crs_reports: R49419

Congressional Research Service reports with summaries, authors, and topic classifications.

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R49419 State-Law Climate Tort Suits and Suncor Energy (U.S.A.) Inc. v. County Commissioners of Boulder County: A Primer for Congress 2026-09-30T04:00:00Z 2026-10-01T12:23:24Z Active Reports Andrew S. Coghlan   Over the last decade, state and local governments have filed dozens of state-law tort suits against energy companies, arguing that those companies are liable for the localized effects of climate change because they misled the public about their products’ impact on the climate, thereby inflating demand for fossil fuels, boosting atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases, and worsening climate-related harms. The City and County of Boulder, CO, filed one such suit, naming as defendants Suncor and Exxon Mobil. On October 5, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court is scheduled to hear oral arguments on whether Boulder’s suit can proceed. This case has generated substantial interest from Congress and other government actors. Nearly 200 members and more than 40 states have signed on to amicus briefs supporting either Boulder or Exxon Mobil and Suncor, and the U.S. Department of Justice has filed a brief siding with the energy companies. According to Suncor and Exxon Mobil, Boulder’s suit is an attempt to impose tort liability under Colorado law for greenhouse gas emissions occurring wholly outside Colorado’s borders, a form of extra-territorial regulation that exceeds the scope of state power in the federal system. Suncor and Exxon Mobil also argue that state-law tort claims like Boulder’s are preempted by the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q), which, they say, provides the exclusive means of addressing pollution that crosses state borders and thus precludes Boulder’s suit. Boulder argues that Suncor and Exxon Mobil lack standing to challenge Boulder’s suit, which has not yet proceeded to trial, and, according to Boulder, has not yet inflicted any legally cognizable harm. Boulder also contests the Supreme Court’s statutory jurisdiction to hear this case, arguing that there is no final state-court judgment for the Court to review. On the merits, Boulder contends that its suit is a constitutionally permissible exercise of state police power to regulate deceptive marketing and sales practices. Because the Clean Air Act addresses neither marketing nor sales, Boulder argues that the act does not preempt its claims. Congressional purpose “is the ultimate touchstone’ of preemption analysis.” Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (quoting Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978)). Thus, if desired, Congress could enact legislation resolving the statutory preemption dispute now before the Court. To that end, Congress could affirmatively authorize suits like Boulder’s, or, alternatively, expressly preempt those suits, in part or in whole. Two bills introduced in the 119th Congress would employ the latter approach, barring “any suit in law or equity that is brought against any person engaged in the energy business that seeks . . . relief for alleged past or future harm resulting directly or indirectly from climate change.” Stop Climate Shakedowns Act of 2026, H.R. 8330, 119th Cong. (as introduced by House, Apr. 16, 2026); Stop Climate Shakedowns Act of 2026, S. 4340, 119th Cong (as introduced by Senate, Apr. 16, 2026). Congress may also refrain from action, accepting the federal judiciary’s resolution of cases or controversies. https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49419/R49419.1.pdf https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R49419.html

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