{"database": "openregs", "table": "crs_reports", "rows": [["R48980", "Noncompetitive Federal Contract Awards: Other than Full and Open Competition", "2026-06-10T04:00:00Z", "2026-06-12T17:38:06Z", "Active", "Reports", "Dominick A. Fiorentino, David H. Carpenter", null, "In the context of federal procurement, Congress has long been interested in the view that increased competition among potential vendors could result in (1) lower prices, (2) higher quality goods and services, (3) increased innovation, and (4) greater public trust in government. The Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 (CICA), as amended, forms the current framework for competition in federal procurement. CICA requires that executive agencies \u201cobtain full and open competition through the use of competitive procedures\u201d for the procurement of all property and services unless expressly authorized by statute (10 U.S.C. \u00a73201(a), 41 U.S.C. \u00a73301(a)). Under CICA, \u201cfull and open competition\u201d results when \u201call responsible sources are permitted to submit sealed bids or competitive proposals\u201d (41 U.S.C. \u00a7107).\nProcurement contracts are subject to CICA\u2019s full-and-open-competition requirement unless a separate statute expressly authorizes the use of different procedures or a statutory exception applies. Non-procurement contracts, such as those resulting from agencies\u2019 use of other transaction authority (OTA), are not subject to CICA (see, e.g., 51 U.S.C. \u00a720113). Contracts awarded using simplified acquisition procedures; contract modifications that are within the scope of the original contract award; and orders placed under requirements, definite quantity, indefinite quantity, task order, and delivery order contracts are also not subject to the full-and-open-competition requirement (FAR \u00a76001). \nSome competitions in which only certain contractors can compete still meet CICA\u2019s requirement for full and open competition because CICA provides for \u201cfull and open competition after exclusion of sources.\u201d This occurs in two contexts: agencies\u2019 \u201cdual sourcing\u201d initiatives and set-asides for small businesses (10 U.S.C. \u00a73203(a)-(b), 41 U.S.C. \u00a73303(a)-(b)).\nAlthough CICA establishes full and open competition as the default in federal procurement, it also provides seven exceptions that agencies may invoke. These exceptions generally cover situations where either competition is infeasible or the federal government prioritizes other objectives over full and open competition. These statutory exceptions are (1) only one responsible source; (2) unusual and compelling urgency; (3) industrial mobilization, engineering, developmental or research capability, or expert services; (4) international agreement; (5) authorized or required by statute; (6) national security; and (7) the public interest (10 U.S.C. \u00a73204(a), 41 U.S.C. \u00a73304(a)). \nAlthough agencies have discretion to use noncompetitive procedures in certain circumstances, CICA requires that agencies justify their actions in writing. Contracting officers are required to provide justifications of, and obtain approvals for, most noncompetitive procurements conducted in reliance on CICA exceptions (10 U.S.C. \u00a73204(e), 41 U.S.C. \u00a73304(e)).\nVendors excluded from bidding on federal contracts because of an agency\u2019s actions to limit competition may challenge via the bid-protest process the agency\u2019s method of, or rationale for, making a noncompetitive contract award (28 U.S.C. \u00a71491, 31 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a73551-3557). \nArticle I of the Constitution provides Congress the authority to appropriate funds and conduct oversight over government contracting practices. Thus, Congress has often sought to encourage cost-effective and efficient contracting mechanisms to help the government acquire high-quality goods and services that serve taxpayers\u2019 interests. As part of its oversight and legislative functions, Congress may consider (1) the scope of agency discretion in using CICA exceptions, (2) the frequency of agency use of bridge contracts, and (3) changes made by the second Trump Administration\u2019s \u201cRevolutionary FAR Overhaul\u201d (https://www.acquisition.gov/far-overhaul/).", "https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48980/R48980.2.pdf", "https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48980.html"]], "columns": ["id", "title", "publish_date", "update_date", "status", "content_type", "authors", "topics", "summary", "pdf_url", "html_url"], "primary_keys": ["id"], "primary_key_values": ["R48980"], "units": {}, "query_ms": 0.25445800565648824, "source": "Federal Register API & Regulations.gov API", "source_url": "https://www.federalregister.gov/developers/api/v1", "license": "Public Domain (U.S. Government data)", "license_url": "https://www.regulations.gov/faq"}