{"database": "openregs", "table": "crs_reports", "rows": [["R48960", "U.S. Foreign Policy in the Western Hemisphere: Issues for Congress", "2026-05-26T04:00:00Z", "2026-05-30T05:23:54Z", "Active", "Reports", "Kyla H. Kitamura, Clare Ribando Seelke, Karla I. Rios, Shelby B. Senger, Cathleen D. Cimino-Isaacs, Michael D. Sutherland, Danielle M. Trachtenberg, Carla Y. Davis-Castro, Shayerah I. Akhtar, Christopher A. Casey, Liana Wong, Joshua Klein, Peter J. Meyer", "International Terrorism, Trafficking & Crime, Latin America, Caribbean & Canada, U.S. Trade Policy", "Historically, many U.S. policymakers have regarded the Western Hemisphere as a U.S. sphere of influence, vital to U.S. interests, or both. U.S. engagement in the region has shifted over time, responding to changes in the hemisphere and in U.S. objectives. Following the end of the Cold War, the U.S. approach to the Western Hemisphere primarily sought to promote democracy and human rights, reduce barriers to trade, and combat transnational security threats.\nThe second Trump Administration has identified the Western Hemisphere as a priority for U.S. foreign and defense policy. The Administration has begun to implement potentially far-reaching changes to U.S. relations with Latin American and Caribbean countries; Canada; and Greenland, a self-governing part of the Kingdom of Denmark, with some variation by country.\nCompetition with China and Russia. The Administration has placed renewed emphasis on limiting the influence of extra-hemispheric powers in the Western Hemisphere. This approach has included U.S. efforts to secure or enhance access to locations the Administration deems strategic, such as the Panama Canal and Greenland, and to prevent competitors from controlling critical infrastructure in the region. \nCounternarcotics and Transnational Crime. The Administration has increased the U.S. military\u2019s involvement in combating illicit narcotics and addressing related security challenges. This approach has included designating transnational criminal organizations as terrorists, conducting unilateral lethal strikes on suspected drug traffickers, and executing the January 2026 U.S. military capture of then-Venezuelan leader Nicol\u00e1s Maduro. \nMigration Policy. The Administration has focused extensively on stemming unauthorized immigration into the United States and removing unauthorized immigrants from the country. Among other actions, the Administration has imposed new restrictions at the border, ended humanitarian protections that had provided relief from removal for some immigrants in the United States, and negotiated agreements with governments to accept increased repatriations and third-country migrants from the United States.\nTrade Policy. The Administration has implemented tariffs on imports from Western Hemisphere countries\u2014including free-trade-agreement partners\u2014tied to various economic, security, and political goals. The Administration also has pursued bilateral trade negotiations to lower foreign tariffs and nontariff barriers and to potentially expand Western Hemisphere supply chains in strategic sectors.\nPolitical Engagement. The Administration has scaled back democracy assistance in Latin America and the Caribbean while offering support to some politically aligned leaders in the hemisphere. The Administration also has increased U.S. pressure on the authoritarian governments of Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua, while sometimes prioritizing economic or other U.S. objectives over democracy and human rights.\nWestern Hemisphere governments have reacted to these policy shifts in various ways. Some governments have fully embraced the Trump Administration\u2019s approach, adopted similar policies, and sought to collaborate more closely with the U.S. government. Other governments have demonstrated a willingness to negotiate with the Trump Administration and cooperate in certain areas while rebuffing the Administration in others. U.S. actions perceived to threaten Western Hemisphere countries\u2019 economic interests and sovereignty, such as levying tariffs, imposing sanctions, and threatening to use unilateral U.S. military force, appear to have generated particular pushback and contributed to some countries seeking to bolster ties with other partners.\nFor the most part, the 119th Congress has not directly authorized or codified the second Trump Administration\u2019s policy shifts in the Western Hemisphere, nor has it enacted various measures introduced by some Members to oppose or block elements of the Administration\u2019s approach to the region. Congress has taken some steps to monitor and shape U.S. policy, enacting Western Hemisphere-specific reporting requirements, directives, and appropriations in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (P.L. 119-60) and the National Security, Department of State, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2026 (P.L. 119-75, Division F), among other legislation (see Appendix). Congress also has held hearings and engaged in other oversight to examine the Administration\u2019s approach to the hemisphere and particular issues. Congress may explore various other options to influence U.S. policy in the region, depending on its goals.", "https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48960/R48960.3.pdf", "https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48960.html"]], "columns": ["id", "title", "publish_date", "update_date", "status", "content_type", "authors", "topics", "summary", "pdf_url", "html_url"], "primary_keys": ["id"], "primary_key_values": ["R48960"], "units": {}, "query_ms": 0.24572199617978185, "source": "Federal Register API & Regulations.gov API", "source_url": "https://www.federalregister.gov/developers/api/v1", "license": "Public Domain (U.S. Government data)", "license_url": "https://www.regulations.gov/faq"}