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM)—published in the context of public debate and government action on “diversity, equity, and inclusion” (DEI)—discusses “affirmative action” and rejects “remedial or diversity-related objectives” as a defense to its bar on racial discrimination. This Legal Sidebar discusses the legal authority and background of the proposed regulations—explaining the proposed changes and their legal justifications as asserted by the IRS and identifying potential legal challenges to the rulemaking. Finally, it presents considerations for Congress. Tax Exemption Under IRC § 501(c)(3) and the Public Policy Doctrine The Internal Revenue Code (IRC) exempts certain organizations from federal income taxes. Section 501(c)(3) of the IRC specifically exempts those that are “organized and operated exclusively” for certain enumerated purposes, including “charitable” and “educational purposes.” Many private schools—including private universities—receive tax exemption under § 501(c)(3). Section 501(c)(3) organizations are subject to several requirements to obtain and maintain tax exemption. One of these requirements, sometimes referred to as the “public policy doctrine,” provides that § 501(c)(3) organizations must not violate “fundamental public policy.” The public policy doctrine is not explicitly stated in § 501(c)(3) but, as explained below, comes from IRS and judicial interpretation of the IRC. In 1971, the IRS issued guidance (Revenue Ruling 71-447) that stated that a private school must have a “racially nondiscriminatory policy as to students” to qualify for exemption under § 501(c)(3). The guidance was based on case law developments from the pre… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB11491/LSB11491.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/HTML/LSB11491.html |
| IG10102 | State Proposals to Change Daylight Saving Time Observance | 2026-10-19T04:00:00Z | 2026-10-20T13:22:57Z | Active | Infographics | Corrie E. Clark, Lynn J. Cunningham | Energy Policy, Transportation Safety | / State Proposals to Change Daylight Saving Time Observance Daylight saving time (DST) is a period of the year between spring and fall when clocks in most parts of the United States are set one hour ahead of standard time (ST). The United States first adopted DST in 1918. DST begins on the second Sunday in March and ends on the first Sunday in November. The beginning and end dates are set in statute (15 U.S.C. §260a). Congressional interest in the potential benefits and costs of DST has resulted in changes to DST observance (including changes to its start and end dates, periods of temporary year-round DST, and periods of no federal DST observance). Though the authority to change DST observance rests solely with Congress, since 2015, a majority of states have had legislation introduced to change the observance of DST—seeking to establish either DST or ST year round. State-enacted permanent DST would go into effect if and when such action is allowed by Congress. Forty-seven states and DC have had legislation introduced proposing some variation of permanent year-round DST. * Introduced permanent DST * Enacted permanent DST (19 states) * Adopted nonbinding resolution in support of permanent DST * No DST legislation introduced Forty-two states have had legislation introduced to establish permanent year-round ST. The Uniform Time Act of 1966 as amended (15 U.S.C. §§260-267) allows states to exempt themselves from observing DST. * Introduced permanent ST * No ST legislation introduced * Observes permanent ST Sources: State legislation information from Lexis Advance “Statutes and Legislation” database; state legislature websites/databases; National Council of State Legislature’s Daylight Saving Time | State Legislation resource; CQ.com’s Policy Note database. Notes: American Samoa, most of Arizona, Guam, Hawaii, the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands do not observe DST. CRS identified introduced legislation from January 2015 to August 2026 that would amend time observance; in this … | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IG/PDF/IG10102/IG10102.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IG/HTML/IG10102.html |
| LSB11490 | The Commerce Clause and Federal Firearms Prohibitions | 2026-10-16T04:00:00Z | 2026-10-20T11:37:57Z | Active | Posts | Dave S. Sidhu | Judicial Branch, Jurisprudence, The Supreme Court of the United States, Commerce Clause, Firearms & Regulation | “Most” modern federal criminal laws are predicated on Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce. Federal firearms offenses are no different in this respect. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which prohibits felons from possessing firearms “in or affecting commerce,” stems from Congress’s Commerce Clause power. The Supreme Court has interpreted the statutory precursor to § 922(g)(1) to require that the government prove that the firearm has a “requisite nexus” with interstate commerce. Federal appeals courts have uniformly held what was perhaps “implicit” in the Court’s cases: that the felon-in-possession prohibition is a valid exercise of Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause. Justice Thomas, federal judges, and scholars have expressed serious doubt, however, as to the soundness of these and similar constitutional conclusions, suggesting that the felon-in-possession ban and other federal restrictions on firearms possession exceed Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause. On July 21, 2026, in Squire v. United States, a majority of the active judges on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (Fifth Circuit) agreed that the full court would decide whether the Commerce Clause is a proper source of authority for § 922(g)(1). One judge dissented from the order granting a rehearing, warning that to invalidate § 922(g)(1) as unconstitutional would by logical extension “imperil much of the United States Code” that rests on the Commerce Clause and “would mark the start of a new, severely contracted Commerce Clause era.” This Sidebar describes the relationship between the Commerce Clause and federal firearms laws to aid in an understanding of the constitutional issues to be considered by the Fifth Circuit in the Squire case. The Sidebar begins with an overview of the Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence. It then addresses the Commerce Clause in the context of federal firearms laws, paying specific attention to judicial concerns with the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB11490/LSB11490.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/HTML/LSB11490.html |
| IF13329 | When a Case Can Be Filed: Statutes of Limitations and Statutes of Repose | 2026-10-16T04:00:00Z | 2026-10-17T05:53:24Z | Active | Resources | Joanna R. Lampe | Many federal laws are subject to time limits known as statutes of limitations or statutes of repose, which generally bar enforcement of the law after a certain amount of time has passed. Congress can set or modify statutes of limitations and repose via legislation, subject to some constitutional limits. This In Focus provides a brief overview of the law related to statutes of limitations and repose with a focus on time limits that apply to civil litigation. (CRS Report RL31253 provides more information on criminal statutes of limitations.) The In Focus then discusses selected considerations for Congress regarding legislation that imposes time limits on enforcing the law. Overview of Statutes of Limitations and Statutes of Repose Statutes of limitations and statutes of repose both impose time limits on when a law can be enforced, but they function somewhat differently. In CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 573 U.S. 1 (2014), the Supreme Court distinguished between the purposes and functions of the two types of laws. The Court explained that statutes of limitations “require plaintiffs to pursue diligent prosecution of known claims” and “promote justice by preventing surprises through [plaintiffs’] revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared” (internal quotation marks and citations are omitted from all quotes in this In Focus). While statutes of repose “also encourage plaintiffs to bring actions in a timely manner, and for many of the same reasons,” the Court explained that “the rationale has a different emphasis. Statutes of repose effect a legislative judgment that a defendant should be free from liability after the legislatively determined period of time,” and “embod[y] the idea that at some point a defendant should be able to put past events behind him.” In light of these differing rationales, the Court explained, “the time periods specified are measured from different points.” A statute of limitations “creates a time limit for suing… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13329/IF13329.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13329.html | |
| R49488 | The Unemployment Trust Fund: FY2026 Income, Outlays, and End-of-Year Balances | 2026-10-15T04:00:00Z | 2026-10-16T10:38:50Z | Active | Reports | Julie M. Whittaker, Katelin P. Isaacs | The joint federal-state Unemployment Insurance (UI) system provides temporary and partial wage replacement to involuntarily unemployed workers and stabilizes the economy during recessions. Two permanent law unemployment benefits—Unemployment Compensation (UC) and Extended Benefits (EB)—are countercyclical, with spending and weekly benefit payments that increase automatically during a recession. States administer unemployment benefits under their state laws, with U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) oversight, resulting in 53 different UC programs operated in the states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. The Unemployment Trust Fund (UTF) in the U.S. Treasury accounts for transactions related to UC and EB. The UTF is a single trust fund with 59 accounts: the Employment Security Administration Account (ESAA); the Extended Unemployment Compensation Account (EUCA); the Federal Unemployment Account (FUA); 53 state accounts (including the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands); the Federal Employees Compensation Account (FECA); and two accounts related to the Railroad Retirement Board (RRB). Congress has shown interest in the operations of the UTF as part of its oversight of the UI system. For example, at a June 2024 hearing on “Reforming Unemployment Insurance to Support American Workers and Businesses,” the Subcommittee on Work and Welfare of the House Committee on Ways and Means discussed several reform issues, including the reconsideration of the method through which funding for state administration is collected and distributed via the UTF. This report provides a figure that displays FY2026 flows of funding through the UTF. Specifically, this figure includes projections from DOL related to the income, outlays, and end-of-year balances of the UTF as well as relevant FY2026 annual appropriations data, which are enacted amounts under P.L. 119-75, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2026. This report also describes, including relevant statutory authorities, UTF sourc… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49488/R49488.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49488.html | |
| IN12748 | Department of Transportation’s “Family Friendly” Policy and Public Transit Project Funding | 2026-10-15T04:00:00Z | 2026-10-16T10:08:49Z | Active | Posts | William J. Mallett | On October 1, 2026, the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) published for comment revised policy guidance for the Capital Investment Grants Program (CIG). In the Federal Register notice, FTA stated “the proposed revisions are intended to streamline the CIG process, improve accountability of CIG project sponsors, and improve overall readability of the policy guidance.” Among other things, FTA proposes a new formal methodology for calculating the federal share of a proposed project’s cost from a CIG grant. This proposed methodology includes greater CIG funding shares for projects in places with higher than average birth rates and marriage rates, in line with the Department of Transportation’s (DOT’s) “family friendly” policy. CIG provides funding to support the construction of fixed-guideway transit systems (e.g., light rail), including new systems and additions to existing systems. A CIG project is categorized as a “New Starts” project, unless as a “Small Starts” project it costs less than $400 million and CIG program funding is less than $150 million. “Core Capacity” projects are investments in existing fixed-guideway systems that increase capacity of a corridor by 10% that is at or will be at capacity in 10 years (49 U.S.C. §5309(a)). To evaluate proposed CIG projects, FTA computes ratings of statutory project justification and local financial commitment criteria on a 5-point scale (high, medium-high, medium, medium-low, low). The project justification criteria are mobility improvements, environmental benefits, congestion relief, economic development effects, land use (or capacity needs of the corridor for Core Capacity projects), and cost effectiveness. Cost effectiveness, for example, is measured by estimated capital and operating and maintenance costs per trip. Federal law limits the maximum federal share of a project’s cost from the CIG program funds to 60% for New Starts projects and 80% for Small Starts and Core Capacity projects (49 U.S.C. §5309(l)). Many projects have received a commitment from FTA for … | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12748/IN12748.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/HTML/IN12748.html | |
| R49487 | Russia’s Arctic Military Posture: Considerations for Congress | 2026-10-14T04:00:00Z | 2026-10-16T10:38:31Z | Active | Reports | Andrew S. Bowen | The Arctic is a key strategic region for Russia with significant military and economic implications. Russia is the largest of the Arctic states in terms of territory, stretching over 24,000 kilometers of coastline. The Arctic is central to Russian strategic and military concerns and is home to Russia’s Northern Fleet, which operates about two-thirds of Russia’s submarine-based nuclear deterrent, according to the U.S. intelligence community’s 2026 Annual Threat Assessment. The Arctic also plays an important role in Russia’s energy and economic development plans. After the Cold War and prior to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the Arctic was a region of multilateral cooperation, but tensions have since grown in the region between Russia and the other Arctic states. In a March 2025 speech at the Arctic Forum in Murmansk, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated, “the role and importance of the Arctic for Russia and for the entire world are obviously growing. Regrettably, the geopolitical competition and fighting for positions in this region are also escalating.” For over a decade, Russia has increased its military capabilities in the Arctic, including reestablishing old Soviet-era military bases, building new bases and infrastructure, announcing the creation of new units and increasing the size of existing forces, reorganizing command and control structures, and undertaking new efforts to modernize the Northern Fleet—including its submarine forces. It remains unclear whether Russia has the financial and personnel resources to carry out its military modernization efforts and plans in the Arctic, or in what time frame it could do so. Additionally, the Russian military posture in the Arctic has become increasingly precarious with the accession of Finland and Sweden into NATO (in 2023 and 2024, respectively) and heavy ground-force losses suffered in Ukraine. According to Lieutenant General James Adams, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, in April 2026 testimony before Congress, “As the Arctic bec… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49487/R49487.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49487.html | |
| R49486 | Clean Water Act Permitting: Overview and Policy Issues | 2026-10-14T04:00:00Z | 2026-10-16T07:53:27Z | Active | Reports | Laura Gatz | Water Quality | The Federal Water Pollution Control Act, commonly referred to as the Clean Water Act (CWA), is the principal federal law in the United States governing water pollution. To help achieve its goals, the statute prohibits the discharge of pollutants from any point source (e.g., a discrete conveyance such as a pipe) to waters of the United States (WOTUS) without a permit. The CWA also establishes two permitting programs that may be used to authorize certain discharges. These include the Section 402 National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permitting program and the Section 404 permitting program for dredged or fill material. NPDES permits are issued by states and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for discharges of pollutants from point sources, such as municipal and industrial sources. These sources include wastewater treatment facilities, municipal stormwater collection systems, and a wide variety of industrial dischargers. Section 404 permits are issued primarily by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) and two states (Michigan and New Jersey) for discharges of dredged or fill material. Activities that may require a Section 404 permit include pipeline projects, water resource projects, mining projects, transmission line projects, or other development projects. Separate from, but related to permitting, CWA Section 401 requires a type of approval, called a water quality certification, for any federal permit or license that may result in a discharge to WOTUS. Although Section 401 water quality certifications are not permits, they are a type of approval required for some projects to move forward and have implications for issuance of some federal permits and licenses. Examples of activities that may require a CWA Section 401 water quality certification include activities requiring a USACE-issued CWA Section 404 permit, projects requiring USACE Rivers and Harbors Act permits, hydropower projects licensed by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), and certificates of public convenie… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49486/R49486.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49486.html |
| LSB11489 | SEC Proposes Rescission of the Shareholder Proposal Rule | 2026-10-14T04:00:00Z | 2026-10-16T08:53:43Z | Active | Posts | Jay B. Sykes | Securities, Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) | On September 16, 2026, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued a proposal to rescind Rule 14a-8, which requires companies subject to the SEC’s proxy rules to include qualifying shareholder proposals in their proxy materials. The SEC also proposed amendments to its proxy rules that would expand companies’ ability to obtain discretionary voting authority for shareholder proposals submitted outside the Rule 14a-8 process. This Legal Sidebar discusses the SEC’s proposed rule and related issues that may be of interest to Congress. The Sidebar begins by providing background information on Rule 14a-8. Much of this background is derived from CRS Report R48855, The Shareholder Proposal Rule (Feb. 11, 2026), which offers a more detailed overview of Rule 14a-8’s history and current role in corporate governance. Background Shareholders of public companies vote on a variety of corporate matters at annual shareholder meetings, including director elections, charter amendments, executive compensation plans, and (as relevant here) proposals from their fellow shareholders. The vast majority of shareholder proposals are nonbinding recommendations, which are often called “precatory” proposals; a much smaller percentage consists of binding amendments to corporate bylaws. Generally, shareholder proposals involve either corporate governance or environmental and social (E&S) issues raised by a company’s operations. Common topics for governance proposals include the structure of a corporation’s board of directors, voting standards for director elections, and takeover defenses. E&S proposals often involve issues such as climate change, diversity, corporate lobbying and political expenditures, and human rights practices. The SEC has traditionally taken the view that state law provides shareholders with the right to present proposals at annual meetings. In the case of bylaw amendments, this right is explicit: Most state corporation statutes empower shareholders to amend a corporation’s bylaws without board approval. Precatory … | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB11489/LSB11489.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/HTML/LSB11489.html |
| IN12747 | H-1B Executive Actions in 2026 | 2026-10-14T04:00:00Z | 2026-10-16T10:23:36Z | Active | Posts | Jill H. Wilson, Elizabeth Weber Handwerker | Immigration Enforcement & Removal, Immigration Law, Labor Force, Labor Standards | The H-1B program allows U.S. employers to hire temporary foreign workers for specialty occupation positions (i.e., positions that require specialized knowledge and a college degree). To date in 2026 the Trump Administration has announced several policy changes aimed at addressing perceived abuses of the program, such as replacing U.S. workers with lower-paid foreign workers. These executive actions come on the heels of policy changes announced in 2025. Increased Costs for Employers In February 2026, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) implemented a weighted (instead of random) selection process for the H-1B lottery to “favor the allocation of H-1B visas to higher-skilled and higher-paid” workers. The first affected lottery was for H-1B employment starting in October 2026. In March 2026, the Department of Labor (DOL) published a proposed rule to increase H-1B prevailing wage requirements. DOL asserted that under the current regulation, “employers were permitted to hire alien workers at wage levels below those that similarly employed U.S. workers were paid, resulting in adverse effects to the wages and working conditions of U.S. workers.” H-1B prevailing wage requirements differ by skill level (See Table 1), specialty occupation, and Metropolitan Statistical Area. Table 1. Changes in H-1B prevailing wage requirements proposed in March 2026 Skill Level Description Current Prevailing Wage Requirement Proposed Prevailing Wage Requirement Level I Entry Level Approximately the 17th percentile of the wage distribution for the same occupation in the same Metropolitan Statistical Area 34th percentile of the same wage distribution Level II Qualified Approximately the 34th percentile 52nd percentile Level III Experienced Approximately the 50th percentile 70th percentile Level IV Fully Competent Approximately the 67th percentile 88th percentile Source: CRS Presentation of 91 Federal Register 15454. DOL estimated these proposed wage requirements would increase H-1B employer costs by approximately $1.46 billion in t… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12747/IN12747.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/HTML/IN12747.html |
| IN12746 | The Bipartisan American Affordability and Jobs Act of 2026 and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s Backstop Siting Authority | 2026-10-14T04:00:00Z | 2026-10-15T17:08:40Z | Active | Posts | Ashley J. Lawson | Energy Policy, Electricity | The Bipartisan American Affordability and Jobs Act of 2026 (BAAJA; S. 5653) was introduced on September 30, 2026. The bill would address numerous aspects of energy infrastructure permitting, including by amending the conditions under which the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) may issue a construction permit for certain electricity transmission lines (commonly referred to as FERC’s backstop siting authority). This analysis compares aspects of current law and policy with how Section 2101 of BAAJA would affect FERC’s backstop siting authority. For additional discussion of current law, see CRS Report R47862, Electricity Transmission: What Is the Role of the Federal Government? This analysis does not cover all provisions in Section 2101 of BAAJA. Geographic Coverage Under current law, FERC’s backstop siting authority is limited in its geographic coverage. FERC may issue construction permits only in areas of the country designated as National Interest Electric Transmission Corridors (NIETCs) by the Department of Energy (DOE) (16 U.S.C. §824p(b)). Under BAAJA, FERC’s backstop siting authority would instead apply to most areas of the country in which eligible (as described below) new or modified interstate transmission facilities were being developed. The area of Texas served by the grid operator known as ERCOT (Electric Reliability Council of Texas) would remain exempt from FERC’s backstop siting authority. Under BAAJA, DOE’s authority to designate NIETCs would be repealed. Eligible Transmission Facilities Under current law, FERC’s backstop siting authority applies only to transmission facilities that meet two sets of criteria. One set of criteria applies to characteristics of the transmission facilities themselves (16 U.S.C. §824p(b)(2)-(6)). BAAJA would amend these criteria. Under current law, the facilities must (1) be used to transmit electricity interstate; (2) be consistent with the public interest; (3) be able to reduce transmission congestion in interstate commerce and protect or benefit consumers; … | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12746/IN12746.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/HTML/IN12746.html |
| IN12745 | Hurricane Isaias: Brief Overview of FEMA Programs, Resources, and Selected Issues | 2026-10-13T04:00:00Z | 2026-10-15T14:53:19Z | Active | Posts | Elizabeth M. Webster, Diane P. Horn, Erica A. Lee, Bruce R. Lindsay, William L. Painter, Lauren R. Stienstra | Introduction Hurricane Isaias was the first hurricane of the 2026 Atlantic season to make landfall in the conterminous United States. It made landfall in the Florida Panhandle as a Category 2 hurricane the night of Friday, October 9, 2026, and brought high wind, significant rainfall, flooding, and power outages to many areas across the Southeast. Emergency and Major Disaster Declarations On October 9, President Trump issued several emergency declarations for certain counties in Florida, Alabama, and Georgia. These emergency declarations authorized federal assistance to save lives, protect property, and other measures that may prevent the incident from becoming a major disaster. Such measures include evacuations, emergency food and shelter, and the pre-positioning of rescue equipment. The situation remains dynamic; additional declaration requests or amendments to existing requests (i.e., addition of counties) may be forthcoming as states such as Florida are still assessing hurricane-related damage. FEMA Emergency and Major Disaster Assistance Presidential declarations of emergency or major disaster made pursuant to the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the Stafford Act, P.L. 93-288, as amended; 42 U.S.C. §§5121 et seq.) may authorize FEMA to provide assistance through a suite of disaster programs: Public Assistance (PA) provides grants and direct assistance to state, tribal, territorial, and local governments, and certain private nonprofit organizations, for emergency work (debris removal and emergency protective measures), and permanent work (for rebuilding and replacement of disaster-damaged facilities). Individual Assistance (IA) supports disaster survivors, including through grants of financial and direct assistance for housing and other needs, crisis counseling, case management services, legal services, and disaster unemployment assistance. Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) funds mitigation and resiliency projects and programs, typically across the entire state or terri… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12745/IN12745.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/HTML/IN12745.html | |
| R49485 | Amending the National Environmental Policy Act: Analysis of the SPEED Act (H.R. 4776) | 2026-10-09T04:00:00Z | 2026-10-15T14:08:35Z | Active | Reports | Kristen Hite, Heather McPherron | Environmental Review & Policy | Congress has enacted and considered a variety of measures concerning various aspects of federal permitting processes. Certain activities that support the nation’s economy and infrastructure, including energy production, transportation, and natural resource development, require one or more federal authorizations (e.g., license, permit, approval). Many federal permitting processes (e.g., issuing permits, licensing, or granting rights-of-way across federal lands) involve environmental review under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA; 42 U.S.C. §§4321 et seq.). NEPA establishes a common procedural framework for federal agencies to consider environmental impacts across various activities and projects—including federal permitting authorizations—but does not itself authorize projects. Instead, environmental review under NEPA generally informs agency decisions made pursuant to other statutory authorities, including those related to federal permitting. The House of Representatives passed the Standardizing Permitting and Expediting Economic Development Act (SPEED Act; H.R. 4776) on December 18, 2025. H.R. 4776 proposes a number of changes to NEPA, some of which include modifying the current federal environmental review process as well as broader changes to federal permitting. The House Committee on Natural Resources reported that the stated purpose of H.R. 4776 is “to amend the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 to clarify ambiguous provisions and facilitate a more efficient, effective, and timely environmental review process.” The bill would revise, among other things, NEPA’s purpose, the scope of environmental review, timing and coordination of other federal reviews, programmatic environmental documents, categorical exclusions, definitions, judicial review, and circumstances under which agencies may modify or revoke federal authorizations. In addition to amendments to the process for considering the environmental impacts of a proposed federal action, the bill would also incorporate some broader permitting… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49485/R49485.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49485.html |
| R49484 | 2026 Ebola Outbreak: Frequently Asked Questions | 2026-10-09T04:00:00Z | 2026-10-10T05:08:29Z | Active | Reports | Emily M. McCabe, Alexis Arieff, Lauren Ploch Blanchard, Luisa Blanchfield, Kavya Sekar, Jill H. Wilson | First reported in May 2026, the current Ebola disease outbreak, caused by Bundibugyo virus and concentrated in northeastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), has rapidly become the second-largest Ebola outbreak on record. According to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the outbreak has expanded “substantially faster than previous Ebola outbreaks.” The United States has responded to the outbreak with actions taken at home and abroad, including selected domestic preparedness measures, travel restrictions, foreign assistance, and investments in certain vaccine and therapeutics trials, among other actions. As of October 6, no Ebola cases associated with this outbreak have been identified in the United States. Members of Congress have issued statements related to the outbreak, conducted oversight of the Administration’s response, and introduced legislation. This CRS Frequently Asked Questions report provides information related to the virus and its spread, the current outbreak, and U.S. and international responses, among other issues. It may be updated as the situation evolves. | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49484/R49484.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49484.html | |
| IF13328 | State and Local Role in Elections Policy: Selected Recent Developments | 2026-10-09T04:00:00Z | 2026-10-10T05:38:40Z | Active | Resources | Karen L. Shanton | States and localities have primary responsibility for administering elections in the United States, including for setting elections policy. Congress has sometimes used what the Supreme Court has described as its “override” authority to specify national standards for federal elections. In the 2026 election cycle, the executive branch has also issued policy documents with implications for state and local elections policy. President Donald Trump signed executive orders (EOs) in March 2025 and March 2026 that include provisions related to state and local administration of elections. Federal agencies have taken steps toward implementing many of those provisions, including in agency regulations and notices of funding opportunities (NOFOs) for federal grants. This In Focus provides an overview of provisions of recent EOs and related federal regulations and NOFOs that would require states and localities to conduct particular elections activities, either in general or in order to access federal funding. Several of the cited provisions are the subject of litigation as of this writing and have been blocked by the courts. The In Focus does not generally address litigation or offer analysis of legal questions, such as questions about underlying executive branch authorities. Congressional clients may contact CRS for information about the current status of individual provisions. Voter Registration and Citizenship Noncitizens are prohibited by federal law from voting in federal elections. Two federal voter registration forms that states are generally required to accept—the Federal Post Card Application (FPCA) available to voters covered by the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act of 1986 and the broader-purpose federal mail voter registration form—require applicants to attest to their citizenship and eligibility to vote under penalty of perjury. States and localities have other safeguards against noncitizen voting in federal elections. They also choose whether to allow noncitizens to participate in their state an… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13328/IF13328.5.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13328.html | |
| IF13327 | Disabled Adult Child (DAC) Passalong of Medicaid Coverage | 2026-10-09T04:00:00Z | 2026-10-10T05:23:37Z | Active | Resources | Emma K. Tatem, Varun Saraswathula | Disabled adult child (DAC) benefits are a type of Social Security auxiliary benefit that is paid to eligible adults aged 18 or older who have qualifying disabilities that began before they turned age 22. Supplemental Security Income (SSI) is a means-tested federal program that makes monthly cash payments to adults and children with qualifying disabilities and to adults aged 65 or older, regardless of their disability status. In most states, SSI recipients are automatically eligible for Medicaid, a means-tested program jointly financed by federal and state governments that pays for the delivery of health and long-term services and supports (LTSS) to certain low-income populations. DAC benefits reduce SSI benefits on a dollar-for-dollar basis (after certain exclusions are applied). Thus, entitlement to DAC benefits may cause some individuals to become ineligible for SSI. Under current law, states are generally required to continue providing Medicaid coverage to individuals who lose SSI eligibility because they become entitled to or have an increase in their DAC benefits. This Medicaid eligibility pathway is sometimes referred to as the DAC passalong. By keeping their Medicaid coverage, individuals under the DAC passalong can retain access to Medicaid-covered services such as LTSS, which are typically not covered by other payers, including Medicare. Some policymakers have expressed interest in expanding the DAC passalong to DAC recipients who were not enrolled in SSI prior to receiving DAC benefits but would otherwise be eligible for SSI. Overview of Disabled Adult Child Benefits and Supplemental Security Income Adults aged 18 or older with qualifying disabilities that began before they turned age 22 can receive DAC benefits (also referred to as childhood disability benefits [CDB]) based on the work record of a parent who (1) is receiving Social Security retirement or disability benefits, or (2) is deceased and met minimum insured status requirements under Social Security at the time of his or her death. In May 20… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13327/IF13327.3.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13327.html | |
| R49483 | Ex Parte Communications in Informal Rulemaking: A Legal Framework | 2026-10-08T04:00:00Z | 2026-10-10T05:08:38Z | Active | Reports | Benjamin M. Barczewski | Ex parte communications are nonpublic communications between an agency official and either a person outside the government or inside the government but in a different agency to which the public has not been given notice or a chance to respond. Ex parte communications could include oral or written communications, written correspondence submitted to an agency, or meetings between an agency and stakeholders. In the informal rulemaking context, ex parte communications typically refer to written or oral communications that occur outside of the comment period. The Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706) does not prohibit ex parte communications between an agency and an outside party during informal rulemaking. It also does not prohibit ex parte communications between agencies or between an agency and the President or his advisors. Rather, prohibition or regulation of ex parte communications primarily flows from agency-specific statutes, rules, and guidance. Many agencies, however, have no stated policy on ex parte communications during informal rulemaking. Courts require agencies to include the justification for a rulemaking to be contained in the public rulemaking record. Accordingly, if the ex parte communication forms the basis for the agency’s action, judicial interpretations of the APA would require that communication to be reflected in the record. If the communication is not reflected in the record and the record does not otherwise support the agency’s action, the rule could be subject to vacatur and remand by a court. A small minority of courts have taken a more critical view of ex parte communications, setting out a per se ban on them. Many of those cases, however, have been limited by subsequent decisions to apply to a relatively small number of informal rulemakings that are akin to quasi-judicial proceedings, such as where an agency regulation awards a valuable privilege to a specific person or entity. Despite the general absence of statutory and judicial regulation of ex parte communic… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49483/R49483.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49483.html | |
| R49482 | Retail Electricity Rates and Utility Return on Equity: State Primacy and Federal Influence | 2026-10-08T04:00:00Z | 2026-10-10T05:08:30Z | Active | Reports | Ashley J. Lawson, Adam Vann | Electricity, Federalism, Energy Policy | The retail electricity rates paid by end-use commercial and residential customers have long been a focus of federal, state, and local policymakers. In 1935, Congress passed the Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C. §§ 791a–823g), under which state and local utility regulators retain primary authority over retail electricity rate regulation. The law, in part, reflected views of the Supreme Court and others at the time about the scope of Congress’s authority to regulate interstate commerce pursuant to Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution. In the years that followed, the Supreme Court has taken a more expansive view of Congress’s constitutional authority, including over intrastate activities that substantially relate to interstate commerce. These judicial developments, along with the growing interconnectedness of the nation’s electricity system since the early 20th century, have reduced some of the constitutional barriers to congressional regulation of retail electricity services and rates. Nonetheless, political opposition to an expanded federal role from many states, utilities, and others creates potential barriers to Congress’s action in this space. Instead of amending the Federal Power Act to create an explicit role for the federal government in setting utility retail policies, Congress has opted for other mechanisms to influence retail rates. Since 1978, one such mechanism has been Section 111(d) of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA; 16 U.S.C. § 2621(d)). This section’s “states-must-consider” standards, as they are sometimes called, establish congressionally preferred policies that state and local utility regulators must consider adopting. The ultimate decision to adopt—or not adopt—the federal standards is made at the state level. Congress established 21 standards in Section 111(d) from 1978 to 2021 (the most recent year in which Congress amended the section). A retail electricity rate issue receiving attention in the 119th Congress is the return on equity (ROE) utilities are allowed t… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49482/R49482.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49482.html |
| R49481 | Active Presidential Tariff Actions in 2026: Fact Sheet | 2026-10-08T04:00:00Z | 2026-10-09T14:23:35Z | Active | Reports | William F. Burkhart | Since the beginning of the second Trump Administration on January 20, 2025, President Donald J. Trump has used various trade authorities to impose tariffs. Following the Supreme Court’s ruling on February 20, 2026, invalidating the Trump Administration’s use of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to impose certain tariffs, President Trump has used a combination of other trade authorities to impose tariffs. For example, shortly, after the Supreme Court’s IEEPA decision, President Trump announced a global 10% tariff rate using Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974. This authority permitted the President to levy duties for no more than 150 days barring legislation from Congress authorizing an extension. With the expiration of the Section 122 tariffs on July 24, 2026, the President imposed additional duties using Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1971 and continued to use Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 to impose duties. This fact sheet provides a summary table of the official tariff actions taken during the second Trump Administration that were in effect as of September 30, 2026 or are currently under an active investigation. The table includes a description of each action, the most recent non-amendment Federal Register notice related to the action, the countries impacted by the action, and the latest tariff rate imposed, and the status of any investigation. Actions are organized under the authority used and in alphabetical order by their description. U.S. negotiations with trading partners are ongoing, including the statutorily required joint review of the U.S.-Canada-Mexico Agreement (USMCA). The summary table may be periodically updated to reflect outcomes from USMCA negotiations and other talks with partner nations, as well as implementation of announced framework agreements. | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49481/R49481.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49481.html | |
| LSB11487 | Artificial Intelligence and Federal Criminal Law: Considerations for Congress | 2026-10-08T04:00:00Z | 2026-10-10T05:08:39Z | Active | Posts | Cassandra J. Barnum, Michael A. Foster | Artificial Intelligence, Computer Fraud & Abuse Act (CFAA), Generative Artificial Intelligence, Crime, Cybercrime, Cybersecurity | Recently, leading technology companies that have developed generative artificial intelligence (AI) models and agents disclosed certain cybersecurity incidents and cases of misuse related to their products. For instance, OpenAI disclosed that its AI agents hacked into the systems of another AI company called Hugging Face, infiltrated an Australian government website and accessed private data, and “interacted” with U.S. government websites “in unusual ways.” Anthropic also recently indicated that in multiple instances, it has “identified and disrupted operations” in which “suspected state-sponsored groups, financially motivated criminals, commercial spyware vendors, state propaganda institutions, and politically motivated individuals” attempted to use Anthropic AI Claude models as well as AI agents “for malicious activity.” In light of these developments, some observers and government decisionmakers have begun to grapple with questions regarding the application of criminal laws when AI tools work to accomplish harmful acts autonomously. Although state legal systems and liability regimes may implicate distinct principles, this Legal Sidebar examines the applicability of existing federal criminal liability frameworks to AI agents and their makers, with an emphasis on mental-state requirements, and provides some considerations for Congress with respect to potential reliance on or supplementation of those federal frameworks to address AI tools. Existing, Potentially Relevant Federal Offenses As a starting point, individuals who use AI tools to accomplish criminal ends may be prosecuted under existing federal criminal provisions applicable to the individuals’ conduct, just as they could when using other tools. For instance, one potentially relevant statute mentioned by some scholars and commentators is the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), which prohibits a variety of intentional or knowing conduct related to unauthorized computer access and could apply to individuals who use AI to obtain such access. Similarly, a… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB11487/LSB11487.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/HTML/LSB11487.html |
| R49480 | The Good Neighbor Authority on Federal Lands: In Brief | 2026-10-07T04:00:00Z | 2026-10-10T05:08:37Z | Active | Reports | Anne A. Riddle | Under the Good Neighbor Authority, the Secretaries of Agriculture and the Interior (“Secretaries”) may authorize specified nonfederal partners to conduct land management projects on certain federal lands in pursuit of specified land management goals. These land management goals include treating insect and disease infestations; reducing hazardous fuels; activities to restore or improve forest, rangeland, and watershed health, including fish and wildlife habitat; and specified work on certain NFS, BLM, NPS, and national wildlife refuge-managed roads. The authority allows agencies to collaborate with nonfederal partners to execute cross-jurisdictional land management projects. Partners may conduct commercial timber sales, retain any revenue, and use the revenue for specified purposes. Accordingly, the Good Neighbor Authority is often viewed as a tool for facilitating cross-boundary landscape management, leveraging partner resources, and increasing efficiency. Beginning in 2025, a related authority, colloquially known as the Good Neighbor Authority for Recreation, allows the Secretaries to authorize specified partners to conduct recreation enhancement or improvement services on Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and National Park System lands, both in the Department of the Interior (DOI), and National Forest System (NFS) lands, managed by the Forest Service (FS) in the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). This CRS report provides background, statistics, and a brief overview of some issues related to these authorities, including issues related to timber sales and associated revenues. | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49480/R49480.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49480.html | |
| R49479 | Environmental Remediation of Per- and Polyfluoroalkyl Substances (PFAS) | 2026-10-07T04:00:00Z | 2026-10-08T11:53:06Z | Active | Reports | Lance N. Larson, Kate R. Bowers, Jason O. Heflin | Per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) are a large, diverse group of fluorinated compounds that have been used in numerous commercial, industrial, and military applications. Among other uses, PFAS have been used in fire-fighting foams and in the processing and manufacture of many commercial products. Multiple PFAS—primarily perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA) and perfluorooctane sulfonate (PFOS)—have been detected in soil, surface water, and groundwater in numerous locations across the country. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA; P.L. 96-510) authorizes the federal government to respond to releases or threatened releases of hazardous substances, pollutants, or contaminants into the environment. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) administers the federal Superfund program to carry out CERCLA authorities on nonfederal lands. CERCLA establishes a broad liability scheme that holds past and current owners and operators of facilities from which a release (or threatened release) of hazardous substances in the environment occurs financially responsible for cleanup costs, natural resource damages, and the costs of federal public health studies. In 2024, EPA designated PFOA and PFOS as CERCLA hazardous substances. Entities responsible for releases of these substances may be subject to the CERCLA liability framework. Also in 2024, EPA issued an enforcement discretion and settlement policy explaining how the agency would exercise its enforcement discretion under CERCLA in matters involving PFAS. That memorandum describes categories of entities where EPA “does not intend to pursue otherwise potentially responsible parties where equitable factors do not support seeking response actions or costs under CERCLA.” These categories include community water systems, publicly owned treatment works, publicly owned/operated municipal solid waste landfills, publicly owned airports and local fire departments, and farms where biosolids are applied to the land. EPA’s enforcement discre… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49479/R49479.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49479.html | |
| LSB11486 | Appointing the Comptroller General: Law and History | 2026-10-07T04:00:00Z | 2026-10-08T16:23:26Z | Active | Posts | Todd Garvey | The Government Accountability Office’s (GAO’s) structure is unique. The agency is part of the legislative branch, but has a leader—the Comptroller General (Comptroller)—who is appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate to a 15-year term and, unlike any other officer in the federal government, may be removed only for cause after enactment of a joint resolution or through impeachment. There are historical reasons for this arrangement. Created as an “establishment . . . independent of the executive departments” in 1921, GAO combined the auditing, accounting, and claims-settlement functions that executive officers in the Treasury Department had previously exercised, with new investigative and reporting functions in service to Congress’s power of the purse that were legislative in nature. While GAO’s constitutional status in either the legislative or executive branches may not have been entirely clear at the time (it was not until 1945 that Congress explicitly identified GAO by law as a legislative branch agency), it appears that Congress may have believed that the Comptroller exercised powers that, as a legal matter, required presidential appointment but, as a policy matter, called for insulation from presidential removal and control. Those powers have changed substantially since 1921. The modern GAO has largely evolved into an agent of Congress, with some, though perhaps not all, of its more “executive” powers reassigned or disabled by statutes and court decisions. This Sidebar describes this progression from an agency of mixed powers and functions to one that primarily aids Congress in its legislative functions. Historical Development of the GAO and Comptroller From the outset, Congress recognized that officers tasked with accounting for and auditing the financial transactions of the United States would benefit from some degree of independence from the President if they were to serve as a meaningful check on executive spending. James Madison, for example, argued that there were “strong re… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB11486/LSB11486.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/HTML/LSB11486.html | |
| IF13326 | Medicaid Program Integrity: Background and Resources | 2026-10-07T04:00:00Z | 2026-10-09T14:23:34Z | Active | Resources | Angela Napili, Sarah K. Braun, Alison Mitchell | Medicaid & CHIP | Medicaid is a means-tested entitlement program that finances the delivery of primary and acute medical services, as well as long-term services and supports (LTSS). Each state designs and administers its own Medicaid program within federal parameters. In FY2024, Medicaid covered health care services for an estimated 85 million individuals at an estimated cost of $949 billion. At the federal level, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) approves Medicaid state plan amendments and waivers. Both the states and the federal government are responsible for Medicaid program integrity activities to ensure that all federal and state Medicaid rules are followed. For further background on Medicaid, see CRS In Focus IF10322, Medicaid Primer, and CRS Report R43357, Medicaid: An Overview. This In Focus provides background information on key questions about Medicaid program integrity and identifies selected supplemental federal resources. What Is Program Integrity? Medicaid program integrity activities are those administrative activities that ensure that the state Medicaid programs, Medicaid providers, and Medicaid enrollees operate in accordance with the federal and state Medicaid laws. Often, Medicaid program integrity activities are associated with the identification and prevention of fraud, waste, and abuse. While these are core program integrity activities, program integrity also encompasses additional components, such as oversight of the Medicaid program and identifying improper payments and overpayments. Program integrity activities also include measuring improper payments through the Payment Error Rate Measurement (PERM) program. An improper payment is “any payment that should not have been made or that was made in an incorrect amount (including overpayments and underpayments) under statutory, contractual, administrative, or other legally applicable requirements” (42 C.F.R. §431.958). CMS estimates that most improper payments (77% in FY2025) are the result of insufficient documentation (e.g., failing to subm… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13326/IF13326.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13326.html |
| R49478 | El Salvador in Brief: Overview and U.S. Relations | 2026-10-06T04:00:00Z | 2026-10-08T14:23:07Z | Active | Reports | Joshua Klein | El Salvador, Latin America, Caribbean & Canada | El Salvador is a small, densely populated country in Central America with deep historical, migratory, and economic ties to the United States. The United States has played a prominent role in El Salvador’s political and economic development, including through extensive involvement in the country’s civil conflict from 1980 to 1992. The conflict also contributed to increased migration flows from El Salvador to the United States that continued into the 2020s, driven in part by security and economic factors. The U.S. Census Bureau estimated that about 1.5 million Salvadoran-born individuals resided in the United States in 2024. This total includes more than 170,000 Salvadoran nationals who have relief from removal and work authorization through Temporary Protected Status (TPS). The United States is also a key trade and investment partner for El Salvador, as well as the country’s main source of remittances. According to El Salvador’s central bank, remittances to El Salvador from abroad totaled about $10 billion in 2025, the equivalent of roughly 27% of El Salvador’s dollarized economy (by gross domestic product). Since 2019, President Nayib Bukele and his New Ideas (NI) party have incrementally consolidated power across El Salvador’s executive, legislative, and judicial branches to become the dominant force in Salvadoran politics. Since he assumed office, President Bukele and NI’s majority in El Salvador’s unicameral legislature have overseen several changes to the country’s political and electoral processes, including through constitutional amendments in 2025 that permit continuous presidential reelection, among other things. President Bukele has presided over a significant decrease in gang-related violence, which has plagued El Salvador since the 1990s. Bukele’s security strategy is underpinned by an ongoing state of exception, which permits the suspension of some civil liberties and enables mass arrests of anyone suspected of belonging to or aiding gangs. Despite concerns from international and local observers about… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49478/R49478.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49478.html |
| IF13325 | Private Rights of Action: Authorizing Lawsuits to Enforce Federal Law | 2026-10-06T04:00:00Z | 2026-10-08T14:08:23Z | Active | Resources | Joanna R. Lampe | Jurisprudence, Administrative Procedure Act (APA), Executive Branch, Federal Regulations & Rulemaking | When Congress enacts a federal statute, it may consider whether and how the statute should be enforced. Different enforcement mechanisms may be available depending on the specific statute and the legal consequences that Congress chooses to impose for violations. One such option is a private right of action, which allows non-government entities to bring civil lawsuits to enforce the law. When Congress creates a private right of action, it may consider who can sue to enforce the law; who can be named as a defendant; where the suit should proceed; and what remedy should be available to a prevailing plaintiff, including options such as money damages, an injunction, or attorney’s fees. Options for Enforcement Federal statutes may be enforced via civil or criminal proceedings, and sometimes both. If Congress seeks to make a violation of a statute punishable by imprisonment, it may provide for enforcement via criminal proceedings. Crimes may also be punished with fines, restitution, or forfeiture of property and may carry other collateral consequences. Federal crimes can only be prosecuted by the federal government, not by state authorities or private individuals, though individuals may report suspected criminal violations for possible investigation and prosecution. Criminal proceedings are subject to constitutional limits designed to protect the rights of suspects and defendants. With respect to civil enforcement, Congress sometimes authorizes federal government officials to bring administrative enforcement proceedings against a regulated entity (subject to constitutional limits) or to sue in court to enforce the law. In addition or in the alternative, Congress sometimes empowers state attorneys general to sue to enforce federal laws. Congress can also create private rights of action, allowing private individuals or other non-government entities to sue public or private parties to vindicate legal interests. Congress may create private rights of action for suits involving individuals’ personal interests, such as tort ca… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13325/IF13325.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13325.html |
| R49477 | Classwide Scheduling of Controlled Substances | 2026-10-02T04:00:00Z | 2026-10-03T05:08:04Z | Active | Reports | Lisa N. Sacco, Joanna R. Lampe | As new dangerous substances appear on the illicit drug market in the United States, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) may use its emergency scheduling authority to temporarily place those substances in Schedule I of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) if the agency deems it necessary to avoid imminent hazards to public safety. (DEA was given temporary scheduling authority in the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 [Title II of P.L. 98-473].) However, as DEA has worked alongside state and foreign authorities to control hazardous substances, new, yet similar, substances have been found to rapidly emerge. Chemists, often operating illicitly, slightly alter a regulated compound to create a similar substance that is in the same structural class, but is not specifically controlled. Law enforcement has described efforts to control each new substance as a game of “whack-a-mole.” The CSA classifies various substances in one of five lists known as “schedules” based on characteristics such as their medical use, potential for abuse, and safety or dependence liability. Schedule I is the most restrictive, containing substances with no accepted medical use and high potential for abuse, such as heroin. The CSA authorizes the Attorney General to schedule substances temporarily or permanently via an administrative rulemaking process, and the Attorney General has delegated that scheduling authority to DEA. Congress may also schedule substances via legislation. In 2018, when new fentanyl analogues were rapidly emerging, DEA issued a temporary scheduling order (TSO) that placed a class of fentanyl-related substances in Schedule I under the CSA for two years. Congress (and Presidents Trump and Biden) enacted legislation to extend the TSO 10 times before making the classwide scheduling permanent through the Halt All Lethal Trafficking of Fentanyl Act (HALT Fentanyl Act; P.L. 119-26). Until the 2018 TSO, DEA had never scheduled substances as a class, but Congress had previously done so. For example, Congress defined “cannabi… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49477/R49477.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49477.html | |
| R49457 | Measuring Housing Affordability | 2026-10-01T04:00:00Z | 2026-10-03T05:25:49Z | Active | Reports | Mark P. Keightley, Maggie McCarty | Housing Finance, Housing Tax Policy, Social Services, Housing Budget & Appropriations | Housing affordability is an area of interest for policymakers and the public. There are a variety of ways to measure housing affordability, with the most common being the housing-cost-to-income ratio approach (hereinafter, “ratio approach”). This approach considers housing “unaffordable” if housing costs exceed 30% of household income. Recently, the residual income approach—which defines housing as “affordable” if the difference between household income and housing costs is sufficient to pay for some socially acceptable basket of non-housing necessities—has gained attention from researchers due to its ability to address some of the shortcomings of the ratio approach. Understanding the conceptual and empirical differences between these approaches is important, because the concept of what is affordable influences subsidy levels in federal assistance programs, research on family economic well-being, and reports on the health of the nation’s housing market. This report compares the ratio and residual income approaches to measuring housing affordability. While these two measures often show similar overarching housing affordability patterns, they can generate different estimates of the extent of affordability challenges for certain subpopulations. Using data from the 2023 American Community Survey, CRS found the following among non-elderly U.S. households: Compared to the residual income approach, the ratio approach estimates lower rates of housing affordability challenges for all households, low-income households, and households with children. Approximately 53.0% of households did not face housing affordability challenges under either approach, 31.8% faced challenges under both approaches, and 15.2% faced challenges according to only one of the approaches. Under the residual income approach, it would require more than three times as much additional household income—from work or public subsidies—to alleviate housing affordability challenges than is required under the ratio approach. CRS analysis of the 2023 American H… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49457/R49457.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49457.html |
| IN12744 | Diesel Export Ban: Transportation Policy Considerations for Congress | 2026-10-01T04:00:00Z | 2026-10-02T18:08:01Z | Active | Posts | Ben Goldman | On September 21, 2026, the average price of diesel fuel for use in highway vehicles reached $6.529 per gallon, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration. In 2024, trucks and trains transported between two-thirds and three-quarters of all domestic freight (about 13 million of 17.7 million total tons transported), almost all using diesel-fueled engines. Shippers of perishable goods, which cannot be easily stored for later shipment, may be especially sensitive to high fuel costs. The Trump Administration and some Members of Congress are reportedly considering restrictions on the export of diesel fuel, with the goals of increasing domestic supply and reducing consumer product prices through lower shipping costs. One such bill (H.R. 10423) would immediately ban exports of diesel fuel until the end of the calendar year. Another (H.R. 10422) would automatically implement an export ban if the diesel fuel price averages more than $5.00 per gallon over a two-week period; the export ban would remain until the diesel fuel price was below $4.50 per gallon for 30 consecutive days. The United States is a major exporter of diesel fuel. If diesel fuel exports are restricted, refineries could be left with a temporary surplus, potentially leading to lower prices in the short term in some areas. Fluctuations in the price of diesel fuel could present various surface, maritime, and aviation transportation policy issues for Congress to consider. In response to a proposed export ban, industry analysts reportedly forecast that refineries could respond by reducing production of diesel until surpluses are depleted, depending on how any restrictions would be structured. Diesel fuel is produced by refining crude oil in a process that also produces gasoline, aviation fuel, and other products. A decline in the production of diesel could be accompanied by declines in the other types of fuel produced, potentially raising those prices depending on the overall supply and other factors. In the global market, countries accustomed to im… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12744/IN12744.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/HTML/IN12744.html | |
| R49432 | Online Scam Centers in Southeast Asia: Background and U.S. Responses | 2026-09-30T04:00:00Z | 2026-10-03T05:24:08Z | Active | Reports | Ben Dolven, William Piekos, Shelby B. Senger | In the past decade, cyber-enabled scam operations have proliferated across Southeast Asia, concentrated in Burma (Myanmar), Cambodia, and Laos. People operating from scam centers target individuals for cyber-enabled financial fraud using, for example, promises of fake cryptocurrency investment opportunities or romantic overtures to elicit payment from victims around the world. Scam centers are operated by and beneficial to a range of actors in the region, with criminal organizations from the People’s Republic of China (PRC, or China) the most common operators of scam compounds, according to the United Nations. Scams have had a significant and growing impact both in the United States and globally, though their illicit nature and underreporting by victims make it difficult to accurately measure their reach. The Global Anti-Scam Alliances estimated global losses at $442 billion in 2025. The Federal Bureau of Investigation estimated Americans lost $17.7 billion to online fraud in 2025, and U.S. officials have estimated Americans have lost $12.5 billion to scam centers in Southeast Asia specifically. The scam ecosystem also has implications for other forms of criminality, and many of the individuals involved in perpetrating scams are victims of human trafficking. The United Nations estimated that the scam workforce included as many as 300,000 people from 66 countries in early 2025; INTERPOL estimated human trafficking victims forced to conduct online fraud came from 80 countries in late 2025. Approximately 90% of the individuals who facilitated human trafficking for scam center purposes were from Asia, according to INTERPOL. Congress has considered and may consider a range of legislative and oversight options to reduce the impact of these scams on Americans and strengthen the U.S. government’s response against scam centers in Southeast Asia. In the 119th Congress, some Members have introduced legislation seeking to mitigate the harms of scams on U.S. citizens, sanction and pursue scam perpetrators and beneficiaries, a… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49432/R49432.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49432.html | |
| R49427 | Department of Homeland Security Appropriations: FY2027 State of Play | 2026-09-30T04:00:00Z | 2026-10-02T09:12:33Z | Active | Reports | William L. Painter | FY2027 marks the 24th annual appropriations cycle with a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appropriations measure. In six of the first seven years of its existence, the annual appropriations measure for DHS was enacted within a month of the beginning of the fiscal year it covered. Since FY2010, however, no annual DHS appropriations measure has been enacted within the first two months of its fiscal year, and twice DHS received its annual appropriations within the first fiscal quarter. Lapses in annual appropriations for the department lasting more than a week have occurred four times in since FY2010. This report is a quick reference for tracking the “state of play” for DHS appropriations from the end of the August 2026 district work period until the resolution of the annual appropriations measure. DHS appropriations 2027 Latest DHS appropriations DHS appropriations 2027 supplemental Homeland Security appropriations lapse 2026 DHS continuing resolution anomaly 2027 (This is an “In Brief” style report, and as such, should have its summary and TOC suppressed) | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49427/R49427.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49427.html | |
| R49421 | Connecting Constituents to Information About Census Bureau Surveys: Frequently Asked Questions | 2026-09-30T04:00:00Z | 2026-10-02T16:12:48Z | Active | Reports | Taylor R. Knoedl | The U.S. Census Bureau produces statistics on demographic and economic characteristics across the United States based on more than 130 different surveys, including the agency's largest products: the decennial census and the American Community Survey (ACS). Data from the decennial census are used for apportioning seats in the House of Representatives as well as for redistricting in the states. Other uses for census data include informing various policy decisions, guiding federal funding, offering the public insights on population trends, and helping the private sector make informed business decisions. To produce the statistics used in its data products, the Census Bureau surveys and samples the population of the United States and its territories. For these reasons, constituents across states and congressional districts may have questions regarding the Census Bureau and the surveys it conducts. This FAQ is intended to provide information on these potential questions to support district and state staff and other staff that interact with constituents in fielding questions on these topics. This report addresses several Census Bureau-related topics that may be of particular interest to constituents, including, but not limited to, how constituents may be contacted by the Census Bureau, how collected data are used, how data are kept private, and how Census data and other products can be accessed. | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49421/R49421.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49421.html | |
| R49419 | State-Law Climate Tort Suits and Suncor Energy (U.S.A.) Inc. v. County Commissioners of Boulder County: A Primer for Congress | 2026-09-30T04:00:00Z | 2026-10-01T12:23:24Z | Active | Reports | Andrew S. Coghlan | Over the last decade, state and local governments have filed dozens of state-law tort suits against energy companies, arguing that those companies are liable for the localized effects of climate change because they misled the public about their products’ impact on the climate, thereby inflating demand for fossil fuels, boosting atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases, and worsening climate-related harms. The City and County of Boulder, CO, filed one such suit, naming as defendants Suncor and Exxon Mobil. On October 5, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court is scheduled to hear oral arguments on whether Boulder’s suit can proceed. This case has generated substantial interest from Congress and other government actors. Nearly 200 members and more than 40 states have signed on to amicus briefs supporting either Boulder or Exxon Mobil and Suncor, and the U.S. Department of Justice has filed a brief siding with the energy companies. According to Suncor and Exxon Mobil, Boulder’s suit is an attempt to impose tort liability under Colorado law for greenhouse gas emissions occurring wholly outside Colorado’s borders, a form of extra-territorial regulation that exceeds the scope of state power in the federal system. Suncor and Exxon Mobil also argue that state-law tort claims like Boulder’s are preempted by the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q), which, they say, provides the exclusive means of addressing pollution that crosses state borders and thus precludes Boulder’s suit. Boulder argues that Suncor and Exxon Mobil lack standing to challenge Boulder’s suit, which has not yet proceeded to trial, and, according to Boulder, has not yet inflicted any legally cognizable harm. Boulder also contests the Supreme Court’s statutory jurisdiction to hear this case, arguing that there is no final state-court judgment for the Court to review. On the merits, Boulder contends that its suit is a constitutionally permissible exercise of state police power to regulate deceptive marketing and sales practices. Because the Clean Air Act ad… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49419/R49419.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49419.html | |
| R49408 | Overview of Fiscal Spending Projections: FY2027 Budget Cycle | 2026-09-30T04:00:00Z | 2026-10-01T08:53:06Z | Active | Reports | D. Andrew Austin | This In Brief summarizes projections for major components of the federal budget from the February 2026 Congressional Budget Office (CBO) budget outlook, the Trump Administration FY2027 budget submission issued in April 2026, and CBO’s June 2026 reestimate of Administration fiscal proposals. Scoring of legislative proposals compares the trajectory of spending and revenues relative to CBO baseline projections, which indicate the trajectory of federal spending under current law. Most CBO reestimates closely track Office of Management and Budget (OMB) levels for major budget aggregates. [Summary is suppressed.] | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49408/R49408.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49408.html | |
| IN12743 | International Conservation Funding, FY2023-FY2027 Request | 2026-09-30T04:00:00Z | 2026-10-01T09:38:05Z | Active | Posts | Pervaze A. Sheikh, Eric P. Nardi, Anthony R. Marshak | International Environmental Funding, International Natural Resource Issues | The United States provides foreign assistance to address international conservation in the form of financial, programmatic, and technical support. International conservation activities include protecting biodiversity, restoring habitat, supporting the management of protected areas, and promoting community-based conservation, among others. Several federal agencies administer these programs, including the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), the Department of the Treasury, and the Department of State (State), among others. Table 1 lists selected U.S. international programs that address conservation and their enacted funding levels for FY2023-FY2026 and the Administration’s budget request for FY2027. The funding in Table 1 is for specific programs, financial commitments to certain international treaties or organizations, and line items in appropriations laws or committee reports that identify funding for a set of activities. This list is not exhaustive; other programs where conservation may be a secondary objective may not be listed. Table 1 does not include funding provided outside of regular discretionary appropriations (e.g., supplemental appropriations). The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) was dismantled and ceased operations in July 2025. Some of the programs and activities it conducted were transferred to State. In these instances, both entities are noted in the column. Further, the appropriations reported in Table 1 do not reflect any potential rescission and reallocation of funding or dissolution of programs. Table 1. Enacted Appropriations from FY2023 to FY2026 and the FY2027 Budget Request for Selected Federal Programs that Address International Conservation (nominal, $ in millions) Program Description FY2023 FY2024 FY2025 FY2026 FY2027 Request U.S. Foundation for National Security and Counterterrorism The foundation was authorized under P.L. 118-159 as the Foundation for International Conservation. P.L. 119-75 changed the name to the U.S. Foundation for National Security and Counter… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12743/IN12743.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/HTML/IN12743.html |
| IF13324 | Crypto and Bank-Permissible Activities | 2026-09-30T04:00:00Z | 2026-10-01T13:23:18Z | Active | Resources | Marc Labonte | By law, banks can engage only in “the business of banking” and related or incidental activities. These limitations differentiate banks from other financial firms. The business of banking includes accepting customer deposits and making loans. But what else should be permitted? Over time, Congress and the federal bank regulators have permitted numerous and diverse activities that have broadened the scope of banking. Policymakers are currently debating whether activities involving cryptocurrencies and digital assets (crypto) should be considered bank-permissible activities. Since 2017, there has been a repeated pattern of federal bank regulators, with changes in presidential Administrations, reversing policies put in place by predecessors to allow or disallow these activities. Regulators use a two-prong test to decide whether to approve activities: (1) Are they related to the business of banking, and (2) do they pose safety and soundness risks to banks? There is disagreement on whether crypto meets either of those tests. Congress could continue to defer to regulators on which crypto activities should be permissible, pass legislation to allow or ban particular activities, or combine both approaches. Legislation would result in a more durable outcome, reducing the likelihood of frequent regulatory changes. But regulators have specialized expertise that might make them better placed to evaluate whether particular activities are unduly risky for banks and are sufficiently related to the business of banking. In the 119th Congress, the House and Senate have considered legislation that would expand the permissible crypto activities of banks differently. Background Following the stock market crash and banking crisis of the Great Depression, the Glass-Steagall Act (48 Stat. 162), among other things, separated banking and securities, with the goal of reducing the risk that banks would fail through speculative investments. To achieve this separation, the act restricted banks to banking activities. (Conversely, certain activi… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13324/IF13324.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13324.html | |
| R49436 | Digital Health Information Interoperability: Background and Selected Policy Considerations | 2026-09-29T04:00:00Z | 2026-10-03T05:24:09Z | Active | Reports | Nora Wells | Health Care Delivery, Health & Medical R&D, Technology & Innovation | Interoperability, essentially the ability of different technologies to speak with one another, is a key concept in the advancement of modernized digital health information exchange across a variety of health-related settings nationwide. Health information systems in part use health information technology (IT), a broad category of tools that may encompass electronic health records (EHRs), patient portals, medical imaging, and remote patient monitoring. Health IT may be used in a variety of ways in health-related settings, from underpinning individual patient care to population health improvement efforts such as disease tracking. Interoperable health IT can potentially allow for the rapid, seamless, and secure exchange of authorized digital health information between parties without special effort on the part of those exchanging it. Ultimately, a system of interoperable health IT may create an infrastructure that supports a learning health system. In a learning health system, a single longitudinal record of a patient’s care over the course of their lifetime can follow them from provider to provider, state to state. Such a system allows continuous learning cycles that can produce innovative knowledge that in turn improves health outcomes. Many offices and operating divisions within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) collaborate to further digital health information interoperability efforts, including primarily the Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology (ONC) and the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. Multiple other HHS actors, such as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the Office of Inspector General, serve roles as well. Digital health information interoperability in the United States is a long-term initiative spanning multiple decades. Modern digital health information interoperability has been advanced by a variety of laws and regulations building upon one another. In tandem with other supporting efforts, at least five laws and 18 regulatio… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49436/R49436.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49436.html |
| IN12742 | Suspension of Countervailing Duties on Phosphate Fertilizer: Options for Congress | 2026-09-29T04:00:00Z | 2026-10-01T10:23:07Z | Active | Posts | Christopher A. Casey, Stephanie Rosch, Benjamin Tsui | Agricultural Trade & Food Aid, Import Policy, Agricultural Trade | On June 29, 2026, President Donald J. Trump, citing Section 318(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1318(a)), proclaimed an emergency and authorized the Secretary of Commerce to suspend the collection of countervailing duties (CVDs; tariffs that offset foreign subsidies) on phosphate fertilizer from Morocco that have been in effect since 2021. Farmers commonly apply phosphate fertilizers to provide essential elements for the growth of corn, cotton, soybeans, wheat, and other crops. U.S. prices for certain phosphate fertilizers increased after the escalation of the U.S. conflict with Iran in February 2026 to their highest levels since September 2025. Some U.S. agricultural groups favor removing CVDs on fertilizer imports as a means of lowering U.S. fertilizer prices. In contrast, certain U.S. fertilizer manufacturers support the CVDs to address foreign government support of foreign phosphate fertilizer manufacturers. Citing costs to farmers, some Members of Congress have urged the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) to revoke the CVDs or supported their suspension through legislation (e.g., S. 4418, H.R. 8583). Other Members in prior years have supported the CVDs, citing unfair trade practices harming the U.S. fertilizer industry and the importance of ensuring U.S. food security. Phosphate Fertilizer Imports From 2016 to 2025, U.S. imports of phosphate fertilizers averaged nearly 3 million metric tons annually (Figure 1). Morocco, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Israel were the main foreign suppliers of phosphate fertilizers to the United States over this period. From 2016 to 2019, Morocco and Russia accounted on average for about 74% of U.S. phosphate fertilizer imports. In 2021, the United States imposed CVDs on phosphate fertilizers from Morocco and Russia. Following this action, U.S. imports of Moroccan and Russian phosphate fertilizer declined, and imports from Saudi Arabia, Israel, and other trading partners increased. Figure 1. U.S. Imports of Phosphate Fertilizers, by Country of Origin Calendar years 2… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12742/IN12742.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/HTML/IN12742.html |
| IF13323 | Defense Primer: U.S. Army Force Structure Development Process | 2026-09-29T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-30T11:08:11Z | Active | Resources | Andrew Feickert | Air, Land, Sea, Space & Projection Forces | Introduction The U.S. Army has changed the units and organizations comprising its force structure throughout its history, which dates to 1775. Force structure can be described as the number and types (infantry, artillery, engineer, etc.) of Army units containing soldiers, weapons, and equipment. Changes to Army force structure have occurred for various reasons, including evolution of national security requirements; introduction of new technologies and weapons; adoption of new tactics and techniques; assignment of new missions; and consideration of budgetary factors. Under Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution, Congress has the authority to “raise and support Armies” and “make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces,” among other powers pertaining to the armed forces. Congress typically considers annual legislation to authorize the size of the armed forces, including Army components, and to appropriate funding for defense. Under Title 10, Section 113, of the U.S. Code, Congress has generally delegated the daily administrative management of the U.S. military (including determination of force structure) to the Secretary of Defense, who is using “Secretary of War” as a “secondary title” under Executive Order (EO) 14347 dated September 5, 2025. Under Title 10, Section 7013, of the U.S. Code, the Secretary of the Army is responsible for the administration, training, equipping, and organization of the Army. Background The process of developing and fielding Army units is known as Force Management (FM), an administrative function translating strategic security requirements into resourced, trained, and ready forces. The FM process informs annual Army budget requests to Congress and guides budget implementation once Congress authorizes and appropriates funding and sets end strength. The Army uses an iterative, five-phase Force Development (FD) process (Figure 1) to design and authorize its units. This process is usually guided by the National Security Strategy (NSS), the National Defense St… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13323/IF13323.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13323.html |
| IF13322 | U.S. Measles Outbreaks 2025-2026: Overview and Issues for Congress | 2026-09-29T04:00:00Z | 2026-10-01T13:38:23Z | Active | Resources | Kavya Sekar, Alexandria K. Mickler | Public Health Emergency Preparedness & Response, Public Health Services & Special Populations, Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP), Vaccines & Immunization | As of September 24, 2026, the United States has seen the highest number of annual reported measles cases since 1991, according to Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) data. This 2026 total has already exceeded the 2025 total, which was also significantly higher than prior years. In 2000, the United States declared it had eliminated measles, meaning that no continuous spread had occurred in the United States across one year. CDC credited the measles elimination to a “highly effective vaccination program,” as well as better measles control in the Americas region. The United States may lose its decades-long measles elimination status this year due to ongoing outbreaks. Measles is a vaccine-preventable disease, meaning that the two-dose vaccine can protect against measles infection and disease. High measles vaccination rates (estimated 95% of the population and above) in a community can help establish herd immunity that limits the spread of the virus and protects those who cannot get vaccinated, including infants who are not yet eligible for vaccination and people with medical contraindications to measles vaccines. About Measles Measles, also referred to as rubeola, is a highly contagious virus that spreads from person to person through contact with respiratory and airborne droplets. It is characterized by a red rash that spreads from the hairline to the neck, torso, arms, legs, and feet. In addition to the rash, measles is often accompanied by a high fever, cough, and common complications like ear infections and diarrhea. More serious complications include pneumonia, encephalitis (swelling of the brain), long-term nervous system damage, and death from respiratory and neurologic complications. Measles complications are most common among children under five years of age and adults. Prior to the vaccine’s introduction in 1963, an estimated 3 to 4 million cases, 48,000 hospitalizations, and 500 deaths occurred annually in the United States due to measles. About 1,000 people annually developed chronic disab… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13322/IF13322.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13322.html |
| R49363 | Temporary Protected Status: History and Issues for Congress | 2026-09-28T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-30T14:38:33Z | Active | Reports | Jill H. Wilson | Asylees, Refugees & Other Humanitarian Concerns, Immigration Enforcement & Removal, Permanent Immigration, Temporary Immigration, Asylum, Temporary Protected Status (TPS) | The United States has long offered protection to foreign nationals who face jeopardy in their home countries. Various mechanisms have been incorporated into U.S. immigration law over the years to grant humanitarian protection. Asylum is a form of humanitarian protection available to foreign nationals who are physically present in the United States and who meet the definition of refugee—that is, someone typically outside his or her country of nationality who is unable or unwilling to return to that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution. Congress created temporary protected status (TPS) in 1990 to fill what it considered a gap in statutory protection for those in the United States who lacked the individualized finding of persecution necessary to qualify for asylum but whose home countries were experiencing armed conflict, natural disaster, or other extraordinary circumstances that prevented their safe return. The TPS statute gives the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) the authority to designate countries for TPS for periods of six to 18 months and the authority to extend such designations if conditions continue to be met. Foreign nationals present in the United States from designated countries at the time of the designation may apply for TPS. Those granted TPS are eligible for employment authorization, cannot be detained on the basis of their immigration status, and are not subject to removal from the United States while they retain TPS. At the beginning of the second Trump Administration, the number of designated countries (17) and the number of individuals covered by TPS (approximately 1.4 million) were at all-time highs. Since then, the Trump Administration has terminated TPS designations for 13 of the 17 countries and reduced the number of individuals covered by TPS to approximately 274,000. Throughout the history of the program, approximately 1.7 million people from 28 countries have been granted TPS. Some countries’ designations have lasted as little as … | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49363/R49363.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49363.html |
| LSB11485 | Artificial Intelligence Safety Collaboration and Antitrust Law | 2026-09-28T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-30T12:53:00Z | Active | Posts | Jay B. Sykes | Antitrust Law, Artificial Intelligence, Cybersecurity, Judicial Branch, Sherman Antitrust Act | On September 12, 2026, Anthropic chief executive Dario Amodei published a blog post arguing that the artificial-intelligence (AI) industry should slow the pace at which it develops frontier models to mitigate risks of catastrophic harm, including the loss of control of AI systems and misuse of AI for cyberattacks and bioterrorism. Amodei also proposed several measures to “pace the frontier,” including coordination among AI companies to establish common safety standards and “limits on the rate of unchecked AI progress.” He added, however, that “[s]ome forms of coordination that would be impactful for pacing are legally challenging, and will require government support,” potentially including “waivers of antitrust restrictions.” Amodei’s post—which was published amid heightened public discussion of potential AI safety risks—generated considerable commentary. Leaders of other AI labs endorsed his call to “pace the frontier.” House Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries called on Congress to take “decisive action” to slow AI development in the interest of safety. Other observers criticized Amodei’s proposals. Some contended that antitrust law permits AI firms to engage in many forms of safety collaboration, making antitrust waivers unnecessary and potentially harmful. Amodei’s post also generated antitrust litigation: On September 18, 2026, customers of several leading AI companies filed a putative class action alleging that the companies violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act by agreeing to slow the pace of AI innovation. This Legal Sidebar discusses antitrust issues raised by the prospect of AI safety collaboration. It begins with an overview of the antitrust principles that govern competitor collaboration. Next, it applies those principles to evaluate the legal risks that may accompany certain types of safety collaboration between competing AI developers. The Sidebar concludes with considerations for Congress. Competitor Collaboration and Antitrust Law: General Principles Per Se Illegality, the Rule of Reason, and “Qui… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB11485/LSB11485.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/HTML/LSB11485.html |
| IN12741 | Citizenship and Residence Criteria for the 2030 Census: Recent Developments | 2026-09-28T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-29T14:38:09Z | Active | Posts | Taylor R. Knoedl | The decennial census of housing and population is conducted every 10 years to count each resident of the United States and its territories, as well as military personnel and dependents abroad. The constitutionally mandated purpose of the decennial census is to determine the apportionment of the seats in the U.S. House of Representatives. Per Article I, Section 2, clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution, every 10 years an “actual [e]numeration” must be conducted “in such Manner as [Congress] shall by Law direct.” Recently, the Census Bureau published a notice of proposed rulemaking and requested comments on operational revisions to the decennial census for 2030. The proposed rule includes residence criteria that would exclude from the apportionment count all citizens of foreign countries who are not either also citizens of the United States or lawful permanent residents of the United States. The proposed rule also describes methods that might be used to determine a respondent’s citizenship status. The Federal Register notice indicates that comments on the proposed rule must be received by October 13, 2026. Who Does the Decennial Census Count? The Census Bureau aims to count every person during the decennial census only once and in the right place. To ensure individuals are counted at the right place, the Census Act of 1790 introduced the concept of a “usual residence.” In a document for the 2020 decennial census, the Census Bureau defined usual residence as “the place where a person lives and sleeps most of the time,” which may not necessarily be the person’s legal residence, voting residence, or where they may want to be counted. Residence criteria have varied over time. 2020 Residence Criteria The Census Bureau published the final residence criteria in the Federal Register in advance of the 2020 census. The criteria used to determine usual residence for 2020 indicated the definition of usual residence; how foreign citizens living in the United States are counted; that foreign citizens visiting the United States are e… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12741/IN12741.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/HTML/IN12741.html | |
| R49360 | The Second Amendment and Aliens Unlawfully Present in the United States | 2026-09-25T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-26T05:54:56Z | Active | Reports | Amin Aminfar | The Second Amendment to the Constitution protects “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms.” In New York State Rifle and Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 17 (2022), the Supreme Court explained that courts examining whether a law infringes on this right should look first to whether the text of the Second Amendment covers the regulated conduct—for example, whether an item covered by the regulation is covered by the term “Arms”—and, if it does, courts should then determine whether the law is consistent with the historical tradition of firearm regulation in the United States. If the law is not consistent with that tradition, then it is considered an unconstitutional infringement of the Second Amendment. This two-step framework has been applied by the Supreme Court and federal courts of appeals to numerous firearms regulations, including a federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922, that prohibits possession of firearms by nine categories of persons. One of the provisions in that statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(A), bars possession of firearms by aliens “illegally or unlawfully in the United States.” The Supreme Court has not addressed that provision with respect to the Second Amendment directly, but it has interpreted how other constitutional provisions apply to aliens unlawfully present in the United States. Some of these provisions have been interpreted as applying to aliens regardless of the legality of their presence in the United States, but the Supreme Court has nevertheless qualified the protection offered by those provisions, explaining that the “plenary” power that Congress generally enjoys over matters of immigration empowers it to legislate with respect to aliens in a manner that it could not with respect to citizens, at least in some circumstances. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976). In other cases, the Supreme Court has analyzed whether aliens are included within the scope of a constitutional provision at all, specifically, whether they should be considered among “the people” when that term is used … | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49360/R49360.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49360.html | |
| R49361 | Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) Standards | 2026-09-24T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-26T05:55:04Z | Active | Reports | Naseeb A. Souweidane | The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) administers Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards that regulate the fuel consumption of vehicles. These standards require automotive manufacturers to produce vehicles with greater fuel-efficiency with the stated goal to reduce energy consumption and limit dependence on foreign oil. Title 49, Section 32902, of the U.S. Code sets several statutory obligations for CAFE standards, including a mandate to set the maximum feasible standards for each model year and considerations to be used in making that determination. The stringency of CAFE standards has generally increased since their implementation in 1978. NHTSA sets separate CAFE standards each model year for light-, medium-, and heavy-duty vehicles. Light-duty vehicles are separated into three fleet or compliance categories: (1) domestic passenger vehicles, (2) imported passenger vehicles, and (3) light trucks. Manufacturers are required to meet CAFE standards for each fleet in which they produce vehicles. NHTSA expresses CAFE standards through a mathematical function represented as a curve. The CAFE curve sets a range for vehicles in a given fleet each model year, and the specific standards are dependent on footprint, a vehicle attribute that is a measurement of vehicle size. NHTSA and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) both have roles in the enforcement of CAFE standards. EPA verifies automotive manufacturers’ CAFE data, conducts tests to measure the fuel economy and emissions of vehicles, calculates manufacturers’ CAFE values, determines the average CAFE values, and issues final CAFE reports to manufacturers and NHTSA. NHTSA then identifies whether the fleet performance is greater than or equal to the standards set for a manufacturer’s fleet. Additionally, manufacturers are required to label certain fuel economy information on vehicles, and EPA and NHTSA coordinate to administer the labeling requirements. NHTSA offers several flexibilities for manufacturers to comply with CAFE standards… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49361/R49361.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49361.html | |
| IF13321 | Estimated Effects on Effective Tax Rates and Revenues of Increasing the 199A Deduction for Pass-Through Businesses | 2026-09-24T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-25T09:08:10Z | Active | Resources | Mark P. Keightley | Business & Corporate Tax, Pass-Through Businesses, Tax Rates | Under Section 199A of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC), owners of pass-through businesses are eligible to claim a deduction of up to 20% of a firm’s qualified business income, subject to certain limitations. The deduction was added to the tax code from 2018 to 2025 by the 2018 reconciliation law (P.L. 115-97). The 2025 reconciliation law (P.L. 119-21) made the deduction permanent and widened eligibility limits. According to the Joint Committee on Taxation’s (JCT’s) most recent estimates, the extension and changes to the deduction made by the 2025 reconciliation law are expected to reduce federal tax revenues by $736.5 billion from FY2025 to FY2034. This In Focus provides an overview of the 199A deduction, briefly examines selected key policy issues of the deduction generally, and presents estimated effects on effective tax rates and revenues of increasing the deduction to 25%. Increasing the deduction’s rate from 20% was considered during the debate over the 2025 reconciliation law. The chair of the House Ways and Means Committee reportedly expressed interest in increasing the deduction to 25%. Overview of the Deduction How a business is taxed at the federal level depends partly on how it is organized. A firm can be organized as either a C corporation or a pass-through entity (i.e., partnership, S corporation, limited liability company, or sole proprietorship). C corporation profits are taxed once according to the corporate tax system, and then potentially a second time at the shareholder level when corporate dividend payments are made or capital gains are recognized. Pass-through business profits are, in general, not subject to the corporate tax. Instead, the income of these businesses passes through to the individual owners who pay tax according to individual income tax rates. Under current law, the tax rate for corporate income is permanently set at a flat rate of 21% for tax years after 2017. Most corporate dividends and capital gains recognized by individual shareholders are subject to a maximum tax rate of 2… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13321/IF13321.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13321.html |
| R49359 | College Sports Media Rights: Background and Issues for Congressional Consideration | 2026-09-23T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-25T14:23:14Z | Active | Reports | Dana A. Scherer | The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), a voluntary, self-governing organization of four-year colleges and universities, includes intercollegiate athletics programs organized into divisions, subdivisions, and conferences. Division I (DI) schools compete at the highest level and can offer students full athletic scholarships. Within DI are an elite group of conferences, known as the Autonomy or Power Four conferences, that have autonomy to create their own rules. For schools within the Power Four conferences, sales of media rights for college sports represent the largest source of revenue. College sports media rights contracts have far-reaching effects on the finances of schools and the quality of life of student athletes. Schools have switched conference memberships to maximize media revenue in lieu of geographic proximity. As a result, student athletes spend an increasing portion of their time traveling thousands of miles to play games. Moreover, as a condition of the media contracts that generate revenue for schools’ athletics departments, schools must pay to construct and operate on-site production studios and rely on students to produce and transmit telecasts of sporting events to cable networks and streaming services. Congress may consider issues relating to media rights contracts, conference alignments, and funding for college sports broadcast production facilities. As one option, Congress could amend current law. An example of such legislation in the 119th Congress is the Protect College Sports Act of 2026 (PCSA; S. 4668), which Senator Ted Cruz sponsored and for which Senator John Thune submitted an amendment in the nature of a substitute, S.Amdt. 6776. The bill with the amendment was considered by the Senate on September 22, 2026 (hereinafter PCSA, as amended). Title II of the PCSA, as amended, would amend the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961 by giving an antitrust exemption to NCAA DI colleges and/or conferences to form and operate a new entity, known as a “covered entity,” to collectively n… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49359/R49359.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49359.html | |
| LSB11484 | The Protect College Sports Act of 2026: Potential Implications for Title IX | 2026-09-23T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-24T12:53:44Z | Active | Posts | Jared P. Cole, Whitney K. Novak | School & Campus Safety, Title IX | Calls from stakeholders for federal legislation regulating intercollegiate athletics have increased during a period of significant change in intercollegiate sports. Intercollegiate athletics regulators have faced uncertainty with respect to the enforcement of uniform rules on issues such as compensation for the use of an athlete’s Name, Image, and Likeness (NIL); eligibility; and transfers between institutions, due in part to years of litigation. One legislative proposal, the Protect College Sports Act (PCSA), has been characterized as a bipartisan solution to “end the disorder facing college athletics” stemming from a “conflicting patchwork of court decisions and state laws.” The revised Senate version of the PCSA addresses a wide range of issues related to intercollegiate athletics, including several provisions that explicitly address women’s sports. Some observers have raised questions about how the bill’s provisions, if enacted, would ultimately interact with existing requirements for university athletics programs under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (Title IX). Title IX prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex in education programs and activities that receive federal financial assistance. Among other things, the statute imposes significant requirements for university athletics programs with respect to the allocation of resources between the sexes. The PCSA does not directly amend Title IX, but it includes a Title IX “savings clause” that would clarify that nothing in the PCSA shall be construed to “override, modify, or amend the applicability of Title IX.” This Sidebar begins with a brief background on Title IX’s requirements for athletics programs. It continues by describing the PCSA and its provisions most relevant to university Title IX obligations. The Sidebar then examines how those provisions, if enacted, might interact with Title IX’s requirements for athletics. It concludes with some considerations for Congress. Title IX and Athletics Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (T… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB11484/LSB11484.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/HTML/LSB11484.html |
| IF13320 | Defense Contractors, Data Rights, and the “Right to Repair” | 2026-09-23T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-26T05:54:56Z | Active | Resources | Alexandra G. Neenan, Kevin J. Hickey | The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) often relies on private contractors to support its mission. (DOD is using a “secondary Department of War designation” under Executive Order 14347.) DOD works with these contractors to develop and field complex weapons systems that include technologies developed by the government, by private contractors, or by a combination of both. Private companies may have intellectual property (IP) rights in technologies that they developed, which grants them exclusive rights in, for example, data and software. DOD may therefore need contractual permission (i.e., a license) to access data or modify software to conduct necessary maintenance and repairs. A lack of DOD access to data may delay deployment of key DOD weapons systems and increase sustainment costs. For example, a 2026 DOD Office of the Inspector General (OIG) review of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program found that DOD did not “enforce a contract requirement for Lockheed Martin to identify and provide accurate data on Government property within its possession.” OIG stated that “inaccurate and incomplete inventory data could have a negative operational impact on the program and may lead to uninformed logistical and budgetary decisions.” Some Members of Congress and analysts are advocating for contractors to provide DOD access to technical data and software needed to repair and maintain acquired weapons systems. This stance is known as the right to repair. IP and DOD Data Rights IP law refers to various types of legal rights to exclude others from making, copying, or using intangible creations of the human mind. Generally, IP protections are intended to encourage innovation by providing incentives to generate new works and useful inventions. At the federal level, IP includes four main types of legal protection: patents, copyrights, trademarks, and trade secrets. These legal regimes each protect a distinct type of creation and grant the relevant IP owner rights that vary in scope and duration. For example, trademarks prote… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13320/IF13320.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13320.html | |
| IF13319 | Private Investments and Insurance Companies | 2026-09-23T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-24T15:38:10Z | Active | Resources | Eva Su, Baird Webel | Private investments’ involvement in the insurance industry often takes two forms: (1) private equity (PE) ownership of insurers and (2) insurance company holdings of private investment assets. Rapid growth in these activities and their associated risks have drawn attention from Congress and financial regulators. Private investments (also known as alternative investments, private placements, or private capital) generally are not available to the public and are exempt from certain regulatory requirements. They include private securities offerings and private funds. Common types of private funds include PE and private credit. This In Focus describes related trends and their policy implications. For general background on PE in selected industries, see CRS In Focus IF13214, Private Equity in Selected Industries: Policy Background, by Eva Su. PE Ownership and Insurer Private Assets PE ownership of insurers can be through (1) direct ownership, where the insurer is a subsidiary within a PE firm (e.g., Apollo Global Management’s direct ownership of Athene), or (2) portfolio company holdings, where PE funds invest in insurance companies. PE firms’ direct ownership of insurers generally focuses on capital-intensive life insurance and annuity providers that offer the insurers predictable premium payments coupled with long-term investment horizons and relatively low liquidity needs. An annuity is a common financial product offered by insurance companies to provide periodic payments for income during retirement, often for the life of the annuity holder. PE’s involvement in the life insurance sector dates to at least the 1980s and increased after the 2007-2009 global financial crisis. PE ownership of insurance companies has grown over the past decade, with the number of PE-owned insurers increasing from approximately 25 in 2017 to 139 in 2024 (Figure 1). In 2024, PE-owned insurers held approximately $700 billion in cash and invested assets, or 7.8% of the U.S. insurance industry total. Figure 1. Private Equity Ownership of the… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13319/IF13319.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13319.html | |
| IF13318 | Air Force MQ-9A Reaper: Background and Issues for Congress | 2026-09-23T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-24T15:23:07Z | Active | Resources | Daniel M. Gettinger | The MQ-9A Reaper is a multi-role uncrewed aircraft system (UAS, or drone) produced by General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc. Within the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), the Air Force operates the greatest number of Reapers; the Air National Guard and Marine Corps also operate the MQ-9A. (DOD is “using a secondary Department of War designation,” under Executive Order 14347 dated September 5, 2025.) The Air Force’s inventory of MQ-9A Reaper aircraft has declined as the Air Force has divested older-variant MQ-9As and lost aircraft in accidents and combat operations (see Figure 1). The Air Force has proposed developing a successor for the MQ-9A known as the Massed Modular Aircraft (MMA). As currently conceived, an MMA would cost less per unit than the Reaper, which has a unit cost of between $30 million and $50 million, and potentially perform many of the same missions. Some Members of Congress have expressed concern about the reported decrease in the Air Force inventory of MQ-9As and have introduced legislation that would, if enacted, prohibit the service from divesting the aircraft in most circumstances (e.g., H.R. 9119; S. 4677, 119th Congress). Background The Reaper is part of the Predator aircraft series, the origins of which date to the early 1980s, which has included the Air Force MQ-1A/B Predator (now retired), the Army MQ-1C Gray Eagle, and other variants. In 1999, General Atomics began developing a Predator B model as an internal project. In 2001, the Air Force awarded General Atomics a contract for work on developing the Predator B aircraft—later renamed the Reaper. The Air Force and Air National Guard began fielding the aircraft in 2007 and 2008, respectively, while the Marine Corps first leased Reapers for operations in 2018. In FY2021 and FY2022 budget requests to Congress, the Air Force proposed ending production of the MQ-9A and iteratively divesting older Block 1 variants of the MQ-9A in favor of the newer Block 5s. Air Force officials expressed concern that the Reaper “was not designed for o… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13318/IF13318.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13318.html | |
| R49358 | Analyzing the Incidence of the Corporate Income Tax: Models and Statistical Estimates | 2026-09-22T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-26T05:52:58Z | Active | Reports | Jane G. Gravelle | Who bears the burden of the corporate income tax (i.e., the incidence of the tax) is a perennial issue in debates about the corporate tax. This issue is crucial for determining the extent to which the corporate tax is progressive or regressive. If the tax falls on capital income, it is progressive because capital income is concentrated in higher incomes. To the extent it falls on wages, it can become a regressive tax, falling more heavily on lower incomes. Corporate taxes can fall on labor if they discourage the inflow of capital from abroad or reduce savings, thus reducing the capital stock and production, and therefore wages. They can also fall on labor if workers share in the taxes on rents (i.e., profits in excess of the amount needed to attract investment). Researchers have used two approaches to estimate the share of the corporate tax burden that falls on wages through capital flows: general equilibrium models and reduced form statistical estimates. General equilibrium models impose a structure on the findings and use estimates of how freely capital flows across borders, how easily capital can be substituted for labor, and how readily imports can be substituted for domestic products to determine labor’s share of the corporate tax burden. Reduced form statistical estimates use regression analysis to estimate the effect on wages of a change in corporate taxes. Rent shares are estimated by statistical methods, although the limits to the share of the burden that can fall on labor can be constructed based on estimates of the share of profits that is rent. Bargaining models indicate that while rents may be shared, the taxes on rent are not. A higher tax reduces the total after-tax rents available for sharing, potentially reducing wages, but also makes it cheaper to pay wages because the value of the tax deduction for wages increases. General equilibrium models of capital flows generally find that, with the assumptions most favorable to the corporate tax burden falling on labor, about 70% can fall on wages. How… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49358/R49358.3.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49358.html | |
| R49357 | Judiciary Appropriations, FY2026 | 2026-09-21T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-24T12:38:24Z | Active | Reports | Barry J. McMillion | Funds for the judicial branch are included annually in the Financial Services and General Government (FSGG) appropriations bill. The bill provides funding for the U.S. Supreme Court; the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit; the U.S. Court of International Trade; U.S. courts of appeals and district courts; the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts; the Federal Judicial Center; the U.S. Sentencing Commission; the federal defender organizations that provide legal representation to defendants financially unable to retain counsel in federal criminal proceedings; security and protective services for courthouses, judicial officers, and judicial employees; and fees and allowances paid to jurors. The federal judiciary’s FY2026 budget request was made public by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts on April 25, 2025, one week prior to the release of the President’s FY2026 “skinny budget” on May 2, 2025 (the President’s budget request was formally submitted to Congress on May 30, 2025). Historically, the judiciary’s appropriations request is released without change in a President’s annual budget submission to Congress. The judiciary requested $9.43 billion in discretionary funds for FY2026, an increase of 9.3% over the FY2025 enacted level of $8.63 billion in discretionary funds. The judiciary’s FY2026 budget request also included $872.4 million in mandatory funds to pay the salaries and benefits of certain types of federal judges, as well as provide for judicial retirement accounts. The House FSGG appropriations subcommittee held a hearing on the judiciary’s request on May 14, 2025, and it held a markup of the FSGG appropriations bill on July 21, 2025. The subcommittee recommended $8.94 billion in discretionary funding for the federal judiciary. The same amount was recommended by the House Appropriations Committee, which held its markup on September 3, 2025, and reported an original bill, H.R. 5166, on September 5, 2025. None of the 12 regular appropriations bills for FY2026, including the FSGG bill, w… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49357/R49357.3.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49357.html | |
| R49356 | Internal Revenue Service’s Statistics of Income (SOI): Current Available Tabulations by State and Local Area | 2026-09-21T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-26T05:55:06Z | Active | Reports | Tig Wartluft | Individual Tax | This report summarizes data currently available from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) on individual and estate tax filings tabulated by state, congressional district, ZIP code, county, and metro area. The IRS collection of U.S. population migration data through individual income tax filings is also discussed. This report reviews the methodology, data limitations, and expected publication schedules specific to each level of geography. Tables are provided listing the IRS form and line numbers of source data contained within each tabulation. This report is intended as a reference document to assist with navigation of the IRS’s SOI tables and to facilitate access to the data contained within. | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49356/R49356.3.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49356.html |
| LSB11483 | Federal Preemption of State Pesticide Failure-to-Warn Claims After Monsanto v. Durnell | 2026-09-21T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-23T13:23:07Z | Active | Posts | Jason O. Heflin | Federal Preemption, The Supreme Court of the United States, Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), Environmental Health Hazards, Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) | The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) is the primary federal law regulating the sale and use of pesticides, including herbicides. FIFRA prohibits the sale or distribution in the United States of any pesticide that has not been registered with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), a process which includes submission of the pesticide’s labeling. On June 25, 2026, in a case involving glyphosate-containing pesticides, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Monsanto v. Durnell that FIFRA’s express preemption provision preempts a state law failure-to-warn claim—that is, an allegation that a pesticide manufacturer failed to include a required warning on the label of its pesticide—where EPA has registered the pesticide with a label that does not include such a warning. Similar conflicts regarding the preemptive effect of federal regulatory schemes for products and state tort regimes have arisen in other contexts in recent years, including in the context of medical devices. A number of statutes contain preemption provisions similar to the FIFRA provision at issue in Monsanto. In addition to considerations specific to pesticide regulation, the Court’s opinion may raise considerations for Congress about the preemptive scope of those statutes. Further, the Court’s analysis of the language used in the FIFRA preemption provision may inform how Congress drafts preemption provisions in future legislation. This Legal Sidebar explains the context and background for the Supreme Court’s decision, the opinions of the Court and individual Justices, and selected considerations for Congress related to the case. Background: Preemption and FIFRA Requirements Preemption Under FIFRA The Constitution’s Supremacy Clause provides that federal law is the “supreme Law of the Land,” meaning where a federal law and state law conflict, federal law preempts state law. Congress has the authority to define a federal statute’s preemptive scope. A federal statute may preempt state law explicitly or by implication. A federal … | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB11483/LSB11483.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/HTML/LSB11483.html |
| IN12740 | SBA’s Proposed Expansion of Small Business Program Eligibility | 2026-09-21T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-24T17:08:04Z | Active | Posts | R. Corinne Blackford, Anthony A. Cilluffo | Overview In a proposed rule announced August 20, 2026, the Small Business Administration (SBA) set new size standards for defining firm size while simultaneously issuing a notice for comments on a revised methodology for establishing, reviewing, and modifying these size standards. Currently, the SBA’s size standards determine firm-size limits for various SBA services and contracting preferences by industry category that results in over 1,000 individual size standards. These size limits are generally expressed in terms of either average annual revenue or average number of employees, with revenue limits ranging from $2.25 million to $47 million and employee-count limits ranging from 100 employees to 1,500 employees (see the SBA table of size standards at 13 C.F.R. §121.201). Using the revised methodology, the proposed size standards would newly classify approximately 110,000–114,500 additional firms as “small.” Although robust analysis of the new proposal is unavailable to date, some researchers and economists have analyzed the impacts of prior expansions to the size standards. This Insight describes the proposed changes and issues that may be of congressional interest. Proposed Changes Fewer Size Standards Overall Under the August 2026 proposal, the number of size standards would shrink from around 1,000 to 338. This is a result of the revised methodology, which calculates size standards at a higher (less specific) industry level. The SBA’s 2024 methodology (and its prior methodologies issued in 2023, 2019, 2018, and 2009) defined size standards for the most specific industry category (categories are assigned a six-digit North American Industry Classification code [NAICS]). The proposed 2026 methodology sets size standards by four- and five-digit NAICS codes. An example of a four-digit NAICS code is 5417, Scientific Research and Development Services, which has five-digit codes within that category that include Research and Development (R&D) in the Physical, Engineering, and Life Sciences, as well as R&D in the S… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12740/IN12740.3.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/HTML/IN12740.html | |
| IN12739 | U.S. Space Academy Proposal: Considerations for Congress | 2026-09-21T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-22T16:37:55Z | Active | Posts | Kristy N. Kamarck, Rachel Lindbergh | On August 28, 2026, President Trump signed Executive Order (EO) 14423 establishing a Presidential Commission on the United States Space Academy, to be chaired by the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). The EO directs the commission to submit a report to the President proposing key details for the establishment of a U.S. Space Academy (USSA) within 120 days (i.e., by December 26, 2026). The stated purpose of the EO includes preparing “the next generation of astronauts, scientists, engineers, operators, entrepreneurs, civil servants, and warfighters.” The EO directs the commission to develop recommendations for the academy’s governance framework, curriculum, and candidate eligibility and service obligations, as well as processes for site location and coordination with existing federal programs. The commission is to report on administrative and legislative actions needed to establish an academy and an implementation strategy to achieve these actions. “Among the frameworks considered,” the commission is to evaluate establishing the academy within NASA. Existing Federal Service Academies In his remarks on signing the EO, President Trump compared the USSA concept to existing military service academies. In considering a proposal for a new academy, Congress may draw lessons from the creation of existing academies. There are currently five federal service academies; the U.S. Military Academy (USMA), Department of the Army; U.S. Naval Academy (USNA), Department of the Navy; U.S. Air Force Academy (USAFA), Department of the Air Force; U.S. Coast Guard Academy (USCGA), Department of Homeland Security; and U.S. Merchant Marine Academy (USMMA), Department of Transportation. The three military service academies and the USCGA require a minimum commissioned service obligation in the Armed Forces. USMMA graduates are required to accept a reserve officer commission, obtain and maintain merchant mariner licensure, and serve a minimum amount of time as an officer or a civilian employee in th… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12739/IN12739.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/HTML/IN12739.html | |
| IF13317 | Federal Wiretaps and the Fourth Amendment | 2026-09-21T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-22T17:38:01Z | Active | Resources | Tamsin G. Harrington | Wiretapping, Civil Rights & Liberties, Fourth Amendment, Jurisprudence, Privacy, Surveillance, Search & Seizure | The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures, generally requiring that law enforcement obtain a warrant from a neutral and detached magistrate upon a showing of probable cause. In 1928, the Supreme Court determined in Olmstead v. United States that projected voices passing over telephone wires beyond a person’s home were not protected by the Fourth Amendment, so no warrant was required for a wiretap installed outside of the home. Since the Olmstead decision, the case law and statutory framework governing law enforcement surveillance of real-time communications has changed significantly. This In Focus provides a brief history of the Fourth Amendment’s application to such surveillance, an overview of the federal Wiretap Act, selected caselaw interpreting the statute, and considerations for Congress. Selected Legal History In Olmstead, the Supreme Court determined the projection of voices outside the home by telephone to be outside the scope of the Fourth Amendment protections because the Court perceived the text of the Amendment to be focused on “material things—the person, the house, his papers or his effects.” By the 1967 case Berger v. New York, the Court’s views had shifted. The Court held that a state statute—which permitted a related type of surveillance, eavesdropping, when authorized by a court order—was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment. Explaining its concern about the development of “sophisticated electronic devices,” which “pick up whispers in a room,” the Court identified several aspects of the statute that did not “carefully circumscribe[]” the circumstances under which courts could authorize electronic eavesdropping to prevent so-called “general searches” through electronic listening devices. The Court held that the statute lacked the particularity required by the Fourth Amendment in that it did not require the applicant to describe a particular offense, particularly describe the property to be seized (i.e., the conversations sought), provide notice to parties, or obt… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13317/IF13317.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13317.html |
| IF13316 | Federal Role in Elections Policy: Selected Recent Developments | 2026-09-21T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-23T16:08:28Z | Active | Resources | R. Sam Garrett | More than 20 federal agencies play roles in federal campaigns and elections policy. Many of those roles are based primarily in statutory authority granted by Congress. Policy actions, such as executive orders (EOs) and rulemakings, also can affect agency roles. This CRS In Focus discusses selected developments in federal agency activity during the 2026 election cycle. CRS products linked below provide additional information on some topics. This In Focus does not contain legal analysis. Another CRS product addresses recent Supreme Court activity. The developments discussed below have produced varying responses, ranging from support to opposition from Members of Congress and from elections officials. Discussion of those competing perspectives is beyond the scope of this product. Some actions have been halted for 2026 by litigation. Regardless of how short-term questions about agency activities are resolved, understanding the scope of those activities could be relevant over the longer term as Members consider legislation or oversight related to federal roles in campaigns and elections—including for the 2028 cycle. Selected Executive Orders Two executive orders (EOs) issued during the 2026 election cycle specify agency priorities or expanded agency roles regarding elections. Neither EO has been fully implemented; both have been subject to litigation. Table 1 and Table 2 summarize selected agency roles specified in EO 14248, published in the Federal Register on March 28, 2025; and in EO 14399, published in the Federal Register on April 3, 2026. Table 1. Selected Agency Roles Specified in EO 14248 Primary Agency Selected Roles and Other Agencies Election Assistance Commission (EAC) Require documentary proof of citizenship on national mail registration form; condition federal funding on accepting federal form consistent with proof-of-citizenship requirement; update Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG) 2.0 and, if appropriate, recertify voting systems; condition federal funding on uniform election-day receipt da… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13316/IF13316.3.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13316.html | |
| R49355 | Fishery Resource Disaster Assistance | 2026-09-18T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-19T16:22:55Z | Active | Reports | Anthony R. Marshak | Oceans & Fisheries, Natural Resources Policy, Fishing Industry & Fisheries | Oceanic conditions, climate, human activities, and weather events can affect fishery resources and commercial infrastructure, such as boats, shoreside processing, and ports. Congress authorized the Secretary of Commerce (the Secretary) to provide disaster assistance to the fishing industry when fish populations decline or other disruptions cause economic losses. The governor of a state, the Secretary, or a representative of a fishing community (including through an official resolution of an Indian Tribe) may initiate a request for assistance. The National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), state agencies, and fishing communities compile the information needed to make a determination. When all necessary information has been obtained and reviewed, the Secretary determines whether a fishery failure or fishery resource disaster (also referred to as fishery disaster) has occurred. In most cases, Congress has appropriated funds to support the fishing industry and/or tribal fisheries following the Secretary’s determination. Since 1994, the Secretary has made 144 fishery disaster determinations, and Congress has appropriated nearly $2.1 billion for fishery disaster relief. As of August 2026, examples of fishery disaster determinations have included those made for salmon fisheries in the Pacific Northwest and Alaska, Alaskan crab fisheries, West Coast Dungeness crab fisheries, the New England Atlantic herring fishery, and fisheries affected by several hurricanes and other causes. NMFS, states, interstate marine fisheries commissions, and industry or fishing community representatives often work together to develop a spend plan for how assistance will be distributed to the fishing industry and allocated among potential projects. The criteria for the Secretary to determine whether a commercial fishery failure or fishery resource disaster has occurred is provided in Section 312(a) of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MSA; 16 U.S.C. §1861a(a)). In 2022, through the Fishery Resource Disasters Improveme… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49355/R49355.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49355.html |
| IN12738 | Federal Retirement Processing: Background and Recent Developments | 2026-09-18T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-22T11:38:09Z | Active | Posts | Katelin P. Isaacs, Tamar B. Breslauer | Retirement Services (RS) at the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) administers retirement benefits for civilian federal employees. In FY2026, an estimated 2,832,789 retiree and survivor annuitants will have received an estimated $114.8 billion in federal retirement benefits. Many in Congress have long expressed interest in OPM retirement processing, including the backlog of claims and delays experienced by former federal employees in receiving their full annuity payments. Previous congressional oversight focused on OPM’s goal of modernizing retirement processing. On July 1, 2026, after decades of paper-based processing, OPM announced the “Last Day of Paper,” “ending paper retirement processing for more than 95% percent of federal retirement applications and completing the agency’s transition to a fully digital retirement process.” Overview of Federal Retirement Processing OPM’s RS processes benefits and makes payments to federal retirees after employees’ federal agencies and payroll processors complete their employees’ retirement packages. OPM’s “Retirement Quick Guide” outlines the transfer of the claim from federal agencies to OPM, with the entire process estimated to take three to five months, including 30-45 days for federal agency and payroll processing, 10-15 days for OPM RS intake when a Retirement Claims number (CSA number) is assigned, and 10-90 days for OPM RS processing (i.e., reviewing and calculating benefits). When OPM RS receives retirement claims, it generally provides interim annuity payments to former federal employees. OPM states that these interim annuity payments are typically 60%-80% of the estimated net annuity (further reduced by federal income tax withholding). Once finalized, OPM provides an adjustment payment that makes up the difference between the interim and full annuity amount. No interest is payable for any period of interim annuity payments or delayed payments of finalized annuity payments. OPM Retirement Processing Data Table 1 provides monthly OPM retirement processing data f… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12738/IN12738.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/HTML/IN12738.html | |
| R49354 | The 21st Century ROAD to Housing Act (P.L. 119-101) | 2026-09-17T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-19T11:23:15Z | Active | Reports | Henry G. Watson, Katie Jones, Maggie McCarty | The 21st Century ROAD to Housing Act (P.L. 119-101) was enacted at a time of increasing concerns about the affordability of both rental housing and homeownership and the extent to which insufficient housing supply may be contributing to affordability pressures. Both the 118th and 119th Congresses held numerous hearings to explore these concerns. P.L. 119-101 represents a compromise between two bills that were separately introduced and considered in the House and Senate: the Renewing Opportunity in the American Dream to Housing Act of 2025 (S. 2651, also known as the ROAD to Housing Act of 2025); and the Housing for the 21st Century Act (H.R. 6644). Both of these bills included a number of sections that, in many cases, were similar or identical to standalone housing bills that had been introduced previously, often with bipartisan cosponsorship by members of the relevant authorizing committees. P.L. 119-101 was enacted on July 11, 2026, after passing with bipartisan support in both the Senate (85-5) and the House (358-32). The law contains 12 titles comprising 59 sections. It addresses a range of housing issues, including creating new incentives for permitting reform through community planning and development grants, addressing assisted housing inspection and environmental review procedures, removing the requirement that manufactured homes be built on a “permanent” chassis, and increasing Federal Housing Administration (FHA) multifamily loan limits. It authorizes or reauthorizes versions of several existing programs, including the HOME Investment Partnerships grant program, the Community Development Block Grant-Disaster Recovery (CDBG-DR) grant program, and a suite of rural multifamily housing preservation tools under the Multifamily Preservation and Revitalization demonstration. It also authorizes several new competitive grant programs and pilot programs, including an FHA Small Dollar Loan pilot, a Whole Home Repairs grant pilot, and a temperature sensor pilot for federally assisted housing. It revises several exi… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49354/R49354.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49354.html | |
| R49353 | Overview of Continuing Appropriations for FY2027 (Division A of P.L. 119-103) | 2026-09-17T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-18T15:24:25Z | Active | Reports | Drew C. Aherne | On September 2, 2026, the President signed into law H.R. 6500, the Continuing Appropriations and Extensions Act, 2027 (P.L. 119-103). Division A of the act—the Continuing Appropriations Act, 2027—provides continuing appropriations for FY2027 through December 11, 2026. Measures providing continuing appropriations are commonly referred to as “continuing resolutions,” or “CRs,” because they have historically been enacted in the form of a joint resolution. The Continuing Appropriations Act, 2027, provides appropriations for federal agencies funded through all 12 regular appropriations bills to continue operations from October 1, 2026, through December 11, 2026—a 72-day period covering roughly the first 10 weeks of FY2027. Congress must enact regular appropriations bills for FY2027 or an additional CR prior to the expiration of this CR to avoid a funding gap beginning on December 12, 2026, that may result in a shutdown of affected government activities. For most covered programs, projects, and activities, the CR provides funding at a rate for operations based largely on the funding amounts, authorities, and conditions provided for in regular appropriations acts enacted for FY2026. The CR includes several provisions that may further define or affect the amounts available for certain purposes. These include provisions establishing certain limitations on agency operations under the CR and provisions—known as “anomalies”—that establish exceptions to the CR’s general funding for specific accounts or programs. According to an estimate prepared by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), Division A of P.L. 119-103 is projected to provide a total annualized amount of $1.701 trillion in discretionary budget authority for FY2027. The CR includes several provisions that are specific to certain agencies or accounts. These include anomalies as well as other legislative provisions related to amending and/or extending existing provisions of law. The section of this report titled “Agency-, Account-, and Program-Specific Provisions” su… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49353/R49353.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49353.html | |
| R49351 | GENIUS Act (P.L. 119-27): Creating a Regulatory Framework for Stablecoins | 2026-09-17T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-19T16:52:51Z | Active | Reports | Paul Tierno, Marc Labonte | The Guiding and Establishing National Innovation for U.S. Stablecoins Act (GENIUS Act) was signed into law as P.L. 119-27 on July 18, 2025. The act creates a regulatory structure for payment stablecoins. Stablecoins are cryptocurrencies that aim to maintain a fixed value against some other asset, such as the U.S. dollar. Currently, they are used primarily to facilitate the trading of other cryptocurrencies, but proponents of the act believe that a regulatory framework could spur their adoption for retail payments and other non-crypto applications. However, depending on future rulemaking, various exemptions in the act combined with current market practices could limit how much of the existing market becomes subject to the act. The GENIUS Act mainly regulates issuers. Under the act, anyone can issue a stablecoin in the United States if they are approved and regulated by a federal regulator or a certified state regulator. Issuers can be divided into three groups—depository institutions, nonbank financial firms, and commercial firms. During the congressional debate before passage of the bill, its most contentious aspects involved its approach to certain policy issues, including the following: Preventing illicit finance. The act subjects issuers to anti-money-laundering laws, such as those mandating the monitoring and reporting of suspicious activity, and requires stablecoins issuers to be capable of complying with lawful orders. Given the pseudonymous nature of crypto, it is unclear how illicit activity can be effectively prevented in the secondary market to which issuers are not party. Foreign stablecoins. Foreign issuers are not required to be regulated under the U.S. regime. If they wish to be available to U.S. persons through intermediaries, they must be regulated in a country with a regulatory regime that the Treasury Secretary has certified as comparable to the U.S. regime, register with the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and be capable of complying with lawful orders. Eligibility of commercial fir… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49351/R49351.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49351.html | |
| IF13315 | Selected Federal Legislation on Search and Seizure Authority | 2026-09-17T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-19T12:08:00Z | Active | Resources | Cassandra J. Barnum, Tamsin G. Harrington, Andreas Kuersten | The Fourth Amendment protects the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures[.]” As interpreted by the Supreme Court, the Amendment imposes certain limits on searches and seizures by the government. Within these limits, Congress has the option to further restrict or explicitly authorize a variety of law enforcement activities by legislation. This In Focus identifies a selection of such laws Congress has previously enacted and provides considerations for Congress related to potential legislation in the realm of search and seizure authority. Fourth Amendment Backdrop Courts have determined that a Fourth Amendment search occurs if “the Government obtains information by physically intruding on a constitutionally protected area” or “when the government violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable.” The Supreme Court has said that “seizure’ of property occurs when there is some meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interests in that property.” If a law enforcement activity qualifies as a search or seizure, then the Fourth Amendment requires it to be reasonable, which ordinarily means that the search or seizure must be conducted pursuant to a warrant supported by probable cause and issued by a neutral magistrate (with some exceptions). To satisfy the probable cause standard to obtain a search warrant, law enforcement must generally show a likelihood that (1) the materials sought are “seizable by virtue of being connected with criminal activity,” and (2) the materials “will be found in the place to be searched.” The Fourth Amendment dictates that the resulting warrant must “particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” The purpose of this requirement is to prohibit “general searches” and not permit seizure of “one thing under a warrant describing another.” Federal Law Governing Search and Seizure Authority Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 4… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13315/IF13315.3.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13315.html | |
| IF13314 | The IRS Direct File Program | 2026-09-17T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-19T16:52:53Z | Active | Resources | Victoria M. Martinez | Individual Tax | The IRS Direct File (DF) program provided certain taxpayers with the option of electronically filing (e-filing) their federal tax return through a free, secure portal on the IRS website during the 2024 and 2025 filing seasons. The Department of the Treasury (Treasury) suspended the DF program in October 2025. This In Focus provides an overview of the DF program, including its implementation and expansion, preliminary findings from the pilot, and suspension of the program. Background on E-Filing Options E-filing provides faster delivery of refunds for taxpayers and lower processing costs for the IRS. E-filing and other means of lowering barriers to the tax filing process have been found to reduce tax evasion, which could increase the federal revenue generated from taxes. The IRS offers certain taxpayers several options for free e-filing. One option is the Free File program, a partnership that allows lower-income taxpayers to e-file free of charge through websites of participating tax software companies. The IRS also has two volunteer programs providing free e-filing and filing services for certain filers: (1) the Volunteer Income Tax Assistance (VITA) grant program, offered to low-income individuals, disabled individuals, and persons with limited English proficiency; and (2) the Tax Counseling for the Elderly program, offered to taxpayers 60 years of age and older. Another option is Free Fillable Forms, which allows taxpayers to self-prepare tax forms electronically and file directly with the IRS, albeit without guided assistance. Some private companies also offer free filing options outside of the Free File program for simple tax returns. Prior to 2024, the IRS had not offered taxpayers a guided option for filing directly through a secure portal on its website, an option known as “direct file.” Direct file became available under a pilot program for a limited number of taxpayers during the 2024 filing season. Later in 2024, the IRS announced the program would be made permanent. However, after the 2025 filing seas… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13314/IF13314.3.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13314.html |
| R49352 | Mongolia: In Brief | 2026-09-16T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-19T14:38:01Z | Active | Reports | Maria A. Blackwood | Mongolia is a landlocked, mineral-rich country about the size of Alaska with a population of 3.6 million; it shares borders with two powerful neighbors, Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC, or China). Mongolia has long sought to maintain good relations with Russia and China, while pursuing a “third neighbor” policy that emphasizes developing relationships outside of its immediate neighborhood, including with the United States. The United States and Mongolia upgraded their bilateral relationship to a Strategic Partnership in 2019. The Millennium Challenge Corporation has implemented two compacts with Mongolia (2008-2013 and 2021-2026). Mongolia has extensive deposits of minerals including copper, gold, coal, molybdenum, uranium, tin, and tungsten, and extractive industries account for over 90% of Mongolian exports. Mongolia has received international recognition for its peaceful transition to democracy in 1990, but some experts point to corruption and weak governance as chronic issues. This report provides an overview of U.S.-Mongolia relations, Mongolia’s relations with China and Russia, as well as Mongolia’s domestic politics and economy. | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49352/R49352.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49352.html | |
| IN12737 | Poverty in 2025 | 2026-09-16T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-18T15:24:27Z | Active | Posts | Joseph Dalaker | Annual Social & Economic Supplement (ASEC) of the Current Population Survey (CPS), Supplemental Poverty Measure (SPM), Poverty Measurement, Poverty | The official poverty rate in the United States, or percentage of people who live in poverty, fell to 10.2% in 2025, down from 10.7% the previous year. In 2025, 34.5 million people lived in poverty, down 1.5 million from the previous year. This decline in the national official poverty rate was reflected in poverty rate declines among children (13.4% in 2025, down from 14.4% in 2024), adults ages 18 to 64 (9.2%, down from 9.6%), persons living in the Northeast region (9.0%, down from 9.9%), and full-time year-round workers (1.6%, down from 1.8%). Additional poverty rates by demographic group may be viewed in Table 1 and Table 2 accompanying the Census Bureau’s annual report on poverty from September 2026. Statistically significant changes in poverty rates are marked with asterisks (rightmost two columns). Poverty is defined using dollar amounts called poverty thresholds that represent a low level of basic needs. Poverty status is determined using family income if a person lives in a family, or the individual’s own income otherwise. If a family’s or individual’s annual income is below the threshold, they are considered to be in poverty. The poverty thresholds are scaled by family size and composition and are updated annually for inflation. For a single individual under age 65 (not in a family), the official poverty threshold in 2025 was $16,749; for a family of four with two adults and two children, it was $32,649. These official poverty thresholds are the same nationwide. In official poverty statistics, income before taxes is used, which does not include refundable tax credits nor the value of noncash benefits such as those from the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) or housing subsidies. (Further details are available in CRS Report R44780, An Introduction to Poverty Measurement.) Another measure of poverty, the Supplemental Poverty Measure (SPM), tells a different story from the official poverty measure. The SPM registered a higher poverty rate (13.1% in 2025) than the official measure, with no sta… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12737/IN12737.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/HTML/IN12737.html |
| IN12736 | Health Insurance Exchanges: Sources for Enrollment Data | 2026-09-16T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-17T16:09:15Z | Active | Posts | Angela Napili, Kate M. Costin, Vanessa C. Forsberg | Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (P.L. 111-148, as amended), exchanges (sometimes called marketplaces) have been established in every state. Generally, states have two types of exchanges—individual exchanges and small business health options program (SHOP) exchanges—in which consumers and small businesses, respectively, can shop for private health insurance coverage. Different types of exchange enrollment data are released throughout the year by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). CMS data vary in whether they include all states or just the states that use the federal HealthCare.gov platform. This Insight provides links to some of the most frequently requested health insurance exchange data. It is not a comprehensive resource but includes an overview of the types of federal data available for the health insurance exchanges. For more information on the health insurance exchanges, including a discussion of enrollment data, see CRS Report R44065, Health Insurance Exchanges and Qualified Health Plans: Overview and Policy Updates. What is the difference between the types of enrollment statistics? Pre-effectuated enrollment data reflect individuals who have selected a plan but might not necessarily have paid their first premium. Pre-effectuated data are often released during or soon after the open enrollment period (OEP). Effectuated enrollment data reflect individuals who have selected a plan and have submitted the first premium payment. Effectuated data is typically released several months after the OEP. This data is available through data.cms.gov, and some older datasets are archived on the CMS Archive page. Where can I find health insurance exchange data? The following table provides links to some of the federal health insurance exchange datasets available. Table 1. Types of Individual Health Insurance Exchange Data from Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) Data Type of Enrollment Data Where to Find It What It Includes Current plan year enrollment Pre-effectuate… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12736/IN12736.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/HTML/IN12736.html | |
| TE10125 | Oversight Hearing - The Economy Act | 2026-09-15T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-16T09:24:08Z | Active | Testimony | Dominick A. Fiorentino | The Economy Act Expenditure Transfer 31 U.S.C. §§1535, 1536 Interagency Procurement Interagency Agreement IAA Determination and Findings D&F Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 Federal Acquisition Regulation 48 C.F.R. §17.5 | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/TE/PDF/TE10125/TE10125.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/TE/HTML/TE10125.html | |
| LSB11482 | EEOC’s Proposed Changes to the Federal-Sector Equal Employment Opportunity Complaint Process | 2026-09-15T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-16T09:24:33Z | Active | Posts | Abigail A. Graber | Congress has taken an active interest in the operation of equal employment opportunity (EEO) laws in the executive branch, periodically legislating to manage and gather information about how those laws apply in the federal sector. On August 28, 2026, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) to overhaul the process governing federal employee discrimination complaints. EEOC proposes to “streamline” the federal-sector EEO process by eliminating the pre-complaint counseling process (which is mandatory as of the time of this writing), administrative hearings at the agency level, and administrative class actions. EEOC instead proposes that federal employees with discrimination claims begin the administrative process by filing a complaint with their agency. Agencies would compile the record and resolve all complaints, without the option for a hearing before an EEOC-appointed administrative judge. Complainants would be able to appeal agency decisions to EEOC, as they can now. Under the proposed rule, EEOC could opt for an administrative judge to further develop a case on appeal. EEOC would decide whether to adopt the administrative judge’s conclusions, and in any case it would review the record without deference to resolve appeals. Parties would retain their statutory rights to file civil actions in court. Rather than process class complaints, the EEOC would accept such complaints only so that putative class representatives can exhaust administrative remedies on behalf of the class, and it would direct federal agencies to otherwise process complaints only for named individuals. The NPRM also proposes measures that appear designed to reduce attorney’s fee awards. Other proposed changes include limitations on monetary sanctions against agencies, more guidance on offers of resolution, and new complaint resolution timelines. EEOC also proposes measures to implement the Elijah E. Cummings Federal Employee Antidiscrimination Act of 2020 (Cummings Act). The proposed rev… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB11482/LSB11482.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/HTML/LSB11482.html | |
| IF13313 | An Overview of H.R. 3633, the CLARITY Act (Senator Lummis Draft) | 2026-09-15T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-16T09:24:16Z | Active | Resources | Paul Tierno | On September 14, 2026, Senator Cynthia Lummis published updated draft text for an amendment in the nature of a substitute for H.R. 3633, the Digital Asset Market Clarity Act (CLARITY Act) on her office’s website. The House passed its version of the bill on July 17, 2025. The recent text combines and modifies text from H.R. 3633, with amendments as reported by the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs on June 1, 2026, and S. 3755, as reported by the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry on February 2, 2026. The bill would provide a regulatory framework for cryptocurrency (or digital asset) activities and categories of industry participants (such as asset originators and exchanges). Generally, the bill would give the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) a central role in regulating digital commodities and related intermediaries while preserving certain aspects of Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) authority over primary market sales of ancillary assets, subject to a limited exemption from SEC registration. A summary of the major provisions of the bill is below. (For more on crypto policy issues, see CRS Report R48963, Cryptocurrency: Regulatory and Legislative Policy Issues.) SEC Jurisdiction and “Regulation Crypto” The bill would require the SEC to adopt a series of rules, collectively called “Regulation Crypto,” under the securities laws. These rules would provide a qualified exemption from the securities registration requirements for “an offer, sale, or distribution of an investment contract involving an ancillary asset.” The bill would define ancillary asset as a network token whose value would be “dependent upon the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of an ancillary asset originator or a related person.” Network token would be defined as a form of digital asset intrinsically linked to and that derives its value from the use of a distributed ledger system; under the bill, network tokens would not be treated as securities. Originators would be limited to raisi… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13313/IF13313.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13313.html | |
| R49350 | National Ambient Air Quality Standards and Selected Issues for Congress | 2026-09-14T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-16T09:25:12Z | Active | Reports | Jonathan D. Haskett, Omar M. Hammad | National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS), Air Quality | Congress passed the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 to provide “a more effective program to improve the quality of the Nation’s air.” This legislation included provisions that helped regulate criteria air pollutants present nationwide in the ambient (outdoor) air, based on the criteria that they were a danger to public health or welfare and were emitted from “numerous diverse mobile or stationary sources.” The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has designated six criteria air pollutants: particulate matter (PM), ozone (O3), nitrogen dioxide (NO2), sulfur dioxide (SO2), carbon monoxide (CO), and lead (Pb). For each of these pollutants EPA has established primary and secondary National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS), uniform nationwide standards that define EPA air quality goals. EPA sets standards at a level requisite to prevent adverse effects, including for sensitive populations, with an adequate margin of safety. EPA is precluded from considering cost when establishing or revising a NAAQS, but NAAQS determinations can affect pollution control costs; State Implementation Plans (SIPs), which outline states’ control strategies to achieve or maintain compliance with air quality standards; and individual facility emissions permits—as well as morbidity and mortality. To ensure that air pollution from new or expanded stationary criteria-air-pollution emissions sources is sufficiently controlled so an area can attain and maintain the new or revised NAAQS, EPA and the states administer the New Source Review (NSR) permitting program. The NSR program requires preconstruction air permits for new or modified sources such as petroleum refineries and chemical plants. The NSR program includes a minor NSR program required for minor new sources or minor modifications at existing sources that do not exceed certain emissions thresholds, a Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) NSR program required for new major sources or major modifications at existing sources in attainment areas, and a nonattainment NSR p… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49350/R49350.3.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49350.html |
| R49349 | U.S. Tariffs on Canadian Imports: Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930 | 2026-09-14T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-16T09:24:36Z | Active | Reports | Kyla H. Kitamura | Tariffs, U.S. Trade Policy, Latin America, Caribbean & Canada, Import Policy, Major Economies & U.S. Trade Relations | On July 20, 2026, President Trump announced he would impose 50% tariffs on certain Canadian goods starting August 19, 2026, to “offset Canadian discrimination against the commerce of the United States with respect to” alcoholic beverages, dairy, and motor vehicles (the “Section 338 Canada Tariffs”). President Trump stated he would impose these tariffs under Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. §1338)—the first time a President has expressly cited this statute to impose tariffs. On August 18, 2026, President Trump suspended the tariffs until August 22, citing progress in negotiations. After the two sides were unable to reach an agreement, the Section 338 Canada Tariffs went into effect on August 22, 2026. The Canadian government imposed retaliatory tariffs on C$27.6 billion (US$20 billion) worth of U.S. goods starting September 8, 2026. On September 8, the Trump Administration announced import bans for certain Canadian goods under Section 338 (effective September 29) and changes to the lists of products covered by the Section 338 Canada Tariffs (effective September 15). President Trump directed the General Services Administration (GSA), working with the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) to remove Canadian products’ access to U.S. government procurement programs. Some Members of Congress have expressed concerns about increased costs due to tariffs, a broader lack of stability in the U.S.-Canada trade relationship, and President Trump’s statements toward Canada. Others have urged the Administration to use tariff measures and the review of the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) as leverage to address U.S. trade issues with Canada. Congress has constitutional authority over foreign commerce and tariffs and could consider whether and, if so, how to codify, curb, or modify trade restrictions on Canadian imports and monitor potential implications for U.S.-Canada trade relations. Congress could also consider whether to engage with U.S.-Canada tariff and trade issues through the USMCA re… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49349/R49349.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49349.html |
| R49347 | Overview of the Department of Veterans Affairs FY2027 Appropriations | 2026-09-14T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-16T08:54:32Z | Active | Reports | Sidath Viranga Panangala | Veterans Budget & Appropriations | The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) administers numerous programs that provide benefits and services to eligible veterans and their families. These benefits include medical care, disability compensation, Dependency and Indemnity Compensation (DIC), pensions, education, vocational rehabilitation and employment services, assistance to homeless veterans, home loan guarantees, and administration of life insurance, as well as traumatic injury protection insurance for servicemembers and benefits that cover burial expenses. On April 3, 2026, President Trump released his FY2027 budget request for VA. The President’s FY2027 request for VA is $481.88 billion, a $36.4 billion (+8.17%) increase above the FY2026 enacted level. This includes a discretionary budget request of $144.72 billion, an $11.53 billion (+8.66%) increase above the FY2026 enacted amount, and a mandatory budget request of $337.16 billion, a $24.86 billion (+7.96%) increase over the FY2026 enacted level. The President’s budget also proposes to restructure the four medical care accounts (medical services, medical community care, medical support and compliance, and medical facilities) into two new account categories, beginning with the FY2028 budget cycle, known as the “direct care” and “community care” accounts. On April 17, 2026, the House Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Subcommittee marked up a draft version of the FY2027 Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies (MILCON-VA) appropriations bill. On April 21, the full House Appropriations Committee marked up the FY2027 MILCON-VA appropriations bill and reported it to the House (H.R. 8469; H.Rept. 119-622). On May 15, the House passed its version of the FY2027 MILCON-VA appropriations bill. The House-passed bill would provide $474.40 billion for VA for FY2027, a $7.48 billion (-1.55%) decrease compared with the President’s request. This includes $336.97 billion in mandatory funding, a $197 million (-0.06%) decrease from the FY2027 request, … | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49347/R49347.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49347.html |
| LSB11481 | Standing to Sue for Informational Injuries | 2026-09-14T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-15T11:23:05Z | Active | Posts | Peter J. Benson | Some statutes authorize private parties to file a lawsuit seeking information. The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) is a prominent example. FOIA provides that federal agencies “shall make available to the public [certain] information,” and it grants federal courts “jurisdiction to . . . order the production of any agency records improperly withheld.” According to the Department of Justice (DOJ), members of the public file hundreds of FOIA lawsuits each year. Courts have described lawsuits brought under FOIA and similar laws as suits that “seek[] to vindicate a statutory right to information.” Even when Congress creates a right to information, though, a private party who files a lawsuit in federal court must meet the standing requirements imposed by Article III of the U.S. Constitution. One of those constitutional requirements is that the party suing has to have suffered a concrete injury. Suits to enforce informational rights therefore require courts to decide when the “denial of information” amounts to a sufficiently concrete injury to support constitutional standing. That question has divided the federal courts of appeal (i.e., created a “circuit split”). Some courts have held that a plaintiff alleging an informational injury must “assert downstream consequences’” that result from the denial of information, causing harm to the plaintiff. Other courts have held that a plaintiff need only allege that they did not receive “information which must be publicly disclosed pursuant to a statute.” For the latter group of courts, no additional injury is required. This Legal Sidebar analyzes the circuit split. It begins with a discussion of cases in which the Supreme Court has found standing to sue for informational injuries. It then analyzes more recent Supreme Court case law that addresses Article III’s concrete injury requirement, and it describes how courts have applied the recent case law in informational injury cases. The Sidebar concludes by examining some considerations for Congress. Background on Standing for I… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB11481/LSB11481.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/HTML/LSB11481.html | |
| IG10101 | Surface Transportation Authorization Legislation: Timelines and Extensions | 2026-09-14T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-15T12:38:03Z | Active | Infographics | Lena A. Maman, Kezee Procita | Transportation Funding | / Surface transportation authorization acts are multiyear legislation that authorize spending on federal highway and public transportation programs, surface transportation safety and research, and, since 2015, intercity passenger rail programs. The most recent authorization from FY2022 through FY2026 was part of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA; P.L. 117-58). Congress has extended the IIJA authorizations through December 11, 2026 (P.L. 119-103). Historically, Congress has extended surface transportation authorizations beyond their expiration dates before passing new authorization bills. This infographic compiles timing and voting information on enacted surface transportation authorization legislation as well as related extensions since 1991. H.R. 3684 Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) 2022-2026 P.L. 117-58 H.R. 22 Fixing America's Surface Transportation (FAST) Act P.L 114-94 H.R.4348 Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century (MAP-21) Act P.L. 112–141 H.R. 3 Safe, Accountable, Flexible and Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU) P.L. 109-59 H.R. 2400 Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21) P.L 105-178 H.R.2950 Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA) P.L. 102-240 The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) does not provide information on the ISTEA extension between April 1 and June 9, 1998, when TEA-21 was enacted. FHWA does not provide information on the SAFETEA-LU extension between May 30 and July 6, 2012, when MAP-21 was enacted. Source: CRS, using data from Congress.gov and FHWA, "Funding Federal-Aid Highways," January 2017, https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policy/olsp/fundingfederalaid/02.cfm. Information as of September 14, 2026. Prepared by Lena A. Maman, Senior Research Librarian; Kezee Procita, Section Head, Research and Library Services; and Juan Pablo Madrid, Visual Information Specialist. | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IG/PDF/IG10101/IG10101.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IG/HTML/IG10101.html |
| IF13312 | The Small Business Administration’s (SBA’s) Women’s Business Centers Program | 2026-09-14T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-16T09:24:02Z | Active | Resources | Adam G. Levin | The Small Business Administration’s (SBA’s) management and technical assistance programs offer free counseling, training, and resources to small business owners and entrepreneurs. Although these programs are open to any type of small business owner and entrepreneur, some management and technical assistance providers target specific demographics. Among those are Women’s Business Centers (WBCs). SBA funds WBCs through grants and cooperative agreements, and the WBCs are operated by the third-party entities receiving federal awards. Congress initially authorized a version of the WBC program as a pilot program in the Women’s Business Ownership Act of 1988 (P.L. 100-533) and permanently authorized the program in its current form in the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007 (P.L. 110-28). By statute, WBCs must offer small businesses: technical assistance, including counseling for obtaining business credit and investment capital (SBA and WBCs do not provide direct financial assistance to small businesses); management assistance, including guidance with general business planning, organizing, and staffing; and marketing assistance, including help identifying market opportunities, preparing marketing plans, and developing pricing strategies. According to a 2025 evaluation of the WBC program commissioned by SBA, there were 168 WBCs in 2024. Women-owned businesses may also seek assistance through other SBA programs, including Small Business Development Centers (SBDCs), Veterans Business Outreach Centers (VBOCs), and SCORE chapters (a mentoring program formerly known as the Service Corps of Retired Executives). Collectively, these providers (which SBA calls “resource partners”) seek to improve access to entrepreneurial education and assist with business formation and expansion. History As noted, Congress initially established the Women's Business Demonstration Pilot Program in P.L. 100-533. The act directed SBA to provide assistance to private, nonprofit orga… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13312/IF13312.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13312.html | |
| R49348 | U.S. Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program: Overview and Considerations for Congress | 2026-09-11T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-16T09:24:34Z | Active | Reports | Kathryn G. Kynett | Greenhouse Gases (GHGs), Climate Change, Environmental Policy, Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) | The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) established the Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program (GHGRP) in 2009 in response to a congressional directive mandating economy-wide reporting of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. EPA described the program’s purpose as gathering comprehensive emissions data to inform the development of future climate change policies. The GHGRP requires reporting from three broad groups of covered entities. Direct-emitting facilities in covered source categories report the GHG emissions released directly from their on-site processes and fuel combustion. Suppliers of fuels and industrial gases report the potential emissions associated with their products if combusted, released, or oxidized. Facilities that inject carbon dioxide (CO2) underground must report the quantities of CO2 injected or sequestered underground. Reporting is generally subject to emissions thresholds for both direct-emitting facilities and suppliers, primarily a threshold of 25,000 metric tons of CO2 equivalent (MTCO2e) per year, although certain source categories are required to report regardless of their emissions levels. There is no threshold for CO2 injection facilities, which must report all quantities of CO2 sequestered or injected underground. EPA began collecting GHGRP data in 2011 and has since collected data annually from approximately 8,000 direct-emitting facilities, suppliers, and CO2 injection facilities nationwide. EPA states these data represent 85%-90% of annual U.S. GHG emissions. The GHGRP requires covered entities to calculate and report annual GHG emissions using methodologies specified in regulation, tailored to each source category. Covered entities must report data on the following GHGs: CO2, methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), sulfur hexafluoride (SF6), perfluorinated compounds (PFCs), and other fluorinated gases. The program also includes verification and recordkeeping requirements. EPA generally makes reported emissions data publicly available. According to EPA, the G… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49348/R49348.3.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49348.html |
| R49346 | Temporary Protected Status Terminations, 2025-2026: Fact Sheet | 2026-09-10T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-16T09:24:10Z | Active | Reports | Jill H. Wilson | Immigration Enforcement & Removal, Temporary Immigration | Congress created Temporary Protected Status (TPS) in 1990 to provide safe haven to noncitizens in the United States, regardless of immigration status, who are nationals of countries experiencing armed conflict, natural disaster, or other extraordinary circumstances that prevent their safe return. The second Trump Administration has announced terminations for 13 of the 17 countries designated for TPS. For each of these countries, this Fact Sheet provides the termination date and the estimated number of beneficiaries as of June 25, 2026. Additional keywords: Afghanistan, Burma, Cameroon, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Haiti, Honduras, Lebanon, Nepal, Nicaragua, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Ukraine, Venezuela, Yemen, INA §244, 8 U.S.C. §1254a. | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49346/R49346.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49346.html |
| R49343 | Agriculture and Related Agencies: FY2027 Appropriations | 2026-09-10T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-12T05:08:00Z | Active | Reports | Jim Monke | Agriculture Appropriations, Agriculture Budget & Appropriations | The Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act (Agriculture appropriations) funds the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)—except for the U.S. Forest Service—and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA, in the Department of Health and Human Services). It also carries the funding for the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) in alternating fiscal years; jurisdiction for CFTC appropriations is with Agriculture appropriations in the House and a different subcommittee in the Senate. Agriculture appropriations acts include both discretionary and mandatory funding, which differentiates Agriculture appropriations from some other appropriations acts. Congressional debate on appropriations is primarily about discretionary spending. Appropriations for mandatory spending programs, although not usually debated, are necessary to technically make funds available for those programs (e.g., entitlement programs, such as farm safety net and nutrition assistance programs, that were previously enacted under separate budget enforcement procedures). The primary discretionary spending accounts are for the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC); agricultural research; rural development loans and grants; the FDA; foreign food assistance and trade promotion; farm agency salaries and loans; food safety inspection; animal and plant health programs; and conservation program technical assistance. Below is an overview of the legislative actions and amounts in FY2027 Agriculture appropriations compared with prior years. The Trump Administration released its budget request on April 3, 2026. The Administration proposed $22.055 billion for discretionary appropriations in the jurisdiction of Agriculture appropriations, a reduction of $4.923 billion from FY2026 (-18.2%). The largest reductions would eliminate appropriations for Foreign Agricultural Service Food for Peace (FFP) Title II international food aid grants (-$1.2 billion, -100.0%), the Rur… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49343/R49343.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49343.html |
| LSB11480 | SEC Proposes ”Regulation Crypto Assets” | 2026-09-10T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-11T15:09:13Z | Active | Posts | Jay B. Sykes | Blockchain & Cryptocurrencies, Securities, Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) | On August 18, 2026, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued a proposed rule that would create a tailored offering and disclosure framework for certain types of crypto assets. In announcing the proposal—titled Regulation Crypto Assets (Reg CA)—SEC Chairman Paul Atkins described it as “the most historic step yet to modernize federal securities regulations for crypto assets.” The proposed rule includes new exemptions from securities law registration requirements for crypto asset offerings, a bespoke disclosure regime for issuers that rely on the new exemptions, and a safe harbor codifying SEC guidance as to when crypto assets issued pursuant to an investment contract are no longer subject to SEC oversight. This Legal Sidebar provides an overview of proposed Reg CA and discusses issues that may be of interest to Congress, which is considering comprehensive crypto market-structure legislation. Background The status of crypto assets under federal securities law has been a point of contention for some time. The federal securities laws define the term “security” to include a range of traditional financial instruments such as stocks and bonds, in addition to “investment contracts”—a category that courts have used to evaluate whether “[n]ovel, uncommon, or irregular” arrangements fall within the SEC’s jurisdiction. Under the Supreme Court’s 1946 decision in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., an arrangement qualifies as an “investment contract” if it involves a “contract, transaction or scheme” whereby a person invests money in a common enterprise with an expectation of profit derived from the efforts of others. The SEC and federal courts have generally used the Howey test to evaluate whether specific crypto assets are subject to the securities laws. Crypto assets include a diverse range of instruments, ranging from Bitcoin to stablecoins to “meme coins.” Many of the core disputes involving crypto and securities law, however, involve something like the following fact pattern: A developer seeks to raise capital to create a… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB11480/LSB11480.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/HTML/LSB11480.html |
| LSB11479 | The Sixth Amendment’s Right to Assistance of Counsel and the Risk of Denaturalization: Federal Circuit Courts Are Split | 2026-09-10T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-11T14:39:31Z | Active | Posts | Alejandra Aramayo | Immigration, Immigration Law, Right to Counsel, Sixth Amendment | Until the Supreme Court decided Padilla v. Kentucky in 2010, immigration consequences of guilty pleas were generally treated by reviewing courts as exempted from the Sixth Amendment’s requirement to provide effective assistance of counsel. In Padilla, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment requires a criminal defense attorney to advise an alien client as to whether pleading guilty to a particular offense carries a risk of being placed in removal proceedings. The majority reasoned that removal is a severe penalty; that historically, removal had been closely associated with criminal prosecutions; and that it was difficult to separate “the penalty from the conviction” because changes to immigration law had raised the stakes of criminal convictions for criminal alien defendants. Both before and following Padilla, in ineffective assistance of counsel claims where a defendant argues that a plea was not valid, lower courts have determined that defendants must be made aware of any direct consequences of the plea—such as the punishment that can be imposed—and that criminal defense attorneys have no duty to advise defendants of the collateral consequences of the plea. The Supreme Court has yet to endorse or reject this framework. The lower courts have often treated Padilla as recognizing a “narrow deportation exception to the otherwise chink-free wall between direct and collateral consequences.’” Recently, a split has emerged among federal appeals courts as to whether a similar exception exists when a criminal naturalized defendant faces a risk of denaturalization when pleading guilty to a criminal offense. In 2024, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (Second Circuit) held that, because the risk of denaturalization is similar to the risk of removal that the Supreme Court identified in Padilla, a criminal defense attorney must advise the naturalized client of the risk of denaturalization. Conversely, in 2026, the Sixth Circuit held that because the risk of denaturalization is a collateral—and not a direct—con… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB11479/LSB11479.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/HTML/LSB11479.html |
| IF13311 | Overview of the 340B Drug Discount Program | 2026-09-10T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-11T14:26:24Z | Active | Resources | Hannah-Alise Rogers, Laura A. Wreschnig | Drug Pricing, Health Resources & Services Administration (HRSA), Medicare, Prescription Drugs, Drug Affordability | Congress established the 340B Drug Discount Program in Section 340B of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. §256b) through the Veteran’s Health Care Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-585) to enable certain safety net health care providers (“covered entities”) that serve low-income and uninsured patients to purchase drugs at discounted prices. The 340B statute requires manufacturers to offer these covered entities certain covered outpatient drugs (CODs) at discounted prices as a condition of their participation in the Medicaid and Medicare programs. The Health Resources & Services Administration (HRSA), part of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), administers the program. The scale of the program has increased from less than 30,000 registered sites in 2014 to over 60,000 in February 2025. In 2025, covered entities made approximately $100 billion in COD purchases through the program. The program’s growth has sparked congressional debate over its scope and HRSA’s authority to regulate it. 340B Program Discount and Participants The 340B statute requires the HHS Secretary to enter into purchase price agreements with drug manufacturers as a condition of their products’ coverage under Medicaid and Medicare Part B. The terms of these agreements require manufacturers to sell CODs to covered entities at a “ceiling price,” calculated based on a statutory formula derived from the rebate formulas under the Medicaid Drug Rebate Program (MDRP). Manufacturers may not charge covered entities more than the ceiling price if they sell the drug to any other purchaser at any price, although covered entities may be able to negotiate sub-ceiling price discounts. The providers that qualify as covered entities are listed in the 340B statute and include federal grantees such as Federally Qualified Health Centers, Tribal and Urban Indian Organizations, Ryan White HIV/AIDS Program grantees, and other types of health centers and specialized clinics. Certain hospitals are also eligible for the program, including Critical Access Hos… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13311/IF13311.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13311.html |
| R49345 | Implementation of the Whole Milk for Healthy Kids Act of 2025 (P.L. 119-69): In Brief | 2026-09-09T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-12T05:09:57Z | Active | Reports | Kara Clifford Billings, Randy Alison Aussenberg | The Whole Milk for Healthy Kids Act of 2025 (P.L. 119-69) was enacted on January 14, 2026. The act allows whole and reduced-fat (2%) milk in federally funded school lunches and exempts milk from federal saturated fat limits. Such milks were previously prohibited from the National School Lunch Program (NSLP) since school year (SY) 2011-2012, following a change made by the Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-296) to align milk served in NSLP with the Dietary Guidelines for Americans (DGAs). P.L. 119-69 also expands nondairy milk alternatives in the program. After publishing initial guidance implementing the law for NSLP, the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA’s) Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) (now the Food and Nutrition Administration [FNA]) published a final rule on May 8, 2026, implementing the milk-fat related provisions in the law (not the nondairy-related provisions). In addition to NSLP, the final rule allows whole and 2% milk in other child nutrition programs including the School Breakfast Program (SBP), Child and Adult Care Food Program (CACFP), and Special Milk Program (SMP), citing the updated 2025-2030 DGAs (released in January 2026) as a basis for the change. This report begins with a brief history of milk in the school meals programs. It then summarizes the provisions in P.L. 119-69, discusses USDA’s implementation of the law, and concludes with some considerations for this policy area. | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49345/R49345.1.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49345.html | |
| R49340 | Budgetary Effects Excluded or Eliminated from the Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Scorecards | 2026-09-09T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-12T05:07:54Z | Active | Reports | Tori Gorman | Statutory PAYGO, Office of Management & Budget (OMB), Federal Budget Deficit | The Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010 (Statutory PAYGO, P.L. 111-139, 2 U.S.C. §§931-939) is a budget enforcement mechanism intended to ensure that laws affecting direct (mandatory) spending or revenues do not, in aggregate, increase budget deficits. Under the act, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is required to maintain two scorecards that record the estimated average annual net effects on the deficit of enacted PAYGO legislation over 5 years and 10 years, respectively. The scorecards are cumulative—they keep a running total of net deficit effects across successive sessions of Congress. OMB is required to finalize the scorecards at the end of each congressional session. If either scorecard shows a positive balance in the budget year (a “debit,” representing a net increase in the deficit), the President is required to issue a sequestration order within 14 days, implementing across-the-board reductions in non-exempt mandatory spending programs sufficient to eliminate the debit. Since adoption of the Statutory PAYGO Act, laws estimated to increase federal budget deficits have been enacted, but a sequester under the law has never been ordered—an outcome attributable to congressional actions to exclude or eliminate the budgetary effects of legislation from the scorecards. Between 2010 and 2024, nearly $12.07 trillion was excluded or eliminated from the 5-year Statutory PAYGO scorecard and $17.07 trillion was excluded or eliminated from the 10-year scorecard (as measured in nominal dollars) in the following manner: Exclusions provided in the original Statutory PAYGO Act. The 2010 law excluded from the scorecards the budgetary effects of legislation that would extend certain policies current at that time (relating to certain tax policies and Medicare). The law also excluded the projected budgetary savings anticipated from repeal of the Community Living Assistance Services and Supports Act (CLASS Act), and any provision designated by Congress as an emergency. In total, between 2010 and 2025 these original pr… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49340/R49340.3.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49340.html |
| IF13310 | Tech Hubs and Build to Scale (B2S) Program Updates and Considerations | 2026-09-09T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-12T05:08:27Z | Active | Resources | Julie M. Lawhorn | The Economic Development Administration (EDA), a bureau of the U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC), administers grants to assist state and local stakeholders with developing the conditions and amenities necessary to grow businesses, create jobs, and expand local opportunities for private investment. Regional Technology and Innovation Hubs (Tech Hubs) and Build to Scale (B2S) are two EDA programs that focus on fostering innovation and technological advancement as a means to drive economic development and growth. The programs are often referred to as regional innovation programs and are authorized under the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980, as amended (15 U.S.C. §§3701 et seq.). This In Focus provides a comparison of the programs’ roles, structure, and activities. This report also summarizes the two programs’ appropriations and other funding from FY2023 through FY2026, recent award activity, and select issues for Congress. Background and Program Comparisons EDA’s B2S and Tech Hubs programs are viewed as complementary because they support similar policy objectives through different types of investments. Both programs focus on activities that contribute to regional economic development and innovation objectives, with Tech Hubs having additional economic and national security goals. Both programs focus on the expansion of businesses in key technology focus areas such as biotechnology, quantum information sciences, semiconductors, and advanced materials science, among others. B2S supports organizations that assist entrepreneurs with innovation and technology development, including capital access as well as the processes of adopting, demonstrating, commercializing, and deploying new technologies. Similarly, the Tech Hubs strategy implementation grants (SIGs) may be used to support technology development as well as entrepreneurship development activities. SIGs may fund site connectivity infrastructure and workforce training activities, which B2S does not directly support. The two programs vary in award… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13310/IF13310.4.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13310.html | |
| R49344 | Status of FY2027 Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education Appropriations: In Brief | 2026-09-08T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-12T05:08:29Z | Active | Reports | Karen E. Lynch, Jessica Tollestrup | This report provides an overview of FY2027 Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies (LHHS) appropriations, including relevant congressional actions and a top-line comparison of discretionary funding proposed for FY2027 versus prior-year funding for FY2025 and FY2026. It also provides background on the scope of the bill and context for congressional budgetary decisionmaking. Full-year FY2027 LHHS appropriations have not been enacted. In the interim, FY2027 funding has been provided on a temporary basis through a continuing resolution (CR). The FY2027 CR (H.R. 6500; P.L. 119-103) was signed into law on September 2, 2026, following earlier passage by the Senate (90-6) on August 8, 2026, and by the House (370-48) on September 1, 2026. The CR provides continuing appropriations for all 12 annual appropriations acts (including LHHS) through December 11, 2026. In general, the CR funds discretionary LHHS programs at the same rate and under the same conditions as in FY2026, and it funds annually appropriated LHHS entitlements at their current law levels. Prior to enactment of the FY2026 CR, on June 9, 2026, the House Appropriations Committee voted to report its version of the FY2027 LHHS bill (34-28). The measure was subsequently reported on June 11, 2026, as H.R. 9260 (H.Rept. 119-696). The FY2027 House committee bill would provide $189.3 billion in regular discretionary appropriations, which is $5.6 billion (-2.9%) less than the FY2026 enacted level. The Senate Appropriations Committee has not marked up its version of the FY2027 LHHS bill. No further congressional action on annual LHHS appropriations has occurred as of the cover date of this report. | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49344/R49344.3.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49344.html | |
| R49339 | The United States and United Nations Reform: In Brief | 2026-09-08T04:00:00Z | 2026-09-10T16:53:01Z | Active | Reports | Luisa Blanchfield | The United Nations (UN) system comprises a range of interconnected entities, such as the United Nations, specialized agencies, peacekeeping operations, and funds and programs. UN member states and past and current UN secretaries-general have repeatedly attempted to reform different parts of the organization. These efforts tend to be cyclical, with member states considering reform proposals every 5 to 10 years. Primary areas of focus have included (1) UN inefficiencies and lack of accountability; (2) duplication and redundancy in UN mandates and activities; and (3) mismanagement of UN resources. The United States led in the creation of the United Nations in 1945 and has historically supported the organization, including UN reform efforts. Both Congress and the executive branch play key (and sometimes overlapping) roles in shaping U.S. approaches to UN reform. Over the decades, Congress has, at times, tied U.S. funding to progress on specific UN reforms and/or withheld funding from certain UN activities or entities with which it did not agree. Some U.S. Administrations have fully supported U.S. participation in and funding of the United Nations, while others have sought to limit U.S. engagement. Most recently, the second Trump Administration has expressed support for UN reform while at the same time withdrawn the United States from more than 30 UN entities and delayed or halted payments to some UN bodies, including the UN regular budget and peacekeeping missions. The most recent UN system-wide reform effort, referred to as the “UN80 Initiative” (UN80), was proposed by UN Secretary-General (UNSG) António Guterres in March 2025. It aims broadly to improve the effectiveness of the UN Secretariat, review the status of UN mandates, and realign certain UN programs and structures. Some UN80-related reforms have been adopted, while others are still being considered. UN80 is being pursued against the backdrop of shifting U.S. policy toward the United Nations and UN budget shortfalls due mainly to the accumulation of arrears… | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49339/R49339.2.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49339.html |
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