{"database": "openregs", "table": "crs_reports", "rows": [["IF13229", "Executive Order 14395, \u201cEstablishing the Task Force to Eliminate Fraud\u201d", "2026-05-19T04:00:00Z", "2026-05-20T11:53:25Z", "Active", "Resources", "Garrett Hatch", null, "Background\nFraud, the act of obtaining something of value through willful misrepresentation, is a growing concern for the federal government. According to the U.S. Sentencing Commission, convictions for government benefits fraud increased 242% between 2020 and 2024. During the pandemic, criminal organizations and individual actors fraudulently obtained hundreds of billions of dollars from programs intended to assist American businesses and people, including more than $100 billion from the Unemployment Insurance program. Nearly 50 individuals have been convicted of fraudulently obtaining nearly $250 million in funds from one pandemic assistance program, the Federal Child Nutrition Program. Similarly, in 2025, more than 320 doctors, nurses, and pharmacists were arrested across the nation for schemes to defraud Medicare and other federal assistance programs out of an estimated $14.6 billion. The Government Accountability Office estimates that federal agencies lose between $233 and $521 billion annually to fraud.\nOn March 16, 2026, President Trump signed Executive Order (E.O.) 14395, \"Establishing the Task Force to Eliminate Fraud.\u201d Section 1 of E.O. 14395 alleges that \u201cloopholes\u201d at the state level have created the conditions for fraud in federal benefit programs, such as allowing applicants to self-certify information, failing to verify applicants\u2019 eligibility, and \u201crefus[ing]\u201d to implement adequate fraud controls, among other things. \nTo address these issues, E.O. 14395 establishes a multi-agency task force to develop \u201ca comprehensive national strategy to stop fraud, waste, and abuse within Federal benefit programs, including programs administered jointly with State, local, tribal, and territorial partners.\u201d\nComposition of Task Force\nSection 2 of E.O. 14395 identifies three leadership positions at the task force and who shall fill them. The Vice President of the United States is to serve as chairman; the Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission is to serve as vice chairman; and the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security is to serve as senior advisor. Ultimately, the task force is \u201csubject to the President\u2019s direct supervision and control.\u201d\nIn addition, E.O. 14395 requires the task force to include, at a minimum, representatives from the Department of Agriculture, Department of Education, Department of Health and Human Services, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Housing and Urban Development, Department of Justice, Department of Labor, Office of Management and Budget, Small Business Administration, Department of the Treasury, and Department of Veterans Affairs. As chairman, the Vice President is authorized to add other agencies, inspectors general, or components of agencies.\nWhile the Homeland Security Council is not an official member, E.O. 14395 requires the task force to coordinate with the council on matters of law enforcement, transnational crime, public safety, national security, and organized criminal activity. \nPriorities and Operation\nAs noted, the primary purpose of the task force is to develop a coordinated national strategy for eliminating fraud, waste, and abuse in federal benefits programs. To that end, Section 3 lists nine priorities to guide the group\u2019s work:\n\u201cDevelop measures to improve eligibility verification processes in federal benefits programs and maximize [their] enforcement.\u201d\nDevelop pre-payment controls, including the ability to determine when ongoing or potential fraud might \u201crequire proactively pausing\u201d funding until effective controls are implemented.\n\u201cEvaluate indicators of fraud and high-risk vulnerabilities to fraud,\u201d potentially by hiring third-party contractors.\nPromote information and data sharing between the federal government and state, local, tribal, and territorial governments; benefit-providing agencies; and law enforcement agencies.\n\u201cDisrupt and dismantle fraud networks and facilitators ... through interagency information sharing.\u201d\n\u201cInvestigate and disrupt the mechanisms through which fraud is committed,\u201d including mechanisms facilitated by government officials.\n\u201cPrevent remittance transfers that involve the proceeds of Federal benefits fraud.\u201d\n\u201cAudit and ensure prospective compliance monitoring\u201d for identifying fraud.\nAnalyze information from providers or retailers that redeem benefits to identify fraud and develop policies for revalidation or reauthorization to deter fraud.\nMembers of the task force are required to share information concerning programs that the task force deems relevant, consistent with applicable laws.\nImproved Controls and Fraud- Prevention Measures\nSection 4 requires each agency on the task force to submit to the chairman and vice chairman, within 30 days from the date of E.O. 14395, a report on the agency\u2019s transactions and payment processes that are most susceptible to fraud schemes. Among the transactions and processes that agencies may examine, Section 4 lists new enrollments, redeterminations, provider enrollments, eligibility self-attestation procedures, changes to payment destinations, or transactions involving third-party intermediaries. The report is to include suggested policies for reducing the risk of fraud.\nWithin 60 days from the date of E.O. 14395, the task force shall coordinate member agency efforts to adopt minimum anti-fraud requirements for the transactions and processes that agencies reported as susceptible to fraud. \nIf a transaction or process is administered by a state, local, tribal, or territorial jurisdiction, then the task force must discuss how these jurisdictions may demonstrate implementation of anti-fraud requirements. As part of this discussion, the task force is required to examine and recommend ways that federal funds may be withheld from jurisdictions that do not have adequate anti-fraud requirements, potentially including\n\u201cscreening, proof of identity, and eligibility verification\u201d;\n\u201cpre-payment integrity and risk controls,\u201d including documentation of services provided;\ndata sharing, \u201cupdated criteria, minimum integrity checks, cross-program risk indicators, and coordinated recovery and enforcement pathways to prevent immigration sponsor and beneficiary and household-related\u201d fraud;\n\u201cappropriate use of providers, vendors, contractors, nonprofit organizations, intermediaries, and service organizations; and\u201d\n\u201caudit and remedial measures, including suspension, termination, repayment, exclusion, and debarment actions.\u201d\nWithin 90 days from the date of E.O. 14395, each member of the task force is required to submit to the chairman and vice chairman a plan to implement the anti-fraud controls and measures developed. \nRelated Anti-Fraud Initiatives\nE.O. 14395 is one of several actions the Trump Administration has taken in 2026 on fraud. Among the others, two are particularly relevant. On January 8, 2026, the White House announced a new National Fraud Enforcement Division (NFED) within the Department of Justice. The new division is to enforce federal criminal and civil laws against fraudsters targeting federal government programs, federally funded benefits, businesses, nonprofits, and private citizens nationwide. In particular, the NFED is charged with overseeing multi-district and multi-agency fraud investigations and working with other departments to dismantle organized fraud schemes that cross jurisdictions. \nOn March 6, 2026, the President signed E.O. 14390, \u201cCombating Cybercrime, Fraud, and Predatory Schemes Against American Citizens.\u201d E.O. 14390 focuses on fraud and cyber-enabled crime carried out by transnational criminal organizations (TCOs). It requires the Secretary of State to demand that foreign governments take action against TCOs operating within their borders and to penalize nations that do not do so, including through the imposition of trade sanctions, visa restrictions, and the expulsion of foreign officials who are \u201ccomplicit in these schemes.\u201d \nCongressional Considerations\nE.O. 14395 seeks to address some well-known fraud vulnerabilities in federal benefits programs. The emphasis on strengthening pre-payment controls, including eligibility verification, might lead to actions that reduce future fraud losses. Weak pre-payment controls, notably the use of self-attestation when applying for benefits, directly contributed to the billions in federal funds lost to fraudsters during the pandemic. Similarly, some states have not consistently verified the eligibility of applicants prior to approving them for assistance from federally funded programs, so working with states to improve their pre-payment controls might also reduce the risk of fraud.\nIn addition, the task force may be supported by both the enhanced investigatory and prosecutorial resources of the newly established NEFD and the diplomatic tools the Department of State may bring to bear on foreign governments with TCOs operating within their borders.\nIt is not clear how effective the task force might be at accomplishing other objectives. E.O. 14395 calls for the task force to improve data sharing among jurisdictions, but that may be subject to whether Congress provides statutory authority to do so, at least for certain programs. Even improving federal and state agencies\u2019 access to Treasury\u2019s Do Not Pay system to screen applicants\u2019 eligibility is a complex process that may not yield the results that some proponents anticipate.\nIt is also not clear how effective the task force may be in getting state, local, tribal, and territorial governments to enhance their internal controls. Some may argue, for example, that they do not have the funds needed to upgrade their financial or payment systems to accommodate new controls. The extent to which agencies may pause funding due to perceived fraud risks is also unclear, and attempts to withhold appropriated funds that have been awarded to jurisdictions may be met with legal challenges.", "https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13229/IF13229.1.pdf", "https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13229.html"]], "columns": ["id", "title", "publish_date", "update_date", "status", "content_type", "authors", "topics", "summary", "pdf_url", "html_url"], "primary_keys": ["id"], "primary_key_values": ["IF13229"], "units": {}, "query_ms": 0.3694540064316243, "source": "Federal Register API & Regulations.gov API", "source_url": "https://www.federalregister.gov/developers/api/v1", "license": "Public Domain (U.S. Government data)", "license_url": "https://www.regulations.gov/faq"}