crs_reports: R48983
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| id | title | publish_date | update_date | status | content_type | authors | topics | summary | pdf_url | html_url |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| R48983 | China’s Role in the International Financial Institutions | 2026-06-11T04:00:00Z | 2026-06-13T05:38:13Z | Active | Reports | Rebecca M. Nelson | Foreign Policy Institutions & Tools, East Asia, International Financial Institutions | The United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC, or China) are the world’s two largest economies. The U.S. and PRC governments have foreign policy and economic priorities that sometimes overlap and sometimes diverge. The international financial institutions (IFIs)—including the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and regional multilateral development banks—provide a formal venue through which the United States and China, in coordination with other IFI members, can advance economic cooperation on areas of agreement and negotiate differences on a range of international financial issues. Examples of issues discussed at the IFIs include macroeconomic policies, structural reforms, banking regulations, efforts to combat money laundering, exchange rates, capital controls, development priorities, coordination of foreign aid, and debt relief for developing countries, among many others. Some key policy questions about China’s role in the IFIs include the following: To what extent, if any, should the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank continue to fund development projects in China? China’s level of economic development has increased over the past two decades and it has sizeable resources it could use to pay for development projects itself, rather than relying on multilateral financing. At the same time, World Bank and AsDB projects include environmental, labor, and procurement standards that might not otherwise be adopted, and multi-year development projects provide visibility into China’s economy. What is the appropriate representation of China at the IFIs? Voting shares at the IFIs are broadly tied to a member’s economic size; countries with larger economies generally have larger voting shares. By this metric, China is underrepresented at the IFIs—China’s voting share does not reflect its rapid economic growth over the past two decades. Increasing China’s voting share could strengthen the legitimacy of the IFIs and raise additional funds for the IFIs, but it might also allow China to advance policies that are not in line with U.S. interests. What are the implications of PRC firms having a significant share of World Bank and regional development bank civil works contracts? China has a number of large, state-owned infrastructure companies which may benefit from explicit and/or implicit government subsidies. This can result in cost savings for development projects but also raises concerns about whether private companies are able to compete on a level playing field with PRC firms when bidding on MDB contracts. There may also be concerns about the number of PRC firms that have been banned from bidding on MDB contracts due to fraudulent or corrupt business practices. These policy issues are discussed in more detail below, following a brief background on U.S. and PRC membership in the IFIs. The report concludes with policy options for Members of Congress seeking to shape U.S. policy towards China at the IFIs. Inter-American Development Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, African Development Bank | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48983/R48983.7.pdf | https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48983.html |
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