{"database": "openregs", "table": "crs_reports", "rows": [["LSB11493", "The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978: Preemption of State Law", "2026-10-21T04:00:00Z", "2026-10-24T05:39:51Z", "Active", "Posts", "Bryan L. Adkins", null, "The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) has implemented a number of measures during the second Trump Administration to promote economic deregulation of the airline industry. For example, in November 2025, DOT withdrew an advance notice of proposed rulemaking on airline passenger rights initiated during the Biden Administration, which would have required airlines to provide cash compensation, meals, lodging, and other amenities to airline consumers experiencing significant flight disruptions. In July 2026, DOT issued a notice of proposed rulemaking to amend the agency\u2019s existing rule on air fare advertising to provide \u201cgreater flexibility for regulated entities in how air fare is displayed.\u201d \nDOT\u2019s recent deregulatory actions have drawn attention to the respective roles of the federal government and state governments in policing airline business practices. When Congress enacted the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (ADA), it included an express preemption provision \u201c[t]o ensure that the States would not undo federal deregulation with regulation of their own.\u201d That provision, as amended, preempts state laws \u201crelated to\u201d an airline\u2019s \u201cprice, route, or service.\u201d Under Supreme Court precedent, the ADA\u2019s preemption provision applies broadly and can preempt even generally applicable state laws that indirectly affect airline prices, routes, or services. This Legal Sidebar provides background on the ADA and its preemption provision, examines the provision\u2019s scope, and discusses considerations for Congress.   \nBackground \nPrior to Congress enacting the ADA in 1978, federal law subjected the airline industry to a \u201csystem of detailed economic regulation\u201d in which airlines \u201coperate[d] like a public utility.\u201d Under the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, the now-abolished Civil Aeronautics Board \u201cclosely regulated\u201d air carrier prices, routes, and services. In enacting the ADA, Congress sought to \u201cplac[e] maximum reliance on competitive market forces\u201d and encourage \u201can air transportation system relying on actual and potential competition ... to provide efficiency, innovation, and low prices.\u201d While the ADA scaled back federal control over airlines\u2019 business practices, DOT still enforces economic regulations governing the airline industry, and DOT has statutory authority to prohibit airlines from engaging in unfair or deceptive practices and unfair methods of competition. \nScope of the ADA\u2019s Preemption Provision\nThe Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution (Article VI, clause 2) provides the basis for the doctrine of federal preemption, under which \u201cstate laws that interfere with, or are contrary to,\u2019 federal law\u201d are superseded. Federal law can preempt state law in multiple ways. Federal law may impliedly preempt state law, but Congress also may enact legislation with language expressly preempting state law, as it did in the ADA. The ADA\u2019s preemption provision is codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. \u00a7 41713(b)(1) and provides as follows:\n[A] State, political subdivision of a State, or political authority of at least 2 States may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier that may provide air transportation under this subpart.\nThe Supreme Court has emphasized that, regardless of the type of preemption at issue, Congress\u2019s intent is the \u201cultimate touchstone\u201d of a statute\u2019s preemptive effect. In evaluating Congress\u2019s preemptive intent, courts look primarily to the statutory text itself. \nThe Court has interpreted the ADA\u2019s \u201crelated to\u201d language as having an \u201cexpansive\u201d scope. The Court has held that state laws are \u201crelated to\u201d airline prices, routes, or services where the laws have either a \u201creference to\u201d or \u201cconnection with\u201d the prices, routes, or services. The ADA\u2019s preemption provision thus not only preempts state laws directly regulating airline prices, routes, or services, but also can preempt generally applicable state laws that have only an indirect effect on airlines, including common-law rules that states have not enacted in a statute. \nWhile the Supreme Court has recognized that the phrase \u201crelated to\u201d in the ADA \u201cexpress[es] a broad pre-emptive purpose,\u201d the Court has also emphasized limits on the phrase\u2019s preemptive scope when used in the ADA and other federal statutes. The Court has cautioned against strictly literal interpretations of \u201crelated to\u201d preemption provisions. Rather than reading \u201crelated to\u201d language \u201cto the furthest stretch of its indeterminacy,\u201d the Court has looked to Congress\u2019s statutory objectives as a guide to the scope of preemption under such provisions. The Court has thus explained that preemption under the ADA \u201coccurs at least where state laws have a significant impact\u2019 related to Congress\u2019 deregulatory and pre-emption-related objectives,\u201d and that some state laws may affect airline prices, routes, or services \u201cin too tenuous, remote, or peripheral a manner\u201d to give rise to preemption.\nDetermining whether the ADA preempts a particular state law can involve difficult interpretive questions and require fact-intensive, case-by-case analysis. In addition to questions over the scope of the ADA\u2019s \u201crelated to\u201d language, the preemption provision\u2019s use of the term \u201cservices\u201d has posed interpretive challenges for courts, and federal courts of appeals have split over the meaning of the term. Most federal courts of appeals that have interpreted the meaning of \u201cservice\u201d in the ADA have concluded that the term encompasses not only the provision of transportation, but also other features or amenities that passengers bargain for or anticipate as part of their transaction with the airline, such as boarding procedures, provision of food and drink, and baggage handling. In contrast, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Ninth Circuit) has adopted a narrower definition of \u201cservice.\u201d According to the Ninth Circuit, \u201cthe word service\u2019 in ... the ADA\u2019s preemption clause ... refer[s] to the prices, schedules, origins and destinations of the point-to-point transportation of passengers, cargo, or mail ... [and] was not intended to include an airline\u2019s provision of in-flight beverages, personal assistance to passengers, the handling of luggage, and similar amenities.\u201d The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (Third Circuit) has favorably described the Ninth Circuit\u2019s narrower interpretation, but lower courts debate whether the Third Circuit has adopted the Ninth Circuit\u2019s interpretation. \nApplication of the ADA\u2019s Preemption Provision to Different Categories of State Laws \nBelow are selected examples of how courts have applied the ADA\u2019s preemption provision in certain state law contexts. The examples include each of the Supreme Court\u2019s decisions to date applying the ADA\u2019s preemption provision (Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.; American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens; and Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg), as well as selected decisions of federal courts of appeals. Additionally, the Supreme Court has provided relevant guidance on the ADA\u2019s preemption provision in cases interpreting a similarly worded provision governing motor carriers in the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA). The examples include one of the Court\u2019s FAAAA preemption decisions. \nConsumer Protection Law\nThe Supreme Court has recognized that the ADA can broadly preempt the enforcement of state consumer protection laws against airlines. In Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., the Court held that the ADA preempted states from \u201cprohibiting allegedly deceptive airline fare advertisements through enforcement of their general consumer protection statutes.\u201d A group of airlines had sued state attorneys general to block them from enforcing guidelines that purported to \u201cexplain in detail how existing state laws apply to air fare advertising and frequent flyer programs.\u201d In the majority opinion authored by Justice Scalia, the Court rejected the argument that the ADA only preempts states from \u201cactually prescribing\u201d airline prices, routes, or services, and imposes \u201cno constraints on laws of general applicability\u201d that do not target the airline industry. In the Court\u2019s view, the state restrictions on airline fare advertisements had a \u201cforbidden significant effect upon fares\u201d because the restrictions would significantly limit the airlines\u2019 \u201cability to market their product,\u201d and thus, as a matter of economics, would have a \u201csignificant impact upon the fares they charge.\u201d \nThree dissenting Justices in Morales objected to the Court\u2019s broad interpretation of the ADA\u2019s preemption provision. Focusing on the ADA\u2019s legislative history, the dissent concluded that Congress intended to preempt state laws that relate \u201cdirectly\u201d to airline prices, routes, or services, but not generally applicable advertising laws that only \u201cindirectly\u201d relate to airline prices.\nThe Supreme Court also addressed the ADA\u2019s preemption of a consumer protection law in American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens. In Wolens, members of an American Airlines\u2019 frequent-flyer program had sued American because its retroactive changes to the program\u2019s terms allegedly violated an Illinois consumer fraud statute and constituted a breach of contract. In a majority opinion authored by Justice Ginsberg, the Court held that the ADA preempted the consumer fraud claims, but not (as discussed below) the contract claims. The Court explained that the consumer fraud law did not \u201csimply give effect to bargains offered by the airlines and accepted by airline customers,\u201d but instead \u201cserve[d] as a means to guide and police the marketing practices of the airlines.\u201d In the Court\u2019s view, the state consumer fraud law demonstrated the \u201cpotential for intrusive regulation of airline business practices inherent in state consumer protection legislation.\u201d Justice Stevens dissented with respect to preemption of the consumer fraud claim and argued that the ADA does not preempt generally applicable laws.\nContract Law\nIn the Wolens case described above, the Supreme Court also held that the ADA did not preempt the plaintiffs\u2019 state-law breach of contract claims alleging that the airline violated the terms of its agreement with passengers. The Court reasoned that the terms and conditions the airline offered to passengers were \u201cprivately ordered obligations and thus d[id] not amount to a State\u2019s \u201cenact[ment] or enforce[ment] [of] any law, ... regulation, ... or other provision having the force and effect of law\u201d within the meaning of [the preemption provision].\u2019\u201d The Court explained that, although \u201cthe ADA\u2019s preemption prescription bars state-imposed regulation of air carriers,\u201d it does not protect airlines from lawsuits \u201cseeking recovery solely for the airline\u2019s alleged breach of its own, self-imposed undertakings.\u201d In a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Thomas, Justice O\u2019Connor argued that the ADA preempts state contract law \u201cwhere the terms of a private contract relate to airline rates and services, and those terms can only be enforced through state law.\u201d\nThe Supreme Court addressed preemption of state contract laws again in Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg, where the Court unanimously held that the ADA preempts state common-law contract claims that seek to \u201cenlarge the contractual obligations that the parties voluntarily adopt[ed].\u201d The plaintiff\u2019s lawsuit against Northwest had alleged, among other things, that the airline breached an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing under Minnesota contract law by revoking his frequent flyer membership \u201cin a way that contravened his reasonable expectations.\u201d In support of its conclusion that the implied-covenant claim sought to enforce a state-imposed obligation, the Court noted that Minnesota law did not permit contracting parties to agree not to be bound by the implied covenant, and that Minnesota law excluded certain types of contract claims from the implied covenant for policy reasons. \nEmployment Law\nA number of federal appellate courts have concluded that generally applicable state employment laws are often too tenuously connected to airline prices, routes, and services to fall within the ADA\u2019s preemption provision. Examples of state employment laws that some courts have held not preempted under the ADA include racial discrimination laws, wage laws, meal and rest break laws, and whistleblower laws. \nCourts have, however, held in some circumstances that the ADA preempted a generally applicable employment law. For instance, in DiFiore v. American Airlines, Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the ADA preempted a Massachusetts law regulating tips for service employees. The tips law prohibited employers from taking fees \u201cthat a patron or other consumer would reasonably expect to be given to a ... service employee ... in lieu of, or in addition to, a tip.\u201d American Airlines charged passengers a $2 fee for each bag checked with the skycaps at Boston\u2019s Logan Airport, and the skycaps brought a lawsuit alleging that the fee violated the tips law. \nIn concluding that the ADA preempted the tips law, the court reasoned that preemption under the ADA distinguishes between laws that regulate \u201cmerely how the airline behaves as an employer or proprietor,\u201d and laws that regulate \u201chow an airline service is performed and how its price is displayed to customers.\u201d In the court\u2019s view, because complying with the tips law would require the airline to change the way it provided curbside check-in service or how it advertised the price for that service, the law did not \u201csimply regulate the employment relationship between the skycaps and the airline.\u201d \nPublic Health Law\nThe FAAAA\u2019s preemption provision for motor carriers of property provides that no state may enact or enforce laws \u201crelated to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier ... with respect to the transportation of property.\u201d In Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor Transport Association, the Supreme Court applied its ADA preemption precedents in holding that a Maine law regulating the delivery of tobacco products to customers impermissibly \u201crelated to\u201d a motor carrier\u2019s \u201cservice\u201d and was therefore preempted under the FAAAA. The challenged law required, among other things, that tobacco retailers use only delivery services that provided a specified age-verification service. \nIn concluding that the FAAAA preempted the state law, the Court rejected Maine\u2019s primary argument that state public health laws are categorically outside the scope of the preemption provision. The Court concluded that Maine\u2019s law would have a \u201csignificant\u2019 and adverse impact\u2019\u201d on the FAAAA\u2019s \u201cpre-emption-related objectives\u201d because the law would substitute the state\u2019s \u201cown governmental commands for competitive market forces\u2019 in determining (to a significant degree) the services that motor carriers will provide.\u201d The Court also emphasized that if each state were permitted to require carriers to provide a special recipient-verification service, the \u201cstate regulatory patchwork\u201d that could ensue would be \u201cinconsistent with Congress\u2019 major legislative effort to leave such decisions, where federally unregulated, to the competitive marketplace.\u201d\nConsiderations for Congress\nIn recent years, some advocacy groups and state officials have proposed amending the ADA\u2019s preemption provision to give states a larger role in policing airlines, particularly with respect to consumer protection issues. In 2022, for instance, the National Association of Attorneys General sent a letter to Congress arguing that DOT does not adequately protect airline consumers and that Congress should enact legislation authorizing states to enforce state and federal consumer protection laws against airlines. \nIn contrast, Congress has also considered proposals to amend the ADA\u2019s preemption provision to explicitly preempt state laws related to additional subjects beyond airline prices, routes, and services. For instance, a withdrawn amendment to the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 would have amended the preemption provision to explicitly preempt state laws related to \u201cthe pay or scheduling of the flight crew of an air carrier.\u201d An airline industry group advocating for broad preemption under the ADA has argued that \u201c[p]reemption of patchwork state regulation has helped create a cost-effective and efficient transportation network throughout the United States.\u201d \nCongress may choose to monitor how courts apply the ADA\u2019s preemption provision and evaluate whether the scope of state laws preempted under the ADA aligns with Congress\u2019s determination of the appropriate balance of federal and state authority over regulating airline business practices. Congress could amend the ADA\u2019s preemption provision to narrow, expand, or otherwise clarify its scope. \n\n", "https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB11493/LSB11493.1.pdf", "https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/HTML/LSB11493.html"]], "columns": ["id", "title", "publish_date", "update_date", "status", "content_type", "authors", "topics", "summary", "pdf_url", "html_url"], "primary_keys": ["id"], "primary_key_values": ["LSB11493"], "units": {}, "query_ms": 0.2991417422890663, "source": "U.S. government sources, plus a few identifier registries; each is listed on the methodology page", "source_url": "https://datadawn.org/methodology#data", "license": "Public Domain (U.S. Government data)", "license_url": "https://www.regulations.gov/faq"}