id,title,publish_date,update_date,status,content_type,authors,topics,summary,pdf_url,html_url
R48984,The Certification of Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) Aircraft: In Brief,2026-06-12T04:00:00Z,2026-06-13T05:38:03Z,Active,Reports,Bart Elias,,"Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) refers to a novel transportation system for flying a few passengers and small payloads of cargo over relatively short distances—about 10 miles to 150 miles—using new aircraft designs. Congress has expressed interest in supporting the development of AAM flight operations and promoting U.S. leadership in technology innovation to support the industry developing AAM aircraft and its supporting infrastructure. 
This report discusses the framework, approach, and complexities of certifying new aircraft designs to enable future AAM production and operations. Most AAM concepts envision using electric vertical takeoff and landing (eVTOL) aircraft. The FAA classifies most of these designs as powered-lift aircraft, which have characteristics of both rotorcraft (helicopters) and fixed-wing airplanes, as well as novel characteristics that are distinct from more traditional aircraft designs. The FAA is requiring developers to address special conditions to demonstrate vehicle safety and airworthiness before the FAA issues a final aircraft type certification approval for the design of a specific AAM model. Type certification of an aircraft refers to the regulatory approval of an aircraft design and the conditions and limitations imposed regarding the use of that aircraft. 
No AAM vehicles have been certified by the FAA to date, but a few are progressing through the required steps to obtain certification. This process will address aircraft systems, flight operations, maintenance, and noise and environmental considerations. After type certification, manufacturers must obtain production certification to produce aircraft, and each aircraft assembled must obtain an airworthiness certification demonstrating safe construction and adherence to the type design. Future design changes would require FAA approval through either a supplemental type certification or an amended type certification. Manufacturers or their successors would be generally responsible to assist the FAA and aircraft operators in identifying safety concerns regarding the aircraft type design and applying safety modifications and corrections as needed to maintain the continued airworthiness of the aircraft. 
The Advanced Air Mobility Coordination and Leadership Act (P.L. 117-203) mandated an interagency working group to address safety, security, and federal investment needs to support AAM development and operations. Some legislative proposals in the 119th Congress seek to continue AAM research and development and federal interagency coordination on AAM development and related technological capabilities.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48984/R48984.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48984.html
LSB11440,FCC v. AT&T: Supreme Court Rejects Seventh Amendment Challenge to FCC Forfeiture Penalties,2026-06-12T04:00:00Z,2026-06-13T05:38:17Z,Active,Posts,"Chris D. Linebaugh, Daniel T. Shedd",,"On June 4, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC or Commission) issuance of forfeiture penalties does not violate the right to a jury trial enshrined in the Seventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The Court’s decision is a significant sequel to its 2024 decision in SEC v. Jarkesy. In Jarkesy, the Court held that the Seventh Amendment prohibits the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) from imposing civil penalties for securities fraud by way of an in-house administrative adjudication. By contrast, in FCC v. AT&T, the Court concluded that the FCC’s forfeiture penalties pass constitutional muster because they are not binding. While the SEC could immediately collect its administrative penalties by garnishing violators’ wages or making deductions from their tax returns, recipients of FCC forfeiture orders are only required to pay once the Department of Justice (DOJ) prevails in a follow-on de novo jury trial (i.e., a trial without any deference to the FCC’s factual or legal conclusions) in federal district court. 
AT&T may have several implications for Congress. Should Congress wish to empower agencies with administrative penalty authority, AT&T demonstrates a potential path for doing so consistent with the Seventh Amendment. The case also provides a framework for evaluating whether existing statutes establishing administrative penalty schemes are constitutional.
The Seventh Amendment and Jarkesy
The Seventh Amendment preserves “the right of trial by jury” in “Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars.” The Supreme Court has explained that the term suits at common law embraces all actions that are “legal in nature,” meaning that it is the type of action that courts of law, rather than courts of equity (which historically sat without a jury and typically awarded nonmonetary relief such as injunctions), would hear. The Court, however, has recognized an exception to the Seventh Amendment for cases involving “public,” rather than “private,” rights. While the Court has not “definitively explained” this public rights exception, it has recognized that the exception includes certain “historic categories of adjudication,” such as revenue collection, foreign commerce, immigration, tribal relations, public lands, public benefits, and patents. 
In Jarkesy, the Court held that a statutory scheme in which the SEC could impose civil penalties for securities fraud through an in-house administrative proceeding (with either an administrative law judge or the Commission itself acting as decisionmaker) violated the Seventh Amendment. The Court first concluded that the Seventh Amendment applied because the action was “legal in nature.” The remedy was the “most important” factor in this determination. Civil penalties, the Court explained, are designed to punish wrongdoing rather than to restore the status quo between the parties; they are, therefore, quintessentially legal, rather than equitable, in nature. While the presence of penalties was enough to establish the legal nature of the claim, the nature of the cause of action “confirmed” the Court’s conclusion. While “not identical,” the Court recognized a “close relationship” between securities fraud and historic common-law fraud. The Court further rejected the idea that the public rights exception applied to these SEC proceedings. The public rights exception, the Court cautioned, “has no textual basis in the Constitution” and must be treated “with care” so as not to let it swallow the Seventh Amendment’s general rule. While the Court had in the past applied it to the adjudication of statutory standards that had no similarity to historical common-law causes of action, the Court held it did not apply to a statutory action that operates similar to common-law fraud.
FCC v. AT&T
Background
Section 503(b) of the Communications Act of 1934 (Communications Act), as amended, provides that anyone who “is determined by the Commission” to have “willfully or repeatedly” violated the Act or the FCC’s implementing regulations “shall be liable to the United States for a forfeiture penalty.” Section 503(b) authorizes the FCC to issue final orders assessing a forfeiture penalty, provided it has first notified the person of the alleged violations and given the person a chance to respond. 
The recipient of a forfeiture order has “two options.” First, it may pay the fine and seek review in a federal appellate court. While an appellate court reviews any legal challenges to the order de novo, the appeals court sits without a jury and reviews the FCC’s factual determinations under a deferential standard. The recipient’s second option is to refuse payment and not appeal—in effect, “to do nothing.” In the event of nonpayment, Section 504 of the Communications Act directs the FCC to refer the matter to DOJ, which may bring a collection action in federal district court within five years of the order’s issuance. In such actions, the defendant is entitled to a “trial de novo.” Unless DOJ prevails in Section 504 trial, or until the recipient chooses to pay, Section 504(c) prohibits the Commission from using the unresolved forfeiture “to the prejudice of the person” in any other Commission proceedings. 
In 2024, the FCC issued forfeiture orders to cellular telephone carriers AT&T, Verizon, Sprint, and T-Mobile based on their treatment of customer location data. These carriers had contracts with location aggregators, who collected consumers’ location data from the carriers and sold it to third parties that used the data to provide location-based services. Following 2018 news reports revealing abuses of this location data, the FCC opened an investigation and ultimately determined that the carriers’ practices violated Section 222 of the Communications Act and the FCC’s implementing regulations, which require carriers to protect the privacy and security of this information. The FCC assessed forfeiture penalties of roughly $80 million against T-Mobile, $57 million against AT&T, $47 million against Verizon, and $12 million against Sprint. 
Rather than await a potential Section 504 suit by DOJ, the carriers opted to pay the forfeiture penalties and challenge them in federal appellate courts. In addition to various statutory and administrative law arguments, the carriers maintained that the forfeiture proceedings violated the Seventh Amendment, citing Jarkesy. These challenges resulted in a circuit split. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (Fifth Circuit) agreed with the carriers and vacated the FCC’s forfeiture order against AT&T on Seventh Amendment grounds. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the “back-end Section 504 trial” did not meet the Seventh Amendment’s demands because, even if DOJ decided to bring a Section 504 suit, by that time the FCC “would have already found the facts, interpreted the law, adjudged guilt, and levied punishment” without the involvement of a jury. The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second Circuit and D.C. Circuit, on the other hand, upheld the Commission’s orders against Verizon, T-Mobile, and Sprint, reasoning that the prospect of a de novo trial under Section 504 satisfies the Seventh Amendment’s demands.
Supreme Court’s Opinion
In an 8-1 opinion, the Supreme Court resolved the circuit split by holding that the FCC’s forfeiture proceedings do not violate the Seventh Amendment. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Roberts began by explaining that the Seventh Amendment does not “prescribe at what stage” of a legal dispute a jury trial is held so long as the trial occurs before legal rights and obligations are “conclusively ascertained and determined.’’’ Consequently, the Court reasoned, “nonjury adjudications making initial findings” are consistent with the Seventh Amendment provided they “are subject to de novo review in a subsequent jury trial.” 
Applying these principles, the Court concluded that the FCC’s forfeiture orders are nonbinding and may therefore be issued without the involvement of a jury. Unlike in Jarkesy, where the SEC had authority to enforce its administrative penalties by garnishing an offender’s wages or deducting the amount from their tax returns, the Communications Act, Justice Roberts wrote, “nowhere gives the Commission the authority to execute on a forfeiture order.” The Court further observed that there are no penalties for nonpayment, interest does not accrue on the forfeiture amount, and Section 504(c) of the Communications Act prohibits the FCC from holding the existence of an unpaid forfeiture against a party unless a court has ordered payment. Furthermore, the Court explained, FCC’s factual conclusions have “no effect” in a Section 504 suit. Consequently, the “only legal effect” of the FCC’s forfeiture orders, the Court held, is to enable the DOJ to file a Section 504 suit. 
The Court also rejected the idea that the FCC’s forfeiture proceedings placed an “unconstitutional condition” on the carriers’ exercise of their Seventh Amendment rights. According to the carriers, they faced an “impermissible choice: waive their jury right by voluntarily paying the forfeiture in exchange for guaranteed but deferential judicial review in the court of appeals; or decline to pay, and wait to make their case before a jury in an enforcement suit that may never come.” The carriers emphasized the costly nature of choosing the second option, explaining that no carrier wants to “thumb its nose at its principal regulator” by defying a forfeiture order, nor do they want to risk such orders going unchallenged in light of the reputational harm and precedential effect they have. The Court recognized that the government “may not effectively deny constitutional rights by making it too costly to exercise them.” In this instance, however, the Court specified that the carriers’ Seventh Amendment rights never “attach[ed] in the first place” because the FCC’s forfeiture proceedings were nonbinding and thus not a “[s]uit” under the Seventh Amendment. In any event, the Court said, it is “hard to see” how the carriers’ alleged harms go beyond what it has already upheld in the criminal context, where defendants regularly face the “difficult choice[]” to “forgo a jury trial by pleading guilty.”
Justice Thomas dissented from the Court’s opinion. Justice Thomas concurred with the Court’s Seventh Amendment analysis. Nevertheless, he would have reimbursed the carriers’ penalty payments and given them an opportunity to respond to the forfeiture orders with a “correct understanding of the law.” Justice Thomas wrote that the carriers paid the penalties under the “good-faith” belief that they were mandatory and faulted the Court for not granting the carriers any relief.
Implications of the Decision
The Court’s decision in AT&T appears to bring at least some clarity to the type of enforcement provisions that will pass muster under the Seventh Amendment. Following the Supreme Court’s 2024 decision in Jarkesy, some commenters argued that the opinion could have a significant effect on numerous statutory enforcement schemes across the federal bureaucracy. Justice Sotomayor, in her dissent in Jarkesy, cautioned that “more than 200 statutes authorizing dozens of agencies to impose civil penalties for violations of statutory obligations” may be called into question. If courts determined such enforcement schemes to be unconstitutional, Congress potentially would face consideration, to the extent that it desired continued enforcement of certain statutes, of how to amend numerous agency organic acts to align with Jarkesy’s requirements. The Court’s decision in AT&T will also have implications for federal agencies and Congress. 
FCC Enforcement Actions
The direct impact of AT&T is that the FCC’s forfeiture proceedings are constitutional and the agency may continue to enforce the Communications Act using the existing procedures under Section 503. Thus, in this respect, agency practice may change little in response to the Supreme Court’s ruling. The Supreme Court’s decision may, however, affect how parties respond to forfeiture orders, potentially making regulated parties more willing to decline to pay forfeitures. The end result may lead to increased Article III litigation to enforce penalties for violations of the Communications Act.
As discussed above, parties have two options to contest a forfeiture order. A party may, as AT&T and Verizon did, pay the forfeiture under protest and seek judicial review of the legality of the FCC’s order. Alternatively, the party may refuse to pay and wait for the DOJ to file an enforcement action in district court to determine liability with the option for a jury trial. Following the Court’s decision in AT&T, it may be that regulated entities increasingly choose the latter option. For example, Justice Thomas’s dissent implies that parties subject to such orders prior to AT&T may have had a “good faith belie[f]” that they had an immediate legal obligation to pay. Now that the Court’s decision clarifies that such orders have no legal effect, it is possible that enforcement of the Communications Act will increasingly occur in Article III litigation as regulated entities may be more inclined to opt for a trial. At the same time, the decision does not necessarily signify that regulated parties will litigate all such actions. Regulated entities will have to weigh concerns beyond their jury right when deciding how to proceed—litigation in an Article III court is expensive and, as the parties established in the case, regulated entities may consider other business effects, such as damage to reputation, when deciding how and whether to challenge an FCC forfeiture order.
Enforcement at Other Agencies
Beyond the FCC, the ruling may have impacts for similar enforcement mechanisms at other executive agencies. One amicus brief submitted to the Supreme Court in AT&T highlighted “at least eleven other federal statutes” that provide for similar enforcement procedures. For example, the Federal Power Act provides that, when enforcing violations concerning hydropower operations, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) may issue a penalty-assessment order following an informal hearing. If the regulated party refuses to pay within 60 days, FERC then may file suit in federal district court where the court shall “review de novo the law and the facts involved.” (These FERC procedures are currently subject to litigation by parties claiming, among other arguments, that they deny regulated parties’ Seventh Amendment rights. The district court in that case stayed the proceedings while awaiting, among other decisions, the Supreme Court’s opinion in AT&T.) Other agencies that use an enforcement model whereby an agency issues a penalty order but must file suit in court for a de novo trial include the Department of Energy, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and the Department of Health and Human Services. To the extent that the agency in-house proceedings do “not reflect the ultimate determination of any fact” and still require the government “to prove its case to a jury,” these procedures may also pass constitutional muster. Just as discussed above with the FCC, following AT&T, it is possible that parties regulated by agencies under these enforcement systems may increasingly opt to refuse payment and wait to see if the government pursues an action in court.
If there is an increase in Article III litigation to enforce statutory programs, an additional consideration is the potential increased reliance on DOJ attorneys in agency enforcement. Many statutes, including the Communications Act, require DOJ to bring suit in federal court after the agency has determined that a violation has occurred, rather than authorizing the agency itself to file the lawsuit. When compared to administrative procedures that place enforcement priorities squarely in the hands of the regulatory agency, this appears to place additional control with DOJ. For example, it is possible that DOJ would decline to bring suit in certain instances—even if an agency has found a violation—as DOJ would have to assess its own available resources, evaluate the available evidence, and weigh its competing enforcement policy priorities before electing to pursue a claim on behalf of the requesting agency. Some commenters, however, have argued that these concerns may be misplaced, as the increase in DOJ activity could potentially be relatively small.
“Waiver” Model of Administrative Enforcement
The Court’s AT&T decision appears to indicate that enforcement schemes that provide regulated entities a choice between review forums can also satisfy the Seventh Amendment, provided that one of the options involves a trial before a federal district court with the option for a jury. Following the Jarkesy opinion, commenters argued that the Seventh Amendment problems with administrative adjudication could be resolved if regulated parties were provided the option to either proceed before the agency adjudicator or remove the action to federal court where a jury could hear the case. These commenters noted that a party may waive his or her right to a jury trial in an Article III setting and that, if the regulated party opts for agency adjudication over an Article III court, that decision is akin to a jury waiver. In other words, the regulated entity, and not the government, would choose the juryless forum. Some Members of Congress, following the decision in Jarkesy, introduced legislation that would provide respondents facing agency adjudications an option to remove the proceedings to federal court. Proponents argued that this would provide regulated entities with the option to hear a matter with a more efficient and less expensive administrative adjudication proceeding or to secure the right to a jury. 
AT&T appears to provide some support for proponents of this potential model. The Supreme Court upheld the FCC’s enforcement scheme that provided the option of paying the ordered forfeiture and seeking judicial review from a federal appeals court or refusing to pay and awaiting a potential trial de novo before a district court. The Court held that such a choice does not unconstitutionally coerce the party to waive its jury right. That the carriers had the option to pay the fine and seek appellate review did not affect their Seventh Amendment rights because the initial forfeiture order had no binding effect. If providing the option to voluntarily pay the forfeiture under protest and seek review through a federal appellate court satisfies the Seventh Amendment (as long as there is an option to proceed before a jury), this may arguably support the concept that it would be permissible for a party to choose to proceed in an administrative adjudication setting or choose to proceed in federal court in the first place.
Considerations for Congress
As noted above, in the wake of Jarkesy some argued that Congress, if it wished to ensure compliance with the Seventh Amendment, might consider whether to change the adjudication procedures for numerous federal agencies. In AT&T, the Court has established certain principles that Congress might use to draft enforcement mechanisms that protect litigants’ Seventh Amendment rights. 
Under AT&T, it appears that enforcement mechanisms whereby agencies investigate and hold informal hearings with regulated parties to determine compliance with statutory and regulatory requirements are permissible, so long as the government is “required to prove its case to a jury” before collecting penalties. This, arguably, permits an agency to develop facts and make preliminary assessments before forwarding the case to DOJ for ultimate enforcement. Following the Court’s decision, Congress could, if it so chooses, emulate this enforcement scheme in future statutes or when revising existing laws to bring them in compliance with the Seventh Amendment. Congress and agencies may seek to ensure that an agency’s initial determination does not “reflect the ultimate determination of fact” (emphasis added). Further, when crafting such laws, Congress could ensure that, before the ultimate decision is reached in an Article III court, there is no penalty for nonpayment, that no interest accrues, and that an agency cannot use the existence of such a nonbinding order against a party in other matters.
Congress could also consider alleviating the constitutional challenges associated with the administrative adjudication by providing an option for individuals subject to an enforcement action to remove the proceeding to federal court. As discussed in more detail above, this option arguably could cure some constitutional issues because proceedings would only occur outside of an Article III court if the litigants agree to the administrative forum. 
Cases such as Jarkesy and AT&T may result in increased agency dependence on DOJ to bring enforcement actions. If Congress instead desired ultimate decisions on enforcement proceedings to lie with the regulatory agency charged with administering the statute, Congress could elect to provide specific agencies with independent litigating authority. In this manner, an agency with independent litigating authority would be able to bring suit in an Article III court without needing to rely on DOJ attorneys to pursue an action.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB11440/LSB11440.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/HTML/LSB11440.html
R48983,China’s Role in the International Financial Institutions,2026-06-11T04:00:00Z,2026-06-13T05:38:13Z,Active,Reports,Rebecca M. Nelson,"Foreign Policy Institutions & Tools, East Asia, International Financial Institutions","The United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC, or China) are the world’s two largest economies. The U.S. and PRC governments have foreign policy and economic priorities that sometimes overlap and sometimes diverge. The international financial institutions (IFIs)—including the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and regional multilateral development banks—provide a formal venue through which the United States and China, in coordination with other IFI members, can advance economic cooperation on areas of agreement and negotiate differences on a range of international financial issues. Examples of issues discussed at the IFIs include macroeconomic policies, structural reforms, banking regulations, efforts to combat money laundering, exchange rates, capital controls, development priorities, coordination of foreign aid, and debt relief for developing countries, among many others.
Some key policy questions about China’s role in the IFIs include the following:
To what extent, if any, should the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank continue to fund development projects in China? China’s level of economic development has increased over the past two decades and it has sizeable resources it could use to pay for development projects itself, rather than relying on multilateral financing. At the same time, World Bank and AsDB projects include environmental, labor, and procurement standards that might not otherwise be adopted, and multi-year development projects provide visibility into China’s economy.
What is the appropriate representation of China at the IFIs? Voting shares at the IFIs are broadly tied to a member’s economic size; countries with larger economies generally have larger voting shares. By this metric, China is underrepresented at the IFIs—China’s voting share does not reflect its rapid economic growth over the past two decades. Increasing China’s voting share could strengthen the legitimacy of the IFIs and raise additional funds for the IFIs, but it might also allow China to advance policies that are not in line with U.S. interests.
What are the implications of PRC firms having a significant share of World Bank and regional development bank civil works contracts? China has a number of large, state-owned infrastructure companies which may benefit from explicit and/or implicit government subsidies. This can result in cost savings for development projects but also raises concerns about whether private companies are able to compete on a level playing field with PRC firms when bidding on MDB contracts. There may also be concerns about the number of PRC firms that have been banned from bidding on MDB contracts due to fraudulent or corrupt business practices.
These policy issues are discussed in more detail below, following a brief background on U.S. and PRC membership in the IFIs. The report concludes with policy options for Members of Congress seeking to shape U.S. policy towards China at the IFIs.
Inter-American Development Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, African Development Bank
",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48983/R48983.7.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48983.html
R48982,The 2026 Childhood Immunization Schedule,2026-06-11T04:00:00Z,2026-06-13T05:38:17Z,Active,Reports,"Kavya Sekar, Alexandria K. Mickler, Vanessa C. Forsberg",,"Since 1995, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), has published an annual immunization schedule for children and adolescents (18 years of age and younger). Prior to 2026, the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP)—a committee of experts who advise on U.S. vaccine policy—led the annual process of updating the schedule in consultation with federal health officials and nonfederal health groups, such as medical associations. 
In January 2026, the CDC Acting Director, forgoing the usual ACIP process, approved a new childhood immunization schedule developed solely by federal officials that included several changes to prior childhood vaccine recommendations. The schedule was supported by an assessment, developed by Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and other HHS officials, that outlined the rationale for the schedule’s recommended changes. The assessment centered on three primary concerns: (1) how the U.S. vaccination schedule compares with those of other countries, (2) public trust in vaccines, and (3) vaccine safety. This assessment was prompted by a December 2025 presidential memorandum that directed HHS and CDC to review childhood vaccine recommendations. As of March 16, 2026, this schedule is currently stayed (i.e., suspended) by a U.S. district court; the federal government appealed the ruling on April 29, 2026. On May 29, 2026, Executive Order 14407 (E.O. 14407) stated that the assessment, and its proposed 2026 updates to the childhood immunization schedule, are a “guiding resource” for the federal government. E.O. 14407 directs CDC and ACIP to review the assessment and the latest clinical data and, to the extent permitted by law, take steps to update the child and adolescent immunization schedules.
The new schedule does not remove any vaccines from the previous childhood immunization schedule. The new schedule differs from the January 2025 schedule by 
incorporating prior 2025 ACIP-recommended changes to the COVID-19 and Hepatitis B vaccine recommendations;
changing the recommendation type for three vaccines—Hepatitis A, Meningitis ACWY, and RSV—from a full recommendation for all children to risk-based and shared clinical decisionmaking recommendations, depending on a child’s risk from the disease that the vaccine protects against;
changing the recommendation type for two vaccines—rotavirus and influenza—from a full recommendation for all children to a shared clinical decisionmaking recommendation; and
changing the number of recommended doses of the human papillomavirus (HPV) vaccine.
The process, timeline, and methods used to develop the revised schedule also deviated from those used in prior updates. 
Many federal and state laws reference ACIP or CDC immunization recommendations, such as federal vaccine coverage requirements and certain state requirements on vaccine administration. CDC immunization recommendations also provide important guidance to clinicians in their practice. Following the January 2026 announcement, nonfederal professional medical society organizations have opposed the revised schedule and since published separate childhood vaccine schedules, which some states have adopted in their vaccine policy. These responses indicate the clinical and policy significance of the CDC immunization schedule and changes to the schedule, particularly if the 2026 revised schedule is allowed to go into effect. The specific potential federal policy implications of the 2026 schedule change are unclear at this time should the schedule go into effect.
This CRS report begins with a summary of the changes to the recommended childhood vaccine schedule. It also summarizes the rationale for the changes, as outlined in the HHS assessment, and provides a brief discussion of the justifications presented in the assessment. This report also describes how the process used to revise the 2026 childhood immunization schedule deviated from prior procedures. The report concludes by outlining potential clinical and federal policy implications of the 2026 childhood immunization schedule.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48982/R48982.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48982.html
IN12696,Effects of Iran Conflict on Natural Gas Prices,2026-06-11T04:00:00Z,2026-06-12T16:08:18Z,Active,Posts,Michael Ratner,"Iran, Strategy, Operations & Emerging Threats, Global Economy, Natural Gas Prices, Oil & Gasoline Prices","The U.S./Israel military operations against Iran that commenced on February 28, 2026, quickly raised the specter of a closure of the Strait of Hormuz, a key waterway in the Persian Gulf for the transit of natural gas, oil, and other commodities. Approximately 20% of the world’s liquefied natural gas (LNG), primarily from Qatar, uses the Strait to reach global markets. Iran reportedly struck Qatari LNG infrastructure in retaliation for Israeli attacks against Iran’s energy infrastructure. The conflict’s impact on global natural gas prices, however, has been less pronounced and regionally varied than the conflict’s impact on oil prices. The differences in how the conflict has affected these two commodities underscores some key features of these markets and highlights associated policy considerations for Congress.
The global natural gas market remains less integrated than the global oil market. As shown in Figure 1, while U.S. crude oil prices have trended upward since the war with Iran began, U.S. natural gas prices have stayed relatively flat. This is, in part, because the crude oil market is more connected globally, so that an event anywhere generally affects prices everywhere. Natural gas is a more regional commodity and the global market is not as reactionary. Almost 30% of U.S. crude oil is exported, while 23% of U.S. natural gas is exported.
One of the key factors that affects natural gas prices is the weather. As shown in Figure 1, the January 2026 freeze in the United States greatly affected domestic natural gas prices. This is partially because a major use of natural gas is to provide heat to homes, businesses, and industrial processes. In addition, natural gas is the primary fuel used in electricity generation in the United States, where data centers are likely to increase demand for electricity and consequently natural gas. By comparison, the United States’ use of oil for heating is limited to certain regions, mainly the Northeast. Oil is primarily used in the transportation sector.
Figure 1. U.S. Natural Gas and Oil Benchmark Spot Prices
January-May 2026
/
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, Natural Gas Spot and Futures Prices (NYMEX) and Spot Prices for Crude Oil and Petroleum Products.
Notes: The spot price is for a one-time open market transaction for immediate delivery of a specific quantity of product at a specific location where the commodity is purchased “on the spot” at current market rates. For comparison purposes, the graph shows prices in a common unit, dollars per million British thermal units ($/MMBtu). Henry Hub is the U.S. benchmark price for natural gas, and West Texas Intermediate (WTI) is the U.S. benchmark price for crude oil.
Globally, natural gas prices in the U.S. market are lower than in the other two major markets, Europe and Asia (see Figure 2). Between February and May 2026, European and Asian natural gas prices have increased 44% and 66%, respectively, while U.S. prices declined by 6%. As both Europe and Asia are net importing regions, curtailment of Qatari exports and other Middle Eastern LNG exports from the Persian Gulf may have a bigger impact on both regions. Europe, in particular, has also been affected by Russia’s reduction of gas exports. By comparison, global oil prices rose 50% between February and May 2026. Almost half of worldwide oil production is exported, while less than 30% of worldwide natural gas is exported to foreign markets, mostly by pipeline. Total U.S. exports of natural gas make up approximately 23% of U.S. natural gas production, as noted. The volume of exports has contributed to upward pressure on prices, but not as strongly as other factors such as the weather.
Historically, the effects of a closure of the Strait on natural gas prices were of less concern to policymakers, but as natural gas becomes a more global commodity, events like closing the Strait likely will have greater global effects. For example, geopolitical events such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 have highlighted the importance of natural gas in the global economy. Global energy commodities have faced unprecedented events over the last several years:
The COVID-19 global pandemic was responsible for declines in energy demand and prices. (March 2020)
After Russia—a major oil and natural gas producer and exporter—invaded Ukraine, prices in all markets rose. (February 2022)
When the United States captured and arrested the head of state of Venezuela—a significant oil producer and exporter—the event initially added uncertainty to energy markets and put modest upward pressure on prices. (January 2026)
U.S. and Israeli attacks on Iran (a significant oil producer and exporter), including on Iran’s energy infrastructure, contributed to Iranian retaliation against neighbors, including those that are major oil and natural gas producers and exporters, putting upward pressure on global prices. (February 2026)
Figure 2. Selected International Futures Prices for Natural Gas and Oil
January 2022-May 2026
/
Source: Data from the U.S. Energy Information Administration and Bloomberg L.P., a subscription service.
Notes: $/MMBtu = dollars per million British thermal units. The futures prices represent the delivery month for a certain quantity of a commodity at a specified time and place in the future. The natural gas prices are at the U.S. (Henry Hub), European (TTF), and Asian (JKM) trading hubs and are in nominal dollars. Brent is the international benchmark for crude oil. Operation Midnight Hammer refers to the June 2025 U.S. military operations against Iran. 
Figure 3 shows how U.S. natural gas exports have grown since 2016, when the United States started exporting natural gas as LNG from the lower 48 states. The export data in Figure 3 include LNG and pipeline exports, the latter of which go primarily to Mexico; pipeline exports to Mexico have increased significantly since 2000, accounting for 27% of total U.S. natural gas exports in 2025. Figure 3 also shows an overall rise in U.S. natural gas exports despite more volatile prices. To meet the growth in exports, U.S. natural gas production has also steadily increased, which has contributed to keeping U.S. prices relatively stable and low compared to other countries’ prices.
Figure 3. U.S. Natural Gas Exports and Prices
January 2016-April 2026
/
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, U.S. Natural Gas Exports and Re-Exports by Country and Henry Hub Natural Gas Spot Price (Dollars per Million Btu).
Notes: LNG = liquefied national gas. The graph shows monthly, nominal prices in dollars per million British thermal units ($/MMBtu). For natural gas volumes, the graphic uses monthly export data in billion cubic feet.
Natural gas markets have unique characteristics, which may be relevant when evaluating different policies. The ramifications of policies may also not necessarily yield their intended effects. For example, a policy intended to dampen effects on U.S. natural gas prices by limiting exports may lead to higher prices in the long term as producers may scale back drilling because of the lower prices. Events such as the U.S./Israel conflict with Iran may have unanticipated consequences on market components because the effects are wide and varied.
",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12696/IN12696.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/HTML/IN12696.html
TE10123,Examining Local Needs in Disaster Recovery,2026-06-10T04:00:00Z,2026-06-16T04:35:29Z,Active,Testimony,Joseph V. Jaroscak,,"Community Development Block Grants for Disaster Recovery, CDBG-DR, Mitigation, Resilience, Disaster Management.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/TE/PDF/TE10123/TE10123.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/TE/HTML/TE10123.html
R48980,Noncompetitive Federal Contract Awards: Other than Full and Open Competition,2026-06-10T04:00:00Z,2026-06-12T17:38:06Z,Active,Reports,"Dominick A. Fiorentino, David H. Carpenter",,"In the context of federal procurement, Congress has long been interested in the view that increased competition among potential vendors could result in (1) lower prices, (2) higher quality goods and services, (3) increased innovation, and (4) greater public trust in government. The Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 (CICA), as amended, forms the current framework for competition in federal procurement. CICA requires that executive agencies “obtain full and open competition through the use of competitive procedures” for the procurement of all property and services unless expressly authorized by statute (10 U.S.C. §3201(a), 41 U.S.C. §3301(a)). Under CICA, “full and open competition” results when “all responsible sources are permitted to submit sealed bids or competitive proposals” (41 U.S.C. §107).
Procurement contracts are subject to CICA’s full-and-open-competition requirement unless a separate statute expressly authorizes the use of different procedures or a statutory exception applies. Non-procurement contracts, such as those resulting from agencies’ use of other transaction authority (OTA), are not subject to CICA (see, e.g., 51 U.S.C. §20113). Contracts awarded using simplified acquisition procedures; contract modifications that are within the scope of the original contract award; and orders placed under requirements, definite quantity, indefinite quantity, task order, and delivery order contracts are also not subject to the full-and-open-competition requirement (FAR §6001). 
Some competitions in which only certain contractors can compete still meet CICA’s requirement for full and open competition because CICA provides for “full and open competition after exclusion of sources.” This occurs in two contexts: agencies’ “dual sourcing” initiatives and set-asides for small businesses (10 U.S.C. §3203(a)-(b), 41 U.S.C. §3303(a)-(b)).
Although CICA establishes full and open competition as the default in federal procurement, it also provides seven exceptions that agencies may invoke. These exceptions generally cover situations where either competition is infeasible or the federal government prioritizes other objectives over full and open competition. These statutory exceptions are (1) only one responsible source; (2) unusual and compelling urgency; (3) industrial mobilization, engineering, developmental or research capability, or expert services; (4) international agreement; (5) authorized or required by statute; (6) national security; and (7) the public interest (10 U.S.C. §3204(a), 41 U.S.C. §3304(a)). 
Although agencies have discretion to use noncompetitive procedures in certain circumstances, CICA requires that agencies justify their actions in writing. Contracting officers are required to provide justifications of, and obtain approvals for, most noncompetitive procurements conducted in reliance on CICA exceptions (10 U.S.C. §3204(e), 41 U.S.C. §3304(e)).
Vendors excluded from bidding on federal contracts because of an agency’s actions to limit competition may challenge via the bid-protest process the agency’s method of, or rationale for, making a noncompetitive contract award (28 U.S.C. §1491, 31 U.S.C. §§3551-3557). 
Article I of the Constitution provides Congress the authority to appropriate funds and conduct oversight over government contracting practices. Thus, Congress has often sought to encourage cost-effective and efficient contracting mechanisms to help the government acquire high-quality goods and services that serve taxpayers’ interests. As part of its oversight and legislative functions, Congress may consider (1) the scope of agency discretion in using CICA exceptions, (2) the frequency of agency use of bridge contracts, and (3) changes made by the second Trump Administration’s “Revolutionary FAR Overhaul” (https://www.acquisition.gov/far-overhaul/).",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48980/R48980.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48980.html
LSB11439,Congressional Court Watcher: Circuit Splits from May 2026,2026-06-10T04:00:00Z,2026-06-12T16:22:59Z,Active,Posts,"Michael John Garcia, Peter J. Benson",Jurisprudence,"The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the thirteen “circuits” issue thousands of precedential decisions each year. Because relatively few of these decisions are ultimately reviewed by the Supreme Court, the U.S. Courts of Appeals are often the last word on consequential legal questions. The federal appellate courts sometimes reach different conclusions on the same issue of federal law, causing a “split” among the circuits that leads to the nonuniform application of federal law among similarly situated litigants.
This Legal Sidebar discusses circuit splits that emerged or widened following decisions from May 2026 on matters relevant to Congress. The Sidebar does not address every circuit split that developed or widened during this period. Selected cases typically involve judicial disagreement over the interpretation or validity of federal statutes and regulations, or constitutional issues relevant to Congress’s lawmaking and oversight functions. The Sidebar includes only cases where an appellate court’s controlling opinion recognizes a split among the circuits on a key legal issue resolved in the opinion. This Sidebar refers to each U.S. Court of Appeals by its number or descriptor (e.g., “D.C. Circuit” for “U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit”).
Some cases identified in this Sidebar, or the legal questions they address, are examined in other CRS general distribution products. Members of Congress and congressional staff may click here to subscribe to the CRS Legal Update and receive regular notifications of new products and upcoming seminars by CRS attorneys.
Civil Procedure: The Tenth Circuit held that a group of plaintiffs alleging breach of a settlement agreement satisfied the ascertainability requirement for certifying a class action. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, which sets the prerequisites for bringing a class action in federal court, does not expressly refer to ascertainability. Most circuits, however, treat ascertainability as an implied prerequisite and require the party seeking class certification to establish that the court will be able to ascertain the class members at some stage of the proceeding. Pointing to its decision in an earlier case, the Tenth Circuit held that a moving party meets this ascertainability requirement when a class is defined clearly and objectively and the movant shows that class members can be identified with reasonable accuracy. That rule, the court explained, follows the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of the ascertainability requirement but splits with the Third Circuit, which has held that ascertainability incorporates an “administrative feasibility” element. In the Third Circuit’s view, to show ascertainability at the class certification stage, a movant must establish that there is an “administratively feasible” way to decide whether putative class members are covered by the class definition (Rider v. Oxy USA, Inc.).
Civil Procedure: The Eleventh Circuit held that a federal court hearing a case in diversity jurisdiction must apply state law to determine the applicability of a contract’s forum selection clause. The Supreme Court has observed that federal courts exercising diversity jurisdiction generally “apply state substantive law and federal procedural law.” The Eleventh Circuit had previously held that in diversity jurisdiction cases, federal law governs a court’s consideration of whether to enforce a forum selection clause. In this case, the court held that the question of whether a forum selection clause applies to the particular parties in a particular dispute is distinct from the question of whether to enforce the clause. The applicability question, the court decided, turns on interpretation of the relevant language in the contract, and contract interpretation is a substantive issue governed by state law in diversity cases. Accordingly, the court applied Florida choice-of-law rules to identify the law governing the contract at issue, and based on those choice-of-law rules, it interpreted the contract under Slovenian law. The Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits have similarly concluded that the applicability and enforceability of forum selection clauses are distinct legal issues governed by different sources of law in diversity actions. The Eleventh Circuit split, however, with the Fourth and Ninth Circuits. Those two courts have held that, in diversity cases, federal law governs both the interpretation and enforceability of forum selection clauses (Declan Flight, Inc. v. Textron eAviation, Inc.).
Communications: The Eleventh Circuit held that 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)—which provides that “[t]he regulation of the placement, construction, and modification of personal wireless service facilities” by state and local governments “shall not prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the provision of personal wireless services”—applies to local or state zoning rules, but not to a decision to deny an individual permit for a wireless service facility. Pointing to the statute’s text, context, and structure, the court interpreted the word “regulation” in Section 332(c)(7)(B)(i) to mean “control by rule.” Accordingly, the court explained, Section 332(c)(7)(B)(i) restricts municipalities’ control of facility siting by rules, but not through individual zoning decisions. In the Eleventh Circuit’s view, this interpretation of Section 332(c)(7)(B)(i) is “irreconcilable with any version of the significant gap test” that has been adopted by the First, Second, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits. Those circuits have held that the denial of a single permit for a wireless service facility can violate Section 332(c)(7)(B)(i) if the proposed facility would be the least intrusive means or only feasible way to close a significant gap in wireless services (T-Mobile South, LLC v. City of Roswell).
Firearms: In consolidated cases, a divided Second Circuit upheld a lower court decision that rejected a constitutional challenge to some provisions of a New York firearms statute, but held that a provision barring the possession of firearms on private property without express owner’s consent violated the Second Amendment as applied to property open to the public (e.g., a gas station or a grocery store). The panel observed that its analysis of the law’s compatibility with the Second Amendment was governed by the framework set forth by the Supreme Court in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association., Inc. v. Bruen, which first looks at whether conduct regulated by the challenged law is covered by the plain text of the Second Amendment and, if so, requires the government to prove that the law is consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearms regulation. The Second Circuit panel majority held that the New York law’s firearms restrictions, as applied to private property open to the public, were not consistent with the nation’s historical tradition. The majority disagreed with the conflicting analysis of the Ninth Circuit in its review of a different state’s firearm statute, deciding that the historical examples of firearms regulation on private property cited by that court did not constitute sufficiently close analogues that reflected a national tradition of such regulation (Christian v. James; Boron v. James).
Immigration: Within days of each other, the Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits issued decisions involving a widening circuit split over when an alien taken into immigration custody after having unlawfully entered the country years earlier can be detained without bond during the pendency of removal proceedings. Under federal statute, in many cases an alien may be released from custody on bond or on his or her own recognizance during the pendency of removal proceedings. Except in narrow circumstances, however, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) directs that, “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained [during removal proceedings]” (italics added). Federal statute provides that an alien “present in the United States who has not been admitted” shall be treated as an “applicant for admission,” but does not define an alien “seeking admission.” The Fifth and Eighth Circuits have treated “applicant for admission” and “alien seeking admission” as synonymous terms, meaning that aliens present in the United States but not lawfully admitted are subject to mandatory detention under Section 1225(b)(2)(A). In May 2026, divided panels of the Sixth Circuit (in Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft) and the Eleventh Circuits (in Hernandez Alvarez v. Warden, Federal Detention Center Miami) disagreed with this interpretation. They joined an earlier Second Circuit panel in holding that an “alien seeking admission” under Section 1225(b)(2)(A) is not synonymous with an “applicant for admission,” and that Section 1225(b)(2)(A) only directs the mandatory detention of those unlawfully present aliens who are actively seeking lawful admission into the country. In the same period as the Sixth and Eleventh Circuit cases were decided, the Seventh Circuit (in Castañon Nava v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security) vacated an earlier decision that took a similar position as those courts on Section 1225(b)(2)(A)’s meaning. The Seventh Circuit panel—in the course of reviewing a request for a stay of district court orders enforcing a consent decree—had initially concluded that the government was unlikely to prevail in its position that Section 1225(b)(2)(A) directed the mandatory detention of all unlawful entrants. After full briefing and oral arguments in the case, a fractured panel affirmed and reversed aspects of the district court’s consent decree orders without conclusively deciding the proper interpretation of Section 1225(b)(2)(A).
Immigration: A divided Sixth Circuit panel held that the Sixth Amendment, which guarantees a criminal defendant’s right to effective counsel, does not require a defense attorney to inform a naturalized citizen when a guilty plea for a criminal offense could lead to the citizen’s denaturalization. The panel majority reasoned that Supreme Court precedent recognized that a criminal defense attorney generally was not required to inform the defendant of collateral consequences stemming from a plea agreement—i.e., those beyond the control of the district court in which the conviction was issued. Because denaturalization is a separate judicial process over which the criminal court exercises no responsibility, the panel majority held that the Sixth Amendment did not require notification by a criminal defense attorney of the risks of denaturalization. Although the Supreme Court in Padilla v. Kentucky recognized a limited exception to the collateral rule, requiring that a criminal defendant who is an alien be informed when a guilty plea would render him or her deportable, the panel majority believed this exception did not apply beyond the deportation context. The majority split with the Second Circuit, which has applied Padilla to require that a criminal defendant be informed of the risk of denaturalization resulting from a guilty plea (United States v. Singh).
Labor & Employment: The Second Circuit held that a federal district court lacked personal jurisdiction over out-of-state plaintiffs’ claims against an out-of-state defendant in a collective action brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The FLSA allows employees to sue on behalf of themselves and others who are “similarly situated.” Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k) provides that service of process establishes personal jurisdiction over a defendant in three circumstances: (1) when the defendant would be subject to the jurisdiction of the court of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located; (2) over certain parties joined to the lawsuit (in circumstances not relevant here); and (3) when authorized by a federal statute. The Second Circuit explained that, because the FLSA does not provide for nationwide service of process or otherwise authorize service on the defendant in this case, the only applicable category from Rule 4(k) was the first one. Accordingly, the federal district court could exercise personal jurisdiction in the FLSA action only over defendants subject to the jurisdiction of the court’s state counterpart. That state court’s jurisdiction, the Second Circuit said, is limited by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly, the Second Circuit held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process limits—including the limits identified by the Supreme Court in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California—applied to this case. In Bristol-Myers Squibb, the Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited a California state court from exercising specific personal jurisdiction over claims of nonresident plaintiffs against a nonresident defendant in a mass tort action—even though the mass tort action included some claims brought by California residents. The Second Circuit applied this reasoning to the various “similarly situated” employees’ claims in this FLSA collective action and concluded that the district court lacked specific personal jurisdiction over each FLSA claim brought by an out-of-state plaintiff. The Second Circuit joined the Third, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits, which have applied Bristol-Myers Squibb’s claim-by-claim specific personal jurisdiction analysis to FLSA collective actions. The Second Circuit split, however, with the First Circuit. In the First Circuit’s view, Rule 4(k) governs when service of a summons establishes personal jurisdiction, but does not limit a federal court’s jurisdiction after a summons has been properly been served. As a result, the First Circuit has declined to apply Bristol-Myers Squibb and dismiss claims asserted by out-of-state plaintiffs in an FLSA collective action where the named (in-state) plaintiff had established personal jurisdiction over the defendant consistent with Rule 4(k) (Provencher v. Bimbo Foods Bakeries Distrib. LLC).
Labor & Employment: A divided Sixth Circuit held that when the National Labor Relations Board (“Board”) seeks a preliminary injunction under 29 U.S.C. § 160(j), courts may not infer, without independent factual support, that an employer’s refusal to bargain with a union causes irreparable harm. The Supreme Court recently confirmed that the “the traditional four-factor test for a preliminary injunction”—which includes a requirement that the party seeking the injunction show a likelihood of irreparable harm—“governs the Board’s requests under” 29 U.S.C. § 160(j). The Sixth Circuit held that the Board, like other litigants, must demonstrate “certain and immediate” harm to satisfy the irreparable harm requirement, and this harm must be shown through factual support, not inferred only from a refusal to bargain. The Sixth Circuit disagreed with a Ninth Circuit decision holding that an employer’s failure to bargain in good faith, coupled with permissible inferences regarding the likely effects of that failure, may be enough to show the likelihood of irreparable injury (Kerwin v. Trinity Health Grand Haven Hosp.).",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB11439/LSB11439.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/HTML/LSB11439.html
IF13245,FDA Regulation of AI-Enabled Devices,2026-06-10T04:00:00Z,2026-06-11T10:37:59Z,Active,Resources,Amanda K. Sarata,FDA Product Regulation & Medical Research,"Artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled applications are increasingly used in health care, including for financial, administrative, and clinical purposes. They hold the promise of increased efficiency, improved quality of care, and better health outcomes, while simultaneously challenging regulators, clinicians, payers, and legislators with their safe deployment. The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulates a subset of AI-enabled health care applications as medical devices, and it is balancing regulation of these rapidly advancing, novel tools with access to low-risk products. Over the past several years, the agency has taken a number of steps to support device manufacturers developing these products. 
Which AI-Enabled Applications Are Regulated by FDA?
FDA regulates the safety and effectiveness of medical devices, including those with device software functions (DSFs). DSFs include both software as a medical device (SaMD) and software integral to a traditional hardware device (software in a medical device, SiMD). SaMD is defined as “software intended to be used for one or more medical purposes that perform these purposes without being part of a hardware medical device.” An AI-enabled device is generally defined in nonbinding guidance by FDA as a device that includes one or more AI-enabled DSFs (AI-DSF), but FDA also uses the terms interchangeably.
FDA has authority only over software functions that meet the definition of “device” in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA). The 21st Century Cures Act (Cures Act, P.L. 114-255) clarified the scope of software functions that meet the definition of device. Specifically, the Cures Act excluded from the device definition those software functions intended (1) “for administrative support of a health care facility”; (2) “for maintaining or encouraging a healthy lifestyle ... unrelated to the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, prevention, or treatment of a disease”; (3) “to serve as electronic patient records”; and (4) “for transferring, storing, converting formats, or displaying” certain data and results. The law also excluded clinical decision support (CDS) software that meets specific criteria (e.g., is for the purpose of displaying medical information about a patient; providing recommendations to a health care professional about prevention, diagnosis, or treatment of a disease; and enabling a professional to independently review the basis for the recommendations). 
Determining whether a software function meets the definition of a device, and is thus regulated by FDA, can be a challenge for the developer. FDA has published guidance clarifying products that meet the device definition and addressing enforcement discretion policies for various types of DSFs (e.g., mobile medical applications). FDA has also developed resources to aid with determining if a given software function is a DSF, and if so, whether it is the focus of FDA oversight. 
FDA maintains a list of AI-enabled devices, based on publicly available information, that have received marketing authorization beginning with the first such device in 1995. FDA reports that approximately 1,450 such devices have been authorized for marketing, with the majority in the fields of radiology, cardiology, and neurology. Most of these devices were cleared for marketing through the 510(k) premarket notification pathway for moderate risk devices, which requires a determination that the device is “substantially equivalent” to a legally marketed device in terms of intended use, technological characteristics, and performance testing. 
To date, the agency does not appear to have authorized for marketing any generative AI (genAI)-enabled device. However, in March 2026, FDA gave breakthrough designation to a patient-facing clinical genAI application developed by RecovryAI. FDA has considered issues around the regulation of genAI devices in two meetings of its Digital Health Advisory Committee.  
How Does FDA Regulate AI-Enabled Devices?
AI-enabled devices, which are often SaMD, are regulated as FDA regulates other devices. That is, these devices are subject to a risk-based regulatory scheme, with devices designated as Class I (low risk), Class II (moderate risk), and Class III (high risk). Regulatory control is based largely on a device’s classification. All devices are subject to general controls, including adverse event reporting, establishment registration and device listing, and the Quality Management System Regulation (QMSR, or current good manufacturing practices for devices), among others. Premarket review requirements vary based on a device’s class. 
To date, AI-enabled devices have been most often classified as Class II—moderate risk—and therefore are generally subject to premarket review through 510(k) notification. These devices may also come to market through a de novo classification request if the device is low or moderate risk and novel. In certain cases, these devices may be Class III, and would be subject to premarket approval (PMA) prior to marketing, requiring the development of clinical evidence to support their approval.
Unlike most traditional hardware devices, AI-enabled devices are expected to change over their lifecycle. The FDA’s device regulatory scheme is based on evaluating a device at a point in time, with the expectation that it will remain largely unchanged during its use. In cases where changes to devices are needed postmarket, FDA generally requires follow-on regulatory submissions, such as a PMA supplement or a new 510(k). 
To help to address this, in 2019, FDA published a proposed regulatory framework for AI/ML-enabled SaMD, introducing the concept of a predetermined change control plan (PCCP) to describe planned changes to a device over its implementation. FDA defines a PCCP as “the documentation describing what modifications will be made to a device and how the modifications will be assessed.” In 2022, a provision authorizing inclusion of a PCCP in premarket submissions was included in the Food and Drug Omnibus Reform Act of 2022 (FDORA, P.L. 117-328, Division FF, Title III).
Predetermined Change Control Plans (PCCPs).  Pursuant to the authority granted in FDORA, the FFDCA authorizes the use of PCCPs in certain premarket submissions for devices where relevant, including AI-enabled devices. A PCCP allows manufacturers to not have to submit a new premarket submission for certain planned changes to a device postmarket. For example, changes to an approved device (with a PMA) generally require a PMA supplement. However, a supplement is not required for a change to an approved device that is consistent with a PCCP if the device remains safe and effective. A PCCP includes labeling or certain notification requirements for changes, as well as performance requirements for changes under the plan. In August 2025, FDA published final guidance outlining nonbinding recommendations for information to include in a PCCP as part of certain premarket submissions specifically for AI-enabled devices. 
Cybersecurity requirements. Cybersecurity concerns will be relevant for many AI-enabled devices. Traditionally, FDA addressed device cybersecurity through its existing authorities (i.e., Quality Management System Regulation, 21 C.F.R. Part 820) and guidance on both premarket and postmarket device cybersecurity. In 2022, Congress established requirements for premarket submissions for cyber devices (Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023; P.L. 117-328). Many AI-enabled devices will meet the definition of cyber device, which is defined as a device that “(1) includes software validated, installed, or authorized by the sponsor as a device or in a device, (2) has the ability to connect to the internet, and (3) contains ... technological characteristics validated, installed, or authorized ... that could be vulnerable to the cybersecurity threats.” Device sponsors must, among other things, “design, develop, and maintain processes and procedures to provide a reasonable assurance that the device and related systems are cybersecure” and include in their premarket submissions “a plan to monitor, identify, and address ... in a reasonable time, postmarket cybersecurity vulnerabilities” (FFDCA §524B). In February 2026, FDA issued final guidance on device cybersecurity generally that in part addresses these statutory requirements for cyber devices.
Current Issues 
AI-enabled devices represent a rapidly advancing and relatively novel class of products with a wide range of intended uses, software functionalities, and risks to users, posing unique challenges for the oversight of such devices. Currently, as noted, these products are regulated as medical devices under the FFDCA. Most recently, FDA has adopted a somewhat deregulatory approach in certain cases through, for example, updates to its general wellness product and CDS software guidance documents. There is debate about how regulation or oversight should proceed, however, and uncertainty around regulation of AI, and especially genAI, devices may affect consumer confidence and developer innovation. Some stakeholders are calling for additional regulatory authorities, while others maintain that current authorities are adequate. In addition, there is discussion around specific considerations for regulation of genAI devices. 
Some stakeholders maintain that the current device regulatory authorities are not a good fit for AI-enabled devices, and that new authorities may be needed. A 2024 GAO report recommended that FDA broadly “identify and document the specific changes to its statutory authorities that would enable FDA to take the actions it determines best to oversee AI/ML-enabled devices, and then communicate these potential legislative changes to Congress.” 
Others have called specifically for new approaches to monitoring the postmarket performance of AI devices. Congress required FDA to, within 90 days of passage of the FY2026 appropriations for the agency, “conduct an assessment of its existing authorities and provide to Congress a report that identifies, if any, changes to its statutory authorities necessary for the FDA to conduct oversight of post-deployment performance and patient safety monitoring” of AI/ML-enabled devices. In September 2025, FDA published a request for public comment (comments were due December 2025) requesting information “on best practices, methodologies, and approaches for measuring and evaluating real-world performance of AI-enabled medical devices.” 
Still others maintain that no new authorities are needed at this time. The existing device authorities have options for flexibility; for example, a mechanism exists to request exemption of Class II device types from the premarket notification requirement, a flexibility that had been under consideration for application to several types of AI radiology devices. 
GenAI devices raise unique regulatory issues, highlighted by devices with chatbot interfaces. They may perform differently across environments, generate false content (“hallucinate”), or be developed using opaque datasets. Some have suggested an entirely new framework may be needed for genAI devices, for example, regulating them as a form of intelligence more akin to a health care provider rather than a device, or that agencies in addition to FDA should have a role in their oversight. ",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13245/IF13245.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13245.html
R48979,DHS Budget Request Analysis: FY2027,2026-06-09T04:00:00Z,2026-06-13T05:38:04Z,Active,Reports,William L. Painter,,"On April 3, 2026, President Donald Trump’s Administration released its budget request for FY2027, including $118.39 billion in total budget authority for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
DHS is the third largest agency in the federal government in terms of civilian personnel. Its appropriations bill is the only one of the twelve annual measures that funds a single agency exclusively and in its entirety.
The FY2027 budget request was the second budget proposal delivered by the second Trump Administration. It was released 27 days before the enactment of the DHS Appropriations Act, 2026, which was Division A of P.L. 119-86. Many of the proposals in the FY2026 budget request are reiterated in the FY2027 budget request, as the Administration considered those issues unresolved (FY2026 appropriations for DHS were finalized after the delivery of the budget).
This report provides an overview of the FY2027 annual budget request for DHS. It provides a component-level analysis of the appropriations requested for FY2027, and puts the requested appropriations in context with the FY2025 and FY2026 enacted and FY2026 requested appropriations, to the extent possible.
The FY2027 budget request for DHS includes $99.39 billion in gross discretionary budget authority, up $1.45 billion from the budget request for FY2026. When the $28.38 billion in funding requested for the costs of major disasters (which receives special budgetary treatment) is set aside, the remainder of the discretionary request is $0.46 billion below the FY2026 budget request. The $28.38 billion request represents the largest amount of annual appropriations ever requested for the Disaster Relief Fund.
Some of the other major drivers of change from the FY2026 request included
a 5,364-position staffing reduction for the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the budget for which was further offset by a legislative proposal to provide TSA an additional $1.68 billion in budget authority by providing it the full resources of the Aviation Security Passenger Fee (previous similar proposals similar by this and previous administrations have been unsuccessful);
a $766 million reduction in requested funding for U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), due to the use of FY2025 reconciliation funding to pay for ICE’s detention and transportation and removal costs;
a proposed reorganization of DHS headquarters elements, merging the DHS Management Directorate and Intelligence, Analysis and Situational Awareness functions into the Office of the Secretary and Executive Management; and
a $1.46 billion increase for U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) Operations and Support, including $558 million to cover annualization of pay and benefits from prior year initiatives and a 5% to 7% pay increase for USCG military personnel in FY2027. There is no pay increase proposed in FY2027 for DHS civilian personnel. 
The FY2027 budget request only presents a portion of the resources available to DHS. The FY2025 reconciliation measure, P.L. 119-21, provided $191.02 billion in mandatory appropriations, almost all of which was made available through FY2029. This funding was provided for a range of purposes to seven DHS components. While public information on the specific spending plans for those resources has been limited, this report uses the FY2027 request documentation and public reporting of obligations to identify what resources have been used by DHS and what resources remain available to it.
Information on the appropriations committees’ responses to the Administration’s budget request is to be made available in future products.

 ",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48979/R48979.4.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48979.html
R48978,Russian Military Activities in Asia: Combined Military Exercises and Patrols,2026-06-09T04:00:00Z,2026-06-13T05:38:19Z,Active,Reports,Andrew S. Bowen,"East Asia & Pacific, National & Military Intelligence, Europe, Russia & Eurasia","Historically, Russia has claimed a role as a major actor in the Asia-Pacific region. In 2012, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced a policy by which Russia would seek to emphasize and further develop economic and trade opportunities with Asia, in particular with the People’s Republic of China (PRC, or China). Although Russia’s military focus has been drawn westward since its initial 2014 invasion of Ukraine and has further accelerated since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russia has pursued military activities aimed at asserting influence in the Asia-Pacific region. 
With most of its ground forces committed to fighting in Ukraine, Russia has maintained a naval and strategic air presence in the Asia-Pacific region. Russia’s Pacific Fleet, headquartered in Vladivostok and part of Russia’s sea-based nuclear deterrent force, is Russia’s primary military force in the region and primary tool for power projection. Russia uses the presence of its Pacific Fleet and strategic bomber force to signal its strength to other powers in the region, including the United States. 
Combined Russia and PRC military exercises and patrols are key components of Russia’s signaling strategy. Since 2014, Russia and the PRC have conducted increased numbers of bilateral and multilateral military exercises and combined naval and air patrols, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region. These activities also are increasingly conducted near contested areas (such as near Taiwan) or close to the United States, such as off the coast of Alaska. These exercises and patrols have become more complex, involving greater coordination and communication as well as more high-end military equipment and sensitive activities. Despite this cooperation, the Russian and PRC militaries are not interoperable; based on open-source information, it is not clear whether the two governments seek such a high level of military integration.
U.S. officials and some Members of Congress have expressed concerns about Russia’s military activities in the Asia-Pacific region and Russia’s military relationship with the PRC. Members of the 119th Congress may continue to assess the implications of increased Russian military activities and Russia-PRC military cooperation for U.S. interests and consider whether to pursue legislative or other options to address potential concerns. Some in Congress also may seek to shape or monitor U.S. responses through oversight of executive branch policies, reporting requirements, or other measures.
",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48978/R48978.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48978.html
R48977,Russian Military Activities in Asia: Combined Military Exercises and Patrols,2026-06-09T04:00:00Z,2026-06-11T08:07:53Z,Active,Reports,Andrew S. Bowen,,"Historically, Russia has claimed a role as a major actor in the Asia-Pacific region. In 2012, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced a policy by which Russia would seek to emphasize and further develop economic and trade opportunities with Asia, in particular with the People’s Republic of China (PRC, or China). Although Russia’s military focus has been drawn westward since its initial 2014 invasion of Ukraine and has further accelerated since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russia has pursued military activities aimed at asserting influence in the Asia-Pacific region. 
With most of its ground forces committed to fighting in Ukraine, Russia has maintained a naval and strategic air presence in the Asia-Pacific region. Russia’s Pacific Fleet, headquartered in Vladivostok and part of Russia’s sea-based nuclear deterrent force, is Russia’s primary military force in the region and primary tool for power projection. Russia uses the presence of its Pacific Fleet and strategic bomber force to signal its strength to other powers in the region, including the United States. 
Combined Russia and PRC military exercises and patrols are a key component of Russia’s signaling strategy. Since 2014, Russia and the PRC have conducted increased numbers of bilateral and multilateral military exercises and combined naval and air patrols, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region. These activities also are increasingly conducted near contested areas (such as near Taiwan) or close to the United States, such as off the coast of Alaska. These exercises and patrols have become more complex, involving greater coordination and communication as well as more high-end military equipment and sensitive activities. Despite this cooperation, the Russian and PRC militaries are not interoperable; based on open-source information, it is not clear whether the two governments seek such a high level of military integration.
U.S. officials and some Members of Congress have expressed concerns about Russia’s military activities in the Asia-Pacific region and Russia’s military relationship with the PRC. Members of the 119th Congress may continue to assess the implications of increased Russian military activities and Russia-PRC military cooperation for U.S. interests and consider whether or not to pursue legislative or other options to address potential concerns. Some in Congress also may seek to shape or monitor U.S. responses through oversight of executive branch policies, reporting requirements, or other measures.
",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48977/R48977.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48977.html
R48976,Connecting Constituent Organizations to Behavioral Health Funding,2026-06-09T04:00:00Z,2026-06-11T13:53:04Z,Active,Reports,Ada S. Cornell,"Substance Use Disorders, Behavioral & Mental Health Services, Health Care Delivery, Constituent Services","This report provides information and resources to assist congressional offices with responding to constituent questions about federal funding for local organizations that provide behavioral health services. Constituent organizations supporting behavioral health (i.e., mental health and substance use) activities may include local governments or nonprofit programs that support mental health, substance use prevention, or substance use disorder treatment, including the prevention of drug overdose. 
This report provides information on selected federal programs within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) that may be relevant to such organizations. Assistance may be provided through block and formula grants, competitive grants, and cooperative agreements. The grants in this report vary by size and scope: Some grants are specific to behavioral health, and some are more general. 
",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48976/R48976.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48976.html
LSB11438,Mandatory Detention During Removal Proceedings: Circuit Split,2026-06-09T04:00:00Z,2026-06-10T12:23:04Z,Active,Posts,Hillel R. Smith,"Immigrant Removal, Immigration Judges, Immigration Law, Unauthorized Foreign Nationals, Immigrant Detention, Immigration Enforcement & Removal","The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) may arrest and detain aliens for immigration status violations that render them removable. While the agency generally has discretion to release aliens from custody during the pendency of their removal proceedings, some categories of aliens must be detained. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), if an immigration officer determines that an individual is an “applicant for admission” who is “seeking admission” into the United States and is “not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted,” the alien “shall be detained” during the removal proceedings. Federal statute expressly states that aliens who are either arriving in the United States or present in the country without lawful admission shall be treated as “applicants for admission,” but federal law does not define “seeking admission.”
In 2025, it was reported that the Trump Administration issued interim guidance determining that unlawfully present aliens found in the United States—including some who may have been present in the country for several years—are subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A). This interpretation has resulted in numerous legal challenges by aliens present in the United States without having been admitted, who have been detained and, as a result of the interim guidance, are no longer eligible for a custody determination or release during their removal proceedings before an immigration judge. They argue that they are not subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) because they were not actively “seeking admission” into the United States. In the ensuing litigation, there has been a growing circuit split in the federal courts of appeals over whether § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies strictly to aliens actively seeking legal admission at the border or whether it also covers aliens present anywhere in the United States who have not been lawfully admitted.
Statutory Background
The current statutory framework governing the detention of aliens placed in removal proceedings was established by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA). Generally, under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), DHS has the discretion to detain an alien pending the outcome of removal proceedings or it may release the alien on bond or the alien’s own recognizance subject to specified conditions (“conditional parole”). In this circumstance, if the agency determines that the alien will remain detained, the alien may request review of the custody determination at a bond hearing before an immigration judge. 
Some categories of aliens generally must be detained during their proceedings with no opportunity for a bond hearing. These include at least some “applicants for admission” whom the government seeks to remove. The phrase “applicants for admission” is defined at 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1) to cover “[a]n alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival and including an alien who is brought to the United States after having been interdicted in international or United States waters).” Under § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV), an “applicant for admission” who is subject to an expedited removal process before an immigration officer generally must be detained pending a final determination of removability. A separate provision addresses detention of applicants for admission who are not placed in expedited removal. Under § 1225(b)(2)(A), if the examining immigration officer determines that “an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained” (emphasis added) and placed in removal proceedings before an immigration judge under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a.
Although applicants for admission must be detained during the expedited removal process or during the duration of removal proceedings, § 1182(d)(5)(A) provides that, except in certain cases, the Secretary of DHS “may . . . in his discretion parole into the United States temporarily under such conditions as he may prescribe only on a case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit any alien applying for admission to the United States” (emphasis added). In Jennings v. Rodriguez, the Supreme Court construed §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2)(A) as “mandat[ing] detention of applicants for admission until certain proceedings have concluded,” and the Court explained that the “express exception” for parole “implies that there are no other circumstances under which aliens detained under § 1225(b) may be released.” 
DHS’s Detention Policy and Administrative Guidance
DHS and its predecessor agency, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, historically took the position that “aliens who are present without having been admitted or paroled (formerly referred to as aliens who entered without inspection)” (emphasis added) were detained under the discretionary detention authority of § 1226(a) and were eligible for bond and bond redetermination during their detention. On the other hand, under the agencies’ long-standing practice, “any arriving alien who appears to the inspecting officer to be inadmissible, and who is placed in removal proceedings . . . shall be detained in accordance with [§ 1225(b)]” without bond hearings. 
Reportedly, on July 8, 2025, DHS’s Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) issued interim guidance interpreting § 1225(b)(2)(A) to cover arriving aliens and aliens present in the United States without having been admitted. The ICE interim guidance has been described as explaining that, because both categories of aliens are considered to be “applicants for admission” under § 1225(a)(1), both categories are subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b) “and may not be released from ICE custody except [under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)] parole.” The guidance specifies that “[f]or custody purposes, these aliens [i.e., aliens present in the United States who have not been admitted] are now treated in the same manner that arriving aliens’ have historically been treated.” Under the guidance, only aliens who are considered to have been admitted into the United States and who are then charged with being deportable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227 and placed in removal proceedings are eligible for bond hearings under § 1226(a). The guidance is reportedly applicable unless the described alien is subject to mandatory detention under § 1226(c), a separate provision that requires the detention during removal proceedings of aliens who commit certain crimes or terrorist offenses. (Although the ICE interim guidance does not appear as of the date of this Sidebar to have been made publicly available on the agency’s website, DHS’s Customs and Border Protection issued similar guidance on July 10, 2025, and July 15, 2025, interpreting § 1225(b)(2)(A) to cover arriving aliens and aliens present without admission.)
On September 5, 2025, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), the highest administrative body responsible for interpreting federal immigration laws, issued a precedential decision in Matter of Yajure Hurtado. In that case, a Venezuelan national who unlawfully entered the United States without inspection in November 2022 (and whose temporary protected status expired on April 2, 2025) was apprehended by immigration officials on April 8, 2025, and detained. He requested a bond hearing before an immigration judge, and the judge determined that he lacked authority under the statute to conduct a bond hearing. The alien challenged the immigration judge’s determination, and the BIA ruled that the immigration judge lacked jurisdiction because aliens present in the United States without having been admitted or inspected and who have been residing in the United States are considered “applicants for admission” subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A). The alien conceded that he was an “applicant for admission” for purposes of federal statute, but claimed that, because he had been residing in the United States for nearly three years, he could not be considered as “seeking admission” as the phrase is used in § 1225(b)(2)(A). The BIA rejected the alien’s contention that he could not be considered to be “seeking admission,” determining that this argument was “not supported by the plain language” of the statute. The BIA also determined that Congress, in enacting IIRIRA, had intended that aliens who entered without inspection would be treated in a similar manner as aliens initially arriving at U.S. ports of entry and that both classes of aliens would be ineligible for bond hearings. In short, the BIA held, the statutory text is “clear and explicit in requiring mandatory detention of all aliens who are applicants for admission, without regard to how many years the alien has been residing in the United States without lawful status.” 
Federal Court Litigation and Circuit Split
DHS’s interpretation of § 1225(b)(2)(A) as covering aliens present in the United States without admission, and the BIA’s decision upholding that interpretation, has resulted in numerous legal challenges by detained aliens who were denied bond hearings during their removal proceedings before an immigration judge, including some who were in the United States for many years. During the litigation, the government has argued, among other things, that aliens present without admission are covered by § 1225(b)(2)(A) because, based on the ordinary meaning of that provision, every “applicant for admission” is necessarily “seeking admission,” and that Congress, in enacting IIRIRA, had sought to prevent unlawful entrants from obtaining benefits, including bond determinations, that were unavailable to arriving aliens. 
Federal courts have split on this issue, with the majority rejecting the government’s interpretation of § 1225(b)(2)(A) and holding that its detention mandate applies only to aliens seeking lawful admission into the United States. In particular, the Second, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that the provision applies only to aliens who are seeking to enter the United States. On the other hand, the Fifth and Eighth Circuits have sided with the government and interpreted the statute more broadly to also cover those who are present without admission. The Seventh Circuit, in litigation over a consent decree concerning the release of hundreds of persons in immigration detention, fractured on the permissibility of the government’s interpretation.
The Second Circuit reasoned that the plain text of § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to a person who is both an “applicant for admission” and “seeking admission.” The court interpreted the phrase “seeking admission” to mean that a person is “presently pursuing lawful entry into the United States.” According to the court, the statute’s reach is thus limited to those who arrive at ports of entry or are encountered at the border shortly after entry. The court also concluded that, based on the statutory context, structure, and history, Congress intended § 1225(b)(2)(A) to apply only to aliens seeking lawful entry. Further, the court remarked that, even if this provision was ambiguous, “the fact that the Executive Branch has for nearly three decades acted inconsistently with the newfound interpretation strongly counsels against adopting it.” Alternatively, the court held that rejecting the government’s broad interpretation of the statute was warranted to avoid “the grave constitutional concerns” it raised by subjecting aliens present in the United States to “categorical detention without bond” in violation of their right to due process. 
The Eleventh Circuit, in a divided decision, also addressed the meaning of § 1225(b)(2)(A). The court explained that, although an alien present without admission is an “applicant for admission” under § 1225(a)(1), the alien’s detention is justified under § 1225(b)(2)(A) only if the alien is also “seeking admission.” The court defined ”seeking admission” as “the pursuit of lawful entry . . . after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” The court determined that its interpretation of § 1225(b)(2)(A) was reinforced by “the broader statutory scheme,” the provision’s legislative history, and “nearly thirty years of unbroken executive practice” that allowed aliens present without admission to seek bond.
Examining the statutory text of § 1225(b)(2)(A) and other provisions, a divided Sixth Circuit panel likewise construed the “seeking admission” phrase to mean that the alien “must actively be in search of lawful entry into the United States via inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” The court also determined that the government’s “previously unbroken 29-year streak” of applying the discretionary detention provisions of § 1226(a) to aliens present without admission informed the court’s conclusion that § 1225(b)(2)(A) applied strictly to aliens seeking entry. Additionally, the Sixth Circuit upheld lower courts’ rulings that mandating detention without bond hearings of this category of aliens who are already residing in the United States violates their constitutional right to due process.
In contrast, the Fifth Circuit, in a split decision, held that § 1225(b)(2)(A) mandates the detention of aliens present without admission. The court rejected the claim that the phrase “seeking admission” refers only to those pursuing lawful entry. The court explained that there is no distinction between “applying for” and “seeking” something, reasoning that “[j]ust as an applicant to a college seeks admission, an applicant for admission to the United States is seeking admission’ to the same, regardless whether the person actively engages in further affirmative acts to gain admission.” The court observed that other § 1225 provisions use the phrases “applicant for admission” and “seeking admission” synonymously. As for the government’s past detention policy, the court stated that “[y]ears of consistent practice cannot vindicate an interpretation that is inconsistent with a statute’s plain text.” The court also determined that the government’s newer interpretation of § 1225(b)(2)(A) is consistent with Congress’s intent to “put aliens seeking admission lawfully on equal footing with those who entered without inspection.”
The Eighth Circuit, in a split decision, similarly rejected the claim that “seeking admission” under § 1225(b)(2)(A) requires an “affirmative action” to obtain admission. The court agreed with the Fifth Circuit “that the ordinary meanings of the phrases applicant for admission’ and seeking admission’ are the same” and that there is no indication in § 1225(b)(2)(A) or other provisions that “seeking admission” has a separate meaning. In the court’s view, interpreting § 1225(b)(2)(A) to cover unadmitted aliens in the United States is compatible with Congress’s goal of placing all unadmitted aliens on an “equal footing” during removal proceedings. Like the Fifth Circuit, the court determined that the government’s previous interpretation of the statute did not require construing it in a manner that contradicts its plain meaning.
Lastly, in another case, the Seventh Circuit considered, among other things, a district court’s order requiring the release of certain unlawfully present aliens who were found to have been arrested in violation of a consent decree. In a fractured 2-1 decision, two judges rejected the government’s claim that a federal statute limiting courts’ authority to restrain the government’s ability to engage in certain immigration enforcement actions barred the lower court from issuing the release order because it restrained the government’s ability to detain aliens under § 1225(b)(2)(A). One judge determined that the government had waived this argument at the time it entered the consent decree. In the alternative, the judge rejected the government’s argument that aliens present without admission are subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A), interpreting that provision as covering only those “who are seeking lawful entry at the border or ports of entry.” The other judge, in a concurring opinion, expressly declined to consider the interpretation of § 1225(b)(2)(A), reasoning that the government had “intentionally relinquished” this argument by agreeing to the consent decree. 
Considerations for Congress
The extent to which aliens present in the United States without having been admitted are subject to mandatory detention and not entitled to a bond hearing during their removal proceedings under § 1225(b)(2)(A) continues to be litigated in the federal courts. The circuit split over the scope of the statute’s detention mandate has led some to speculate that the Supreme Court may eventually decide this question. In Jennings v. Rodriguez, the Supreme Court in 2018 held that detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) is mandatory “until certain proceedings have concluded,” and that covered aliens may be released only under DHS’s parole authority. The Court did not decide whether § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies strictly to aliens seeking entry into the United States or whether it also covers those who are present without admission, which was a separate issue that was not before the Court. 
The Jennings Court started its analysis by stating that the process the federal government utilizes to determine who may enter the country and who may stay “generally begins at the Nation’s borders and ports of entry, where the Government must determine whether an alien seeking to enter the country is admissible.” The Court stated that under § 1225, “an alien who arrives in the United States,’ or is present’ in this country but has not been admitted,’ is treated as an applicant for admission.’” The Court determined that § 1225(b)(2) “serves as a catchall provision that applies to all applicants for admission not covered by § 1225(b)(1).” The Court continued examining the statute and explained that individuals detained under § 1225(b)(2) must be detained for removal proceedings “if an immigration officer determines that [they are] not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted’ into the country.” The Court further explained that § 1226(a) governs the detention of “certain aliens already in the country.”
In the recent litigation, the Second and Eleventh Circuits interpreted the Supreme Court’s statements as one reason, among others, to conclude that § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies only to those who are seeking entry. Conversely, the Fifth and Eighth Circuits have viewed these statements as merely a general explanation of the statutory framework that did not address the difference between §§ 1225(b)(2)(A) and 1226(a), or preclude the possibility that § 1225(b)(2)(A) could still apply to aliens who are in the United States.
In the ongoing litigation, courts have also looked to recent legislation for guidance. In 2025, Congress passed the Laken Riley Act (LRA), which amended § 1226(c) to require the detention during removal proceedings of aliens who entered unlawfully if they have committed certain crimes. In considering the statutory context, the Second and Eleventh Circuits decided, among other things, that interpreting § 1225(b)(2)(A) to cover aliens present in the United States without admission would make § 1226(c), as amended by the LRA, superfluous because aliens who unlawfully enter would already be subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A). According to the Fifth and Eighth Circuits, the government’s interpretation of § 1225(b)(2)(A) does not result in any redundancy despite the overlap in covered populations because § 1226(c) covers certain aliens who were previously admitted in addition to certain aliens who were not admitted; it makes detained aliens ineligible for parole, which they could otherwise potentially receive under § 1225(b)(2)(A) detention; and the LRA was enacted at a time when DHS was still detaining most aliens present without admission under § 1226(a) instead.
Given the uncertainty about which categories of aliens are covered by § 1225(b)(2)(A), Congress may seek to clarify the scope and meaning of that statute. For example, Congress could specify whether the statute’s detention requirement applies only to aliens seeking to lawfully enter the United States or whether it also applies to unadmitted aliens apprehended anywhere in the United States. In the alternative, Congress could consider whether or under what circumstances aliens in removal proceedings may be detained without bond hearings generally. For example, in the 119th Congress, the Dignity for Detained Immigrants Act (H.R. 6397, S. 3702) would, among other things, amend § 1225(b)(2)(A) by striking the language mandating the detention of applicants for admission during their removal proceedings, and, more generally, it would require prompt custody determinations and bond hearings for any alien detained by DHS. Another introduced bill (H.R. 7190) would remove DHS’s detention authority entirely, including under § 1225(b)(2)(A). In contrast, the Detention Authority Clarification Act (S. 4593) would clarify that aliens present in the United States without admission are subject to mandatory detention.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB11438/LSB11438.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/HTML/LSB11438.html
IF13246,The U.S.-South Korea Alliance: Issues for Congress,2026-06-09T04:00:00Z,2026-06-12T10:23:30Z,Active,Resources,Daniel J. Longo,,"Overview
The U.S.-South Korea (Republic of Korea, or ROK) alliance dates to the 1950-1953 Korean War, during which more than 36,000 Americans died in-theater helping South Korea repel an invasion by North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or DPRK) intended to reunify the country under communist rule. An Armistice Agreement was signed in 1953, the same year the United States and South Korea signed the U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty, which commits the United States to defend South Korea, particularly from North Korea. The U.S. military has maintained a presence in South Korea since. More than 28,500 U.S. troops are based in the ROK, predominately U.S. Army personnel. Most U.S. troops are stationed at Camp Humphreys, the largest U.S. overseas military base in terms of land (Figure 1). 
Amid evolving threats by the People’s Republic of China (PRC, or China), Russia, and North Korea, the United States and the ROK appear ready for the ROK to take a more active role in the alliance and to broaden the alliance’s mission. Through legislation, oversight, and other tools, Congress may direct and influence the executive branch’s efforts to modernize the alliance, including on strategic flexibility, wartime operational control, burden sharing, extended deterrence, and defense industrial cooperation.
Figure 1. U.S. Military Facilities in South Korea
/
Source: Created by CRS using data from the U.S. Department of Defense and U.S. Marine Corps.
“Strategic Flexibility” of USFK
Over the decades, U.S. officials have wrestled with whether and to what extent the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) should address broader regional threats. In a 2006 joint statement, the U.S. and ROK “confirmed their understanding” that the ROK “respects the necessity for strategic flexibility of the U.S. forces in the ROK.” 
“Strategic flexibility” has garnered renewed attention as the second Trump Administration has indicated it will modernize the U.S.-ROK alliance to deter not only North Korea but also China, with the ROK leading in the defense of the Peninsula. In 2025, the allies committed to “enhance U.S. conventional deterrence posture against all regional threats to the Alliance, including the DPRK.” Some observers say the Trump Administration appears to be positioning U.S. military assets for potential use in a China-Taiwan contingency. For example, the U.S. Air Force deployed MQ-9 Reaper drones at Kunsan Air Base in 2025. 
Current ROK President Lee Jae Myung’s efforts to improve ROK-PRC relations may affect South Korea’s approach to “strategic flexibility.” Some experts say the Lee administration appears reluctant to more forcefully support U.S. “strategic flexibility” because doing so may signal weaker deterrence vis-à-vis North Korea.
Wartime Operational Control (OPCON)
The United States and South Korea plan to transfer wartime operational control (OPCON) of the U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command (CFC) to an ROK commander with a U.S. deputy, reflecting the ROK’s military advancements since the Korean War. (Operational control, or OPCON, refers to the legal authority to direct and control military forces in the execution of missions or wartime operations.) No date has been set for the transfer. If wartime OPCON is transferred, an ROK commander would lead the CFC, answering to U.S. and ROK civilian authorities; neither side would relinquish command over its own troops. The OPCON transfer, announced in 2006, has been twice delayed, and now is on a “conditions-based” timeline. Many South Koreans view the transfer as a key tenet of ROK sovereignty. The Lee administration reportedly has proposed to complete the transition by 2030, when Lee’s term ends. In April 2026 congressional testimony, USFK Commander Xavier Brunson said a roadmap has been developed to achieve the transfer by the second quarter of FY2029.
Defense Cost Sharing
Since 1991, South Korea has offset the cost of stationing U.S. forces on the Peninsula via “Special Measures Agreements” (SMAs). U.S.-ROK SMAs since the late-2000s generally have lasted five years. ROK payments—a combination of in-kind and cash contributions—fall into three categories: labor (salaries for South Koreans who work on U.S. bases); logistics; and construction (by ROK firms for U.S. facilities). A 2021 analysis from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that South Korea provided $3.3 billion cumulatively in cash and in-kind support between 2016 and 2019.
Although U.S.-ROK cost-sharing talks historically have been contentious, they became particularly divisive during the first Trump Administration, which reportedly asked South Korea to increase its contribution by roughly 400%. Amid the impasse, the previous SMA expired in December 2019, leading to the furlough of about 4,500 Koreans who worked on U.S. bases. After President Biden’s January 2021 inauguration, the two sides concluded a new, five-year SMA. Under that 11th SMA, South Korea agreed to pay $1 billion in 2021, a 13.9% increase from the 2019 SMA. 
In a break from previous patterns, in November 2024, the allies concluded their 12th SMA, more than a year before the 11th SMA was set to expire in December 2025. This 12th SMA covers the years 2026-2030 and increases South Korea’s 2025 contribution by 8.3%, to roughly $1.19 billion in 2026. Under the SMA, subsequent annual increases are tied to South Korea’s inflation rate and “shall not exceed” 5%. Like its immediate predecessor, the 12th SMA includes a mechanism for ROK workers on U.S. bases to be paid for up to a year after the agreement expires, upon written request by the United States. The mechanism is designed to minimize the risk of South Korean base workers being furloughed as they were in 2020.
Extended Deterrence
Since the early 2000s, multiple North Korean nuclear weapon and missile tests have sharpened North Korea’s threat to South Korea. In a sign of South Koreans’ heightened sense of vulnerability, some South Koreans have questioned the reliability of U.S. security guarantees, and some have advocated that the United States redeploy tactical nuclear weapons to the country (the United States withdrew nuclear weapons from South Korea in 1991). Some public opinion polls suggest that a majority of South Koreans support developing a domestic nuclear weapons capability. President Lee has called a nuclear buildup in South Korea “a senseless move.”
In an apparent bid to reassure South Koreans skeptical of U.S. extended deterrence—the ability and commitment to deter nuclear threats against allies, sometimes referred to as the “nuclear umbrella”—the two governments issued the “Washington Declaration” during then-ROK President Yoon’s April 2023 State Visit to the White House. The declaration articulated a pledge to enhance bilateral planning, exercises, and other consultations related to nuclear deterrence. It also established a Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG), which met for the first time in June 2023. The NCG is intended to align and advance efforts to bolster deterrence against DPRK nuclear threats, with an emphasis on joint planning for ROK conventional support to U.S. nuclear operations and on enhancing the visibility of U.S. “strategic asset deployments” to the Peninsula. Many in Congress and the second Trump Administration have offered statements of reassurance about U.S. extended deterrence commitments to the ROK. 
South Korea’s Defense Industry
In 2025, South Korea had the world’s 13th-largest military budget, spending roughly $47.8 billion or 2.6% of its gross domestic product (GDP). President Lee has committed to boost ROK defense spending to 3.5% of GDP. South Korea has a mature and sophisticated defense industry and was the world’s 9th-largest supplier of major arms from 2021 to 2025, accounting for 3.0% of global arms exports.
South Korea is a major purchaser of U.S. defense articles and services through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) programs. As of 2025, the United States had over $30 billion in active government-to-government sales cases with South Korea under the FMS System. Recent FMS sales to South Korea notified to Congress include the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, Patriot Advanced Capability-3 missile systems, Global Hawk Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, and Aegis Combat Systems. In November 2025, South Korea pledged to purchase $25 billion worth of U.S. military equipment by 2030.
South Korea’s Potential Acquisition of Nuclear-Powered Submarines
Since the mid-1990s, South Korean officials have expressed interest in acquiring nuclear-powered attack submarines in response to North Korean technological advancements. At an October 2025 summit with Lee, President Trump announced U.S. support for South Korea to acquire nuclear-powered submarines. A White House joint fact sheet states, “The United States will work closely with the ROK to advance requirements for this shipbuilding project, including avenues to source fuel.” One top U.S. Navy admiral reportedly said it is a “natural expectation” that South Korea would utilize the submarines to counter China. ROK and U.S. officials initiated consultations in June 2026 in Seoul and have not yet finalized details of the acquisition. South Korea’s cooperation with the United States on nuclear-powered submarines may require a new agreement under the Atomic Energy Act, which would be subject to congressional review.
Congress’s Role in the Alliance
Congress has largely supported the alliance and has acted to constrain the executive branch’s ability to make major changes to U.S. force structure and operational leadership on the Korean Peninsula. Section 1268 of the FY2026 NDAA (P.L. 119-60) prohibits the use of funds to reduce U.S. forces deployed to South Korea below 28,500 until 60 days after the Secretary of Defense, who is using “Secretary of War” as a “secondary title” under Executive Order 14347 dated September 5, 2025: (1) certifies to Congress that such a reduction serves U.S. national security interests and that South Korea and Japan were consulted, and (2) submits a report to appropriate congressional committees analyzing the impact that such a reduction may have on U.S., ROK, and Japanese national security, the interoperability of U.S. and ROK armed forces, and other considerations. Section 1268 of the FY2026 NDAA further prohibits the use of funds to complete the transition of wartime OPCON “in a manner which deviates from a bilaterally agreed plan to effectuate such a transition” until 60 days after the Secretary of Defense, among other things, certifies to Congress that the transition is in the national security interest of the United States. A marked-up House committee version of an FY2027 NDAA (H.R. 8800) would extend the Korean Peninsula-related provisions set forth in Section 1268 of the FY2026 NDAA.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13246/IF13246.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13246.html
R48974,Researching Critical Minerals: Selected Resources,2026-06-08T04:00:00Z,2026-06-10T16:38:09Z,Active,Reports,"Michael P. Jourdan, Emily N. Peterson","Energy Policy, Natural Resources Policy, Natural Resources Trade & Economics, Critical Minerals, Rare Earth Elements (REEs)","The demand for critical minerals and rare earth elements is increasing due to their applications in various advanced and emerging technologies, including batteries, semiconductors, medical equipment, solar and wind energy systems, and certain military equipment. The increasing demand has led to supply chain challenges in the United States that may impact the economy and national security.
Congress has considered legislation to address a wide array of issues concerning critical minerals—including mining, trade, recycling, and research and development—and may continue to engage in critical minerals policymaking.
To help provide context to Members of Congress and their staffs when considering legislative proposals, this report compiles a selection of resources providing information on a wide array of issues concerning critical minerals. Selected resources include CRS products, a Congress.gov legislation search, an executive orders search, and various products and data sources from U.S. government agencies and organizations outside of the U.S. government.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48974/R48974.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48974.html
R48973,Vegetation Management for Wildfire Mitigation Along Electric Power Line Rights-of-Way on Federal Lands,2026-06-08T04:00:00Z,2026-06-10T15:23:01Z,Active,Reports,Alicyn R. Gitlin,,"Congress has shown interest in protecting lives and property from catastrophic wildfires and in protecting electric grid reliability. Electric power line rights-of-way (hereinafter, power line ROWs) often cross multiple land jurisdictions, which may include one or more parcels of federal land. Power line owners and operators (hereinafter, operators) are responsible for clearing vegetation (e.g., trees), both to prevent wildfire ignitions and to protect power line facilities from wildfires on the surrounding landscape. Operators do this by various means, including removing, cutting, or replacing vegetation.
Four federal land management agencies (FLMAs) administer the vast majority of federal lands in the United States: the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), National Park Service (NPS), and U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) within the U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI), and the Forest Service (FS) within the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). Each has its own management mission and purposes. The majority of power line facilities on federal lands are on lands managed by BLM or the FS, which adhere to the same statutes regarding vegetation management along power line ROWs (43 U.S.C. §1772), though each has its own regulations and policies. Vegetation management along power line ROWs on NPS and FWS lands is generally guided by each agency’s regulations and policies. Power line ROWs also cross lands under the jurisdiction of other federal departments or agencies and are managed according to their unique missions and policies.
Operators whose power lines affect the bulk-power system, defined as those “facilities and control systems necessary for operating an interconnected electric energy transmission network (or any portion thereof)” and the electric energy “needed to maintain transmission system reliability” also must adhere to mandatory and enforceable reliability standards (16 U.S.C. §824o). The reliability standards are developed and enforced by the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), a designated not-for-profit organization that is certified by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), the government agency that oversees the bulk-power system. Operators of power lines that affect the bulk-power system and are located on federal land must comply with both the reliability standards and the requirements of the FLMA that manages the underlying land.
The relevant FLMAs must approve operators’ vegetation management plans (which may be part of more comprehensive facility operation and maintenance plans) and the implementation of activities within those plans. Statute directs the Secretary of the Interior (for BLM lands) and the Secretary of Agriculture (for FS lands) to create processes for reviewing and approving these plans and the activities within them, and guides the contents of these plans. Vegetation management typically involves a recurring cycle of inspection and maintenance. Vegetation management is commonly split into emergency and routine (i.e., nonemergency) activities, which generally have different processes for notifying and receiving approval from the relevant FLMA. Emergency activities address vegetation that presents an imminent threat of disrupting electric service or creating a fire or safety hazard and must be treated before the next routine maintenance cycle. Hazard trees are trees or shrubs at risk of falling near or into power lines, and might be pruned or removed as part of emergency or routine vegetation management activities.
Ongoing congressional debate includes how best to protect natural and cultural resources on federal lands in place and the appropriate ways to manage vegetation to mitigate wildfire risk. Some stakeholders assert several potential issues, including a lack of consistency between land jurisdictions, onerous regulations, lack of agency capacity, staff turnover, or poor coordination and information sharing, for causing administrative delays and vegetation management challenges. Congress is considering legislation with provisions that aim to reduce administrative delays and jurisdictional inconsistencies, including the Fix Our Forests Act (S. 1462/H.R. 471) and the Farm, Food, and National Security Act of 2026 (H.R. 7567, a 2026 farm bill).",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48973/R48973.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48973.html
R48975,Recent Political Developments in Bangladesh: Background and Issues for Congress,2026-06-05T04:00:00Z,2026-06-10T10:52:53Z,Active,Reports,Maria A. Blackwood,,"On February 12, 2025, Bangladesh, a Muslim-majority South Asian country of 176 million, held parliamentary elections and a concurrent referendum. Sixty-eight percent of voters endorsed the July National Charter, which proposed changes to “reconstruct the state on the foundation of democracy and human dignity.” At the same time, voters gave one of the country’s two historically dominant political parties, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), a parliamentary supermajority. The party’s leader, Tarique Rahman, was sworn in as Prime Minister on February 17. The elections follow a period of turbulence; in August 2024, student-led protests led to the ouster of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina of the Awami League (AL), seven months into her fourth consecutive term in office. After Hasina fled to India, an interim government headed by Muhammad Yunus, a Nobel Peace Prize-winning economist, assumed power and initiated a reform process. Although the interim government enjoyed general support, Yunus’s administration encountered ongoing challenges that the new government now faces, including crime, inflation, human rights concerns, and the rise of Islamist groups. Rahman has committed to bolstering democracy in Bangladesh, but some observers have questioned the extent to which his party may implement the July Charter. This report discusses recent political developments in Bangladesh, including the 2024 demonstrations that led to the collapse of Sheikh Hasina’s government, the interim government under Yunus, and ensuing parliamentary elections, as well as changes that have taken place in Bangladesh’s politics and foreign policy, economic challenges, and human rights concerns.
",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48975/R48975.3.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48975.html
R48972,Class Action Lawsuits and Classwide Injunctive Relief,2026-06-05T04:00:00Z,2026-06-06T05:54:27Z,Active,Reports,Bryan L. Adkins,,"In Trump v. CASA, Inc., the Supreme Court limited the ability of federal courts to issue nationwide (or universal) injunctions, which are court orders prohibiting the government from implementing a challenged law, regulation, or other policy against all persons and entities, including non-parties to the lawsuit. Trump v. CASA, Inc., 606 U.S. 831 (2025). Although CASA limited the availability of nationwide injunctions, the decision left open a number of potential avenues for litigants to obtain broad relief for persons or entities affected by allegedly unlawful government policies. Class action lawsuits are one such avenue, and class actions have attracted increased attention as a potential alternative to nationwide injunctions following CASA. 
Whereas a nationwide injunction blocks the government from enforcing a law or policy against all persons and entities, a class action is a form of representative action that seeks relief for members of a defined class. Classwide injunctive relief is sometimes functionally equivalent to a nationwide injunction insofar as a class may be defined broadly to cover large numbers of affected individuals or entities who are not participating actively in the case. Class actions in federal court must satisfy certain procedural requirements.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 (Rule 23) governs class actions in federal courts. Rule 23’s requirements help ensure that absent class members’ interests are protected and that the lawsuit is the type of case for which class treatment would be beneficial. A lawsuit may not proceed on a class basis unless the court certifies the class upon determining that Rule 23’s requirements are met. Smith v. Bayer Corp., 564 U.S. 299, 313–15 (2011). The party seeking class certification bears the burden of demonstrating that the requirements are met, and the Supreme Court has held that courts must perform a “rigorous analysis” before deciding whether certification is warranted. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350–52 (2011). Class certification decisions often involve evidentiary hearings and may require the court to address complex legal issues that overlap with the merits of the case.  
To the extent class actions are viewed as an alternative to nationwide injunctions, some observers have expressed concern that class certification may not always be possible to achieve quickly, or at all, in some cases in which courts otherwise may have granted a nationwide injunction. See, e.g., Suzette M. Malveaux, Class Actions, Civil Rights, and the National Injunction, 131 Harv. L. Rev. F. 56, 58–60 (2017). In addition to the potential difficulty of satisfying Rule 23’s requirements, obtaining class certification can also be expensive and time-consuming, and some courts and commentators have raised questions about the extent to which courts may expedite class certification or grant injunctive relief for putative class members without first certifying a class. See, e.g., L.G.M.L. v. Noem, 800 F. Supp. 3d 100, 117 n.3 (D.D.C. 2025). In contrast, some legal scholars contend that obtaining certification for a class seeking injunctive relief against the government is generally not as difficult as other commentators have suggested. See, e.g., David Marcus, The Class Action After Trump v. CASA, 72 UCLA L. Rev. Discourse 2, 8–9. The prospect of using class actions as a substitute for nationwide injunctions has also raised concerns that district courts may become too permissive in certifying class actions after CASA, and that loose enforcement of Rule 23’s certification requirements could undermine the CASA ruling. 
Plaintiffs have obtained broad, classwide injunctions in a number of class actions challenging government policies since the Supreme Court’s CASA decision, but it remains to be seen how the Supreme Court may respond as more such cases work through the judicial system. The extent to which class actions may become a substitute for nationwide injunctions after CASA remains subject to ongoing debate. 
Nationwide injunctions have received substantial attention from the 119th Congress, and some legal scholars have observed that nationwide class actions against the government may implicate similar policy concerns as nationwide injunctions in certain respects. See, e.g., Michael T. Morley, Disaggregating Nationwide Injunctions, 71 Ala. L. Rev. 1, 52–53 (2019); David Marcus, The Class Action After Trump v. CASA, 72 UCLA L. Rev. Discourse at 23. Congress has substantial constitutional authority to regulate federal court procedures, including the procedures that apply to class action lawsuits. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965). In light of the increased focus on class actions as a potential substitute for nationwide injunctions, Congress may choose to monitor the use of the class action device in lawsuits seeking injunctive relief against the government, and evaluate whether such use aligns with Congress’s preferences. If Congress wished, it could consider legislating to expand or limit the ability of plaintiffs to bring suits challenging government policies on a class action basis.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48972/R48972.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48972.html
IF13244,Health Savings Account Contributions: By the Numbers,2026-06-05T04:00:00Z,2026-06-06T05:54:07Z,Active,Resources,"Alice Y. Choi, Ryan J. Rosso",,"A health savings account (HSA) is a tax-advantaged account that eligible individuals can use to save and pay for qualified medical expenses. Eligibility to contribute to an HSA is generally associated with enrollment in a high-deductible health plan (HDHP). An HSA is a trust or custodial account and not health insurance.
HSAs have several tax advantages: individual contributions are tax deductible when not made through a cafeteria plan; employer contributions and individual contributions made through a cafeteria plan are excluded from taxable income and payroll taxes; earnings on invested account balances are tax exempt; and withdrawals are not taxed if used for qualified medical expenses. For more information, see CRS Report R45277, Health Savings Accounts (HSAs).
This In Focus examines Internal Revenue Service (IRS) tax return data on HSA contributions to assess how HSA contribution amounts vary by source and adjusted gross income (AGI). These trends may inform congressional consideration of proposals to modify HSA eligibility, contribution limits, or the tax treatment of contributions. 
These data are available at the tax return level: a return can represent one or multiple individuals if the return is filed jointly with a spouse or includes dependents. A tax return can also represent contributions to more than one HSA (e.g., married individuals filing jointly both have HSAs). In the following analyses, average contributions are calculated by dividing total contribution amounts by the number of tax returns. Employer contributions are both direct employer contributions and employee pretax contributions made through a cafeteria plan. Individual contributions are those made by an individual outside of employer involvement. These contributions are not mutually exclusive; a single tax return may report both contribution types. These data predate recent changes in the Fiscal Year 2025 Budget Reconciliation Law (P.L. 119-21) that expanded the types of plans that can be paired with an HSA.
Overview of HSA Contributions
Eligible individuals may make direct contributions to their own HSAs, and employers, family members, and other individuals may make contributions to an individual’s HSA on the individual’s behalf. The total amount that an eligible individual may contribute to his or her HSA is capped. In 2026, the maximum annual contribution is $4,400 for self-only coverage and $8,750 for family coverage, which are indexed for inflation. In addition, account holders who are at least 55 years of age may contribute a catch-up contribution of $1,000 each year.
Employer Contributions Drive Most HSA Growth
Since 2004, the number of tax returns reporting HSA contributions has increased substantially, with employer contributions accounting for much of this growth (see Figure 1). In 2022, of the 161.3 million total tax returns filed, about 12.9 million (8%) tax returns reported employer contributions, compared to about 2.1 million (1%) with individual contributions. Over time, HSA contributions have been increasingly associated with employer contributions. Therefore, policy changes affecting HSA contributions may have broader effects on HSAs tied to employment. 
Figure 1. Number of Tax Returns Reporting Employer and Individual Contributions, Tax Years 2004-2022
/
Source: CRS analysis of IRS Statistics of Income (SOI) data.
Notes: M = million.
Figure 2. Annual Total Contribution Amounts, Tax Years 2004-2022
/
Source: CRS analysis of IRS Statistics of Income (SOI) data.
Notes: Not adjusted for inflation. B = billion.
Growth in HSA Contribution Dollar Amounts
From 2004 to 2022, HSA contributions in aggregate totaled $337.4 billion. Annual employer contributions increased sharply, from $17.6 million to $35.5 billion, compared with annual individual contributions, which increased as well, going from $207.8 million to $6.6 billion (Figure 2). 
Increasing Average Employer Contributions
From 2004 to 2022, the average individual contribution amount has consistently exceeded the average employer contribution amount, even as the number of tax returns with employer contributions increased more substantially. In 2022, the average employer contribution was $2,747 and the average individual contribution was $3,129 (see Figure 3). However, the difference has narrowed over time, from $1,038 to $383. The growth in average employer contributions, combined with the larger number of tax returns reporting employer contributions, indicates that employer-related funding has become an increasingly prominent component of overall HSA financing.
Figure 3. Average Employer and Individual Contribution Amounts, Tax Years 2004-2022
/
Source: CRS analysis of IRS Statistics of Income (SOI) data.
Notes: Not adjusted for inflation. Averages are at the return level.
HSA Contributions by AGI
In 2022, the AGI group with the largest number of tax returns was $25,000-$49,999, and the AGI group with the largest number of returns reporting employer contributions was $100,000-$199,999. Figure 4 shows that the percentage of returns reporting employer HSA contributions generally increased with AGI, from 0.3% among returns under $10,000 AGI to over 20% among returns in the $200,000-$1,000,000 AGI groups.
Figure 4. Number of Returns with HSA Contributions, by Adjusted Gross Income, Tax Year 2022
/
Source: CRS analysis of IRS Statistics of Income (SOI) data.
Notes: K= thousand; M = million. Numerical ranges reflect values up to, but not including, the upper bound. Percentages reflect returns with employer contributions relative to total returns in the group.
HSA Contribution Amounts by AGI
Higher AGI groups tend to report greater average employer and individual contribution amounts (Figure 5, Figure 6). In 2022, average individual contributions ranged from $1,790 for the $10,000-$24,999 AGI group to $6,339 for the $1 million or more AGI group, and average employer contributions ranged from $798 for the $10,000-$24,999 AGI group to $6,004 for the $1 million or more AGI group. 
Figure 5. Average Individual Contribution Amount, by Adjusted Gross Income, Tax Years 2017-2022
/
Source: CRS analysis of IRS Statistics of Income (SOI) data.
Notes: Not adjusted for inflation. K= thousand; M = million. Numerical ranges reflect values up to, but not including, the upper bound. Averages are at the return level.
Figure 6. Average Employer Contribution Amount, by Adjusted Gross Income, Tax Years 2017-2022
/
Source: CRS analysis of IRS Statistics of Income (SOI) data.
Notes: Not adjusted for inflation. K= thousand; M = million. Numerical ranges reflect values up, to but not including, the upper bound. Averages are at the return level.
Trends in Average Contribution Amounts
From 2017 to 2022, the difference in average contribution generally increased between higher and lower AGI groups. For most AGI groups below $200,000, average employer contributions were flat or slightly decreased, and increased for AGI groups at $200,000 and above. These trends may indicate that growth in average employer contributions has been more concentrated among higher-income individuals. Average individual contributions showed more annual fluctuation relative to average employer contributions, with the largest increases occurring in the highest income group. ",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13244/IF13244.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13244.html
IF13243,Direct Loan Program: Student Loan Repayment Plans,2026-06-05T04:00:00Z,2026-06-06T05:53:51Z,Active,Resources,Rita R. Zota,,"When an individual borrows from the Direct Loan program, they assume a contractual obligation to repay that debt over a period of time that may span a decade or more. While borrowers are required to make payments on a monthly basis, they may currently choose from among a number of loan repayment plans to repay their loans.
This In Focus provides a brief overview of the loan repayment plans available to borrowers of loans made by the U.S. Department of Education (ED) under the Direct Loan program. For a comprehensive description of loan repayment plans, see CRS Report R45931, Federal Student Loans Made Through the William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program: Terms and Conditions for Borrowers.
Repayment Plan Categories
Borrowers may currently choose from among numerous options to repay their loans. The available repayment plans fall into three broad categories: fixed repayment plans, income-driven repayment (IDR) plans, and alternative repayment plans.
Fixed repayment plans require monthly payments amortized over a specified period of time (from 10 to 30 years) based on the borrower’s loan principal amount and interest rate. Monthly payments are structured so that a borrower repays their loan, plus interest, in full over the specified period of time. There are three types of fixed repayment plans: standard, extended, and graduated plans.
IDR plans require monthly payments based on a borrower’s income. There are two types of IDR plans: income-contingent repayment (ICR) plans and income-based repayment (IBR) plans. The ICR plans comprise the Income-Contingent Repayment plan, the Pay As You Earn (PAYE) plan, and the Saving on a Valuable Education (SAVE) plan; however, ED is not currently implementing the SAVE plan as it is the subject of litigation. The IBR plans comprise the Original Income-Based Repayment plan (Original IBR) and the IBR plan for Post-July 1, 2014, New Borrowers (New IBR).
The alternative repayment plans are available in more limited situations to borrowers who demonstrate that the terms of the other repayment plans “are not adequate to accommodate the borrower’s exceptional circumstances.”
Repayment Plan Eligibility and Availability
The particular repayment plans available to any individual borrower may depend on factors such as the type(s) of loans borrowed, the date of becoming a new borrower, or the date of entering repayment status. In general, all of a borrower’s loans made through the Direct Loan program must be repaid together according to the same repayment plan. However, if a borrower has some types of loans that may be repaid according to an IDR plan and some that may not, the borrower may repay the eligible loans according to an IDR plan and the ineligible loans according to a non-IDR plan.
In general, borrowers may change from one plan to another plan for which they are eligible at any time. However, a borrower may switch to a non-IDR plan only if doing so would not result in the borrower having a remaining repayment period of fewer than zero months. Additionally, regulations limit future enrollment in certain IDR plans.
Income Driven Repayment Plans
Since its establishment, the Direct Loan program has included a requirement that ED make an IDR plan available to borrowers (other than to parent borrowers of Direct PLUS Loans). Sections 455(d)(1)(D) and 455(e) of the Higher Education Act (HEA) require ED to offer borrowers an ICR plan. Section 493C of HEA authorizes the IBR plans, in which the terms of the plans are specified in greater detail than in the ICR plan authorization. 
Regardless of the underlying statutory authorization, all IDR plans authorized prior to P.L. 119-21, the FY2025 budget reconciliation law (hereinafter, pre-P.L. 119-21 IDR plans), share some common features:
Income basis. Plans base monthly payments on a borrower’s discretionary income, which is defined as the portion of a borrower’s adjusted gross income (AGI) that exceeds a specified multiple of the federal poverty level (FPL) applicable to the borrower’s family size. The specific multiple of the FPL ranges from 100% to 225%, depending on the plan.
Percentage of income basis used for monthly payment calculation. Under these plans, the monthly payment is equal to one-twelfth of 5% to 20% of discretionary income, depending on the plan.
Maximum repayment period. A borrower is required to repay their loan for no longer than a specified maximum repayment period. After repaying under an IDR plan for the maximum repayment period, any remaining outstanding balance of principal and interest is forgiven by the federal government, and the borrower’s loan is retired.
Additionally, all IDR plans permit negative amortization, or periods in which monthly payments may be less than the interest that accrues each month. During periods of negative amortization, the borrower may accumulate a balance of unpaid interest that must be paid down before the borrower can repay any loan principal. In certain circumstances, an interest subsidy may be provided for any interest that remains unpaid after the borrower’s monthly payment is applied. That is, the remaining unpaid monthly accrued interest is not charged to the borrower. 
Table 1 provides a comparison of common features among pre-P.L. 119-21 IDR plans.
Table 1. Pre-P.L. 119-21 IDR Plans: Selected Features
Plan FeatureICRPAYESAVEOriginal IBRNew IBR
Income basisAGI above 100% of FPLAGI above 150% of FPLAGI above 225% of FPLAGI above 150% of FPLAGI above 150% of FPL
Percentage of income basis used for monthly payment20%10%5% to 10%a
15%
10%

Maximum repayment period
25 years
20 years
10 to 25 yearsb
25 years
20 years

Source: 34 C.F.R. §685.209.
Notes: ICR = income-contingent repayment, PAYE = Pay As You Earn, SAVE = Saving on a Valuable Education, IBR = income-based repayment, AGI = adjusted gross income, FPL = federal poverty level.
Percentage used depends on the borrower’s loan composition (i.e., loans borrowed for undergraduate versus graduate/professional education). 
Maximum repayment period depends on borrower’s loan composition and loan balance. 
Changes to Student Loan Repayment Plans in P.L. 119-21, the FY2025 Budget Reconciliation Law
P.L. 119-21 amends the HEA to change the availability of loan repayment plans for Direct Loan borrowers, including authorization of two new loan repayment plans for certain borrowers and elimination of some currently available repayment plans for other borrowers. Loan repayment plan availability varies based on the date an individual borrows a Direct Loan.
Borrowers who take out new loans on or after July 1, 2026, will have only two repayment plans available to them: the newly authorized tiered standard plan and newly authorized IDR plan called the Repayment Assistance Plan (RAP). Their repayment plan selection is to apply to all of their loans, including existing loans borrowed before July 1, 2026. 
For borrowers who have outstanding loans and who do not borrow any new loans on or after July 1, 2026, plan availability will largely remain the same as under the current framework through June 30, 2028, except that the RAP is to become available starting on July 1, 2026. On July 1, 2028, ICR plans are no longer to be an option for such borrowers. Borrowers enrolled in ICR plans will be required to switch to other available plans by July 1, 2028.
Selected Issues
A number of policy issues and considerations regarding loan repayment plans may garner congressional interest.
Borrower Confusion over Plan Availability and Enrollment
Prior to P.L. 119-21, the number of plans available to borrowers grew through congressional acts and executive actions. There are currently as many as nine different plans from which borrowers may choose. Borrowers may not be aware of them all or which one best meets their needs. Currently, when a borrower enters into repayment, they are automatically enrolled into the standard plan with a 10-year repayment term, unless they select a different plan. Some stakeholders assert that these conditions contribute to low IDR plan take-up by borrowers who struggle the most to repay their loans. While P.L. 119-21 reduced the number of plans available to new borrowers as a way to simplify borrower options, RAP will be the only IDR plan available to new borrowers, and it is considerably different from existing IDR plans. For example, monthly payments under RAP are equal to one-twelfth of 1% to 10% of total AGI as opposed to 5% to 20% of discretionary income. This new IDR plan structure may contribute to increasing confusion in the short term. Confusion over changes in plan structure and availability may also imply challenges for loan servicer implementation based on past servicer performance related to IDR plans. For example, issues of miscalculated payments and other servicer errors when carrying out IDR plans have been reported. 
IDR Plan Targeting
All but one of the pre-P.L. 119-21 IDR plans are available to any borrower regardless of their income. Research suggests that borrowers with large loan balances, such as individuals who borrowed for a graduate or professional degree, are more likely to enroll in IDR plans. However, these individuals are also more likely to have greater lifetime earnings than undergraduate borrowers. Some data suggest that these borrowers receive a larger share of the subsidies or benefits available under IDR plans, such as loan forgiveness, relative to undergraduate borrowers, regardless of their lifetime earnings. This means that the federal government and taxpayers are bearing the costs of benefits that go to potentially higher-income individuals.
Federal Costs of Loan Repayment Plans
The Congressional Budget Office had projected that among federal loans disbursed between 2020 and 2029, loans enrolled in pre-P.L. 119-21 IDR plans will result in a government subsidy of $82.9 billion relative to the negative subsidy of $72.2 billion generated by loans enrolled in fixed repayment plans, thereby resulting in a net increase in the federal deficit ($10.7 billion). Many factors could be contributing to IDR plans’ higher costs. For example, part of the higher costs may be due to the fact that borrowers enrolled in IDR plans tend to have larger balances. They also tend to repay their loans at a slower rate, which means that they are more likely to see some or all of their outstanding balance forgiven.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13243/IF13243.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13243.html
IF13242,Major Railroad Mergers and Acquisitions,2026-06-05T04:00:00Z,2026-06-06T05:53:47Z,Active,Resources,"John Frittelli, Ben Goldman",,"On July 29, 2025, Union Pacific Railroad (UP) announced that it had agreed to acquire Norfolk Southern Railway (NS). If the transaction is approved, it would reduce the number of U.S. Class I railroads—defined as having annual operating revenues of $900 million or more in inflation-adjusted 2019 dollars—from four to three (see Table 1). Two additional Class I Canadian railroads provide transcontinental service across southern Canada, own track in the United States that connects to some northern tier U.S. ports, and also own track that parallels the Mississippi River with connections to and into Mexico.
Table 1. U.S. Class I Railroads 2024
Railroad and Region
Operating Revenue ($ Millions)
Route Miles Operated
Employees

UP (West)
$24,189
32,880
32,388

BNSF (West)
$23,747
32,897
36,958

CSX (East)
$13,278
19,701
19,471

NS (East)
$12,122
19,154
20,236

Source: Association of American Railroads, Railroad Fact Book, December 2025.
Notes: UP = Union Pacific, NS = Norfolk Southern. Not shown are two Class I Canadian railroads that own track in the United States through U.S. subsidiaries. Class I railroads are defined as having annual operating revenues of $900 million or more in inflation-adjusted 2019 dollars.
Prior railroad mergers have enabled the surviving railroads to consolidate their networks by abandoning or selling off parallel lines. End-to-end mergers have also allowed railroads to improve profitability by carrying long-haul traffic greater distances. A wave of mergers in the 1970s through the 1990s left seven Class I carriers controlling almost all long-distance freight rail traffic in the United States and Canada; some of these resulted in periods of poor service reliability as rail networks combined. The merger between Canadian Pacific Railway (CP) and Kansas City Southern Railway (KCS), approved in 2023 (see below), further reduced the number of Class I carriers to six.
The volume of freight transported by rail has broadly declined over the last 20 years, as has the overall share of freight transported by rail compared with other transportation modes. Coal traffic, the single largest bulk commodity transported by rail, has declined as the amount mined and consumed has decreased. Freight rail growth has been strongest in intermodal container traffic, which can be moved between ships, trains, and trucks when it is economically advantageous. Mergers and acquisitions can offer carriers opportunities to increase profits through operating efficiencies, even if traffic volumes do not increase. 
Surface Transportation Board Jurisdiction
Rail merger and acquisition applications must be filed with the five-member Surface Transportation Board (STB, or the Board), which has exclusive authority to make a final decision on an application. These applications include detailed proposals regarding how the combined railroad would operate. Some of the operations proposed in the applications typically are designed to reduce opposition to the proposed transaction. For example, customers might be concerned about higher shipping rates, railroad employees might be concerned about job cuts, other railroads might seek to preserve access to certain markets, and state and local governments might have concerns about the local impacts of higher or lower rail traffic volume. 
After considering an application and soliciting comments from affected parties and the public, the Board is to decide whether to approve or reject the transaction and whether it will base its approval on specific conditions or commitments. If an applicant perceives the conditions required by the Board to be too burdensome, it can withdraw its application. Historically, it has taken a year or more from the time an application is accepted for the Board to reach a decision. 
The Board has authority to make major changes as conditions of the proposed merger in order to protect rail customers, employees, and other railroads from possible adverse impacts from the proposed merger. Such changes can significantly affect the future operation of the combined railroad and its relations with its customers and with other railroads. Further, the Board has authority to oversee future operations indefinitely and to reopen a case for further adjustments if conditions change. 
Evaluating Railroad Combinations 
Federal law directs the STB to approve railroad mergers and acquisitions that it deems to be “consistent with the public interest.” The STB revised its merger regulations in 2001, creating a higher bar for “major” transactions, defined as those involving multiple Class I railroads. Under previous standards, Class I railroads planning to merge had to demonstrate to the STB that the level of competition would remain unchanged following the transaction, but since 2001, the STB has held that it would approve such transactions only if the parties can demonstrate that competition will be enhanced as a result.
Since the revised regulations were implemented, most railroad mergers and acquisitions have involved smaller carriers. Some Class I carriers explored potential mergers but never formally applied for STB approval. For example, Canadian Class I railroad CP explored mergers with CSX Transportation (CSX) in 2014 and with NS in 2016, but neither deal was submitted to the STB. The first major transaction to be approved after the rules were revised was decided in 2023, but it was evaluated under the pre-2001 rules. The 2001 rulemaking preemptively granted KCS—the smallest of the Class I railroads at the time—a waiver that allowed it to meet the older, less stringent standards for merger proposal evaluation. The Board’s reasoning at the time was that KCS was small enough that its involvement in a merger would present less risk of anticompetitive effects than a merger between any two of the six larger railroads. Although KCS merged with CP in 2023, the resulting CPKC Railroad is still the smallest Class I carrier.
The Board is directed by statute to afford “substantial weight” to the recommendations of the Department of Justice (DOJ) in evaluating transactions, but any opinion would be purely advisory. For example, in the 2023 merger involving KCS, the Board approved the transaction even though the DOJ opposed it.
Features of the Proposed Transaction
If the UP acquisition of NS is approved, the combined railroad would be the first to offer uninterrupted service between the East and West Coasts of the United States by a single carrier (see Figure 1 for a map of states served by UP and NS). 
Figure 1. States Served by Union Pacific and Norfolk Southern
/
Source: Prepared by CRS using information from Union Pacific Railroad and Norfolk Southern Railway merger application.
Notes: Norfolk Southern also serves Massachusetts via the Pan Am Southern Railway, jointly owned with CSX Transportation.
Currently, rail shipments moving between areas served by Eastern and Western railroads tend to be transferred from one carrier to another at a limited number of interchange points. This can lengthen delivery times as railcars, locomotives, and crews are exchanged, especially if multiple trains are waiting to use the same facility. Delays can be especially noticeable for shipments originating and/or terminating within what UP and NS refer to as the “Watershed” region—several hundred miles wide and roughly centered on a handful of “Gateway” cities on or near the Mississippi River. UP and NS claim that by offering single-line service (i.e., without changing carriers) across the Watershed, they will be able to offer trip times that are competitive with both other Class I railroads and trucks. Diversion of freight from trucks to trains is a factor in how the application intends to meet the STB’s “public interest” and “enhanced competition” tests.
Shippers that use UP or NS in combination with another Class I railroad for cross-country journeys could be concerned about the effect that having one option for interline service may have on prices at interchange points. For this group of customers, the application proposes to maintain competitiveness by implementing consistent pricing at interchange points with all Class I railroads. This pricing strategy would be applied only during the STB’s oversight period. The application also states that three facilities are to see direct access to rail carriers drop from two to one as a result of the transaction and declares an intent to preserve access to a different carrier in those cases.
Parties in Support and Opposition
Customers shipping intermodal containers, such as the Port of Los Angeles/Long Beach, have voiced support for the UP-NS transaction, citing gains in efficiency that can result from a consolidated network. Other shippers, including the American Chemistry Council, the American Farm Bureau Federation, the American Iron and Steel Institute, and the National Industrial Transportation League, have opposed the combination, citing the potential for price increases and service disruptions. Some rail shippers may be wary of publicly criticizing the proposed transaction if they believe that UP or NS could retaliate against them in the form of higher freight rates or less reliable service.
Early reactions from major railroad labor unions were mixed. One major railroad labor union endorsed the deal after reaching a job protection agreement with UP and NS for its members. Other labor organizations have publicly opposed the transaction or have withheld judgment. 
Considerations for Congress
If Congress is concerned that a successful UP-NS combination could precipitate more mergers that would further reduce the number of U.S. Class I railroads, it could enact a moratorium on major transactions, such as the one adopted by the STB in 2000 in the run-up to its 2001 rulemaking. Alternatively, Congress could consider legislative proposals to make it easier for shippers to petition the STB for relief from substandard service or abuse of market dominance, or Congress could take no action until the STB has rendered a decision. 
Members of Congress can and have submitted letters to the STB expressing support or opposition to the transaction or to specific conditions of approval. These letters become part of the public record, and the Board is required to consider them in making its decision.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13242/IF13242.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13242.html
IN12695,Possible Changes in U.S. Military Aid to Israel: Considerations for Congress,2026-06-04T04:00:00Z,2026-06-05T11:38:05Z,Active,Posts,Jeremy M. Sharp,,"Overview
The Trump Administration and Israeli government are reportedly negotiating a new Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on U.S. foreign assistance to Israel, which, if completed, would make it the fourth such bilateral understanding reached between the two countries. MOUs are not legally binding agreements like treaties and do not require Senate ratification; ultimately, lawmakers’ appropriations power subjects foreign assistance levels delineated in MOUs to congressional approval. Past MOUs have significantly influenced U.S. aid to Israel; historically, Congress has appropriated foreign aid to Israel largely according to the terms of the MOU in place at the time (with the exception of supplemental appropriations acts). Congress last authorized military aid to Israel per the terms of the current MOU in P.L. 116-283, the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for FY2021. With potentially consequential elections scheduled this fall in Israel and Israel seeking munitions replenishment in light of the war in Iran and other conflicts, both sides may seek to complete a new MOU in the months ahead. 
Historical Background
The first 10-year MOU (FY1999-FY2008), agreed to under the Clinton Administration, represented a political commitment to provide Israel with at least $26.7 billion in total economic and military aid (of which $21.3 billion was military aid). This MOU provided the template for the gradual phaseout of all economic assistance to Israel. In 2007, the George W. Bush Administration and the Israeli government agreed to a second MOU, consisting of a $30 billion military aid package for the 10-year period from FY2009 to FY2018. In 2016 during the Obama Administration, the U.S. and Israeli governments signed the third MOU covering FY2019 to FY2028. Under its terms, the United States pledged $38 billion in military aid—$33 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) grants and $5 billion in defense appropriations for missile defense programs—to Israel. This third MOU phases out a benefit known as Off-Shore Procurement (OSP), which allows Israel to use a portion of U.S. military assistance for Israeli domestic purchases of armaments.
Israel’s Proposal to Phase Out U.S. Military Aid to Israel
Arguing that Israel has “come of age,” and no longer needs assistance as it once did, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has publicly called for the phasing out of U.S. military aid to Israel. In lieu of continued aid, Netanyahu reportedly has sought more joint U.S.-Israeli investments in cyber and defense projects. Currently, U.S. defense budget appropriations support a variety of jointly funded, cooperative U.S.-Israeli defense programs, including on missile defense, counter-tunneling, counter-unmanned aerial systems, and emerging technologies. Of these jointly funded programs, only U.S. support for Israel’s missile defense ($500 million annually) falls within the purview of the current MOU. For FY2026, Congress appropriated $202 million for cooperative defense programs with Israel outside the MOU. 
Considerations for Congress
Equal Partnership or Continued Dependence? Most U.S. military aid to Israel finances the procurement of weapons systems and services from U.S. defense contractors. If aid is phased out, Israel may have fewer financial constraints on purchasing defense articles from other global suppliers and/or manufacturing more arms domestically. However, with a fleet of fighter aircraft that is almost entirely American-made and a missile defense architecture which relies on U.S. assistance, Israel may remain dependent for quite some time on U.S. supply chains and, in times of military operations, direct defensive U.S. military support.
Human Rights Restrictions. If a new MOU were to phase out FMF grant aid to Israel and replace it with joint cooperative programming from defense accounts, such as “Procurement, Defense-Wide” and “Research, Development, Test and Evaluation Defense-Wide,” sales of defense articles to Israel, even those financed with Israeli national funds, would still be subject to some human rights restrictions in law. Meanwhile, the executive branch’s interpretation of Leahy Law human rights restrictions may mean that such restrictions would not apply if sales were financed solely with Israeli national funds. 
Shifting Congressional Oversight. If U.S. FMF to Israel were to phase out, congressional oversight and appropriations responsibilities regarding Israel could shift away from foreign affairs-oriented committees toward defense-focused ones. 
Financing Sales of U.S. Defense Articles to Israel. Israel is an economically and militarily advanced nation, with a per capita Gross Domestic Product in the top 30 worldwide, and a defense budget that has reportedly increased more than 150% in the last decade. Since the Hamas attacks of October 7, 2023, the United States has approved tens of billions of dollars in new sales of U.S. defense articles to Israel, which Israel has financed with FMF. Some of these cases, such as the sale of advanced fighter aircraft, have long timelines and may require financing, either from grant aid or Israeli national funds, well into the timeline of any new MOU. Furthermore, as the costs of procuring advanced U.S. fighter aircraft have increased, Israel may need to sustain historically high levels of procurement spending to continue purchasing advanced U.S. equipment. The United States sells Israel its advanced weaponry and longstanding U.S. policy, codified in law, requires the Administration to determine that any export of a U.S. defense article to any Middle Eastern country other than Israel would not adversely affect Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge.
U.S. Aid to Egypt and Jordan. U.S. foreign assistance to Israel, Egypt, and Jordan has long facilitated military cooperation among the parties. The U.S.-brokered peace treaties between Israel and Egypt (1979) and Israel and Jordan (1994) are considered major U.S. foreign policy achievements. If U.S. military aid to Israel is phased out, Arab governments at peace with Israel, such as Egypt, may have a harder time advocating for continued U.S. grant aid
Competing Viewpoints on Joint U.S.-Israeli Defense. Some lawmakers reportedly have approved the prospect of phasing out aid and moving toward a more equal defense partnership, arguing that joint U.S.-Israeli defense programs require financial commitments from both parties, provide the United States access to Israeli innovations, and support the U.S. and Israeli industrial workforce. Others oppose enhanced defense cooperation, as some lawmakers have pledged to no longer support joint missile defense programs, such as Iron Dome, due to Israel’s alleged violations of international law and human rights abuses against Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12695/IN12695.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/HTML/IN12695.html
IF13241,Artificial Intelligence (AI): Implications for Size and Composition of the U.S. Armed Forces,2026-06-04T04:00:00Z,2026-06-05T13:52:56Z,Active,Resources,"Kristy N. Kamarck, Ebrima M'Bai",,"Overview
The U.S. Armed Forces have been adopting artificial intelligence (AI) to analyze data, support decisionmaking, and improve military and administrative processes, including logistics, intelligence analysis, maintenance, planning, and personnel management. Senior military leaders have characterized AI as a means to improve speed, effectiveness, and decisionmaking rather than as a replacement for human judgment. 
Congress exercises oversight of military personnel through end strength authorizations (i.e., maximum size of the Armed Forces), appropriations, and legislation governing military personnel systems. As AI-enabled technologies expand across defense processes, Congress may examine how these systems could influence the size and structure of the Armed Forces and the composition of the broader Department of Defense (DOD) workforce, including civilian employees, and contractors. (DOD is “using a secondary Department of War designation,” under Executive Order 14347.) AI adoption may alter force size requirements, how work is performed, and the skills required to perform it.
AI in the Military Context
In DOD usage, AI generally refers to software systems that analyze large datasets, recognize patterns, generate predictions, or automate routine tasks. In many cases, these systems rely on machine-learning or data-driven software tools that assist in decision-support processes. Uses include predictive maintenance, intelligence data analysis, planning support, and personnel skill-matching. DOD strategy documents emphasize that AI systems are designed to support personnel rather than replace them and that decisionmaking responsibility is to remain with military leaders and authorized personnel.
DOD-Wide Organization and Strategy
In December 2021, the Deputy Secretary of Defense established the Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Officer (CDAO) to integrate and scale data, analytics, and AI efforts across the department. The CDAO is to serve as the principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense on these matters and is responsible for accelerating AI adoption across military and business functions. Congress has previously examined the creation and role of the CDAO, including how it aligns with existing defense organizations.
The office of the CDAO consolidates functions previously performed by several organizations, including the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC), the Defense Digital Service, and elements of the department’s Chief Data Officer organization.
DOD has issued several strategies guiding AI adoption, including the DOD Data Strategy (2020) and the Data, Analytics, and Artificial Intelligence Adoption Strategy (2023). In addition, the Responsible Artificial Intelligence Strategy and Implementation Pathway (2022) describes DOD plans to “ensure” AI systems are ethical, reliable, and subject to appropriate human oversight. Collectively, these strategies suggest that DOD expects AI adoption to be broad, sustained, and integrated into both operational and institutional aspects of the Armed Forces. 
DOD budget documents indicate continued departmental investment in AI-related capabilities. For example, the FY2027 President’s budget request included $58.5 billion for AI-related investments intended to support AI-enabled warfare and broader departmental innovation.
Statutory Framework
Congress has enacted several provisions relating to DOD’s implementation of AI and the identification, recruitment, training, and management of military and civilian personnel with AI-related skills. For example, Section 226 of the FY2022 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA; P.L. 117-81) required DOD to review applications of AI and digital technology across departmental platforms, processes, and operations and to establish performance objectives and metrics. The law directed DOD to assess AI-related skill gaps and qualifications for civilian and military personnel and to establish recruiting, training, and talent-management metrics.
In the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81, §909), Congress also addressed talent management by requiring DOD to identify, recruit, and manage digital talent, including personnel with AI-related skills. These provisions include responsibilities for a chief digital recruiting officer and DOD’s Chief Human Capital Officer in defining AI workforce roles, assessing workforce requirements, and developing qualification and training programs.
These statutory provisions suggest that congressional oversight of AI extends beyond technology adoption to include workforce management, personnel systems, and long-term talent development.
Implications for Military Personnel Management 
DOD generally frames AI as a tool to improve efficiency and effectiveness. Efficiency gains reduce the time or labor required to perform routine tasks, while effectiveness gains improve the quality of military operations and decisionmaking.
From an efficiency perspective, some AI tools are used to automate or streamline repetitive functions, such as data processing, information sorting, and administrative analysis. These tools may reduce workloads in certain headquarters, logistics, and support organizations, potentially allowing them to operate with fewer personnel.  Such efficiency gains may affect institutional and operational functions, although some administrative and support activities may be more readily automated than combat-related functions.  
From an effectiveness perspective, many AI applications are designed to enhance decisionmaking by integrating large volumes of data, identifying patterns, and providing predictive insights to augment human judgment. For example, DOD may use AI predictive maintenance for platforms and systems to help forecast equipment failures. AI adoption may also increase demand for personnel with technical proficiency, data literacy, and analytical skills to employ, interpret, and oversee AI-enabled systems across the defense enterprise. 
Implications for Force Size
CRS has not identified any DOD statements indicating an intention for AI adoption to reduce overall military end strength. Nonetheless, AI may influence force size over time. If AI-enabled tools reduce the time required to perform certain tasks, organizations may adjust how work is distributed among personnel or how functions are organized. In some cases, time saved through automation may be redirected toward training or operational tasks.
In some cases, AI-enabled capabilities may also generate new operational requirements, such as increased demand for cyber defense, data management, or algorithm monitoring personnel. At the same time, new requirements for AI governance, cybersecurity, and technical support may offset reductions elsewhere. As a result, AI adoption may lead to localized workforce adjustments rather than immediate or force-wide changes in end strength.
Implications for Force Composition
Even if total end strength remains unchanged, AI adoption may affect the composition of the defense workforce. DOD and military services strategies emphasize growing demand for data, analytics, software, and digital literacy, which may increase the need for personnel with these technical skills. AI adoption may also influence curriculum requirements for professional military education for operators and those involved in the acquisition of AI-enabled systems.
Competition with the private sector for AI-related skills may further affect the balance among uniformed personnel, civilian employees, and contractors. DOD strategies and workforce discussions have noted competition with the private sector for AI-related skills, which may influence the balance among uniformed personnel, civilian employees, and contractors. While contractor support may provide short-term capacity, disproportionate reliance on contractors could raise questions about institutional knowledge retention, operational continuity, and the performance of inherently governmental functions.
Implementation of the department’s Responsible Artificial Intelligence framework and related autonomy policies may require dedicated personnel to conduct testing, evaluation, verification, validation, monitoring, and governance activities throughout the AI life cycle. DOD’s framework and other policy guidance (e.g., DOD Directive 3000.09), establish requirements relating to reliability, safety, human oversight, and operational testing for certain AI-enabled and autonomous systems. These requirements may increase demand for personnel with expertise in AI governance, systems testing, cybersecurity, data management, and operational evaluation.
Potential Considerations for Congress
As discussed above, some provisions to enhance AI oversight and to shape how DOD develops and manages its AI-enabled workforce have been enacted in the 119th Congress. Other legislation in the 119th Congress has directed the exploration of AI integration in a broad range of military tasks, from calculating Basic Allowance for Housing to supporting logistics planning and tracking. Congress may also consider the following oversight issues:
 Talent Management and Workforce Structure
How does DOD plan to recruit, train, and retain personnel with AI-related skills, particularly if there is competition with the private sector?
To what extent are military personnel management systems sufficiently adaptable to AI-driven changes in occupational specialties, career pathways, and professional military education? If additional flexibility is needed, how might Congress support and oversee such changes?
What balance does DOD intend to maintain among uniformed personnel, civilian employees, and contractors for AI development, integration, and sustainment functions?
Implementation and Resources
What resources and authorities are required to implement DOD’s Responsible Artificial Intelligence framework in accordance with congressional intent, including testing, validation, monitoring, and oversight across the AI life cycle?
Does DOD have sufficient infrastructure, cybersecurity, and data governance capacity to support its planned AI adoption? What additional resources might be needed? 
Metrics and Accountability
How is DOD measuring AI’s impact on workforce requirements and productivity across operational, institutional, and headquarters organizations? How is that information shaping DOD’s efforts to manage its AI-focused workforce?",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13241/IF13241.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13241.html
R48971,"The Arab Gulf States, the Iran Conflict, and U.S. Relations: In Brief",2026-06-03T04:00:00Z,2026-06-06T05:53:48Z,Active,Reports,"Christopher M. Blanchard, Jeremy M. Sharp",,"Since February 2026, U.S./Israel-Iran conflict in the Persian Gulf region and the de facto closure of the Strait of Hormuz to most shipping have presented fundamental risks to the security and economic vitality of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries—Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, and Bahrain. Thousands of attacks on facilities hosting U.S. forces and critical infrastructure locations across the GCC countries during this period have demonstrated the Arab Gulf states’ vulnerability to threats from neighboring Iran and Iran-aligned regional armed groups. GCC member state responses to the 2026 conflict have differed, while each state has condemned attacks on its respective territory. The UAE, having faced the most attacks of any GCC state, has adopted a defiant and forceful posture toward Iran. Saudi Arabia has called for de-escalation and has promoted Pakistan-based peace talks, while asserting its right to self-defense. Both Saudi Arabia and the UAE reportedly have conducted strikes on Iran, the UAE reportedly has welcomed direct Israeli defense aid, and Saudi Arabia and Kuwait reportedly have struck Iran-linked targets in Iraq. Other GCC states have thwarted attacks, Qatar and Oman have promoted diplomatic engagement, and Qatar has hosted Iranian officials for mediation talks. 
Iran’s attacks and the course of the wider conflict may be raising pivotal questions in the Gulf about U.S. security commitments to the Gulf states and future U.S.-GCC security partnership. The conflict has underscored an important reality for the GCC: the success of the Gulf states’ strategies to diversify their economies and become globally integrated commercial hubs remains dependent on the stability of the Persian Gulf region. Whether Iran emerges from the current conflict cowed and contained, emboldened and empowered, or undone, the Gulf states will face consequences. In the future, the GCC states may deepen their ties with the United States, pursue alternative partnerships with other states and adjust their approaches to Iran based on new views of their interests, or adopt a mix of approaches. 
U.S. policies and Gulf state choices may affect U.S. security, diplomatic, and economic interests in the Gulf region and beyond. Congress may examine whether or how the conflict will shape U.S. basing and force posture plans and Gulf country support for the hosting of U.S. forces or the use of their territory, waters, and airspace for U.S. operations. Congress may be asked to consider new arms sales to Gulf countries and may evaluate the implications of any Gulf country decisions to diversify sources of defense imports or expand local production of defense technologies. Congress may also assess the Gulf states’ responses to U.S. requests that they recognize and normalize their relationships with Israel in connection with any U.S. negotiated agreement with Iran. The Gulf states may evaluate any U.S.-Iran agreement relative to their security interests, views on nuclear issues, and an agreement’s effects on maritime transit in the Strait of Hormuz. Congress may evaluate the implications of any resulting accord or divisions between the GCC states, any new or expanded partnerships among the Gulf States, or any new initiatives between them and extra-regional actors, including Russia, the People’s Republic of China, and countries in South Asia, Africa, East Asia, and Europe. ",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48971/R48971.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48971.html
R48968,Department of Veterans Affairs FY2026 Appropriations,2026-06-03T04:00:00Z,2026-06-05T16:23:01Z,Active,Reports,"Sidath Viranga Panangala, Jared S. Sussman, Madeline E. Moreno","Veterans Affairs (VA) Appropriations, Veterans Disability Compensation & Pensions, Veterans & Military Health Care, Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), Veterans Budget & Appropriations","The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) administers numerous programs that provide benefits and services to eligible veterans and their families. These benefits include medical care, disability compensation, Dependency and Indemnity Compensation (DIC), pensions, education, vocational rehabilitation and employment services, assistance to homeless veterans, home loan guarantees, and administration of life insurance, as well as traumatic injury protection insurance for servicemembers and benefits that cover burial expenses.
President Donald Trump released the FY2026 budget request for VA in several stages during May and June 2025. The Trump Administration requested $434.81 billion for FY2026. This included $300.42 billion in mandatory appropriations and $134.39 billion in discretionary appropriations. On June 25, 2025, the House passed its version of the FY2026 Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies (MILCON-VA) appropriations bill (H.R. 3944; H.Rept. 119-161). The House-passed version would have provided $435.33 billion for VA for FY2026, including $301.57 billion in mandatory funding and $133.75 billion in discretionary funding. On August 1, 2025, the Senate amended the House-passed version of H.R. 3944 and passed the Military Construction and Veterans Affairs, Agriculture, and Legislative Branch Appropriations Act, 2026 (H.R. 3944, as amended). Division A of the measure contained the FY2026 MILCON-VA appropriations bill (Division A of H.R. 3944). The Senate-passed version of the bill would have provided $434.86 billion for VA for FY2026, including $301.57 billion in mandatory funding and $133.28 billion in discretionary funding. On November 12, 2025, after a 42-day lapse in appropriations from October 1, 2025, through November 11, 2025, the President signed into law the Continuing Appropriations, Agriculture, Legislative Branch, Military Construction and Veterans Affairs, and Extensions Act, 2026 (H.R. 5371; P.L. 119-37). Division D of this act contained the FY2026 MILCON-VA Appropriations Act.
Comparative funding levels for FY2025 (Division A of P.L. 119-4) and FY2026 (Division D of P.L. 119-37) are listed in the table below (component amounts may not sum to totals due to rounding and adjustments due to rescissions).
FY2025-FY2026 VBA, VHA, NCA, and Veterans Affairs (VA)-Departmental Administration Appropriations

FY2025 Enacted
(Division A of P.L. 119-4)FY2026 RequestHouse-Passed (H.R. 3944; H.Rept. 119-161)  Senate-Passed (Military Construction and Veterans Affairs, Agriculture, and Legislative Branch Appropriations Act, 2026; Division A of H.R. 3944; S.Rept. 119-43) 

FY2026 Enacted (Continuing Appropriations, Agriculture, Legislative Branch, Military Construction and Veterans Affairs, and Extensions Act, 2026; Division D of P.L.119-37)
Increase (+)/
Decrease (-) and % Change 
FY2026 Enacted vs. FY2025 Enacted

Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA, including General Operating Expenses)
$236.90 billion
$251.90 billion
$253.05 billion
$253.06 billion
$263.79 billion
(+) $26.89 billion (+11.35%)

Veterans Health Administration (VHA)
$113.67 billion
$116.98 billion
$117.47 billion
$115.89 billion  
$116.03 billion
(+) $2.36 billion (+2.08%)

National Cemetery Administration (NCA)
$480 million
$497 million
$498.50 million
$497 million
$498.50 million 
(+) $18.5 million (+3.85%)

Departmental Administration
$10.65 billion
$12.75 billion
$11.64 billion
$12.74 billion
$12.49 billion
(+) $1.84 billon (+17.28%)

Cost of War Toxic Exposures Fund (TEF)
$6 billion
$52.68 billion
$52.68 billion
$52.68 billion
$52.68 billion
(+) $46.68 billion 
(+778%)

Total VA
$367.71 billion
$434.81
billion
$435.33 billion
$434.86 billion
$445.49 billion
(+) $77.78 billion (+21.15%)

Total Mandatory
$238.68 billion
$300.42 billion
$301.57 billion
$301.57 billion
$312.30 billion
(+) $73.62 billion 
(+30.85%)


Total Discretionary
$129.03 billion
$134.39
billion
$133.75 billion
$133.28 billion
$133.18 billion
(+) $4.15 billion (+3.22%)

Sources: U.S. Congress, House Appropriations Committee, Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, And Related Agencies Appropriations Bill, 2026, report to accompany H.R. 3944, 119th Cong., 1st sess., June 10, 2025, H.Rept. 119-161, pp. 93-101; U.S. Congress, Senate Appropriations Committee, Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, And Related Agencies Appropriations Bill, 2026, report to accompany H.R. 3944, 119th Cong., 1st sess., July 17, 2025, S.Rept. 119-43, pp. 110-115; and “Explanatory Statement Submitted By Ms. Collins, Chair of The Senate Committee on Appropriations, Regarding H.R. 5371, The Continuing Appropriations, Agriculture, Legislative Branch, Military Construction And Veterans Affairs, And Extensions Act, 2026,” Congressional Record, vol. 171, no. 189 (November 9, 2025), pp. S8109-S8110.
 
     
",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48968/R48968.3.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48968.html
R48967,"The Natural Gas Act: Background, Key Provisions, and Policy Issues",2026-06-03T04:00:00Z,2026-06-06T05:53:52Z,Active,Reports,"Paul W. Parfomak, Adam Vann, Michael Ratner","Energy Policy, Fossil Energy, International Energy Issues, Environmental Policy","Natural gas has been sold commercially in the United States since 1816, starting with the Gaslight Company of Baltimore. Technological advancements around the turn of the 20th century greatly expanded its uses for heating, cooking, and industrial applications. New pipeline technology and new drilling techniques led to a shift from local, manufactured gas (i.e., distilled from coal) toward geological gas shipped from distant fields through an expanding interstate pipeline network. Growth of the industry brought with it unfair business practices and market abuses. In response, Congress passed the Natural Gas Act of 1938 (NGA; P.L. 75-688), giving the Federal Power Commission (FPC) regulatory authority over interstate natural gas transportation and wholesale sales, the import or export of natural gas, and companies or persons engaged in these activities. In 1977, Congress terminated the FPC and transferred its authorities to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and the Department of Energy (DOE), both newly created under the Department of Energy Organization Act (EOA; P.L. 95-91).
Congress has amended the NGA several times since 1938 to address regulatory gaps, court decisions, or changes in natural gas markets. These amendments added eminent domain authority for interstate natural gas pipelines; exempted certain natural gas companies from federal regulation; allowed intrastate pipelines to transport gas for interstate pipelines; deregulated wellhead natural gas prices; eased restrictions on liquefied natural gas (LNG) trade with free trade partners; gave FERC authority to prohibit gas market manipulation; and designated FERC as the lead agency for coordinating federal authorizations and compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA; P.L. 91-190), among other changes.
In recent Congresses, certain NGA authorities and requirements, or the absence thereof, have drawn the attention of stakeholders and Members of Congress. Congress has debated FERC’s interpretation of the “public interest” standard for authorization of natural gas infrastructure under Sections 3 and 7 of the NGA. Members have also debated whether pipeline and LNG terminal permit reviews have been unduly delayed due to a lack of agency coordination, agency inaction, growing complexity (especially due to environmental considerations), and related directives from the courts. Some in Congress have expressed concern about the NGA’s 30-day deadline for FERC to “act[] upon” a request for rehearing and practices FERC has used in the past to effectively circumvent this deadline, indefinitely delaying the ability for aggrieved parties to seek judicial review. Others have questioned the NGA’s provisions granting eminent domain authority to pipeline developers, including issues regarding landowner rights, just compensation, and the initiation of construction-related activities on acquired rights-of-way while aspects of a pipeline’s approval have been incomplete or challenged. Congress has also debated DOE’s interpretation of the NGA’s public interest standard for LNG commodity trade with non-free trade agreement (non-FTA) countries, especially accounting for domestic price impacts, greenhouse gas emissions, and geopolitics. The NGA’s provisions regarding refunds for unjust and unreasonable pipeline rates have also been a recurring issue in Congress.
In drafting the NGA, Congress gave the implementing agencies discretion to interpret the statute and to establish their rules accordingly, taking account of the contemporary context. FERC and DOE have exercised this discretion to address new industry developments (e.g., U.S. shale gas production) and challenges (e.g., growing LNG exports), often in the face of direction from Congress or the courts. In many cases, discretionary changes in the agencies’ implementation of the NGA have allowed the agencies to adapt their policies relatively quickly. In other cases, such changes have taken years. Notwithstanding a steady stream of legislative proposals over many decades to amend the NGA, Congress has not often done so. The historical infrequency of such amendments may suggest that Congress, as a whole, has continued to support the agencies’ discretionary approach to implementing the NGA, even as Members express concerns about particular provisions or policies at particular times. Alternatively, the infrequency of amendments may suggest a lack of consensus in Congress about how to address concerns related to the NGA.
In the 119th Congress, as in previous Congresses, Members have proposed numerous bills to amend the NGA or to direct FERC or DOE as to how the law should be implemented. As Congress considers these proposals, the question arises whether these agencies may align their discretionary policies to congressional intent without direct intervention, or whether Congress must pass legislation amending the NGA to establish (and maintain) certain policy priorities. A related question is whether the NGA conveys to the implementing agencies all the necessary authorities to fulfill its fundamental mission. Understanding how these considerations may fit into the nation’s overall policies regarding energy, the economy, the environment, and international trade could be a particular challenge for Congress.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48967/R48967.3.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48967.html
R48966,Spain: Background and U.S. Relations,2026-06-02T04:00:00Z,2026-06-04T12:08:33Z,Active,Reports,Derek E. Mix,"Spain, Europe, Russia & Eurasia","Relations between the United States and Spain have experienced tensions during the second Trump Administration. Over the past several decades, the two countries have had extensive cultural ties, shared a mutually beneficial economic relationship, and cooperated closely on numerous diplomatic and security issues. Spain has been a member of NATO since 1982 and a member of the European Union (EU) since 1986. Some Members of Congress may have an interest in Spain’s internal political situation and relations with the United States. 
Political Situation
Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez of the center-left Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) has led the government of Spain since 2018. PSOE formed a minority coalition government with Sumar, an alliance of left-wing parties, following Spain’s 2023 election. The government relies on parliamentary support from smaller regional parties to pass legislation. The center-right Popular Party (PP) and the far-right party Vox are the main opposition parties. The next election is due by August 2027. King Felipe VI is Spain’s head of state.
U.S.-Spain Tensions
Prime Minister Sánchez has been a leading European critic of the Trump Administration’s foreign policy. The Sánchez government has expressed opposition to the U.S. military operation against Iran that began in February 2026 and denied the use of military bases in Spain to U.S. forces involved in strikes against Iran. The Trump Administration has strongly criticized Spain’s position, and President Trump has threatened to “cut off all trade” with Spain in response.
At NATO’s 2025 summit, Spain was the only member of the alliance not to commit to spending 5% of gross domestic product on defense by 2035 (3.5% on core defense requirements, such as equipment and personnel, and 1.5% on defense- and security-related spending, such as critical infrastructure, civil preparedness, and a strong defense industrial base). President Trump strongly criticized Spain’s position.
Security and Defense Relations
Spain has played an important role in U.S. defense strategy for Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. Five U.S. destroyers equipped with the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense system are based in Spain, and the United States also has access to an air base in Spain. Historically, the United States and Spain have cooperated closely on counterterrorism. Spanish forces participated in the NATO-led missions in Afghanistan for nearly two decades. 
Economic Relations
Two-way direct investment between the United States and Spain totaled more than $121 billion in 2024, with Spanish investment in the United States accounting for nearly three-quarters of that total. U.S.-Spain trade in goods and services was valued at nearly $75 billion in 2025, and the United States had a trade surplus of almost $3 billion.
Selected Foreign Policy and Security Issues
Spanish armed forces participate in more than a dozen international peacekeeping and security operations, including NATO and EU missions and the United Nations peacekeeping mission in Lebanon.
Following Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Spain has provided Ukraine with military, financial, and humanitarian assistance and supported EU sanctions against Russia. Spain hosts more than a quarter of a million Ukrainian refugees.
Relations between Spain and Israel have been strained over the past several years. Spanish officials criticized Israel’s military operations in Gaza and against Iran. In 2024, Spain formally recognized a Palestinian state based on pre-1967 borders. 
The Sánchez government has deepened Spain’s ties with the People’s Republic of China (PRC, or China). Sánchez has traveled to China four times in four years, and the two countries have signed numerous trade and cooperation agreements. Some analysts assert that Sánchez’s approach to China is a strategy to diversify Spain’s economic ties in the context of tensions with the United States over tariffs and foreign policy issues. ",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48966/R48966.8.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48966.html
R48965,Statutory Mechanisms for Agency Oversight After INS v. Chadha,2026-06-02T04:00:00Z,2026-06-04T15:23:03Z,Active,Reports,Matthew D. Trout,"Legislative Branch, Presidential Vetoes, Executive Branch, Government Oversight, Separation of Powers","This report examines legislative options for Congress to create statutory mechanisms for executive branch oversight. Historically, and to some extent still today, Congress enacted legislative vetoes as a method of ensuring executive adherence to legislative preferences. A legislative veto is a provision in statute that permits Congress, or some component of Congress, to review an executive action and prevent it from going into effect by voting to disapprove, or failing to approve as the case may be, that action. Although the statute creating the veto is initially passed like other legislation through bicameralism and presentment—passing both Houses of Congress and being signed by the President (or overriding the President’s veto)—exercising the legislative veto only requires a vote of the specified part of Congress. In some cases that could mean a simple majority vote in a single committee is sufficient to veto the executive action.
In a landmark 1983 decision, INS v. Chadha, the Supreme Court held that legislative vetoes were unconstitutional because they made legislative changes without meeting the Constitution’s bicameralism and presentment requirements for passing new legislation. That decision and its progeny have had significant effects on Congress’s methods of statutory executive branch oversight, limiting legally enforceable options in certain ways. Nonetheless, Congress has remaining interest in fashioning statutory mechanisms that comply with the Constitution, providing executive oversight in a timely manner, and ensuring legislative preferences are taken into consideration during executive branch decisionmaking.
This report examines the history of legislative vetoes leading up to the Supreme Court decision in Chadha. It examines the legal reasoning behind the decision, including how the Supreme Court and lower courts have applied that reasoning in subsequent cases. With those legal principles in mind, it examines potential options for legislators seeking to establish statutory oversight mechanisms, beginning with executive branch reporting requirements and walking through more complex report-and-wait requirements and expedited legislative procedures, among others. The end result is an array of options for legislators to consider when drafting legislation seeking to establish how executive branch discretion is monitored and overseen.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48965/R48965.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48965.html
R48964,USMCA Joint Review: Background on Prior Negotiations and Selected Issues for Congress,2026-06-02T04:00:00Z,2026-06-06T05:53:44Z,Active,Reports,"Kyla H. Kitamura, Christopher A. Casey, Shayerah I. Akhtar, Danielle M. Trachtenberg, Cathleen D. Cimino-Isaacs, Michael D. Sutherland","Latin America, Caribbean & Canada, U.S. Trade Policy, U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), Major Economies & U.S. Trade Relations, Trade Agreements","In 2026, the United States, Canada, and Mexico are scheduled to conduct a review of the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) that could result in the revision or phasing out of the agreement. The review is the first of its kind in any U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA). Congress was heavily involved in shaping U.S. priorities during the negotiation of USMCA. Congress also approved USMCA and enacted legislation in 2020 to implement the agreement. In its oversight capacity, Congress may request consultations with the executive branch regarding USMCA implementation and the review process. Members of Congress may also consider whether—and, if so, to what extent—congressional priorities raised during the 2017-2019 USMCA negotiations have been addressed and/or implemented, and whether to pursue any changes to USMCA as part of the review process. Congress could also assess the advantages and disadvantages of comprehensive FTAs for the U.S. economy and the lessons learned from the negotiation, implementation, and review of USMCA.
A key trade policy issue for Congress at the time of USMCA negotiations related to President Trump’s threats to potentially withdraw from the trilateral 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and what that might imply about shared or overlapping congressional-executive authorities on U.S. trade policy. Other issues that were a focus of congressional attention included adding a clause requiring periodic reviews of USMCA, the first such provision in a U.S. FTA; making changes to the rules for duty-free trade of automotive products; modernizing the agreement by including digital trade provisions and updating intellectual property rights protections; changing and removing some investor-state dispute settlement provisions; enhancing provisions related to labor and environment standards; modifying government procurement provisions; and determining whether to retain NAFTA’s binational dispute settlement mechanism. In response to concerns expressed by some Members and other policymakers, USMCA included a new nonmarket economy clause that requires a party to notify the other parties of any efforts to enter into an FTA with a nonmarket economy such as China. 
In August 2017, the United States, Mexico, and Canada officially launched the “renegotiation and modernization” of NAFTA. At the time of its negotiation in the 1990s, NAFTA was the most comprehensive free trade agreement (FTA) that the United States had negotiated. It eliminated nearly all tariffs and most nontariff barriers on trade within North America, and it contained novel provisions that influenced subsequent U.S. trade policy and U.S. FTAs. 
The negotiation and approval of NAFTA was widely debated in Congress, with proponents arguing that the agreement would help generate jobs and reduce income disparity, while opponents warned that the agreement would result in companies moving operations to Mexico, leading to U.S. job losses. U.S. stakeholder opinions on NAFTA remained divided more than two decades after the agreement went into effect. The renegotiation of NAFTA ultimately resulted in USMCA.
Congress approved USMCA and enacted its implementing legislation under rules set out in the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015 (TPA-2015; P.L. 114-26, Title 1), which expired in 2021. In May 2017, the Trump Administration notified Congress of its intent to begin trade talks with Canada and Mexico, as required by TPA-2015. Negotiations officially began on August 16, 2017. In November 2018, the United States, Mexico, and Canada signed USMCA. In December 2019, the three parties signed a protocol to amend the agreement text, in part due to congressional pressure to revise certain provisions. In 2020, Congress passed, and the President signed, the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement Implementation Act (P.L. 116-113), and USMCA entered into force on July 1, 2020, replacing NAFTA. The negotiations that led to that moment, and Congress’s role in them, help provide a roadmap of issues now facing Congress as the United States, Canada, and Mexico embark on a review of USMCA that could result in the revision or phasing out of the agreement. For additional information on the USMCA joint review process and the role of Congress, see CRS Report R48787, USMCA Joint Review: Process and Role of Congress.
",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48964/R48964.4.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48964.html
LSB11437,Denaturalization: A Brief Overview of the Current Legal Framework,2026-06-02T04:00:00Z,2026-06-04T11:23:15Z,Active,Posts,Alejandra Aramayo,"Immigration Law, Permanent Immigration, Naturalization","Congress has established terms and conditions under which foreign-born persons may acquire citizenship through a process known as naturalization. In addition to providing a framework for the acquisition of citizenship for persons born abroad to U.S. citizen parents, federal law sets forth a process for a lawful permanent resident (LPR) to become a U.S. citizen if he or she meets certain statutory requirements. As discussed in another CRS product, most LPRs residing in the United States are eligible for naturalization. The process to revoke an individual’s previously granted naturalization status is commonly known as denaturalization. This process may generally occur any time after naturalization has been granted, with few exceptions. Section 1451 of Title 8 of the U.S. Code specifies several grounds upon which to revoke naturalization. Following denaturalization, an individual’s status reverts back to the status held before becoming a U.S. citizen. An individual may also face criminal penalties or imprisonment if a court determines that he or she “knowingly procure[d] or attempt[ed] to procure, contrary to law, the naturalization of any person.” 
The Trump Administration has issued multiple directives on denaturalization. On January 20, 2025, President Trump issued an executive order that, among other things, requires the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Attorney General, the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Director of National Intelligence, to “ensure the devotion of adequate resources to identify and take appropriate action for offenses described in 8 U.S.C. § 1451.” On June 11, 2025, the Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ) directed attorneys to prioritize denaturalization cases as a civil enforcement priority (June memo). Additionally, it has been reported that the Trump Administration issued internal guidance in December 2025 asking DHS’s U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) field offices to “supply [DOJ’s] Office of Immigration Litigation with 100-200 denaturalization cases per month” for the remainder of FY2026, and the Administration has also reportedly expanded the types of DOJ attorneys handling denaturalization cases. The denaturalization process has been the subject of legislative interest in the 119th Congress, including both congressional hearings and legislative proposals (e.g., the SCAM Act (S. 3674 and H.R. 7156), the Naturalization Accountability Act (S. 4105), and the American Citizens First Act (S. 3318)).
This Legal Sidebar briefly explains the constitutional and statutory authorities for the denaturalization processes. The Sidebar then discusses recent executive branch denaturalization efforts.
Constitutional and Statutory Authorities
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution authorizes Congress “[t]o establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization.” Pursuant to this authority, Congress enacted the Naturalization Act of 1790, which has since been amended several times. The last major amendments were enacted in the Immigration Act of 1990, which transferred responsibility for the naturalization process from the courts to the executive branch. (The 1990 Act originally delegated authority over this administrative naturalization process to the Attorney General, but it is now implemented by DHS.) In general, to naturalize under 8 U.S.C. § 1427, individuals must have resided continuously in the United States for five years as LPRs and must demonstrate that they have been and still are persons “of good moral character, attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States, and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the United States” during the required period of residence. For more information about the naturalization process and a policy overview, see this CRS report.
Early naturalization laws did not include denaturalization provisions, and there was uncertainty over when or whether courts could set aside an earlier naturalization determination. President Theodore Roosevelt called on Congress to revise the existing naturalization laws, including to formalize denaturalization proceedings, following reports of widespread abuse. The first denaturalization law was included in the Naturalization Act of 1906 and delegated to U.S. Attorneys the authority, “upon affidavit showing good cause therefor, to institute proceedings . . . for the purpose of setting aside and canceling the certificate of citizenship on the ground of fraud” or illegal procurement. The Nationality Act of 1940 modeled the 1906 law and also included a more comprehensive set of rules to rescind citizenship from both naturalized and native-born U.S. citizens who commit certain acts “with the intention of relinquishing [U.S.] nationality” (also known as expatriation). The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA) changed the basis to denaturalize an individual “from fraud and illegal procurement to procurement by concealment of material fact or by willful misrepresentation.” 
Civil and Criminal Proceedings
To begin the denaturalization process, DHS’s USCIS recommends to the DOJ that it institute civil revocation or criminal prosecution proceedings against an identified individual. For civil revocation, a DOJ attorney files a complaint with an affidavit showing good cause in the judicial district where the naturalized citizen lives. The DOJ attorney can initiate these proceedings under the civil or criminal denaturalization statutes, depending on the facts presented in each case. Most cases are litigated as civil proceedings, where there is no statute of limitations or right to a court-appointed attorney, and the burden of proof is “clear, convincing, and unequivocal evidence which does not leave the issue in doubt.” For criminal proceedings brought under 18 U.S.C. § 1425, there is generally a statute of limitations of 10 years, the burden of proof is beyond a reasonable doubt, and the individual has a right to counsel.  
In civil denaturalization proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a), individuals can have their naturalization status revoked if a court determines the certificate of naturalization and citizenship order were either “illegally procured or were procured by concealment of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation.” The Supreme Court has held that to establish that an individual “illegally procured” naturalization under Section 1451(a), the government must prove that he or she failed “to comply with the statutory prerequisites for naturalization,” as set forth in the INA. An example of this would be individuals who did not have the requisite good moral character leading up to and at the time they sought to naturalize. 
To establish procurement by concealing a material fact or willful misrepresentation, according to the Supreme Court, the government must establish four independent requirements: (1) there must have been a misrepresented or concealed fact; (2) the misrepresentation or concealment must have been willful; (3) it must have been material; and (4) “the naturalized citizen must have procured citizenship as a result of the misrepresentation or concealment.” The Supreme Court has determined that the test for whether the concealments or misrepresentations are material “is whether they have a natural tendency to influence the decisions of” DHS. To determine the natural tendencies, the Court explained “what is relevant is what would have ensued from official knowledge of the misrepresented fact . . . not what would have ensued from official knowledge of inconsistency between” the later-asserted truth and the earlier lie. An example of this would be an individual who intentionally lies at his or her naturalization interview to obtain citizenship. Although not codified in statute, the Supreme Court has held that the standard of proof for civil denaturalization is “clear, unequivocal, and convincing” evidence that does not leave “the issue in doubt.” If the requisite burden is met, the court must enter an order revoking the naturalization order and canceling the naturalization certificate. Once the revocation process is complete, the individual’s immigration status reverts back to the status held before naturalization. 
An individual can also be denaturalized, within 10 years of naturalization, if convicted for criminal contempt for refusing to testify before a congressional committee on alleged “subversive activities.” Further, if a naturalized citizen, within the first five years of naturalization, becomes a member of or is affiliated with an organization that is opposed to organized government or favors totalitarian forms of government, this is prima facie evidence that he or she “was not attached [at the time of naturalization] to the principles of the Constitution . . . and was not well disposed to the good order and happiness of the United States,” which is required for naturalization under 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a), and a court may authorize denaturalization. Federal statute provides that family members who derived citizenship may also be denaturalized under these listed provisions. 
As to criminal proceedings, under 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a), individuals who knowingly procure or attempt to procure naturalization of any person can be criminally prosecuted and, if found guilty, fined and/or imprisoned. After a conviction under Section 1425(a), the court in which the proceedings took place shall then issue an order revoking the individual’s naturalization, under 8 U.S.C. § 1451(e). The Supreme Court held in 2017 that an individual violates Section 1425(a) only when he or she committed an illegal act that “played some role in [his or] her naturalization.” The Court reminded that it has “never read a statute to strip citizenship from someone who met the legal criteria for acquiring it” and held that “qualification for citizenship is a complete defense to a prosecution brought under [Section 1425(a)].”
Other statutes addressing denaturalization include 8 U.S.C. §§ 1439(f) and 1440(c). Under these provisions, individuals can be denaturalized if they obtained naturalization through service in the U.S. military but later separated “under other than honorable conditions” before they served honorably for at least five years. 
As mentioned earlier, once naturalization is revoked, an individual reverts back to his or her status before naturalization, which typically means LPR status. LPRs are subject to the grounds of deportability under immigration law (and, in certain cases, the grounds of inadmissibility if they are seeking to return to the United States from a trip abroad, including after a period of more than 180 days). According to DOJ’s Journal of Federal Law and Practice, denaturalized individuals must surrender and deliver their naturalization certificates and any other documentation showing proof of U.S. citizenship (such as a U.S. passport), and DOJ notifies DHS and the State Department that the individual is no longer a U.S. citizen. Further, according to DOJ practice, “the government does not expend resources on civil denaturalization actions unless the ultimate goal is the removal of the [individual] from the United States” and DOJ “attorneys confirm that goal before filing the complaint.” 
Recent Administrations’ Denaturalization Efforts
Between 1968 and 2013, fewer than 150 individuals were denaturalized. The Obama Administration launched Operation Janus to investigate individuals who had orders of removal but later naturalized under different names. Operation Janus was expanded in 2019 during the first Trump Administration as Operation Second Look, which aimed to review an estimated 700,000 files. 
The first Trump Administration also made a concerted effort to prioritize denaturalization. In 2017, Attorney General Sessions announced that the DOJ would aggressively pursue denaturalization. In 2018, USCIS announced that it intended to refer an additional 1,600 cases to the DOJ for denaturalization. In 2020, the DOJ’s Civil Division created a section specifically dedicated to denaturalization cases. The goal of this new section was “to bring justice to terrorists, war criminals, sex offenders, and other fraudsters who illegally obtained naturalization.” In 2021, President Biden issued an executive order that told agency heads to ensure that denaturalization policies and practices were “not used excessively or inappropriately.” In 2022, the Biden Administration issued a new policy that certain nonprofit groups argued continued the first Trump Administration’s denaturalization efforts. Between 2017 and 2025, it was reported that “over 130 cases were filed.”  
The Trump Administration has continued and expanded its efforts to prioritize denaturalization, Since the June 2025 memo was issued, the DOJ has pursued several civil denaturalization cases. ",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB11437/LSB11437.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/HTML/LSB11437.html
IF13240,Connecting Constituents with Federal Assistance for Health and Medical Businesses,2026-06-02T04:00:00Z,2026-06-06T05:53:06Z,Active,Resources,"Kate M. Costin, Michele L. Malloy","Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR), Health & Medical R&D, Small Business, Technology & Innovation, Prescription Drugs, Health Care Delivery, SBA 8(a) Business Development Program, Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR), FDA Product Regulation & Medical Research","Federal assistance for health- and medical-related groups primarily focuses on nonprofit organizations. For-profit health and medical businesses do not qualify for many of these opportunities. However, these businesses may qualify for other business-related federal assistance. Health and medical businesses include medical equipment companies, digital health companies, for-profit health care facilities, and medical device and pharmaceutical manufacturers, among others.
Federal agencies assist businesses through a number of credit and technical assistance programs. With few exceptions, the federal government typically does not award grants for starting or expanding for-profit businesses. Exceptions include certain federal grants that may be available for businesses involved in research and development (R&D) activities (e.g., the Small Business Research Programs—see CRS Report R43695, Small Business Research Programs: SBIR and STTR). Agencies may also contract with businesses.
This In Focus includes a summary of selected federal agencies and programs that provide business assistance such as loans, business counseling, and other forms of technical assistance to health and medical businesses. These programs vary in scope, funding levels, and availability, and their relevancy to meeting the needs of specific businesses also varies. This In Focus does not represent a comprehensive list of all potentially relevant federal assistance programs for health and medical businesses, nor does it cover federal contracting preferences and tax incentives.
For broader business assistance opportunities, including those from the Small Business Administration (SBA), see CRS In Focus IF12449, Connecting Constituents with Federal Assistance for Businesses.
Specific information about health care facilities is available in CRS Report R48081, Sources of Federal Funding for Health Care Facilities: Frequently Asked Questions.
Health and Human Services (HHS)
Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization (OSDBU)
HHS partners with the SBA to support small business contractors. OSDBU, in conjunction with the SBA, supports several programs for small businesses:
The 8(a) Business Development Program supports small businesses owned by socially or economically disadvantaged people or entities competing for federal contracts. The SBA supports eligible entities through federal contracting opportunities, training, and technical assistance. Several CRS publications discuss the 8(a) Business Development Program, including CRS In Focus IF12458, The SBA’s 8(a) Business Development Program. 
The HUBZone program supports small businesses located in historically underutilized business areas. HUBZone-certified businesses are eligible for contract set-asides and sole-source awards. For more information, see CRS In Focus IF12428, The SBA’s Historically Underutilized Business Zone (HUBZone) Program.
According to the HHS website, “each year, the federal government aims to award at least 5% of all federal contracting dollars to Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Small Businesses (SDVOSB).” Businesses must be certified by the SBA under the SDVOSB program and may receive contract set-asides and sole-source awards.
HHS sets aside certain federal contracts for eligible Women-Owned Small Businesses and Economically Disadvantaged Women-Owned Small Businesses. Entities must certify their eligibility through the SBA.
OSDBU hosts the Small Business Customer Experience Portal, a database providing information on HHS programs—including contracting opportunities and potential engagement opportunities with industry partners—and a Small Business Directory.
National Institutes of Health (NIH)
The NIH Seed Fund is another SBA partnership that provides funding for small businesses through the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) and Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) Programs.
SBIR contracts are funding opportunities available to small businesses that meet specific needs, as identified by NIH.
SBIR and STTR grant funding opportunities are for small business entrepreneurs seeking non-dilutive funding (capital received that does not require giving up equity or ownership) for early-stage R&D. STTR grants require partnership with nonprofit research institutions.
The Small Business Transition Grant is awarded to  early-career scientists and professionals with research, technology development, and/or health care delivery skills and experience. Applicants must have limited entrepreneurial and independent (non-mentored) research leadership experience.
The Technical and Business Assistance Programs help small businesses identify and address certain product development needs. Funding can support assistance with product sales, intellectual property protections, market research, development of regulatory and manufacturing plans, and access to technical and business literature available through online databases.
Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
FDA research programs provide initiatives encouraging small businesses to meet federal research and development needs, increase private sector commercialization of innovations derived from federal R&D, and foster and encourage participation by minority and disadvantaged persons in technological innovation. 
Information on small business assistance available through several FDA centers is available through the FDA’s website. Examples of FDA funding avenues small businesses may qualify for include the following: 
The FDA Broad Agency Announcement (BAA) for Advanced Research and Development of Regulatory Science is an example of an agency-wide BAA established to support R&D in regulatory science and innovation.
The Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research Advanced Technologies Program supports development and adoption of advanced technologies to modernize biopharmaceutical manufacturing.
The Office of Regulatory and Emerging Science provides funding for extramural medical countermeasures (MCMs) regulatory science research to promote MCM safety, efficacy, quality, and performance.
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)
CMS does not provide grant or loan funding directly to businesses. However, as the agency overseeing Medicare, Medicaid, the Children’s Health Insurance Program, and the Health Insurance Marketplace, CMS has some initiatives that may involve health and medical businesses.
In order to bill Medicare for services provided, providers of medical care and suppliers of durable medical equipment, prosthetics/orthotics, and supplies can obtain national provider identifiers and complete the enrollment process. Businesses creating or supplying services or items they want Medicare to cover may seek details about the Medicare coverage determination processes. See CRS In Focus IF13031, Medicare Coverage: Background and Resources, for more information.
The CMS Innovation Center, also referred to as the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation, develops and tests health care payment and service delivery options to improve patient care, lower costs, and align payment systems to promote patient-centered practices. Though participants in these pilot or demonstration programs are generally already Medicare providers, some opportunities (such as one current model to test healthy lifestyle interventions) more broadly include health care businesses, including technology companies. Businesses can search current models or sign up for updates.
CMS also hosts initiatives that may seek participation or feedback from businesses. For example, their Health Technology Ecosystem initiative includes a Medicare App Library seeking developer applications.
Health care businesses seeking to become Medicaid providers may enroll with their state Medicaid agencies.
Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA)
BARDA partners with industry to support the late state development of MCMs in order to respond to health security threats. Threats include chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear accidents; incidents and attacks; pandemic influenza; and emerging infectious diseases.
Funding to support industry partners specializing in developing MCMs may be available through the BARDA BAA.
Additional Resources
Congressional offices and businesses may consult several additional potential sources of funding or training, including the following:
State and local government agencies are often involved in administering grants and incentives for economic development purposes. Constituents can contact their state economic development organizations for additional assistance, incentives, or loan options. They can also contact their state health departments or view listed funding opportunities.
The resources at USA.gov broadly identify the government financing programs that may be available to help finance an existing business.
The Rural Health Information Hub provides state and topical guides that discuss funding opportunities. These guides are focused on rural areas and funding may or may not be available to for-profit organizations.
The SBA’s Small Business Development Centers provide free counseling, training, and resources to small business owners and entrepreneurs. See CRS In Focus IF12402, The SBA’s Small Business Development Centers Program.
SCORE, an SBA partner organization, is a nonprofit association dedicated to helping nonprofits and small businesses achieve their goals through education and mentorship.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13240/IF13240.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13240.html
IF13239,Prohibiting Senators from Prediction Market Participation,2026-06-01T04:00:00Z,2026-06-02T17:53:07Z,Active,Resources,"Jacob R. Straus, Jason O. Heflin",,"In April 2026, the Senate agreed to S.Res. 708, as amended, to amend Senate rules to prohibit Senators, Senate officers, and Senate employees from participating in prediction markets—exchange platforms that specialize in offering event contracts with a binary payoff structure tied to the occurrence or nonoccurrence of a specific event.
This In Focus provides background on the Senate prohibition on participation in prediction markets, related legislation, legal context, and considerations for Congress.
Amendment to Senate Standing Rules
On April 30, 2026, the Senate agreed to S.Res. 708, as amended, to amend Rule XXXVII (Senate Rule 37) of the standing rules of the Senate and prohibit Senators, Senate officers, and Senate employees from participating in prediction markets. During debate on the resolution, the sponsor explained his reasoning for introducing the measure.
Engaging in any way in a prediction market or trying to place bets where we might have insider information deteriorates the confidence our constituents have in us. So it is extremely important that the public know that from this day forward, there is no chance that any Member of Congress—Member of the Senate in this case, in this resolution I am going to propose—will be involved in any prediction market whatsoever. I am presenting a resolution that makes that crystal clear.
By changing the standing rules of the Senate, what we are doing is allowing our constituents to know once and for all that no Member of the U.S. Senate, no Member of the staff of the U.S. Senate can ever use that inside information as a way to monetize this job whatsoever.
—Senator Bernie Moreno, Congressional Record, 
April 30, 2026 (p. S2151)
Senate Rule 37 contains “Conflict of Interest” provisions that govern outside employment restrictions, financial ethics, and other conflicts of interest. As amended, the new clause in Rule 37, as added by S.Res. 708, states:
Section. 1. Prohibition on Prediction Market Trading by Senators
...
15. No Member, officer, or employee of the Senate may enter into, or offer to enter into, an agreement, contract, swap, or transaction that provides for any purchase, sale, payment, or delivery of an excluded commodity, as defined in section 1a of the Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 1a), that is dependent on the occurrence, nonoccurrence, or the extent of the occurrence of a specific event or contingency. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to apply to insurance for which the insured holds a lawful insurable interest.
Additionally, S.Res. 708 contains a “Sense of the Senate” provision that the “House of Representatives, executive branch, and judicial branch should establish restrictions similar to those” adopted by the Senate.
Following adoption of S.Res. 708, the Senate Select Committee on Ethics issued a Dear Colleague letter to provide guidance on prediction markets. The Dear Colleague letter described prediction markets as “exchange platforms specializing in event contracts. Event contracts refer to contracts with a binary payoff structure based on the occurrence or nonoccurrence of an event. Users buy and sell these event contracts, continually updating the established price.” The letter reiterated that the prohibition extends to activity “conditioned on the occurrence, nonoccurrence, or extent of an occurrence of a specific event.” For more information, see CRS In Focus IF13187, Prediction Markets: Policy Issues for Congress, by Karl E. Schneider and Rena S. Miller (2026); and CRS Legal Sidebar LSB11406, Prediction Markets and Insider Trading Law, by Jay B. Sykes (2026).
Senate Select Committee on Ethics Implementation of Prediction Market Prohibition
The Senate Select Committee on Ethics’ Dear Colleague letter included guidance and frequently asked questions (FAQ) for the implementation of S.Res. 708. The letter provided background information on prediction markets and noted the laws restricting the use of material nonpublic information. The FAQ explained that S.Res. 708
does not apply to spouses and dependent children of covered individuals; 
does not apply to commodity futures trading in agricultural products or exempt commodities, but does apply to excluded “commodities conditioned on the occurrence or nonoccurrence, or extent of an occurrence of a specific event”;
does not apply to legalized sports gambling in jurisdictions that permit sports wagering; and
is effective immediately and covered individuals are required to divest positions and could be required to file a periodic transaction report (PTR).
Other Proposed Legislation
In addition to the Senate’s adoption of S.Res. 708, proposals have been introduced to limit Members’ (and others’) participation in prediction markets. In the 119th Congress, two House resolutions—H.Res. 1248 and H.Res. 1263—propose to restrict House Members, House officers, and House employees from participation in prediction markets, similar to S.Res. 708. Both House resolutions also propose an exemption for insurance contracts similar to the exemption found in the Senate prohibition. H.Res. 1248 also includes an exemption for lawful sports wagers.
Several measures have been introduced that propose to amend the Ethics in Government Act (H.R. 8076; S. 4188), amend the Commodity Exchange Act (S. 4017), or create new law (H.R. 7004) to prohibit Members of Congress and other covered individuals from participation in prediction markets. For analysis of prediction market legislation, see CRS In Focus IF13207, Prediction Markets Legislation in the 119th Congress, by Karl E. Schneider and Alexander H. Pepper (2026).
Legal Context
Measures like S.Res. 708 exercise authority granted Congress under Article I, Section 5, Clause 2 of the Constitution, which gives each chamber authority to determine the rules of its proceedings and to punish its Members. 
In addition to chamber rules, Members and congressional staff participating in prediction markets are subject to requirements under certain government ethics statutes. These include the Ethics in Government Act and the Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge (STOCK) Act, which may require annual and/or periodic disclosure of transactions on prediction markets. For more information on disclosure requirements, see CRS Report R47320, Financial Disclosure in the U.S. Government: Frequently Asked Questions, by Jacob R. Straus (2023).
No federal law prohibits Members or congressional staff from trading on prediction markets. The primary federal conflict of interest statute, 18 U.S.C. §208, does not apply to Members or congressional staff. However, Members and congressional staff trading on prediction markets using confidential information gained in the course of their government service are subject to other limitations under federal law. Some prediction markets have registered with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), and the CFTC has treated contracts traded on these markets as options and swaps. The Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) prohibits the use of “any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance, in contravention of such rules and regulations as [CFTC] shall promulgate.” CFTC has used a rule implementing this provision, Rule 180.1, to pursue persons making trades in commodities and derivatives markets based on material, nonpublic information in breach of a duty to the source of the information. 
In addition to this generally applicable prohibition, Members and congressional staff are also subject to certain explicit prohibitions. The CEA, as amended by the STOCK Act, prohibits Members and employees of Congress from using nonpublic “information that may affect or tend to affect the price of any commodity in interstate commerce, or for future delivery, or any swap” to enter into a futures contract, option, or swap for personal gain. Members and congressional staff are also prohibited from providing such information to a third party with intent to assist that person to enter into such transactions. 
These prohibitions also apply to other employees or agents of the federal government. CFTC has recently taken action against an active-duty servicemember in the U.S. Army for violating these prohibitions and Rule 180.1 by allegedly using nonpublic information to trade on a prediction market. The U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York has also brought criminal charges arising from the same conduct.
Considerations for Congress
Congress could decide to take no further action in relation to the participation of government officials in prediction markets. Should Congress decide to legislate further, several options might exist. These could include a prohibition similar to S.Res. 708, a limitation on participation in categories of prediction market contracts related to congressional or governmental actions, or the inclusion of prediction markets in other measures limiting financial activities.
In that context, the House could pass a resolution to amend House Rules to prohibit House Members, House officers, and/or House employees from engaging in prediction markets. Amending House Rules would likely create a parallel requirement in House and Senate Rules against participation in prediction markets.
The House and Senate could enact legislation to statutorily prohibit Members, House and Senate officers, House and Senate employees, or other covered officials from participating in prediction markets.
Congress could enact legislation to cover a broader group of government officials and employees. For further discussion of legislative proposal in the 119th Congress that would limit or prohibit participation in prediction markets, see CRS Report R48641, Proposals to Limit Member of Congress Financial Activities: Analysis of Introduced Legislation in the 119th Congress, by Jacob R. Straus (2026).",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13239/IF13239.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13239.html
IF13238,The Role of Employer Reports in Understanding Labor Markets,2026-06-01T04:00:00Z,2026-06-02T17:23:28Z,Active,Resources,Elizabeth Weber Handwerker,"Artificial Intelligence, Generative Artificial Intelligence, Technology & Innovation, Labor Force, Labor Standards","Much knowledge about labor markets in the United States comes from employer reports, such as employers’ responses to government surveys and tax filings. While employer responses provide valuable labor market information, there are limitations on what employers can or will report about changes in labor markets. 
This In Focus describes measures of labor markets based on employer reports, with an emphasis on the value and limitations on information from employers about how Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Generative AI (GenAI) technologies are now and may in the future affect labor markets. It relies on ideas presented in CRS In Focus IF13182, The Impact of Generative AI on Labor Markets: Frameworks.
Measures Based on Employer Reports
Many existing measures of labor markets—including measures critical for understanding the impacts of AI and GenAI—are based on data collected from employers. 
Measuring Employment Levels and Changes
Some of the most fundamental concerns about how AI and GenAI may affect labor markets involve potential changes in employment levels. Changes in the number of jobs in the United States are measured each month by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Current Employment Statistics (CES) program. The CES surveys thousands of employers each month, asking how many people are on these employers’ payrolls. These employer reports are used to estimate employment changes (total and by industry) with less than a one-month lag. CES employment change estimates are benchmarked each year to incorporate less timely but more comprehensive data based on employers’ unemployment insurance tax filings, as compiled in the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW). These data do not capture reasons for employment changes. Some private sector payroll companies also publish estimates of employment change based on payroll data.  
New technologies, such as AI and GenAI, may lead to changes in employment for particular types of work, which are not captured in the CES or QCEW. The Occupational Employment and Wage Statistics (OEWS) program at BLS publishes estimates of employment by occupation for each state and metropolitan area annually. OEWS estimates are based on surveying hundreds of thousands of employers about their employment levels by occupation and combining these employer responses with QCEW information on the full population of employers. Each OEWS estimate is based on three years of data collection, so changes in employment by occupation can be estimated only with these data over three-year periods. These data also do not capture reasons for employment changes.
Measuring Changes in Hiring and Separations
Overall employment levels change through hiring and separations (e.g., layoffs and retirements). The BLS Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) measures hires and separations by surveying employers about their hires and separations in the previous month and combining these employer survey responses with QCEW information on the full population of employers. JOLTS estimates are available by state every month. Some policymakers and observers concerned with measuring the impacts of AI and GenAI have suggested adding occupational questions to JOLTS to track changes in hiring and separation by job type more rapidly than new OEWS estimates are available. 
Some researchers have used employer data from payroll providers and administrative tax records to study changes in hiring patterns for young workers by occupation or by industry and whether or not these changes can be explained by new technologies. Other researchers have examined employers’ online job postings for junior roles to study changes in labor demand that may be due to these technologies. Some observers have suggested more states should collect occupational data from employers as part of their unemployment insurance tax filings to better measure changes in hiring and separation patterns.
Measuring AI and GenAI Adoption by Employers
The Census Bureau’s Business Trends and Outlook Survey (BTOS) surveys businesses every two weeks. BTOS questions added in 2025 ask these businesses if they are using GenAI, how they use AI and GenAI, and whether their use of AI is increasing or decreasing their overall employment. Census Bureau surveys can be linked with longitudinal data on employment patterns for these businesses. Other surveys asking businesses about their current and expected future AI use have been sponsored by regional Federal Reserve banks.
Measuring What Workers Do on the Job
New technologies can change what workers do on the job. People with the same job title in different time periods may do different tasks during their workdays. 
BLS surveys employers to ask what people do on the job in specific occupations through the Occupational Requirements Survey (ORS). This survey, sponsored by the Social Security Administration to inform disability determinations, focuses on the physical and cognitive requirements of jobs. Some observers have suggested ORS could collect more information on how jobs are changing as AI and GenAI are deployed in workplaces. 
Limitations of Employer Reports
Employer-provided data are valuable but have limitations to capturing the impact of new technologies on labor markets. Limitations of employer-provided data include the timeliness of published data and the contemporaneousness of classification systems. Other limitations involve the accuracy and representativeness of employer reports and limitations in the information employers can provide.
Early Measures of Changes in Employment Are Available by Industry, Not by Type of Work
The CES program produces estimates of month-to-month changes in employment with less than a one-month lag, followed months later by more comprehensive QCEW employment estimates. Both CES and QCEW estimate changes in employment by industry—the classification of what businesses produce overall (e.g., manufacturing or health care)—and not by the types of work people do within these businesses (e.g., machine repairing). 
New technologies may change employment levels for specific types of work. However, changes in employment by industry do not always measure changes in employment by type of work. For example, the contracting out (domestic outsourcing) of factory production jobs in the United States in the 1990s from manufacturing industry employers to employment services industry employers was large enough to affect whether measured manufacturing industry production jobs increased or decreased during this period.
Measuring New Kinds of Work Takes Time
Millions of U.S. workers work in occupations that did not exist 30-40 years ago. One challenge in measuring new types of work is that employment in new occupations is reported only by the federal statistical system as occupations are added to the Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) system. For example, “Data Scientists” were added in the 2018 SOC update. Before this update, Data Scientist employment was included in the employment of “Mathematical Occupations - All Other.” In 2024, the SOC Policy Committee began the first SOC update since 2018, for a version of the SOC scheduled for use beginning in 2028. Some observers have suggested the SOC should be updated more frequently to measure the impact of new technologies on labor markets.
Employers May Intentionally Overstate or Understate Impacts of AI
In 2025, employers cited AI in laying off thousands of workers. Outside observers suggested that these employers may have overstated the impacts of AI on layoffs to appear innovative rather than ascribing the layoffs to slowing sales, previous over-hiring, or negative impacts of policy changes. Overstating the impacts of AI on business decisions has been called “AI-washing.” 
Employers also may have reasons to understate the labor displacement impacts of AI. These reasons could include the reduction of employee opposition to new technology or concerns regarding proposals to tax AI adoption.
Employers Do Not Always Answer Surveys
Employer response rates to federal surveys have been falling in recent years. (The BTOS began in 2022 and has lower response rates than other federal statistical programs mentioned above.) Low response rates mean estimates based on survey data can be affected by variability in which employers choose to respond to the surveys, in addition to the actual changes in labor markets that these surveys are intended to measure. In contrast, federal and state laws require nearly all employers to file the tax reports underlying the QCEW, which has higher reporting rates.
Employers Have Limited Information on Self-Employed and Freelance Work
Many labor market measurement programs—including the CES, OEWS, JOLTS, ORS, and BTOS—collect data from employers. However, not all workers work for employers. Some studies of how GenAI is affecting freelance labor markets have used data from platforms for buying and selling illustrations and stock images. 
Employers Have Limited Information on Labor Supply
New technologies can affect labor supply and labor demand. For example, the increase in home ownership of washing machines in the mid-20th century may have increased U.S. married women’s availability for work outside their homes. There is some evidence now that people are increasingly using GenAI for nonwork tasks. If this new technology use affects labor supply, employers would not be the best source of information about it.
Employers Have Limited Information About the Impacts of Economy-Wide Forces
The full impact of technology on employers’ labor demand is determined by their own technology adoption decisions and by technology adoption decisions made by their customers, suppliers, and competitors. Thus, asking employers how technology affects their own employment decisions cannot capture the full impact of how technology affects labor markets. 
As an example of this measurement problem, in the early 2000s, BLS asked employers involved in mass layoffs (those resulting in at least 50 unemployment insurance claims) about the cause of each mass layoff. From 2004 through 2011, these employers reported laying off an average of 11,000 workers per year because of work being moved out of the United States. Later, more comprehensive analyses examined changes in global trade patterns by industry and the relationship between increased imports to the United States and changes in employment within the United States. These analyses showed increased imports from China were associated with reductions in about 76,000 U.S. manufacturing jobs per year during this period. 
Asking employers to identify the causes of mass layoffs did not fully capture the labor market impacts of greater trade with China earlier this century and is unlikely to fully capture the impacts of AI and GenAI technologies today. Instead, capturing these impacts requires measures of (1) how new technology is being adopted, (2) how the adoption of new technology is changing what workers do on the job, and (3) changes in employment by type of work (occupation).  ",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13238/IF13238.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13238.html
R48963,Cryptocurrency: Regulatory and Legislative Policy Issues,2026-05-29T04:00:00Z,2026-05-30T05:24:05Z,Active,Reports,Paul Tierno,,"Cryptocurrencies are digital assets that can be held and transacted using software and across networks of disparate groups that do not require financial intermediaries, such as banks. Their key features are that they are pseudonymous, decentralized, and permissionless assets, features that are essential to creating the alternative and censorship-resistant financial system promoted by early adopters. These features may also make them instrumental in facilitating illicit activity and create challenges for regulators. Over time, cryptocurrency has grown into a multi-trillion-dollar industry, and a host of policy issues have arisen. This report discusses legislative and regulatory contexts of the cryptocurrency industry and addresses the key issues debated by Congress. 
The legislative and regulatory contexts have changed somewhat over the past few years. Recent policies pursued by President Trump that diverge significantly from policies of the Biden Administration, along with personnel changes at regulatory agencies, highlight the impermanence of regulatory policy from one Administration to the next. Absent legislation, the current more favorable regulatory climate for certain cryptocurrency businesses—a reversal from the regulatory climate during the Biden Administration—could presumably be reversed again. In the legislative context, congressional reception of cryptocurrencies and the industry has also been changing, and many Members on the committees of jurisdiction have expressed interest in establishing legislation to create what they believe are necessary new authorities and a new regulatory structure. 
Congress has generally approached cryptocurrency-related legislation on two tracks, separately considering a stablecoin framework and a cryptocurrency market structure framework. The 119th Congress passed the Guiding and Establishing National Innovation for U.S. Stablecoins Act (GENIUS Act; P.L. 119-27), which regulates payment stablecoin issuers, in July 2025. Congress continues to debate the details of the broader companion bill addressing cryptocurrency market structure, with the House passing the Digital Asset Market Clarity Act of 2025 (CLARITY Act; H.R. 3633). At the same time, the cryptocurrency industry has gained greater acceptance and greater adoption by traditional financial institutions, allowing the industry to advocate for certain legislative and regulatory preferences. Combined, the shifting regulatory climate and the industry’s growing influence have improved the industry’s outlook, but have also exposed tensions between certain members of the cryptocurrency industry and some traditional financial players, such as traditional banks. 
Key policy issues surrounding the cryptocurrency industry that Congress is considering and may choose to address through legislation include, foundationally, whether new authorities are required for certain market regulators, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, and what such authorities should entail. There is significant debate over who will regulate the various types of cryptocurrency activities, including issuance and secondary market trading performed on centralized platforms; how broad responsibilities may be divided among market regulators; and whether regulators will apply existing frameworks or adopt bespoke ones for the asset class and industry. Another key policy issue Congress may consider is whether to establish some taxonomy for various assets so that regulatory treatment applicable to different types of assets—such as cryptocurrency securities and non-securities—is clearer. Difficulty regulating decentralized finance, a facet of the industry that operates through software without intermediaries, is another emerging policy issue. Whether and how Congress chooses to deal with crypto and decentralized finance has consequences for other key policy issues, including how to account for potential illicit activity. Other issues addressed in the report include the role of fraud and scams, potential ethics issues introduced by the participation of President Trump or his family members in certain crypto enterprises, and greater integration with the traditional financial sector.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48963/R48963.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48963.html
R48962,Transition of Servicing Defaulted Federal Student Loans to the Department of the Treasury: Background and Observations,2026-05-29T04:00:00Z,2026-05-30T05:24:33Z,Active,Reports,Alexandra Hegji,,"As of December 31, 2025, the Department of Education’s (ED’s) portfolio of defaulted federal student loans comprises loans of about 7.8 million borrowers (about 18% of all federal student loan borrowers) owing $179 billion. To collect on defaulted federal student loans, the federal government may negotiate a repayment agreement with borrowers, report the loan default to consumer reporting agencies, initiate administrative wage garnishment (AWG) against borrowers, offset borrowers’ federal payments through the Treasury Offset Program (TOP), and/or refer a borrower’s case to the U.S. Department of Justice for civil litigation, among other actions. Borrowers may resolve the default through mechanisms such as payment in full, loan rehabilitation, and loan consolidation. 
ED’s Office of Federal Student Aid (FSA) is the primary entity that administers the Higher Education Act (HEA) Title IV federal student loan programs. Prior to policies implemented by ED in response to and following the COVID-19 pandemic (e.g., a pause in most debt collection activities), FSA and its contracted private collection agencies (PCAs) serviced defaulted student loans by using the above-described tools and assisting borrowers to resolve their loan default. FSA and its contractors significantly decreased their debt collection activities because of the COVID-19-related policies. Additionally, in the midst of the COVID-19-related collection pause, FSA cancelled its contracts with PCAs but did not transition servicing of defaulted student loan debt to a new set of contractors as planned. 
The Department of the Treasury’s (Treasury’s) Bureau of the Fiscal Service (Fiscal Service) provides centralized delinquent debt collection via its Cross-Servicing Program (CSP) for most other federal agencies. Fiscal Service and its contractors attempt to collect on many types of federal delinquent nontax debts and use similar tools as those FSA might use to collect on defaulted federal student loans.
On March 19, 2026, ED and Treasury entered into an interagency agreement (Treasury-ED IAA) “to promote innovation and process improvements in pursuit of more effective federal student aid administration.” The IAA contemplates a three-phase approach to pursuing this objective. In Phase 1, Treasury is to assume responsibility for servicing ED’s defaulted federally held student loans through Fiscal Service’s CSP gradually, and FSA is to pay Fiscal Service fees relating to the cost of its services. (The other two phases are not addressed herein.)
As part of their rationale for entering into the IAA, ED and Treasury have stated that ED is “ill-equipped” to manage the student loan portfolio, whereas, in their view, Treasury has expertise in “managing highly complex financial and information technology systems” and in collecting on delinquent and defaulted debts for other federal agencies. Opponents of the effort argue that Treasury “lacks expertise in the highly unique and complex federal student loan system” and that Fiscal Service may not be adequately resourced for the transition.
Available data indicate that should all ED-held student loans that are 180 days delinquent (the length of delinquency typically required for other federal agencies to refer loans to the CSP) be referred to the CSP, Fiscal Service may see an 85% increase in the number of delinquent debts and an almost 400% increase in the dollar amount of delinquent debts for which it may be responsible for servicing. While these increases are notable, the extent to which they may pose a challenge for Fiscal Service is unclear for several reasons, including that the IAA contemplates a graduated approach to referral of defaulted student loans to Treasury, which may enable Treasury to gradually gain experience in servicing defaulted student loans before increasing the scope of future operations.
Few evaluations of Treasury’s collection of delinquent debts and the CSP are publicly available. A 2016 interim report for a pilot program between FSA and Fiscal Service, under which Fiscal Service serviced a sample of defaulted federal student loans, showed some indications that it was less successful than FSA-contracted PCAs in resolving or collecting on such debts. Report findings indicate that federal student loans are unlike other debts typically serviced by Fiscal Service and that Fiscal Service’s general collection operations may not have been sufficiently tailored to address those unique products. Although Fiscal Service had planned some operational changes to improve its performance under the pilot program in light of the interim report’s findings, the pilot was ended earlier than planned and any final results from program are unavailable.",,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48962.html
LSB11436,Immigration-Related Crimes,2026-05-29T04:00:00Z,2026-05-30T05:23:51Z,Active,Posts,Michael John Garcia,,"Through the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and other laws, Congress has established a comprehensive framework governing the admission, removal, and presence of people who are not citizens or nationals of the United States (aliens). These rules are buttressed by an enforcement scheme that includes civil and criminal components. Aliens who have engaged in certain kinds of proscribed conduct may be denied admission into the United States or, if present, face removal through civil proceedings. Congress has also established criminal penalties for some activities that undermine immigration rules and requirements, such as smuggling aliens into the country. Some of these offenses carry severe penalties.
Immigration-related crimes make up a significant portion of the federal criminal docket. The U.S. Sentencing Commission reported that in 66,662 cases involving individuals sentenced for a federal offense in FY2025, a 37.7% plurality (22,743) involved immigration-related offenses. This Legal Sidebar begins by discussing how the criminal enforcement components of federal immigration law contrast with the civil enforcement components, and then briefly describes the range of immigration-related criminal offenses in federal statute.
Differences Between Criminal and Civil Components of Immigration Enforcement
Federal immigration law includes both civil and criminal components. Civil enforcement mechanisms are intended to correct or remedy a statutory violation, whereas criminal enforcement mechanisms are primarily aimed at punishing an offense and deterring future wrongdoing. The Supreme Court has long characterized immigration removal proceedings as civil in nature, despite the potentially severe consequences for the removed individual. Other immigration violations—such as knowingly hiring or recruiting aliens for work who lack authorization for employment—may be subject to civil fines and, unlike immigration removal proceedings, apply to offenders (e.g., employers) regardless of citizenship or alienage.
Congress has enacted numerous criminal statutes that address immigration-related conduct. Some criminal offenses carry relatively minor misdemeanor penalties, while others constitute felonies potentially punishable by lengthy prison terms and, for a few offenses involving aggravating circumstances, life imprisonment or death.
Whether an immigration requirement is enforced through criminal or civil mechanisms informs the rights to which an alleged offender is entitled. The Constitution contains several provisions affording protections to the defendant in a criminal prosecution, including the Fifth Amendment’s requirement of a grand jury indictment before a defendant may be brought to trial for a serious crime, and the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of a defendant’s rights to a speedy trial, to a trial by jury if charged with a non-petty offense, and to representation by counsel (which the Supreme Court has held to require the government to appoint counsel if an indigent defendant is charged with an offense punishable by imprisonment). The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause has also been understood to require the government to prove the criminal defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and courts enforce the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures by generally barring the government from using illegally obtained evidence in a later prosecution. These constitutional protections are supplemented by a host of statutory rules governing criminal proceedings and affording the defendant the right to appeal the validity of a conviction or sentence.
Many of these procedural protections do not apply to civil proceedings generally and immigration removal proceedings specifically. The constitutional rights afforded to aliens placed in removal proceedings (including both removal proceedings before an administrative adjudicatory body and more streamlined removal processes before an immigration officer) primarily flow from the Due Process Clause, which confers substantive and procedural protections on all persons within the United States, regardless of alienage and legal status. Nonetheless, while the Supreme Court has said that removal proceedings for aliens who have “passed through our gates” must comply with “traditional standards of fairness,” the Court has also recognized that the scope of protections to which an alien is entitled “may vary depending upon status and circumstance,” and that in exercising its plenary authority over the admission and removal of aliens, “Congress may make rules ... that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.” Against this constitutional backdrop, the procedural protections Congress has granted to aliens in removal proceedings are less robust than those the Constitution affords to all criminal defendants. Table 1 highlights some of the major differences between criminal trials and immigration removal proceedings.
Table 1. Key Features of Criminal Trials vs. Immigration Removal Proceedings 
Key Features
Criminal Trial
Removal Proceeding

Function
To determine whether the defendant committed an offense subject to criminal punishment, potentially including fine, imprisonment, or—in limited cases—death
To determine whether the alien committed an immigration violation rendering him or her removable from the United States

Timing of Proceeding
Constitutional and statutory right to a speedy trial; statutes of limitations set time limits for the initiation of many criminal prosecutions
No enforceable right to prompt initiation of removal proceedings, though immigration authorities are directed to commence proceedings against certain criminal aliens expeditiously

Nature of Proceeding
Judicial proceeding before an Article III court
Usually administrative in nature; depending on the alleged violation and the alien’s status, may occur before an administrative adjudicatory body within the Department of Justice or before an immigration officer within the Department of Homeland Security

Grand Jury Indictment
Indictment constitutionally required for a federal felony prosecution to proceed
No grand jury indictment required

Right to Jury Trial
Right to trial by jury if the offense is punishable by more than six months’ imprisonment
No jury trial required

Right to Counsel
Constitutional right to court-appointed counsel if the defendant cannot afford one and the offense is punishable by imprisonment
Statutory privilege to obtain counsel at no expense to the government in removal proceedings before administrative adjudicatory body; no privilege to seek counsel in removal processes conducted by immigration officers

Introduction of Evidence
Federal Rules of Evidence govern criminal trials; government generally cannot introduce evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment 
Federal Rules of Evidence do not govern and the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule is generally inapplicable; evidence of removability must be probative and not render the proceeding fundamentally unfair

Burden of Proof
Government must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
For aliens admitted into the United States, government typically must prove removability by clear and convincing evidence; for aliens charged with being present without admission or parole, once government proves alienage, the alien has the burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence that he or she has been lawfully admitted or, in the absence of such proof, that he or she is clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted; arriving aliens also bear the burden of showing that they are clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted

Judicial Review/Right to Appeal
Statutory right to appeal validity of conviction and sentence
Limited judicial review of a final order of removal; in some cases, review is unavailable 

Source: CRS.
Sometimes conduct that makes aliens removable from the United States is also punishable under criminal statute. For example, an alien apprehended shortly after surreptitiously entering the United States is not only potentially subject to removal by immigration authorities, but also may face criminal prosecution for improper entry. Decisions as to whether a removable alien in immigration authorities’ custody will be referred to criminal law enforcement authorities may depend on a number of factors, including the nature of the offense, prosecutorial resources, and enforcement priorities. Criminal prosecution and civil removal are distinct proceedings, and the pursuit of one does not necessarily preclude the use of the other. The INA provides that convictions for many criminal offenses constitute grounds to initiate removal proceedings. The INA also provides a mechanism by which a judge in a criminal proceeding may, in qualifying cases, issue an order of removal against an alien criminal defendant at the time of sentencing, and also issue an order of removal against a deportable alien as part of a stipulated plea agreement in a criminal prosecution.
Categories of Crimes Involving Immigration-Related Matters
Federal statutes contain numerous criminal offenses penalizing conduct that undermines immigration rules and requirements. Many immigration-related criminal offenses are found in INA provisions codified in Title 8 of the U.S. Code, but some are found in Title 18. As detailed in Table 2, in recent years the most commonly enforced immigration-related criminal statutes have been 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (bringing in and harboring certain aliens); 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (improper alien entry); and 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (illegal reentry of an alien ordered removed).
Table 2. Defendants Charged Under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324, 1325, and 1326 in Recent Fiscal Years
Criminal Statute
FY2023
FY2024
FY2025
FY2026 (through March 2026)

8 U.S.C. § 1324 (bringing in and harboring certain aliens)
5,066
4,794
4,182
1,841

8 U.S.C. § 1325 (improper entry)
5,777
10,890
25,856
13,165

8 U.S.C. § 1326 (illegal reentry of alien ordered removed)
14,350
18,883
28,854
14,481

Source: Office of the United States Attorneys, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Prosecuting Immigration Crimes Report with accompanying data tables, https://www.justice.gov/usao/resources/PICReport.
Notes: Defendants charged with multiple offenses are counted once in each charge group. Charges under 8 U.S.C. § 1325 include combined totals of charges brought before U.S. district courts and U.S. magistrates (who may adjudicate misdemeanor offenses).
These and other immigration-related criminal offenses found in Title 8 and Title 18 of the U.S. Code fall into three overarching and overlapping categories: (1) offenses related to unlawful alien entry, (2) offenses related to unlawful alien presence, and (3) immigration-related fraud. It may be possible for the government to prosecute the same conduct under multiple criminal statutes, provided that each offense requires the government to prove at least one unique element that need not be proven for the other charged offenses.
Offenses Concerning Unlawful Entry
A number of criminal statutes, including 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324,  1325(a), and 1326, address unlawful alien entry. Sections 1325(a) and 1326 are directed at the unlawful entrants themselves, whereas Section 1324 targets persons who facilitate others’ improper entry.
Section 1325(a) makes it a criminal offense to enter or attempt to enter the United States without authorization—whether by (1) entering or attempting to enter the country at a time or place other than as designated by immigration authorities; (2) eluding inspection by immigration officers; or (3) entering or obtaining entry by a willfully false or misleading representation or the willful concealment of a material fact. A first-time violation of Section 1325(a) is a misdemeanor subject to a fine and imprisonment for up to six months, while subsequent offenses are felonies punishable by up to two years’ imprisonment.
Section 1326 provides that it is a felony for an alien who was previously removed from the United States to reenter the country while an order of removal remains in effect, unless expressly authorized by immigration authorities. By default, a conviction carries a punishment of a fine and imprisonment for up to two years. Aliens may face enhanced penalties, potentially including imprisonment for up to 20 years, if they were previously removed or excluded on certain grounds or if they previously committed specified crimes.
Section 1324 sets forth multiple offenses relating to the facilitation of improper alien entry. These offenses include (1) bringing or attempting to bring an alien to the United States, regardless of any future official action that may occur with respect to that alien, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that an alien had not received prior authorization to come to, enter, or reside in the United States; (2) bringing or attempting to bring a person to the United States between ports of entry knowing that the person is an alien; and (3) encouraging or inducing an alien to come to or enter the United States, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that the alien’s entry will be in violation of the law. These offenses typically constitute felonies and may sometimes carry lengthy prison terms, including enhanced penalties when the offense is performed for commercial advantage or private financial gain. In a few instances, such as alien smuggling offenses resulting in serious harm to or the death of a person, the maximum available penalty may be life imprisonment or death.
Other criminal statutes relevant to the unauthorized entry of aliens include, among other offenses, high-speed flight from an immigration checkpoint (18 U.S.C. § 758), assisting in the unlawful entry of an alien known to be inadmissible on criminal or security-related grounds (8 U.S.C. § 1327), and importing aliens into the country for prostitution or “any other immoral purpose” (8 U.S.C. § 1328).
Offenses Concerning Unlawful Alien Presence
Although the Supreme Court has observed that, as a general rule, unlawful presence by an alien is not a crime, a number of statutes may criminalize unauthorized presence if additional factors are met. The most serious penalties attach to aliens who are unlawfully present in the United States in violation of an order of removal. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1253(b), an alien who has been ordered removed and placed under supervised release pending removal is subject to imprisonment for up to one year if he or she willfully fails to comply with the terms of the release. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a), an alien ordered removed who willfully fails or refuses to depart from the United States, or “connives or conspires, or takes any other action” designed to prevent departure, may face a criminal fine and imprisonment for either up to four years or up to ten years, depending on the reason for the removal order.
As discussed earlier, under 8 U.S.C. § 1326, an alien who unlawfully reenters or attempts to reenter the country in violation of an order of removal is subject to felony penalty, with heightened penalties available in some circumstances. Section 1326 also provides that liability attaches if a covered alien is “at any time found in” the United States. This language is legally significant. The federal statute of limitations for most noncapital offenses runs for five years after the final element of the crime has been completed, placing a time limit on when an offender can be prosecuted. The “found in” language in Section 1326 makes the illegal presence of an alien following reentry part of a continuing offense. Regardless of how long ago the alien illegally reentered the country, courts have held that the statute of limitation for a Section 1326 prosecution begins only after federal authorities discover (or should have discovered with reasonable diligence) the alien’s illegal presence.
The INA requires most aliens present in the United States for 30 days or more to apply for registration and fingerprinting with immigration authorities. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1306, failure to do so is a misdemeanor, and it is also a misdemeanor for a registered, lawfully admitted alien to fail to carry his or her registration documents or notify immigration authorities of a change of address. As discussed in another CRS product, a number of factors, including the lack of registration forms applicable to certain categories of aliens (such as the unlawfully present), contributed to the limited enforcement of these criminal laws for many decades. In early 2025, President Trump issued an executive order that directed agencies to treat alien registration requirements “as a civil and criminal enforcement priority,” and a few months later the Department of Homeland Security published an interim final rule creating a new, general registration form to enable unregistered aliens to comply with registration requirements. While public data on alien registration prosecution trends are limited, available data suggest that it remains uncommon for an alien registration violation to be the most serious charge brought against a defendant in a criminal prosecution.
Federal law also criminalizes certain activities by persons seeking to facilitate aliens’ unauthorized presence in the United States. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A), it is a felony for a person to harbor an unlawfully present alien, transport the alien within the country in furtherance of his or her unlawful presence, or encourage or induce the alien to reside in the country. (The Supreme Court has interpreted the “encourage or induce” provision in Section 1324 to reach only “the purposeful solicitation and facilitation of specific acts known to violate federal law.”) Under 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(f)(1), employers who engage in a pattern or practice of hiring or employing aliens not authorized to work in the country may also be subject to misdemeanor penalties. Persons who control, employ, or harbor an alien for prostitution or “any other immoral purpose” may also face felony penalties under 8 U.S.C. § 1328.
Offenses Involving Immigration-Related Fraud
Criminal offenses also attach to a broad array of fraudulent, immigration-related activities. The primary criminal penalties concerning immigration and passport-related document fraud, forgery, and misuse are contained in Chapter 75 of the U.S. Criminal Code. Offenses are generally punishable by fine and imprisonment for up 10 years in the case of a first or second offense, with greater penalties available for aggravated circumstances. Other criminal statutes bar false claims of U.S. citizenship (18 U.S.C. § 911), along with acts of fraud relating to the procurement of citizenship (18 U.S.C. § 1425) or fraudulent activities related to alien registry (8 U.S.C. § 1306(c)-(d)). More generally, persons may face criminal charges if they make false claims under oath in any matter relating to citizenship, naturalization, or alien registry (18 U.S.C. § 1015). Persons who fail to disclose their role in the preparation of fraudulent applications for immigration benefits are subject to criminal sanctions in some circumstances (8 U.S.C. § 1324c(e)). Marriage-based immigration fraud is also subject to criminal sanction (8 U.S.C. § 1325(c)), as is establishing a commercial enterprise for the purposes of evading immigration laws (8 U.S.C. § 1325(d)).
In some cases, immigration-related fraud may be penalized under statutes of more general applicability, such as those making it a crime to knowingly and willfully make false statements in matters subject to federal jurisdiction (18 U.S.C. § 1001) or to engage in identification-document fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1028). Under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A, a mandatory two-year minimum sentence of imprisonment is added to a felony conviction if the offender used identification documents of another—including immigration-related documents—during the commission of certain other offenses.
Considerations for Congress
Federal criminal law is a creature of statute, and Congress may choose to modify the range of prohibited activities and associated penalties. Over the years, proposals to modify immigration criminal laws have ranged from legislative measures to de-criminalize some immigration violations (such as unlawful entry) and providing humanitarian assistance-based exceptions to certain crimes, to criminalizing a broader swathe of activities that undermine immigration rules (e.g., criminalizing unlawful presence) or, as is the case with House-passed H.R. 3486 in the 119th Congress, heightening penalties for existing immigration offenses.
Congress may also consider whether to clarify the meaning of immigration-related offenses that have been interpreted differently by federal appeals courts in different circuits, resulting in the non-uniform application of those statutes in different parts of the United States. For example, some federal courts of appeals have recognized that the crime of improper entry requires the accused to have entered or attempted to enter the country free from “official restraint” (i.e., surreptitiously). Not all courts have adopted this view, and there is a circuit split on the more specific question of whether an alien may be charged with improper entry if he or she crossed the U.S. border while under continuous surveillance from immigration authorities. Different federal appellate courts also take different approaches in assessing the mental state required for criminal liability for harboring an unlawfully present alien under 8 U.S.C. § 1324.
As noted earlier, resource considerations can inform the criminal enforcement priorities of the executive branch. Under the Operation Take Back America initiative launched in 2025, the DOJ identified “stopping illegal immigration” as a “core enforcement priority,” and directed or encouraged existing agency and U.S. Attorney Office resources to be channeled towards the prosecution of immigration-related crimes. Congress can supplement or constrain these efforts through appropriations measures. Similar to Congress’s enactment of an appropriations rider that limited the Department of Justice from expending appropriated funds to prosecute conduct that was permitted under state medical marijuana laws, Congress could limit funding from being used to enforce certain immigration-related criminal statutes. Conversely, Congress could opt to provide greater resources for the enforcement of immigration-related crimes, including perhaps to the courts and prosecutorial offices in the judicial districts where immigration-related prosecutions are most likely to occur. ",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB11436/LSB11436.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/HTML/LSB11436.html
LSB11435,The Department of Justice’s First Lawsuit Enforcing a Presidential Order Under Section 721 of the Defense Production Act,2026-05-29T04:00:00Z,2026-05-30T05:23:51Z,Active,Posts,Peter J. Benson,,"On July 8, 2025, President Trump issued an order prohibiting a 2020 acquisition of Jupiter Systems, LLC (Jupiter), by Suirui International, a subsidiary of Suirui Group Co., Ltd. (Suirui). Suirui is organized under the laws of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Its subsidiary, Suirui International, is based in Hong Kong. Jupiter designs and produces hardware and software that is provided to U.S. government customers and integrated into military and critical infrastructure systems in the United States. In his order, the President found credible evidence that Suirui “might take action that threatens to impair the national security of the United States.” 
As the President’s order recognized, the transaction being prohibited was already complete. Suirui purchased Jupiter more than five years before the President prohibited the acquisition. Section 721 of the Defense Production Act (DPA), however, gives the President authority to initiate reviews of—and ultimately to prohibit—certain foreign investments in the United States regardless of when the transactions at issue closed. Invoking that authority, the President ordered Suirui to divest all interests and rights in Jupiter within 120 days of July 8, 2025. 
In February 2026, the Department of Justice (DOJ) sued Suirui and Jupiter, alleging that the ordered divestiture had not yet occurred. When announcing the lawsuit, DOJ stated that it marks the first time the agency has sought judicial enforcement of a presidential order issued under Section 721 of the DPA. Shortly after suing, DOJ asked the court to place Jupiter in a receivership while the litigation proceeds. On May 26, finding that “no remedy short of transferring Suirui’s control of Jupiter Systems to a receiver will address the national security risks pending litigation,” the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia granted DOJ’s request. 
This Sidebar analyzes this first-of-its-kind enforcement action. It begins by describing the President’s authority to prohibit transactions under Section 721 of the DPA. It then discusses the proceedings in DOJ’s enforcement suit to date. The Sidebar closes with some considerations for Congress.
Section 721 of the Defense Production Act
Congress enacted Section 721 of the DPA in 1988. The law codified the President’s authority to investigate “mergers, acquisitions, and takeovers” that “could result in foreign control of persons engaged in interstate commerce in the United States.” Shortly after enactment of Section 721, the President delegated authority to review and investigate transactions under the statute to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS). CFIUS is an interagency body chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury. Since the initial delegation, Congress has amended Section 721 of the DPA several times to modify CFIUS’s authority, review procedures, and composition. 
CFIUS currently has authority to review and investigate (1) mergers, acquisitions, or takeovers “by or with any foreign person that could result in foreign control of any United States business”; (2) certain purchases or leases of United States real estate by foreign persons; and (3) certain noncontrolling investments in U.S. businesses related to critical technologies, critical infrastructure, or sensitive personal data. The President may “suspend or prohibit” any covered transaction that “threatens to impair the national security” if the President finds (1) credible evidence of such a threat; and (2) that no laws—other than Section 721 of the DPA itself and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act—sufficiently protect against the national security risks at issue.
In limited circumstances, the parties to a covered transaction are required to file a declaration providing CFIUS with information about the transaction. In other cases, a party to the transaction can voluntarily initiate CFIUS’s review process by filing a written notice or declaration. The President or CFIUS can also unilaterally initiate review of a covered transaction. If transacting parties elect not to file a notice or declaration, their transaction can remain subject to potential unilateral review indefinitely. 
As a former Deputy Secretary of the Treasury and other former officials have explained to Congress, this creates an incentive for parties to notify CFIUS of transactions that may raise national security concerns. Declining to file a voluntary notification can leave the transaction “open to executive branch scrutiny permanently.” By notifying CFIUS, on the other hand, parties can take advantage of Section 721’s safe harbor: For most transactions, the government may not initiate a new review if CFIUS previously stated in writing that it had completed all action with respect to the transaction or the President previously announced that he would not take action under Section 721 with respect to the transaction. 
If CFIUS determines that a transaction poses a risk to national security, it has authority to “negotiate, enter into or impose, and enforce any agreement or condition with any party to the covered transaction in order to mitigate” the risk. CFIUS may also refer transactions to the President for potential suspension or prohibition based on a presidential finding that the transaction threatens to impair national security. CFIUS’s decision to enter into a mitigation agreement or refer a transaction to the President must be “based on a risk-based analysis,” including an “assessment of the threat, vulnerabilities, and consequences to national security related to the transaction.” In carrying out these directives, CFIUS has stated that it seeks to address “threats that can accompany foreign investment, while maintaining the United States’ strong, open investment environment.”
Suirui’s Acquisition of Jupiter
Jupiter was founded in 1981. That year, it demonstrated technology that allows a single visual display to show multiple, simultaneous streaming videos in separate windows. Today, Jupiter continues to design and produce hardware and software that allows multiple data feeds to be organized across a panel of visual displays.
In 2017, Foxconn, an electronics company headquartered in Taiwan, purchased Jupiter. In 2020, Suirui acquired Jupiter and its subsidiaries from Foxconn. Suirui did not report its 2020 acquisition of Jupiter to CFIUS. 
In 2024, during President Biden’s Administration, CFIUS requested that Suirui and Jupiter submit a written notice of the completed transaction, and the parties did so. As discussed, CFIUS has authority to unilaterally initiate review of covered transactions for which the parties did not submit a voluntary notice.
During its review and investigation of the transaction, CFIUS identified national security risks posed by the transaction. CFIUS “evaluated the connections between Suirui, its officials, and the government of the [PRC].” It concluded that an entity listed as a Chinese military company operating in the United States indirectly holds an interest in Suirui and has a right to appoint one of Suirui’s directors. Ultimately, CFIUS determined that Suirui’s acquisition of Jupiter created national security risks that could not be mitigated without the transaction being abandoned.
On July 8, 2025, President Trump issued an order prohibiting the acquisition. The order requires Suirui to divest all interests and rights in Jupiter within 120 days of July 8, 2025, but permits CFIUS to extend that deadline. Prior to any divestiture, Suirui is required to identify the new purchaser or transferee to CFIUS, and CFIUS has thirty days to object to a purchase or transfer. Among other interim measures, the order requires Suirui and its personnel to immediately cease accessing certain nonpublic information maintained by Jupiter, unless the access is approved by CFIUS. 
The Lawsuit Enforcing the President’s Order
On February 9, 2026, DOJ sued Suirui and Jupiter. Since its enactment, Section 721 of the DPA has provided that the Attorney General can enforce presidential orders in court. The suit against Suirui and Jupiter, however, is “the first such action ever filed in federal district court,” according to DOJ. The case thus provides the first opportunity for a court to weigh in on its role when adjudicating a Section 721 enforcement action.
Among other relief, DOJ is asking the court to declare that Suirui and Jupiter have not complied with the President’s order, enjoin Suirui from owning or controlling Jupiter, and issue an order “transferring the equity and assets of Jupiter Systems held by Suirui to a third-party fiduciary pending a transaction.” Shortly after filing the lawsuit, DOJ also moved for a preliminary injunction. In the motion, DOJ requests that the court appoint a receiver to manage Jupiter during the course of the litigation. The proposed receiver would “operate [Jupiter] under the direction of” the court and seek the court’s approval for “major decisions.”
A party seeking a preliminary injunction “must establish that [it] is likely to succeed on the merits, that [it] is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in [its] favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” On the merits, DOJ argues that the President made the findings required by Section 721 of the DPA—that there is credible evidence the Suirui acquisition could threaten to impair the national security, and that other provisions of law do not adequately protect against the national security risk—and those findings are not reviewable by courts. The presidential findings, in DOJ’s view, are therefore sufficient to establish likely success in the enforcement action. DOJ also argues that the government will be irreparably harmed absent a receivership because Suirui’s continued control of Jupiter exposes the military and critical infrastructure systems that use Jupiter’s products to potential compromise. With respect to both the equities and the public interest, DOJ argues that the national security interests at stake outweigh Suirui’s interest in delaying compliance with the President’s order.
In response to DOJ’s motion, Suirui affirms that it is willing to divest Jupiter on reasonable terms. Suirui and Jupiter nonetheless argue that no preliminary injunction should issue. In the companies’ view, DOJ is unlikely to succeed in the case because the President’s order allegedly violated their due process rights. Suirui and Jupiter contend that CFIUS was required to disclose the unclassified record of evidence on which it and the President relied when concluding Suirui’s acquisition should be prohibited. Although CFIUS did provide a summary of its evidence, the companies contend the summary did not satisfy this due process requirement. DOJ cannot establish irreparable harm, the companies argue, because the transaction closed years ago and DOJ has not shown that Suirui took any action that impaired national security in the interim. Finally, Suirui and Jupiter argue that the equities and public interest weigh against the requested injunction because a receivership would harm Jupiter and its operations without vindicating any nonspeculative national security interest.
These arguments raise questions about the court’s role in an enforcement action under Section 721 of the DPA. One question is whether the court has jurisdiction to consider the companies’ due process defense. In an earlier case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (D.C. Circuit) held that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires CFIUS to provide certain procedural protections to transacting parties before depriving the parties of property. Suirui and Jupiter’s due process defense is based on those protections. DOJ argues, however, that Section 721(e)(2) of the DPA, which requires that challenges to Section 721 actions be brought in the D.C. Circuit, precludes the district court from considering the companies’ due process defense. In DOJ’s view, Section 721(e)(2) deprives district courts of jurisdiction to decide any challenge to a president’s order—including when the challenge is raised as a defense to an enforcement action. Suirui and Jupiter disagree with that reading of Section 721(e)(2). They claim the provision, which does not expressly address defenses to enforcement, applies only to lawsuits filed to affirmatively challenge an action taken under Section 721. The companies also point to a recent statement from the Supreme Court—that “[b]arring defendants in enforcement actions from raising arguments about the legality of agency rules or orders enforced against them raises significant questions under the Due Process Clause”—and contend that DOJ’s reading of the statute would result in additional due process concerns.
The parties’ arguments also raise questions about the proper remedy in a Section 721 enforcement action. Section 721(d)(3) of the DPA provides that the Attorney General may “seek appropriate relief, including divestment relief” from the court. Here, Suirui claims that it “has been working toward divestiture,” but the parties dispute what other relief is appropriate. DOJ contends that Jupiter should be immediately transferred to a receivership because Suirui’s “continued control of Jupiter Systems poses the risks to the national security that necessitated the President’s Order.” DOJ also points out that the order included a divestiture deadline, which CFIUS subsequently extended, but which Suirui did not comply with. Suirui responds that a receivership is extraordinary relief that could harm Jupiter and that DOJ’s pending request is itself hampering ongoing efforts to divest. The court is thus faced with two very different claims about what constitutes “appropriate relief” when an acquirer has not completed an ordered divesture on the timeline prescribed by the President and CFIUS under Section 721 of the DPA.
The District Court’s Decision to Grant a Preliminary Injunction
On May 26, 2026, the court granted DOJ’s motion for a preliminary injunction. The court ruled that DOJ is likely to succeed on the merits of the case. The parties agreed that the President’s findings and decision to prohibit the transaction are not subject to judicial review. The parties also agreed that Suirui had not yet divested from Jupiter as the President ordered. The court therefore focused on the companies’ due process defense. Here, the court rejected DOJ’s argument that Section 721(e)(2) of the DPA precludes the companies from raising the defense. It determined instead that nothing in Section 721 bars parties from raising due process or other constitutional defenses in enforcement proceedings. The court also determined, however, that Suirui and Jupiter received adequate process. The court found that CFIUS’s correspondence with the companies during its investigation disclosed the national security concerns at issue and the unclassified evidence CFIUS relied on to analyze the transaction. Suirui and Jupiter then had an opportunity to rebut the concerns and evidence. That process, the court concluded, was sufficient.
The court also found that DOJ established that Suirui’s continued control of Jupiter poses imminent national security risks and DOJ therefore satisfied the irreparable harm requirement. The same consideration—national security risks—demonstrated that a preliminary injunction would be in the public interest. The court acknowledged that some equities weighed against DOJ’s requested injunction. A receiver may, for example, be disruptive to Jupiter’s business. The court found, however, that Suirui was given “extensive opportunities to divest,” so the business consequences of a preliminary injunction were in part the result of Suirui’s own decisions. The relevant interests, the court concluded, weigh in favor of issuing the preliminary injunction.
As for the specific remedy, the court decided that transferring control of Jupiter from Suirui to a receiver was necessary to address the national security risks DOJ identified while the litigation proceeds. Although judicially compelled receiverships are extraordinary, the court explained, the remedy here was necessitated by DOJ’s particular showing in the case, and comes in a context where the President has already ordered and Congress has expressly authorized the even more “drastic” remedy of divestment.
Considerations for Congress
The presidential order underlying DOJ’s lawsuit against Suirui and Jupiter and the lawsuit itself are authorized by Section 721 of the DPA. Congress can amend Section 721 of the DPA and has done so before. The 119th Congress, for example, enacted amendments that address CFIUS’s authority to identify government facilities in close proximity to which an acquisition of real estate may be subject to CFIUS’s jurisdiction. Members have also proposed other amendments in recent Congresses.
Congress could amend Section 721 of the DPA to address issues that have been raised in the dispute between DOJ and Suirui and Jupiter. Congress could, for example, provide additional specific remedies that apply when a divestiture is not completed in the manner prescribed in a presidential order. Congress could also specifically address whether a district court has jurisdiction to hear a due process defense in a Section 721 enforcement action. As mentioned, however, barring defenses to enforcement actions can raise questions about the constitutionality of a statute. The same is true of barring constitutional challenges to government actions generally. Courts therefore have required “the clearest evocation of congressional intent to proscribe judicial review of constitutional claims” when deciding whether a statute deprives the judiciary of jurisdiction over a constitutional challenge. 
Congress could also wait for the lawsuit against Suirui and Jupiter to conclude. The case is ongoing and could result in additional judicial interpretations of Section 721 of the DPA. In addition, Congress could leave the applicable authorities unchanged, or conduct oversight of CFIUS’s activities.
",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB11435/LSB11435.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/HTML/LSB11435.html
IF13237,Medicare Part B Drugs Overview,2026-05-29T04:00:00Z,2026-05-30T05:23:30Z,Active,Resources,Laura A. Wreschnig,"Health Care Delivery, Health Care Reform, Medicare, Medicare Part B","Introduction
Between 2017 and 2022, spending on drugs dispensed outside of retail settings grew nationally at an annual rate of 9.4%, outpacing the 6.5% annual growth in spending on drugs in retail settings, such as retail pharmacies. The Medicare program covers these nonretail drugs, such as novel oncology and immunology treatments, under Part B. The annual growth rate in per enrollee spending under Fee-for-Service (FFS) Medicare for all Part B drugs was over three times the growth rate of Medicare Part D drugs between 2008 and 2021, and four times that of prescription drug spending in the United States in general. This In Focus provides an overview of the drugs covered under Medicare Part B, how they are reimbursed under FFS Medicare, and relevant policy developments relating to these drugs.   
Medicare Coverage Background
Medicare is a federal program that pays for covered health care services of qualified beneficiaries. There are four distinct parts of Medicare: Part A (hospital insurance), Part B (supplementary medical insurance), Part C (also known as Medicare Advantage), and Part D (an outpatient prescription drug benefit). Together, Parts A and B of Medicare are often referred to as Original or Fee-for-Service Medicare. Medicare is administered by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS). Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in both Parts B and D can access outpatient prescription drugs through each benefit, depending on the type of drug and/or its route of administration. Medicare Part D covers the majority of self-administered outpatient prescription drugs dispensed in retail pharmacies, while Part B covers a variety of drugs (described below) that are typically not self-administered or available through retail pharmacy settings. 
Medicare Part B Drugs
In general, for drugs to be covered under Medicare Part B, they must fall within a Medicare benefit category, be deemed to be reasonable and necessary for the diagnosis or treatment of an illness or injury, and not be excluded by statute. The largest category of Part B drugs is those administered in physicians’ offices and hospital outpatient departments (HOPDs), rather than in retail settings such as a retail pharmacy. This includes drugs that are furnished incident to a physician’s services and typically not self-administered, such as injectable drugs for the treatment of rheumatoid arthritis or an infusion of chemotherapy. A small number of  self-administered drugs are covered under Part B rather than Part D under certain conditions, such as pre-exposure prophylaxis (PrEP) for HIV prevention, oral anticancer drugs, oral antiemetics, and immunosuppressive drugs.
Drugs that are supplies to an item of Durable Medical Equipment (DME) also qualify as Part B drugs. For example, Part B covers insulin provided through a pump that qualifies as DME, certain inhalation drugs that are administered through a nebulizer, and certain drugs that are infused at home through a qualifying infusion pump. 
Medicare Part B also covers drugs for the treatment of End-Stage Renal Disease (ESRD), as well as certain preventive vaccines: the influenza vaccine, the COVID-19 vaccine, the pneumococcal vaccine, and the hepatitis B vaccine (subject to certain restrictions). Blood clotting factors, whether self-administered or administered in an inpatient or outpatient setting, are also set in statute as Part B drugs.
Payment for Part B Drugs
The payment system for Part B drugs differs considerably from the Part D drugs payment system. Under FFS Medicare, beneficiaries generally pay 20% coinsurance for Part B drugs after meeting the Part B deductible, with the exception of insulin products, for which there is a fixed $35 copayment amount, and preventive vaccines, for which there is no cost-sharing. Providers receive a payment for administering a Part B drug generally made through payment systems such as the Physician Fee Schedule (PFS) or the Hospital Outpatient Prospective Payment System (OPPS), depending on the setting. In addition to administration payment, FFS Medicare uses a variety of different methodologies to reimburse providers for the cost of the Part B drug itself. 
Average Sales Price Methodology
Since January 2005, FFS Medicare has paid for most Part B drugs based on 106% of the volume-weighted Average Sales Price (ASP) for each drug. The ASP is defined in statute as a manufacturer’s sales of a drug to all purchasers in the United States in a calendar quarter divided by the total number of units of the drug sold by the manufacturer in that same quarter. The ASP is net of any price concessions provided by the manufacturer. 
Manufacturers must provide CMS with data on their ASP amounts and the volume of sales for each drug (reported by national drug code, NDC) on a quarterly basis. There is a two-quarter lag between the sales period for which ASPs are reported by drug manufacturers and the effective date of the reimbursement amount. During this lag, or in certain other cases, CMS may substitute ASP with other  pricing measures, such as Average Wholesale Price (AWP) or wholesale acquisition cost (WAC). Medicare also pays supplying fees to pharmacies for certain drugs, such as inhalation therapies, in addition to the ASP payment.
Non-ASP Pricing Methodologies
Some Part B drugs are not paid for under the ASP methodology. For example, preventive vaccines are reimbursed at 95% of AWP, or in certain settings, a payment based on reasonable cost. Most drugs for the treatment of ESRD are folded into the ESRD Prospective Payment System, which pays a bundled rate for the services associated with dialysis treatment. Certain drugs provided in HOPDs, such as those that do not meet a cost threshold, are paid for through the Outpatient Prospective Payment System. 
Expenditures on Part B Drugs
As shown in Figure 1, expenditures on Part B drugs have grown steadily in recent years, with an increasing proportion of expenditures concentrated in HOPDs. Over half of 2023 expenditures were on three therapeutic classes: antineoplastics (anti-cancer drugs), ophthalmic agents, and skin substitutes. Expenditures on skin substitutes have increased substantially over the past five years, but recently finalized changes to their payment methodology could result in reduced expenditures on certain types of skin substitutes in the future, as some products will no longer be reimbursed using ASP.
Figure 1. FFS Medicare Spending on Part B Drugs, 2009-2023, in Nominal Dollar Amounts
/
Source: MedPAC and Acumen LLC analysis of Medicare claims data.
Notes: Suppliers include pharmacies, DME suppliers, and other nonphysician or HOPD sites that dispense Part B drugs. Data exclude those drugs furnished by critical access hospitals, Maryland hospitals, and dialysis facilities. Expenditures include both program payments and beneficiary cost sharing. Data reflect all Part B drugs, whether they were paid based on the average sales price or other methods. Data exclude blood and blood products (other than clotting factor). 
Recent Policy Developments
Congress has acted several times in recent decades to modify coverage of and payment for Part B drugs. Most recently,  P.L. 117-169, the FY2022 reconciliation law, included several provisions designed to reduce program expenditures. Section 11403 temporarily increased the payment for qualifying biosimilars from 100% of their ASP plus 6% of their reference product’s ASP to 100% of their ASP plus 8% of their reference product’s ASP for the third quarter of 2022 through the fourth quarter of 2027. This payment increase was intended to improve access to biosimilars and encourage price-based competition between biosimilars and their reference products, and, over time, to lower expenditures on biologics, which have been a significant driver of increased Part B drug expenditures.
P.L. 117-169 also created the Medicare Drug Price Negotiation Program (MDPNP), which allows the Secretary of Health and Human Services to negotiate the prices of certain high-expenditure Part B and Part D drugs. Part B drugs became eligible for negotiation in 2026, and five-Part B-covered high-expenditure drugs were chosen for negotiation. The negotiated maximum fair prices (MFPs) for these drugs are to go into effect in 2028. Medicare would then reimburse providers for those drugs at 106% of the MFP rather than 106% ASP, and beneficiary coinsurance would similarly be based on 20% of MFP.
Since the passage of P.L. 117-169, a number of modifications to the MDPNP have been considered. P.L. 119-21, the FY2025 reconciliation law, included a provision that expanded the number of drugs that are excluded from negotiation. Other legislation, such as S. 1836, the SMART Prices Act (119th Congress), would expand the number of drugs negotiated each year, while other bills, such as H.R. 4299, the Protecting Patient Access to Cancer and Complex Therapies Act (119th Congress), would maintain the 106% of ASP payment to providers for negotiated drugs and have the MFP effectuated to Medicare as a manufacturer rebate, rather than as a rebate to providers. 
Another approach to reducing expenditures for Part B drugs has been Most-Favored Nation (MFN) pricing models. Studies have consistently found higher list prices for brand-name drugs in the United States compared with other countries, and MFN models generally incorporate these international reference prices as constraints on domestic reimbursement. An initial MFN model for Part B drugs created by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation (CMMI) under the first Trump Administration was challenged in court and subsequently withdrawn.
CMMI has issued a notice of proposed rulemaking on a new MFN demonstration: the GLOBE (Global Benchmark for Efficient Drug Pricing) model. The GLOBE model builds on inflation rebates created by the IRA for Part B drugs. Drug manufacturers are required to pay the federal government a rebate if the payment amount of certain Part B drugs exceeds those drugs’ inflation-adjusted payment amount. The GLOBE model would create an alternative rebate payment calculation for certain high-expenditure rebatable Part B drugs, based on the difference between the drug’s payment amount and an international benchmark. 
Some bills have also proposed their own MFN methodologies, through legislation such as S. 1753/H.R. 3391, the End Price Gouging for Medications Act, which would direct the Department of Health and Human Services to establish international reference pricing benchmarks for drugs and apply them as ceiling prices across programs. ",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13237/IF13237.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13237.html
R48970,"Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education: FY2026 Appropriations",2026-05-28T04:00:00Z,2026-06-06T05:53:56Z,Active,Reports,"Karen E. Lynch, Jessica Tollestrup, David H. Bradley, Ada S. Cornell, Cassandria Dortch, William R. Morton, Angela Napili, Kavya Sekar, Kyle D. Shohfi, Rebecca R. Skinner","Appropriations Policy, Labor, HHS & Education Appropriations","This report offers an overview of the FY2026 Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies (LHHS) appropriations bill. This bill includes all accounts funded through the annual appropriations process at the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) and U.S. Department of Education (ED). It also provides annual appropriations for most agencies within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), with certain exceptions (e.g., the Food and Drug Administration), and for more than a dozen related agencies (including the Social Security Administration).
This report primarily focuses on regular FY2026 LHHS discretionary funding enacted during the annual appropriations process. Totals generally do not include emergency-designated funds, except as noted. In general, no emergency-designated funds were proposed or enacted for LHHS programs and activities in FY2026; a limited amount of emergency-designated appropriations were provided to LHHS in FY2024 and FY2025. 
FY2026 Appropriations
FY2026 LHHS Omnibus: On February 3, 2026, the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2026 (FY2026 LHHS omnibus; H.R. 7148; P.L. 119-75) was signed into law by the President, providing full-year annual appropriations for LHHS (Division B). Annual discretionary LHHS appropriations totaled $226.1 billion (0.4% less than FY2024 enacted, 0.3% more than FY2025, and 29.9% more than the FY2026 President’s request). It also provided $1.513 trillion in mandatory funding, for a combined LHHS total of $1.739 trillion. The distribution of discretionary funding was as follows:
DOL: $13.7 billion, 0.2% less than FY2024 and 0.5% more than FY2025.
HHS: $116.4 billion, 0.9% less than FY2024 and 0.2% more than FY2025.
ED: $79.0 billion, 0.1% less than FY2024 and 0.3% more than FY2025.
Related Agencies: $17.1 billion, 1.4% more than FY2024 and 1.0% more than FY2025.
FY2026 Continuing Resolutions: At the start of the fiscal year (October 1, 2025), a funding lapse commenced, resulting in a government shutdown that affected many LHHS programs and activities; that lapse ended on November 12, 2025, with the enactment of temporary LHHS funding in a continuing resolution (CR) (Division A of H.R. 5371; P.L. 119-37). The CR funded LHHS programs and activities (and the activities under the purview of several other appropriations acts) through January 30, 2026. Discretionary programs generally were funded at the same rate, and under the same conditions, as in FY2025; whereas appropriated entitlements were funded at their current law levels. The CR also included one provision that was specific to LHHS (§155). When annual appropriations for LHHS were not yet enacted at the time the CR expired, a second funding lapse commenced, ending with the enactment of full-year appropriations on February 3. 
FY2026 LHHS House Action: On September 9, 2025, the House Appropriations Committee voted to report its version of the FY2026 LHHS bill (35-28). The measure was subsequently reported on September 11, as H.R. 5304 (H.Rept. 119-271). As reported, the House committee bill would have provided $202.2 billion in discretionary LHHS funds (10.9% less than FY2024 enacted, 10.3% less than FY2025, and $16.1 billion more than the FY2026 President’s request). In addition, it would have provided an estimated $1.513 trillion in mandatory funding, for a combined LHHS total of $1.715 trillion. The distribution of proposed discretionary funding was as follows:
DOL: $9.6 billion, 30.0% less than FY2024 and 29.6% less than FY2025.
HHS: $109.5 billion, 6.8% less than FY2024 and 5.7% less than FY2025.
ED: $66.9 billion, 15.4% less than FY2024 and 15.1% less than FY2025.
Related Agencies: $16.3 billion, 3.3% less than FY2024 and 3.8% less than FY2025.
FY2026 LHHS Senate Action: On July 31, 2025, the Senate Appropriations Committee voted to report its version of the FY2026 LHHS bill (26-3). The measure was subsequently reported that same day as S. 2587 (S.Rept. 119-55). As reported, the bill would have provided $226.4 billion in discretionary LHHS funds (0.2% less than comparable FY2024 enacted levels, 0.5% more than FY2025, and 30.1% more than the FY2026 President’s request). In addition, it would have provided an estimated $1.513 trillion in mandatory funding, for a combined LHHS total of $1.740 trillion. The distribution of proposed discretionary funding was as follows:
DOL: $13.7 billion, 0.2% less than FY2024 and 0.5% more than FY2025.
HHS: $116.6 billion, 0.7% less than FY2024 and 0.4% more than FY2025.
ED: $79.0 billion, 0.1% less than FY2024 and 0.3% more than FY2025.
Related Agencies: $17.1 billion, 1.8% more than FY2024 and 1.3% more than FY2025.
FY2026 President’s Budget Request: On May 2, President Trump submitted to Congress an outline of his discretionary funding priorities for FY2026. Additional documents related to the budget request were submitted in the weeks that followed, including congressional justifications for individual departments and agencies. The President requested $174.1 billion in discretionary funding for accounts funded by the LHHS bill (23.3% less than FY2024 enacted and 22.8% less than FY2025). In addition, the President requested $1.513 trillion in annually appropriated mandatory funding, for an LHHS total of $1.687 trillion. The distribution of requested discretionary funding was as follows:
DOL: $9.0 billion, 33.9% less than FY2024 and 33.5% less than FY2025.
HHS: $84.0 billion, 28.4% less than FY2024 and 27.6% less than FY2025.
ED: $66.7 billion, 15.6% less than FY2024 and 15.3% less than FY2025.
Related Agencies: $14.3 billion, 15.0% less than FY2024 and 15.4% less than FY2025.
",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48970/R48970.3.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48970.html
R48961,"U.S. Environmental Protection Agency: Origins, Authorities, and Organization",2026-05-28T04:00:00Z,2026-05-30T05:23:52Z,Active,Reports,Angela C. Jones,"Air Quality, Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Waste Management & Cleanup, Water Quality","The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was established through the Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970 (Reorganization Plan No. 3), issued by President Nixon, with the purpose of consolidating and coordinating federal pollution control responsibilities and functions. In 2025, President Trump signed several executive orders that directed EPA, among other agencies, to make changes to its structure and eliminate certain programs. As changes to the agency have been planned and implemented, Congress has demonstrated increasing interest in the origins, authorities, and structure of EPA. 
Congressional interest in pollution control began in the 1940s with enactment of several pollution control statutes to address a range of environmental concerns. Prior to the creation of EPA, federal pollution control responsibilities were implemented by several different departments and agencies, separately addressing air quality, water pollution, solid waste management, pesticides, radiation, and other pollution and environmental protection issues. In addition, many states and some local governments had implemented pollution control laws and programs. 
The general purpose of Reorganization Plan No. 3 was to centralize and coordinate most federal pollution control functions within one independent federal agency. In 1984, Congress ratified as law all reorganization plans then in effect, including Reorganization Plan No. 3. Since 1970, Congress has enacted and amended more than a dozen pollution control statutes that EPA implements, such as the Clean Air Act; the Clean Water Act; the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act; the Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act; the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act; the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act; the National Environmental Policy Act; and the Safe Drinking Water Act. 
EPA’s purposes, as established in Reorganization Plan No. 3 and generally continuing to the present day, include environmental standard-setting; research; monitoring; enforcement; and providing assistance to states, tribes, and local governments to support implementation of federal pollution control programs. As a regulatory agency, EPA is responsible for researching, developing, and implementing environmental regulations as directed by Congress through statute. The agency’s activities cover multiple environmental media (e.g., air, water, and land) and a range of pollution control efforts, such as air and water quality regulation, waste management, cleanup of contaminated sites, environmental permitting, and regulation of chemicals in commerce. In addition, following the principle of “cooperative federalism,” EPA delegates the administration of many programs to states and tribes. Congress has provided appropriations throughout the agency’s history to support EPA funding of state and tribal activities, as well as grant programs to public and nonprofit entities conducting research, technical assistance, and other environment-related activities.
EPA’s current organizational structure includes 10 headquarters offices, 10 regional offices across the United States, labs, and research centers. In the last decade, EPA staffing has ranged from nearly 13,000 full-time equivalents (FTEs) to more than 18,000 FTEs, with 12,500 FTEs estimated for FY2027. EPA’s annual appropriations have been relatively steady, when adjusted for inflation since 1980, supplemented by significant additional appropriations from Congress in FY2009 and FY2022-2026. For FY2026, EPA’s enacted annual appropriations totaled $8.82 billion, with supplemental advance appropriations of $12.01 billion from the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (P.L. 117-58).
EPA’s organizational structure and statutory authorities are closely interrelated; both factors influence the agency’s responsibilities and capacity for promulgating regulations, conducting research, developing standards, and administering programs. Further, EPA appropriations, staffing, and other resources are directly related to the agency’s organizational structure and implementation of statutory duties. Congress could consider a range of policy issues when conducting oversight of EPA, developing legislation related to environmental protection, or debating EPA appropriations. Policy issues include the implications of recent changes to EPA’s structure, functions, and staffing on the agency’s implementation of its responsibilities under a variety of pollution control statutes. As EPA implements changes to regulations and numerous agency programs, driven by executive orders, agency policies, and court decisions, Congress could also consider whether to amend existing legislation or enact new legislation to specify the agency’s responsibilities and functions in statute. In addition, when debating future agency appropriations, Congress could consider increasing, decreasing, or maintaining appropriations levels to align with the agency’s responsibilities and needs for resources and staffing to carry out these responsibilities. ",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48961/R48961.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48961.html
LSB11434,Civil Procedure at the Supreme Court: Selected Cases from the October 2025 Term,2026-05-28T04:00:00Z,2026-05-29T14:54:33Z,Active,Posts,Joanna R. Lampe,,"During the October 2025 Term to date, the Supreme Court has considered multiple cases focused on procedural issues. Among them, as discussed in order below, are cases about the relationship between federal and state procedural rules, the timing of motions for relief from judgment, federal court diversity jurisdiction, sovereign immunity, removal of cases from state to federal court, and constitutional requirements related to standing to sue.
Congress has the power to enact legislation to regulate proceedings in federal courts. Thus, these cases may be of interest to Congress because Congress could amend the specific statutes or rules at issue in these cases or could look to the rulings as guidance on how the Court might interpret related legislation in the future. This Legal Sidebar provides an overview of seven civil procedure cases from the Supreme Court’s October 2025 term, listed chronologically by date of decision, then briefly discusses related considerations for Congress.
Berk v. Choy
In Berk v. Choy, the Supreme Court held that a state law—Delaware’s law requiring that medical malpractice complaints must be dismissed unless accompanied by expert affidavits—cannot apply in federal court because it conflicts with a valid federal procedural rule.
Federal courts hearing cases involving state law claims between parties from different states, known as diversity cases, apply federal procedural law and state substantive law, “except where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide.” After suffering complications from an ankle fracture, plaintiff-petitioner Harold R. Berk filed a medical negligence complaint in Delaware federal court against the treating physician and his employer. Under Delaware law, a plaintiff filing a medical malpractice claim must include an affidavit from a qualified expert stating that “there are reasonable grounds to believe that there has been health-care medical negligence committed by each defendant.” Berk was unable to comply with the affidavit requirement, and the district court dismissed the case. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (Third Circuit) affirmed the dismissal, holding that the affidavit requirement is substantive rather than procedural.
The Supreme Court granted Berk’s petition for a writ of certiorari, held oral argument in the case on October 6, 2025, and issued a decision on January 20, 2026. With Justice Barrett writing for an eight-Justice majority, the Court reversed the Third Circuit. It held that the Delaware affidavit requirement cannot apply in federal court because it conflicts with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 8, which requires that a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” and thus “establishes implicitly, but with unmistakable clarity,’ . . . that evidence of the claim is not required.” It further held that FRCP 12 “reinforces the point” by prohibiting federal courts from considering “matters outside the pleadings” when ruling on motions to dismiss. In so ruling, the Court reaffirmed a prior holding that it does not matter if a displaced state law is substantive, as long as the federal law that conflicts with it is procedural, as FRCP 8 is.
Justice Jackson concurred in the judgment. She agreed with the majority that the affidavit requirement conflicts with federal law but wrote separately to argue that it conflicts with FRCP 3, governing when a civil action is deemed to be “commenced,” and FRCP 12, governing grounds for dismissal, not FRCP 8.
Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited v. Burton
Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited v. Burton concerned the timing of motions for relief from judgment under FRCP 60. The Court held that the requirement in FRCP 60(c)(1) that parties make motions within a “reasonable time” applies to a motion to set aside a default judgment that is void for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to FRCP 60(b)(4).
In 2014, Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited (Coney Island) was subject to an adversarial proceeding in bankruptcy court for unpaid invoices. Coney Island allegedly received insufficient service of process and did not appear in the adversarial proceeding, and a default judgment was entered against it. In 2021, following other attempts to collect, a marshal seized funds from Coney Island’s bank account to satisfy the default judgment. Coney Island then filed an FRCP 60(b) motion in the bankruptcy court, arguing the failure of service rendered the default judgment void. The bankruptcy court denied the motion, holding that Coney Island failed to bring it within a “reasonable time,” and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (Sixth Circuit) affirmed.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and held oral argument in the case on November 4, 2025. In a January 20, 2026, opinion authored by Justice Alito and joined by seven other Justices, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Sixth Circuit. The Court explained that several other appeals courts had held that the “reasonable time” requirement did not apply to motions alleging that a judgment is void because a “void judgment is a legal nullity,” but rejected that interpretation as contrary to the text of FRCP 60 and lacking a limiting principle that would prevent parties from alleging vagueness at any time. While agreeing that “the passage of time cannot cure voidness,” the majority stated that this is true of many types of legal errors, but statutes and rules routinely impose time limits for correcting such errors. To avoid application of the time limit, a party would need to “show that some principle of law, such as the Due Process Clause, gives a party the right to allege voidness at any time.” Coney Island had not attempted to make that argument, and the Court stated that it would be “hard to accept.” The Court also rejected arguments made by Coney Island that were rooted in historical practice, policy concerns, FRCP 60’s drafting history, and the canon of constitutional avoidance, concluding that those interpretive tools did not carry weight where, as here, the rule’s language is unambiguous.
Justice Sotomayor concurred in the judgment, objecting that the majority “unnecessarily opines on the potential validity of a constitutional challenge to the reasonable time’ limit under the Due Process Clause.”
Hain Celestial Group v. Palmquist
In Hain Celestial Group v. Palmquist, the Supreme Court held that a district court’s final judgment must be vacated if it is later determined that the court improperly exercised diversity jurisdiction after erroneously dismissing a nondiverse party.
Plaintiffs-respondents Sarah and Grant Palmquist sued the Hain Celestial Group (Hain) and Whole Foods Market, Inc. (Whole Foods) in Texas state court, alleging that their child was injured by toxic heavy metals in baby food produced by Hain and sold at Whole Foods. Hain removed the case to federal court based on diversity of citizenship. As background, the Constitution grants federal courts limited jurisdiction over specified classes of cases and controversies, including diversity cases between parties from different states. Federal court diversity jurisdiction is also defined in a statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, which has been interpreted to require complete diversity of citizenship—that is, no defendant may be from the same state as any plaintiff. At the time of removal, the parties in Hain were not completely diverse because the Palmquists and Whole Foods were citizens of Texas. However, Hain argued that Whole Foods had been improperly joined and should be dismissed as a defendant. The district court agreed. After dismissing Whole Foods, the court exercised diversity jurisdiction over the case and ultimately granted Hain’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on all claims. The Palmquists appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (Fifth Circuit) reversed, holding that Whole Foods was properly joined, so the district court lacked diversity jurisdiction and the judgment must be vacated.
The Supreme Court granted Hain and Whole Foods’ petition for a writ of certiorari, held oral argument in the case on November 4, 2025, and issued a decision on February 24, 2026. Writing for the unanimous Court, Justice Sotomayor explained that an appellate court must generally vacate a district court’s judgment if the district court lacked jurisdiction at the time a case was filed, unless the district court “cures” a jurisdictional defect prior to final judgment. While the Supreme Court had previously held that the dismissal of a nondiverse defendant can cure a jurisdictional defect, the Court in Hain held that the erroneous dismissal of a nondiverse defendant cannot do so. Because diversity jurisdiction did not exist at the time of removal and “the jurisdictional defect lingered through judgment,” the Court held that the district court’s judgment must be vacated.
Justice Thomas joined the majority opinion in full and wrote a separate concurrence to express his “skepticism of the doctrine of improper joinder,’” which he said “appears to allow federal courts to enlarge their jurisdiction by assessing the merits of claims over which they lack jurisdiction.”
The GEO Group v. Menocal
In The GEO Group v. Menocal, the Court held that an order denying a government contractor’s claim of derivative sovereign immunity is not immediately appealable under the collateral-order doctrine.
In the 1940 case Yearsley v. W. A. Ross Constr. Co., the Supreme Court held that a federal contractor cannot be held liable for conduct that the government has lawfully “authorized and directed” the contractor to perform. Defendant-petitioner GEO Group (GEO) operates a private detention facility under a contract with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Plaintiff-respondent Alejandro Menocal was detained in the facility in 2014 and later filed a class action on behalf of himself and other detainees challenging certain policies under which detainees performed work such as cooking and cleaning within the facility. GEO moved to dismiss under Yearsley, arguing that its contract with ICE “authorized and directed” it to implement the challenged policies. The district court denied the motion, allowing the case to proceed to trial. GEO filed an immediate appeal challenging the denial of the motion to dismiss, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit (Tenth Circuit) dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the denial of dismissal was an unappealable nonfinal order.
The Supreme Court granted GEO’s petition for certiorari, held oral argument in the case on November 10, 2025, and issued a decision on February 25, 2026, affirming the judgment of the Tenth Circuit and remanding for further proceedings. Justice Kagan authored the majority opinion, which six other Justices joined in full and Justice Thomas joined in part. In general, federal appeals courts possess jurisdiction over final orders of district courts that fully resolve the cases in question. Under a line of cases beginning with Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., however, a small class of nonfinal “collateral orders” are immediately appealable if they “(1) conclusively determine the disputed question, (2) resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and (3) [are] effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” For claims like GEO’s, the Court opined, the analysis hinges on “whether the defendant has asserted a defense to liability” on the merits, which could properly be evaluated at trial, “or instead an immunity from suit,” which would entail a right not to go to trial at all. Concluding that Yearsley immunity is a defense on the merits because it depends on the legality of the defendant’s conduct, the Court held that the case failed the third prong of the Cohen test because any error could be effectively corrected on appeal, so the denial of dismissal was not immediately appealable.
Justice Thomas concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. He wrote separately to argue that “[t]he Cohen collateral-order doctrine, which allows federal courts to exercise appellate jurisdiction over certain interlocutory orders, conflicts with Congress’s authority over federal appellate jurisdiction.” Justice Alito concurred in the judgment, but would instead have held that the denial of dismissal was unappealable because “postponing appellate review of Yearsley issues until final judgment would not imperil important constitutional or public-policy interests.”
Chevron USA Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish
In Chevron USA Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish, the Supreme Court held that a case against a corporation could be removed from state to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), which, in relevant part, allows removal if a suit “is against or directed to . . . any officer (or any person acting under that officer) of the United States or of any agency thereof . . . relating to any act under color of such office.”
During World War II, a predecessor of Chevron USA, Inc. (Chevron), entered into a contract with the United States to refine aviation gasoline (avgas). Some crude oil that Chevron produced in Plaquemines Parish, LA, was used to produce avgas subject to the contract. In 1978, Louisiana enacted the State and Local Coastal Resources Management Act, which prohibits certain uses of Louisiana’s coastal zone, including oil production, unless the user first obtains a permit. The act exempts from the permit requirement “[i]ndividual specific uses legally commenced or established prior to the effective date of the coastal use permit program.”
In 2013, several Louisiana parishes filed multiple suits in Louisiana state court against Chevron and other oil and gas companies, alleging that the companies lacked permits for their use of the coastal zone and that some of their activities that began before the permit program took effect were illegally commenced and thus not eligible for the exception to the permit requirement. With respect to Chevron, the parishes filed an expert witness report identifying certain allegedly illegal activities related to oil production during World War II. Chevron removed the suit against it to federal court, arguing that the suit pertained to its duties to refine avgas during the war. The district court rejected that argument and remanded the case to state court. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that while Chevron did “act[ ] under” a federal officer, it had not shown that that the suit was “for or relating to” those acts.
The Supreme Court granted Chevron’s petition for a writ of certiorari, held oral argument in the case on January 12, 2026, and issued a decision on April 17, 2026. Justice Thomas authored the majority opinion joined by six other Justices (Justice Alito did not participate in the case). Before the Supreme Court, it was undisputed that Chevron had “act[ed] under” a federal officer. The only question was whether the suit was “for or relating to” the company’s wartime production of crude oil and avgas pursuant to its contract with the government. The Court held that “Chevron’s wartime crude-oil production was closely connected to its wartime avgas refining, so the parish’s suit challenging that crude-oil production relates to that refining.” Explaining that “a removing defendant need not show that his federal duties specifically required or strictly caused the challenged conduct,” and rejecting the contention that the suit was insufficiently related to the government contract because “Chevron’s refining contract did not specify how to obtain or produce crude oil,” the Court held that the case was removable because “Chevron has plausibly alleged a close relationship between its challenged conduct and the performance of its federal duties—not a tenuous, remote, or peripheral one.”
Justice Jackson argued for a “causal nexus between the targeted conduct and the federal duties” but concurred in the judgment saying Chevron satisfied that more stringent standard.
Enbridge Energy, LP v. Nessel
In Enbridge Energy, LP v. Nessel, the Supreme Court considered another removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1), and held that the deadline for removal under that statute was not subject to equitable tolling.
Several federal statutes specify the circumstances in which cases filed in state court may be removed to federal court, and 28 U.S.C. § 1446 lays out the procedures that apply to such removals. Among other things, and subject to several exceptions, Section 1446 provides that a notice of removal must be filed within 30 days after the defendant receives notice of a suit.
Enbridge Energy LP and two affiliates (collectively, Enbridge) operate an oil and gas pipeline that runs through Michigan. In 2019, the Michigan Attorney General sued Enbridge in Michigan state court, arguing that Enbridge’s operation of the pipeline violated state law. The Attorney General served Enbridge with the complaint on July 12, 2019, and Enbridge initially litigated the case in state court, arguing, among other things, that the Attorney General’s state-law claims were preempted by federal law. In 2020, the Governor of Michigan filed an additional state-court suit against Enbridge. Enbridge removed that case to federal court, and the parties agreed to hold the Attorney General’s suit in abeyance pending disposition of the Governor’s suit. The district court denied the Governor’s motion to remand to state court, and the Governor ultimately voluntarily dismissed her suit. On December 15, 2021, 887 days after the company received the Attorney General’s complaint, Enbridge removed the Attorney General’s suit to federal court. The Attorney General moved to remand to state court, and the district court denied the motion. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that Enbridge had missed the deadline for removal and the deadline in Section 1446(b) could not be extended via equitable tolling.
The Supreme Court granted Enbridge’s petition for certiorari, held oral argument in the case on February 24, 2026, and issued a decision on April 22, 2026. In a unanimous opinion by Justice Sotomayor, the Court affirmed the holding that courts cannot equitably toll the deadline for removal in Section 1446(b). The Court first held that the removal deadline in Section 1446(b) was not jurisdictional, meaning that it could potentially be subject to equitable exceptions, and assumed that the provision functioned as a statute of limitations, meaning that there was a presumption that it was subject to equitable tolling. The Court held, however, that such tolling was unavailable in light of the text and structure of Section 1446(b), the broader statutory scheme governing removal, and the fact that allowing tolling would undermine Congress’s goal of resolving removal issues early in litigation.
First Choice Women’s Resource Centers, Inc. v. Davenport
In First Choice Women's Resource Centers, Inc. v. Davenport, the Supreme Court held that a nonprofit organization has standing to bring a federal-court challenge to a subpoena seeking information about its donors.
First Choice Women’s Resource Centers, Inc. (First Choice) is a nonprofit that operates “faith-based pregnancy centers” with a “pro-life mission.” First Choice does not perform or provide referrals for abortions. In 2022, citing concerns that pregnancy centers like First Choice’s might have misled visitors or donors, New Jersey Attorney General Matthew Platkin issued a subpoena to First Choice seeking, among other things, the names and contact information of many individuals who had made donations to First Choice. (Platkin was the original defendant in the federal court litigation. In 2026, Jennifer Davenport succeeded Platkin as the state’s Attorney General and was substituted as the respondent in the Supreme Court case. This Legal Sidebar refers to both incumbents as the “Attorney General.”)
First Choice concurrently opposed the subpoena in state court and filed suit in federal district court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Section 1983). In federal court, the organization argued that the subpoena violated its First Amendment right to free association and moved for a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of the subpoena. The district court twice denied the motion for an injunction and dismissed First Choice’s complaint, holding that the dispute was not ripe for adjudication in federal court. A divided panel of the Third Circuit affirmed the second dismissal, holding that First Choice’s claims were not ripe because the organization did “not yet show enough of an injury.” The majority further stated, “We believe that the state court will adequately adjudicate First Choice’s constitutional claims, and we expect that any future federal litigation between these parties would likewise adequately adjudicate them.” The Supreme Court then granted First Choice’s petition for a writ of certiorari. The Court held oral argument on December 2, 2025. The United States filed an amicus curiae brief in support of First Choice and also participated in oral argument as amicus curiae.
The Supreme Court issued its decision in First Choice on April 29, 2026. Justice Gorsuch authored the opinion of the unanimous Court, holding that the Attorney General’s subpoena itself caused First Choice an injury in fact sufficient to establish Article III standing. The Court relied on cases including its 1958 decision in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, in which it held that “compelled disclosure of affiliation with groups engaged in advocacy” can “constitute a[n] effective . . . restraint on freedom of association.” “Against this backdrop,” the Court held, “the question before us all but answers itself. First Choice has established a present injury to its First Amendment associational rights.” It explained that an injury in fact need not be “a tangible harm to a plaintiff, like a physical injury or monetary loss. It can also arise when a defendant burdens a plaintiff’s constitutional rights. . . . And our cases have long recognized that demands for a charity’s private member or donor information have just that effect.” Having so held, the Court declined to address First Choice’s alternative argument that it faced an imminent future injury because there was a credible threat that the Attorney General would seek to enforce the subpoena in state court if the group failed to comply.
Considerations for Congress
In addition to the foregoing cases, other matters from the Supreme Court’s October 2025 term raise questions related to federal court jurisdiction and procedures. In Jules v. Andre Balazs Properties, the Court is considering the jurisdiction of federal courts to confirm or vacate certain arbitration proceedings. In T. M. v. University of Maryland Medical System Corp., the Court is considering whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which prohibits federal district courts from reviewing final decisions of state courts, also prohibits review of a state-court decision that remains subject to further state-court review. As discussed in another Legal Sidebar, this term and recent terms have generated discussion around the Court’s nonmerits docket, particularly the Court’s handling of requests for emergency relief.
Generally, Congress has substantial authority to regulate federal court jurisdiction and procedures, subject to some constitutional limits. More specifically, procedural rules for the lower federal courts are generally set by the Supreme Court, subject to review by Congress, but Congress can also directly amend the rules via legislation. Thus, Congress could amend the FRCP at issue in the cases discussed above. CRS has not identified proposals in the 119th Congress that would amend those specific rules, but there are introduced proposals that would amend FRCP 11, which governs sanctions for misconduct in litigation, and FRCP 23, which governs class actions.
With respect to jurisdiction, some grants of federal court jurisdiction and limits on that jurisdiction come directly from the Constitution, but within the applicable constitutional limits, Congress sets the jurisdiction of the federal courts by statute. Thus, because the Court’s decision in First Choice rested on interpretation of Article III, Congress could not directly overturn that holding by legislation (nor could Congress legislate to alter the First Amendment principles at issue in the underlying litigation). However, Congress could amend Section 1983, the federal statute that provides a cause of action for violations of constitutional rights such as those alleged by First Choice. Congress could also amend the diversity jurisdiction statute—28 U.S.C. § 1332—or the federal removal statutes.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB11434/LSB11434.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/HTML/LSB11434.html
IF13236,The Congressional Accountability Act’s Employment Discrimination Provisions,2026-05-28T04:00:00Z,2026-05-30T05:24:10Z,Active,Resources,Abigail A. Graber,"Federal Workers, Labor Force, Legislative Branch, Civil Rights & Liberties, Federal Workforce Management, Employment Discrimination","Before the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995 (CAA), federal legislative branch employees were largely exempt from the federal employment protections available to employees in the private sector, state and local governments, and the executive branch. The CAA applied much of the body of federal employment law to legislative branch employees, including the primary laws prohibiting employment discrimination. This In Focus briefly reviews the application of federal employment discrimination law to the legislative branch through the CAA. It does not address other laws applied to the legislature through the CAA, including those related to employee bargaining rights, family and medical leave, workplace safety, layoff protections, and disability accommodations for non-employees, among other things.
The CAA’s Employment Discrimination Prohibitions
The federal employment discrimination laws the CAA applies to federal legislative branch employees include 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin;
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), prohibiting discrimination on the basis of age (40+); 
Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act (Section 501) and Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), prohibiting discrimination on the basis of disability and requiring reasonable accommodations; and
The Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA), prohibiting discrimination on the basis of a person’s past, present, or intended uniformed service, among other requirements.
Certain later-passed employment discrimination laws cover legislative branch employees while adopting the CAA’s enforcement mechanisms. These are
The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA), prohibiting discrimination on the basis of genetic information or family medical history; and
The Pregnant Workers Fairness Act (PWFA), requiring employers to provide reasonable accommodations for pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions.
Generally, the CAA applies all of the substantive rights of these laws to federal legislative branch employees. That means these employees can bring the same kinds of discrimination claims that are available to employees in other sectors, including disparate treatment and harassment claims and, where the underlying laws allow, disparate impact and reasonable accommodation claims. The CAA also provides broad protections against retaliation for employees who exercise their CAA rights. Courts and OCWR hearing officers adjudicating CAA claims apply precedent from the underlying antidiscrimination laws.
The CAA employment discrimination provisions cover House of Representatives and Senate employees, as well as employees in other legislative offices and agencies, including, for example, the U.S. Capitol Police (USCP), Architect of the Capitol (AOC), and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). Covered employees include applicants for employment and former employees. For many employment discrimination claims, covered employees also include unpaid staff. 
Federal employment discrimination law covers the Library of Congress (LOC), the Government Accountability Office (GAO), and the Government Publishing Office (GPO) differently than other legislative branch offices. Title VII, the ADA, and the ADEA directly cover employees in these agencies. These employees’ rights under these laws are enforced through different administrative mechanisms than those available under the CAA. (LOC employees may elect to proceed under either the CAA or the underlying antidiscrimination law.)
The CAA contains a provision requiring Congress to consider how future employment-related laws should apply to the legislative branch. In committee reports on bills “relating to terms and conditions of employment,” Congress is to explain how the bill applies to the legislative branch or why it does not. This provision is adopted as a rule of each house of Congress and can be changed in the same manner as other rules.
Enforcement and the Office of Congressional Workplace Rights
Before they can bring employment discrimination suits, most employees outside the legislative branch must first file claims with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) or a state-level equivalent. (USERRA operates differently.) Rather than vest the EEOC with authority over claims by legislative branch employees, Congress created the Office of Congressional Workplace Rights (OCWR) (originally named the Office of Compliance) to administer and enforce the CAA.
To initiate enforcement, a legislative branch employee must file a claim with OCWR within 180 days of a violation. A preliminary hearing officer appointed by OCWR conducts an initial review of the claim and submits a report to the claimant and employing office. Congressional ethics committees also receive reports for claims alleging harassment by a Member personally or a Member’s retaliation for a harassment claim. If the hearing officer finds that the claim is viable, the claimant may then request a confidential hearing conducted by a merits hearing officer, who has authority to allow the parties to conduct discovery, hold a hearing (similar to a trial), issue a decision on the merits of the claim, and award damages and impose other remedies. If both parties agree, they may pursue confidential mediation through OCWR at any time before the merits hearing officer’s written decision. Parties may appeal the merits hearing officer’s decision to the Board of OCWR. Parties may then appeal a Board decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
Alternatively, a claimant may choose to initiate a claim with OCWR and then file a suit in federal district court without going through the OCWR hearing process. A suit may be filed within 70 days of filing a claim with OCWR. If a claimant waits for the preliminary review phase to end and the hearing officer determines that the allegations do not pass preliminary review, the claimant has 90 days after receiving the report to file a suit in federal court.
In addition to its role in the claims process, OCWR issues procedural and, in limited cases, substantive regulations implementing parts of the CAA. OCWR may adopt procedural rules after affording Congress a notice and comment period. OCWR does not have authority to issue substantive regulations implementing most of the employment discrimination laws; USERRA is an exception. The CAA requires OCWR to issue three sets of substantive regulations with respect to USERRA: one governing the House of Representatives, one the Senate, and one for all other covered employees and employing offices. Regulations may be approved by the relevant house of Congress or, for those applying to other legislative branch offices, by a concurrent or joint resolution. OCWR last submitted its USERRA regulations for approval in 2023. Congress has not acted on these regulations.
OCWR also conducts workplace climate surveys; provides training and confidential advisory services to covered employees about their rights and remedies under the CAA; and publishes an annual report on the office’s work, including statistics about the use of OCWR services and the types of CAA claims raised. The CAA instructs OCWR to publish a biennial report reviewing federal employment laws and regulations, among other things, and informing Congress of which provisions do not apply to the legislative branch and whether they should be made to apply.
Remedies
Legislative branch employees largely have access to the same remedies for employment discrimination as executive branch employees do. Remedies can include, depending on the law, equitable relief as the court deems appropriate, compensatory damages, backpay, and liquidated damages (as well as attorney’s fees and costs). Legislative branch employees, like other government employees, are not entitled to punitive damages. 
Generally, awards and settlements are paid from a U.S. Treasury account established by Congress for such purposes (except for awards against GAO and GPO). Employing offices, other than House and Senate offices, must reimburse the account for payments on discrimination claims from funds available for operating expenses. Members of Congress individually must reimburse the account for certain awards or settlements of claims that a Member illegally harassed the claimant or retaliated against the claimant for making a harassment claim. After final disposition, OCWR must refer harassment claims against a Member or senior staffer to the relevant ethics committee.
The CAA requires OCWR to annually report payments resulting from employment discrimination claims. For calendar year 2025, not counting payments made the previous year and reimbursed in 2025, OCWR reported 
approximately $257,000 in payments from offices outside the House of Representatives and Senate, including from the AOC, LOC, CBO, USCP, and OCWR itself;
one payment of $98,650 from a House of Representatives office; and
no payments from Senate offices.
Considerations for Congress
Lawmakers periodically seek to amend discrimination protections for federal employees. In considering whether or how to amend the CAA, Congress could seek input from OCWR or look to recommendations in OCWR’s biennial reports. Recent bills that would amend the CAA include H.R. 8126 (119th Congress), which would, among other things, require Members to reimburse the Treasury for damages and settlements resulting from any employment discrimination claim against them personally (rather than only for claims involving harassment as under current law). 
Congress can also regulate legislative branch employment to some extent without passing a statute or amending the CAA. The House and Senate have substantial flexibility to establish the rules governing affairs in their own chambers. The House rules for the 119th Congress, for example, adopted a provision forbidding the Committee on House Administration from approving employment discrimination settlements alleging a violation by a Member personally unless the Member agrees to reimburse the Treasury. In 2018, the House adopted a resolution establishing an Office of Employee Advocacy to provide both “legal assistance” and “representation” to House employees in CAA administrative matters. The House and Senate ethics committees “retain full power” to exercise their authority, notwithstanding any provision of the CAA. The House and Senate could thus continue to address employment discrimination via their own, internal policies.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13236/IF13236.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13236.html
R48959,"SBA Disaster Loan Credit Standards, Collateral Requirements, and Debt Collection",2026-05-27T04:00:00Z,2026-05-29T12:39:41Z,Active,Reports,"Anthony A. Cilluffo, Bruce R. Lindsay, Maria Kreiser",,"The U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) provides low-interest, long-term loans to disaster survivors to allow them to repair or replace uninsured or underinsured property. About 80% of SBA disaster loans are made to individuals, either for real property damage (such as that to a house) or for personal property damage (such as that to a vehicle or other personal belongings). The other 20% of disaster loans are made to businesses and private nonprofit organizations, either to cover physical damage to business property or to cover financial obligations that could have been met had the disaster not occurred.
In designing the disaster loan program, Congress and the SBA have sought to balance “sympathetic consideration” of the needs and circumstances of disaster survivors with the need to maintain program integrity and protect the federal government’s financial interests. Three key factors in this balance are (1) the credit standards required to obtain a disaster loan; (2) the amount and quality of collateral required to be pledged to secure a disaster loan; and (3) debt collection processes followed after default. Together, credit, collateral, and collection policies are designed to keep loan performance and program losses at levels that are deemed acceptable by Congress and the SBA.
To secure an SBA disaster loan, an applicant must demonstrate that they are reasonably likely to repay the loan. The SBA relies on an applicant’s credit score to determine whether the applicant has an acceptable credit history; the applicant’s credit score further determines whether the applicant is eligible for a loan, what level of processing is required, and whether the applicant likely has access to credit elsewhere (which determines the loan’s interest rate). The applicant’s repayment ability is gauged on the applicant’s income and existing debt. Besides determining loan eligibility, the applicant’s estimated repayment ability contributes to decisions regarding monthly payment amount and loan maturity date. The SBA uses a multistep process for loan applications that is designed to quickly decline applications with clearly unacceptable credit histories or little repayment ability; faster rejections allow the SBA to more quickly refer applicants to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) for possible grant assistance.
Disaster loan applicants may be required to pledge specific assets as collateral for their loan. In the event of default, the SBA can seize and liquidate this collateral to repay the loan. Requiring more collateral for a loan may increase the likelihood that the SBA will be repaid or, after default, increase the amount the SBA is able to recover. However, higher collateral requirements may reduce access to the program by preventing applicants with insufficient collateral from accessing SBA disaster loans. Currently, disaster loans of $50,000 or less made for a presidentially declared major disaster do not require collateral. For disasters receiving declaration by the SBA Administrator, loans of $14,000 or less do not require collateral. For SBA home disaster loans that require collateral, the SBA’s collateral requirements are more lenient than those of most private lenders. For these loans, the SBA typically takes the borrower’s house as the only collateral, regardless of the house’s available equity.
SBA business disaster loans have higher collateral requirements compared with SBA disaster loans for individuals or households. Businesses generally must have collateral with available equity at least equal to the value of the disaster loan. Business disaster loans also often require personal guarantees from business principals. Congress and the SBA have, at times, changed the dollar-value threshold above which borrowers are required to pledge collateral; usually, they have increased the threshold. Stated justifications for the changes—when provided—often mention the need to account for inflation occurring since the last change, or a desire to simplify the program.
In the case of loan default and liquidation of collateral, debt collection represents the last opportunity for the federal government to recover its capital. Before a loan defaults, the SBA uses a variety of tools, including financial hardship relief and loan modifications, to help borrowers return to making regular monthly payments. If those options fail, the SBA can refer the loan to the Department of the Treasury for enhanced debt collection efforts, including offsetting (holding back) the borrower’s wages or federal payments to the borrower (such as federal tax refunds, contractor payments, or Social Security benefits). A borrower who defaults on an SBA disaster loan also becomes ineligible for most federal loans in the future.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48959/R48959.4.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48959.html
R48958,National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities: FY2026 Appropriations,2026-05-27T04:00:00Z,2026-05-30T05:23:59Z,Active,Reports,Shannon S. Loane,"Education Budget & Appropriations, Interior & Environment Appropriations","The National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities is the primary vehicle for federal support for the arts and the humanities. Established in 1965, the foundation currently consists of three agencies: the Institute of Museum and Library Services (IMLS), the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA), and the National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH). IMLS is funded through the Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act. NEA and NEH are funded through the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act.
P.L. 119-4, the Full-Year Continuing Appropriations and Extensions Act, 2025, provided FY2025 funding for IMLS, NEA, and NEH at the FY2024 levels. For IMLS, this was $294.8 million, for NEA it was $207.0 million, and for NEH it was also $207.0 million.
P.L. 119-74, the Commerce, Justice, Science, Energy and Water Development, and Interior and Environment Appropriations Act, 2026, provided FY2026 appropriations for the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations act, including NEA and NEH. P.L. 119-75, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2026, provided FY2026 appropriations for the Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, including IMLS.
For FY2026, IMLS received an appropriation of $291.8 million. This level was $3.0 million less than in FY2024 and FY2025. NEA and NEH each received $207.0 million, the same amount as in FY2024 and FY2025.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48958/R48958.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48958.html
R48957,U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Horticulture Programs: Action in the 119th Congress,2026-05-27T04:00:00Z,2026-05-29T14:24:58Z,Active,Reports,Zachary T. Neuhofer,,"The farm bill generally contains reauthorizations, amendments, and new programs that impact specialty crops, organic agriculture, local and regional food programs, hemp, and pest and disease management. Many of these programs are contained in the horticulture title, which was first added to a farm bill in the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (2008 farm bill; P.L. 110-234). The 2008 farm bill amended programs that were introduced in the Specialty Crop Competitiveness Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-465) (such as the Specialty Crop Block Grant Program), created new programs that primarily benefitted horticulture (such as the Plant Pest and Disease Management and Disaster Prevention Program), and contained support for the National Organic Program (NOP). In subsequent farm bills, the Agricultural Act of 2014 (2014 farm bill; P.L. 113-79) and the Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018 (2018 farm bill; P.L. 115-334), the horticulture title expanded to include support for local and urban agriculture and hemp production. Farm bill support for horticultural crops is not limited to the horticulture title; programs in other titles, such as the research and trade titles, also provide support for these crops. 
The most recent farm bill, the 2018 farm bill, expired in 2023. It has been extended three times for a year at a time: in November 2023 to cover FY2024 and crop year 2024 (P.L. 118-22, Division B, §102); in December 2024 to cover FY2025 and crop year 2025 (P.L. 118-158, Division D, §4101); and in November 2025 to cover FY2026 and crop year 2026 (P.L. 119-37, Division E, §5002).
The 119th Congress passed two laws that impact horticulture programs and provisions from the 2018 farm bill. These two laws are the FY2025 budget reconciliation law (P.L. 119-21), which amended certain existing horticulture programs, and the Continuing Appropriations, Agriculture, Legislative Branch, Military Construction and Veterans Affairs, and Extensions Act, 2026 (P.L. 119-37, Division B, §781), which amended the federal definition of hemp and extended the 2018 farm bill through FY2026.
P.L. 119-21 provided additional funding for certain mandatory spending programs in the horticulture title. The law did not reauthorize all expired or expiring programs from the 2018 farm bill. The law impacted horticulture programs with and without budget baseline. Programs with baseline that received increased funding in P.L. 119-21 include the Specialty Crop Research Initiative, the Plant Pest and Disease Management and Disaster Prevention Program, and the Specialty Crop Block Grant Program. Horticulture programs without baseline that received funding from P.L. 119-21 include support programs for NOP; the Emergency Citrus Disease Research and Development Trust Fund; the Multiple Crop and Pesticide Use Survey; and the Urban, Indoor, and Other Emerging Agricultural Production, Research, Education, and Extension Initiative.
P.L. 119-37 amended the federal definition of hemp that was established in the 2018 farm bill. That prior definition allowed agricultural production and processing of hemp and hemp-derived products to fall outside of restrictions in the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. §§801-904) that otherwise affect cannabis. The new definition defines hemp on the basis of a total tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) concentration of 0.3% on a dry weight basis rather than only delta-9 THC, while making explicit inclusions and exclusions. 
On February 13, 2026, Representative Glenn “GT” Thompson, chairman of the House Committee on Agriculture, introduced a farm bill, the Farm, Food, and National Security Act of 2026 (H.R. 7567), which contains reauthorizations and amendments to horticulture programs. The bill was voted out of committee and ordered to be reported on March 4, 2026. On April 30, 2026, the bill was passed by the House. Some other Members of Congress also have introduced legislation that would impact horticulture programs.
In addition to the amendments to horticulture programs in P.L. 119-21 and P.L. 119-37, Congress may consider reauthorizing the program authority for existing horticulture programs that receive mandatory spending or reauthorizing programs that receive discretionary appropriations. Congress also could consider amending, expanding, or terminating existing horticulture programs and provisions related to hemp, specialty crops, local and regional food systems, and organic agriculture. Additionally, Congress could create new programs impacting these areas or take no action on horticulture programs. ",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48957/R48957.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48957.html
IN12694,Trump Administration’s FY2027 Small Business Administration (SBA) Budget Request,2026-05-27T04:00:00Z,2026-05-29T17:55:02Z,Active,Posts,"Anthony A. Cilluffo, Adam G. Levin",,"The U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) operates a range of programs to support small businesses. These include loan guarantee and venture capital programs to enhance small business access to capital; contracting programs to increase small business opportunities in federal contracting; direct loan programs for individuals, businesses, and nonprofit organizations to assist their recovery from natural disasters; and management and technical assistance training programs to assist small business formation and expansion. 
The Trump Administration requested $329.0 million in new discretionary budget authority for the SBA for FY2027. This would represent a 74.7% decrease from the $1.3 billion in appropriations that Congress provided the SBA in FY2026. In nominal terms (not adjusted for inflation), the Administration’s FY2027 request would be the lowest amount of SBA funding since at least FY2000. (See Figure 1 for recent funding data.) In announcing the proposed cuts and eliminations, the Trump Administration stated that its budget request “eliminates a number of SBA programs that waste taxpayer dollars on failed business counseling and training programs.”
The proposed decreases are concentrated in several accounts and activities, including 
SBA’s entrepreneurial development programs, which provide management and technical assistance to small businesses ($21.4 million requested for FY2027, compared with $330.0 million in appropriations for FY2026);
the administrative costs for SBA’s business loan program (no money requested for FY2027 due to a proposed legislative change that would offset these costs, compared with $161.0 million in appropriations for FY2026);
SBA’s salaries and expenses account, which pays for agency-wide services, SBA regional and district offices, and most daily agency operations ($260.2 million requested for FY2027, compared with $323.1 million in appropriations for FY2026);
congressionally directed spending (no money requested for FY2027, compared with $106.9 million in appropriations for FY2026); and
disaster loan program funding ($143.0 million requested for FY2027, compared with $282.0 million in appropriations for FY2026).
The FY2027 budget request for the SBA Office of Inspector General also included a reduction, from $37.0 million in FY2026 to $33.3 million in FY2027. The budget request included an increase for the SBA Office of Advocacy, from $10.1 million in FY2026 to $14.1 million in FY2027.
Figure 1. SBA Appropriations, FY2022-FY2026, and FY2027 Administration Budget Request
In millions of nominal dollars
/
Source: CRS analysis of appropriations acts and explanatory statements of various appropriations acts and SBA, FY 2027 Congressional Budget Justification; FY 2025 Annual Performance Plan.
Notes: Shift in color denotes FY2027 Trump Administration SBA budget request. SBA received disaster assistance supplemental appropriations in FY2022, FY2023, and FY2025.
Details of Selected FY2027 Budget Request Decreases
Entrepreneurial Development
To support small business development, SBA awards grants to third-party “resource partners” to provide managerial and technical assistance training to small businesses. These programs, which include the flagship Small Business Development Centers (SBDC) program, are collectively referred to as SBA’s entrepreneurial development (ED) programs. Congress has generally provided funding for ED programs through annual appropriations acts.
The Trump Administration’s FY2027 budget request proposes zero funding for nearly all of SBA’s 16 ED programs, including the SBDC program. The request proposed $21.4 million total for ED programs, all of which would fund SBA’s veterans outreach program. As aforementioned, in FY2026, Congress provided $330 million for ED programs, including
$150 million for the SBDC program; 
$41 million for technical assistance under the Microloan access to capital program; 
$27 million for Women’s Business Centers targeting assistance to women-owned small businesses; and 
$20 million for the State Trade Expansion Program providing assistance to exporting small businesses.
The Administration’s FY2027 request did not include funding for these programs.
Business Loan Program  
The Administration’s FY2027 budget request includes a legislative proposal to allow SBA to charge lenders participating in SBA’s loan guarantee programs (including the 7(a), 504, and Small Business Investment Company programs) a fee to offset SBA’s cost of administering those programs. Under current law, SBA charges fees to offset the cost of the loan guarantees (which is the expected cost of SBA purchasing defaulted loans) but not loan administration. SBA’s administrative costs are mostly covered by annual appropriations ($158.0 million in FY2026).
For FY2027, SBA requested—contingent upon the enactment of authorizing legislation—to charge program participants a fee to cover SBA’s administrative costs. This fee would reduce annual appropriations provided for the program dollar-for-dollar. If enacted, this fee would move these programs towards a funding model similar to the Export-Import Bank, where participants fund the agency’s administrative costs.
Salaries and Expenses
The SBA’s salaries and expenses account funds the following:
office operating budgets, which are used by program and administrative offices for daily operations including travel, supplies, and contracted services;
SBA’s nationwide network of regional and district offices;
agency-wide costs, such as rent and telecommunications, which are managed centrally;
employee compensation and benefits, which are also managed centrally; and
reimbursable expenses for programs for which the SBA receives reimbursable budget authority from other federal government agencies.
As noted, the Trump Administration’s FY2027 budget request proposed $260.2 million for SBA salaries and expenses. This would be a decrease from $323.1 million in appropriations for salaries and expenses in FY2026 and, in nominal terms, would be the lowest amount of funding for salaries and expenses since FY2015.
Considerations for Congress
As Congress considers FY2027 funding for the Small Business Administration, it faces the question of whether to incorporate cuts proposed by the Trump Administration into an appropriations bill. The proposed funding reductions have drawn critique from some small business advocacy groups and some Members of Congress. Congress also debated SBA funding in FY2026. The Trump Administration’s FY2026 budget request for SBA also proposed funding decreases, particularly for salaries and expenses (a 22.6% decrease from FY2025 appropriations) and ED programs (a 52.7% decrease from FY2025 appropriations, with only the SBDC program proposed to receive funding of all ED programs). As mentioned, in FY2026 Congress ultimately provided appropriations above these requested amounts, including $323.1 million for salaries and expenses and $330 million for ED programs.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12694/IN12694.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/HTML/IN12694.html
R48960,U.S. Foreign Policy in the Western Hemisphere: Issues for Congress,2026-05-26T04:00:00Z,2026-05-30T05:23:54Z,Active,Reports,"Kyla H. Kitamura, Clare Ribando Seelke, Karla I. Rios, Shelby B. Senger, Cathleen D. Cimino-Isaacs, Michael D. Sutherland, Danielle M. Trachtenberg, Carla Y. Davis-Castro, Shayerah I. Akhtar, Christopher A. Casey, Liana Wong, Joshua Klein, Peter J. Meyer","International Terrorism, Trafficking & Crime, Latin America, Caribbean & Canada, U.S. Trade Policy","Historically, many U.S. policymakers have regarded the Western Hemisphere as a U.S. sphere of influence, vital to U.S. interests, or both. U.S. engagement in the region has shifted over time, responding to changes in the hemisphere and in U.S. objectives. Following the end of the Cold War, the U.S. approach to the Western Hemisphere primarily sought to promote democracy and human rights, reduce barriers to trade, and combat transnational security threats.
The second Trump Administration has identified the Western Hemisphere as a priority for U.S. foreign and defense policy. The Administration has begun to implement potentially far-reaching changes to U.S. relations with Latin American and Caribbean countries; Canada; and Greenland, a self-governing part of the Kingdom of Denmark, with some variation by country.
Competition with China and Russia. The Administration has placed renewed emphasis on limiting the influence of extra-hemispheric powers in the Western Hemisphere. This approach has included U.S. efforts to secure or enhance access to locations the Administration deems strategic, such as the Panama Canal and Greenland, and to prevent competitors from controlling critical infrastructure in the region. 
Counternarcotics and Transnational Crime. The Administration has increased the U.S. military’s involvement in combating illicit narcotics and addressing related security challenges. This approach has included designating transnational criminal organizations as terrorists, conducting unilateral lethal strikes on suspected drug traffickers, and executing the January 2026 U.S. military capture of then-Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro. 
Migration Policy. The Administration has focused extensively on stemming unauthorized immigration into the United States and removing unauthorized immigrants from the country. Among other actions, the Administration has imposed new restrictions at the border, ended humanitarian protections that had provided relief from removal for some immigrants in the United States, and negotiated agreements with governments to accept increased repatriations and third-country migrants from the United States.
Trade Policy. The Administration has implemented tariffs on imports from Western Hemisphere countries—including free-trade-agreement partners—tied to various economic, security, and political goals. The Administration also has pursued bilateral trade negotiations to lower foreign tariffs and nontariff barriers and to potentially expand Western Hemisphere supply chains in strategic sectors.
Political Engagement. The Administration has scaled back democracy assistance in Latin America and the Caribbean while offering support to some politically aligned leaders in the hemisphere. The Administration also has increased U.S. pressure on the authoritarian governments of Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua, while sometimes prioritizing economic or other U.S. objectives over democracy and human rights.
Western Hemisphere governments have reacted to these policy shifts in various ways. Some governments have fully embraced the Trump Administration’s approach, adopted similar policies, and sought to collaborate more closely with the U.S. government. Other governments have demonstrated a willingness to negotiate with the Trump Administration and cooperate in certain areas while rebuffing the Administration in others. U.S. actions perceived to threaten Western Hemisphere countries’ economic interests and sovereignty, such as levying tariffs, imposing sanctions, and threatening to use unilateral U.S. military force, appear to have generated particular pushback and contributed to some countries seeking to bolster ties with other partners.
For the most part, the 119th Congress has not directly authorized or codified the second Trump Administration’s policy shifts in the Western Hemisphere, nor has it enacted various measures introduced by some Members to oppose or block elements of the Administration’s approach to the region. Congress has taken some steps to monitor and shape U.S. policy, enacting Western Hemisphere-specific reporting requirements, directives, and appropriations in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (P.L. 119-60) and the National Security, Department of State, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2026 (P.L. 119-75, Division F), among other legislation (see Appendix). Congress also has held hearings and engaged in other oversight to examine the Administration’s approach to the hemisphere and particular issues. Congress may explore various other options to influence U.S. policy in the region, depending on its goals.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48960/R48960.3.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48960.html
R48956,"National Security, Department of State, and Related Programs: FY2027 Budget and Appropriations",2026-05-26T04:00:00Z,2026-05-28T17:24:58Z,Active,Reports,"Cory R. Gill, Emily M. McCabe","Department of State (DOS), State & Foreign Operations Appropriations","Congress typically considers 12 distinct appropriations measures on an annual basis to fund federal programs and activities. Between FY2008 and FY2025, one of these measures was the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS) appropriations. Beginning in FY2026, Congress retitled this measure as the National Security, Department of State, and Related Programs (NSRP) appropriations. The measure includes funding for U.S. diplomatic activities; cultural exchanges; development, security, and humanitarian assistance; and participation in multilateral organizations, among other international activities. For FY2027, the Trump Administration is requesting $37.79 billion in new budget authority for NSRP accounts. This funding level, if enacted, would be 26.8% less than what Congress provided for FY2026. When including proposed rescissions of certain prior-year balances, the FY2027 request totals $35.51 billion, a 29.1% decrease from the FY2026 enacted NSRP level.
As with previous budget requests and annual SFOPS/NSRP appropriations measures, the budget request is divided into two main components:
Diplomatic Engagement and Related Accounts. These accounts, which are provided for in Title I of the NSRP bill, primarily support Department of State diplomatic and security activities. The Trump Administration proposes $13.24 billion in new budget authority for Title I accounts in FY2027, a 20.4% decrease from FY2026 enacted levels.
Foreign Operations. These accounts, which are provided in Titles II-VI of the NSRP bill, have funded most foreign assistance activities. The FY2027 request includes a total of $24.55 billion in new budget authority for these accounts, a 29.9% decrease from total FY2026 enacted levels.
On April 28, 2026, the House Appropriations Committee approved a FY2027 NSRP bill, H.R. 8595. If enacted, the bill would provide $49.21 billion in new budget authority for NSRP accounts, or a net total of $47.37 billion when including rescissions of prior year budget authority. 
Table A-1 provides an account-by-account comparison of the FY2027 request and reported legislation with FY2026 and FY2025 enacted funding levels. Table A-2 offers a similar comparison focused specifically on the International Affairs budget (Function 150). Figure A-1 depicts the International Affairs budget account structure.
This report tracks NSRP budget requests and appropriations, comparing funding levels for component accounts and purposes. It does not provide extensive analysis of international affairs policy issues. For in-depth analysis and contextual information on international affairs issues, consult the wide range of CRS reports on specific subjects, such as human rights, diplomatic security, and U.S. participation in the United Nations. For more information on NSRP accounts, see CRS Report R48939, National Security, Department of State, and Related Programs Appropriations: A Guide to Component Accounts.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48956/R48956.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48956.html
IF13235,Federal Investigations and Seizures of Voting Records,2026-05-26T04:00:00Z,2026-05-27T16:53:03Z,Active,Resources,Jimmy Balser,,"This In Focus provides background on the constitutional and statutory framework underlying federal investigations of elections, summarizes investigations by the Trump Administration and legal action surrounding demands for and seizures of state and county voting records, and offers considerations for Congress. 
Constitutional Background
States have the initial and principal responsibility for administering elections in the United States, including in determining voter eligibility. The federal government maintains a significant role in elections, such as in enforcing federal laws protecting election integrity.
The states’ primary role in congressional elections is partially set out in Article I, Section 4, Clause 1, of the U.S. Constitution, the Elections Clause: “The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof[.]” The Elections Clause also references Congress’s power to “at any time by Law make or alter” state regulations, which the Supreme Court has sometimes described as an “override” authority. Article I, Section 2, Clause 1, the Voter Qualifications Clause, further empowers the states to decide who is qualified to vote in federal congressional elections. For presidential elections, Article II, Section 1, Clause 4, provides that Congress may determine the “Time” of choosing presidential electors and the day the electors shall cast their votes. The states hold the power to appoint presidential electors to the Electoral College and decide how those appointments are made under Article II, Section 1, Clause 2, the Electors Clause.
Congress does not have general regulatory authority over state and local elections, but it may still exercise its power over them in several contexts. For example, Congress has authority to prevent unconstitutional voter discrimination in a state or local election. In addition to its Article I powers, Congress’s authority to legislate regarding these issues derives principally from the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Relying on its Spending Clause authority under Article I, Congress also may condition the receipt of federal funds for state or local elections on compliance with federal requirements.
The Constitution does not articulate a specific role in federal elections for the President. However, the Take Care Clause, in Article II, Section 3, Clause 1, provides that the President “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” The clause imposes a duty that implicates powers to enforce the laws that Congress enacts, including the enforcement of statutory criminal prohibitions.
Select Statutory Background
While states and localities generally determine their own election practices, Congress has set minimum requirements in federal law. For example, the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA) provides that states must “conduct a general program that makes a reasonable effort to remove the names of ineligible voters from the official lists of eligible voters” due to death or residency change. The NVRA contains public disclosure provisions requiring states to maintain and make available for public inspection certain records concerning the implementation of programs for ensuring the accuracy of voter rolls. The Attorney General may bring civil actions to enforce the NVRA. 
The Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) sets additional requirements, including that states maintain “in a uniform and nondiscriminatory manner, a single, uniform, official, centralized, interactive computerized statewide voter registration list” containing the names and registration information of all registered voters. HAVA further requires states to ensure voter registration records are “accurate and are updated regularly,” to make “a reasonable effort to remove registrants who are ineligible to vote,” and to ensure eligible voters are not removed in error. HAVA provides that the Attorney General may bring a civil action against any state or jurisdiction “as may be necessary to carry out the uniform and nondiscriminatory election technology and administration requirements[.]” 
The Civil Rights Act of 1960 (CRA) requires election officers to retain and preserve records “relating to any application, registration, payment of poll tax, or other act requisite to voting in such election” for 22 months, and to provide the Attorney General such records “for inspection, reproduction, and copying” upon demand in writing with a statement of the basis and the purpose of the demand.
Recent Executive Branch Actions
The Trump Administration has issued executive orders (E.O.s) with the stated purpose of protecting the integrity of elections and initiated investigations into the 2020 and 2024 presidential elections, including by demanding statewide voter registration lists with detailed voter registrant information and ballot records. 
Executive Orders
In March 2025, President Trump issued E.O. 14248, “Preserving and Protecting the Integrity of American Elections.” The E.O. includes several Administration policies with regard to state voter registration lists and other election records. For example, Section 2(b) of the E.O. requires, among other things, that “the Department of Homeland Security, in coordination with the DOGE [Department of Government Efficiency] Administrator,” review federal immigration databases alongside state voter registration lists and other state records “concerning voter list maintenance activities,” including by subpoena. Section 5 further orders the Attorney General to consider withholding federal grants from states that do not enter into information-sharing agreements or otherwise refuse to cooperate with enforcement of the E.O. While provisions of the E.O. have since been enjoined from implementation by multiple federal courts, Section 2(b) and Section 5 are outside of the scope of those injunctions. One federal district court declared that in the course of implementing Section 2(b), the Administration must comply with the requirements of the Privacy Act, “including its requirement that agencies provide at least 30 days’ notice and opportunity for comment for any new or intended routine use’ of information stored in an agency’s system of records.” For further information on the March 2025 E.O. and legal challenges, consult this Legal Sidebar.
In March 2026, President Trump issued E.O. 14399, “Ensuring Citizenship Verification and Integrity in Federal Elections.” The E.O. requires, among other things, that federal officials compile and transmit to each state a “State Citizenship List” for upcoming federal elections, and prioritize investigations and prosecutions of state and local officials who issue ballots to individuals not eligible to vote. Two dozen states have filed a legal challenge to the E.O., arguing that the E.O. would unconstitutionally “usurp” power over elections belonging to the states and Congress. 
Investigations of Voter Registration Lists
Citing the President’s March 2025 E.O. along with the NVRA, HAVA, and CRA, the Department of Justice (DOJ) has requested voter information from most states, the District of Columbia, and some local governments, and sued to enforce compliance with various demands. In complaints against states and their election officials, DOJ alleged that the states had failed to provide copies of the statewide voter registration lists, information concerning the implementation of programs and activities for ensuring accuracy, and other election records. In the underlying requests and the complaints, DOJ demanded detailed voter registrant information, including registrants’ “full name, date of birth, residential address, and either their state driver’s license number or the last four digits of their Social Security number.” In various complaints, DOJ alleged that failure to comply with the requests violated the NVRA, HAVA, and the CRA. Several federal district courts have dismissed DOJ’s suits seeking voter registration data. Some of the decisions have reasoned that while federal laws set certain requirements with regard to registration, they do not compel the disclosure of the voter records demanded by DOJ. DOJ has appealed decisions, and cases in other states remain pending as of the date of this writing. Other states have reached agreements to share voter lists, some of which have been challenged by civil rights groups.
In another dispute, a DOJ lawsuit alleged that the North Carolina State Board of Elections (NCSBE) violated HAVA by using a voter registration form prior to 2024 that did not require an applicant to provide a driver’s license number or the last four digits of their Social Security number. The NCSBE reached a settlement in September to reregister voters missing this information. 
Investigations and Seizures of Ballots 
On January 28, 2026, DOJ’s Federal Bureau of Investigation seized over 600 boxes containing the 2020 election ballots of more than 500,000 voters in Fulton County, Georgia. The search warrant and supporting affidavits alleged violations of Title 52, U.S. Code, Sections 20701 and 20511—criminal prohibitions relating to recordkeeping under the CRA and election interference under the NVRA, respectively—and sought records including “[a]ll physical ballots from the 2020 General Election in Fulton County”; “[a]ll tabulator tapes for every voting machine used in Fulton County”; “[a]ll ballot images produced during the original ballot count” and the recount; and “[a]ll voter rolls[.]” 
Fulton County election officials filed a motion in federal court seeking the return of the seized election records, arguing that the federal government’s search lacked probable cause and violated the Fourth Amendment and other legal requirements, and that the factors under Rule 41(g) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure required a return of seized property. The district court denied the motion, finding that the plaintiffs had not met the exacting standard required under circuit caselaw for granting a motion to return seized property. The court noted that the seizure of ballots of a closed and certified election did not interfere with the ability to conduct the past election, nor “will hinder the State’s ability to conduct future elections.”
Officials in Arizona have stated they complied with a subpoena seeking 2020 Maricopa County election records. In April 2026, DOJ demanded all 2024 election “ballots (including absentee and provisional), ballot receipts, and ballot envelopes” from Wayne County, Michigan, citing the CRA and election fraud laws. Wayne County has replied that it does not have custody of the records.
Considerations for Congress
Congress may amend existing statutory authorities, like the CRA, NVRA, or HAVA, or create new federal election authorities within the bounds of the Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court. H.R. 22, the SAVE America Act, which passed the House on April 10, 2025, would amend the NVRA to establish additional state voter list maintenance requirements, among other provisions. Congress may also facilitate federal investigations of elections by encouraging greater information sharing between state, local, and federal officials. In light of challenges in protecting election systems, Congress may consider creating new requirements for securing election records and limiting the appropriate use of such data. Congress may consider limiting the federal role in elections, such as by restricting the circumstances under which the executive branch can obtain and consolidate voter information. Congress may also provide additional resources and guidance to state and local election officials.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13235/IF13235.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13235.html
IF13234,Retroactive Federal Tax Legislation and Due Process,2026-05-26T04:00:00Z,2026-05-27T16:23:12Z,Active,Resources,Milan N. Ball,,"Federal tax statutes routinely have effective dates that precede their dates of enactment. The Supreme Court has stated that this “customary congressional practice” generally “has been confined to short and limited periods required by the practicalities of producing national legislation.” Some taxpayers have challenged the retroactive application of federal tax legislation based on the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. 
Courts generally rely on the Supreme Court’s seminal decision from 1994, United States v. Carlton, to determine whether the retroactive application of tax legislation violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. In Carlton, the Court upheld a tax statute with a retroactive period slightly more than a year. Applying a two-part test, the Court held that the retroactive tax statute was consistent with the Due Process Clause because it (1) was “rationally related to a legitimate legislative purpose” and (2) had “only a modest period of retroactivity.” While courts continue to apply the rational basis standard in the first part of the test, it is unclear whether the second part of the test, the “modest period” limitation, is a dispositive factor.
This In Focus provides an overview of due process, summarizes Carlton, discusses due process arguments based on notice and reliance and the length of a retroactive period, and concludes with considerations for Congress. 
Due Process
The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause provides that “no person” shall “be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” The Supreme Court has long recognized that a statute that claims to tax can be “so arbitrary . . . that it was not the exertion of taxation but a confiscation of property.” The Court has established that the due process standard that applies to retroactive tax legislation does not focus “exclusively on” notice and reliance—whether a taxpayer had adequate notice of a tax statute’s retroactive application and whether a taxpayer detrimentally relied on federal tax laws prior to amendment. The same deferential rational basis review that is “generally applicable to retroactive economic legislation” applies to retroactive tax legislation. Accordingly, the Court “repeatedly has upheld” federal retroactive tax legislation against due process claims.
United States v. Carlton
In October 1986, Congress amended an estate tax provision, Internal Revenue Code (IRC) Section 2057, to allow estates to deduct half the proceeds from securities sales made by an executor to an Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP). Under the 1986 statute, “any estate” could reduce, or potentially eliminate, its estate tax liability by buying securities and “immediately reselling [them] to an ESOP” before the estate tax return due date. By January 1987, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issued a notice announcing that, pending legislation, the ESOP deduction would only be available to “estates of decedents who owned the securities in question immediately before death.” In February 1987, Members of Congress introduced bills restricting the ESOP deduction to that effect. Then, in December 1987, an amendment to the ESOP deduction was enacted to limit the deduction to securities sold to an ESOP that were “directly owned” by the decedent “immediately before death.” The 1987 amendment was retroactive to the date the ESOP deduction was originally enacted in October 1986. 
In Carlton, an executor of an estate sought to take advantage of the new ESOP deduction. He bought 1.5 million shares of MCI Communications Corporation stock on December 10, 1986, for $11,206,000 and sold the stock two days later to MCI’s ESOP for $10,575,000. The estate then claimed a $5,287,000 deduction on its estate tax return, which reduced its estate tax by $2,501,161. The IRS disallowed the estate’s deduction based on the 1987 amendment. The estate paid the tax and filed an action challenging the retroactive application of the 1987 amendment on due process grounds. 
When the case reached the Supreme Court, the Court held that the retroactive application of the 1987 amendment to the executor’s 1986 transaction was “consistent with the Due Process Clause” because it was “rationally related to a legitimate legislative purpose.” There were two main reasons why the Court upheld the 1987 amendment. First, the Court determined that “Congress’ purpose in enacting the amendment was neither illegitimate nor arbitrary.” The Court concluded that Congress was “correct[ing] what it reasonably viewed as a mistake in the original 1986 provision that would have created a significant and unanticipated revenue loss.” In the Court’s view, there was “no plausible contention” that Congress’s motive was “improper.” Congress’s choice to “target[] estate representatives” that engaged in “purely tax-motivated” transactions was not “unreasonable.” Second, shortly after Congress learned of the tax savings strategy, there was a legislative fix with “only a modest period of retroactivity.” The Court highlighted that the 1987 amendment’s retroactive period was “slightly” more than one year and an amendment to the ESOP deduction was proposed by Congress a few months after the deduction’s enactment. 
Notice and Reliance Arguments
In Carlton, the Supreme Court rejected a stricter due process standard for retroactive tax legislation that focuses “exclusively on . . . notice and reliance.” Persons with due process claims have argued that retroactive tax legislation should be invalidated if (1) they do not have “actual or constructive notice that [a] tax statute would be retroactively amended” or (2) they “reasonably relied” on tax laws pre-amendment to their “detriment.” The Court has explained that these notice and detrimental reliance arguments are not dispositive in many tax contexts. 
The Court has concluded that persons challenging retroactive tax legislation had received notice when legislative proposals debated by Congress included a retroactive effective date. In Milliken v. United States, a 1931 case concerning a due process challenge to a federal gift tax increase, the Supreme Court stated that a taxpayer “should be regarded as taking his chances of any increase in the tax burden which might result from carrying out the established policy of taxation.” The Court in Carlton stated that “[t]ax legislation is not a promise, and a taxpayer has no vested right in the Internal Revenue Code.” In Fifth Amendment due process challenges, the Court has also looked to its reasoning in Welch v. Henry, a 1938 case addressing a Fourteenth Amendment due process challenge to state tax legislation. The Welch Court declared, 
Taxation is neither a penalty imposed on the taxpayer nor a liability which he assumes by contract. It is but a way of apportioning the cost of government among those who in some measure are privileged to enjoy its benefits and must bear its burdens. Since no citizen enjoys immunity from that burden, its retroactive imposition does not necessarily infringe due process. 
Multiple Supreme Court cases suggest that taxpayers challenging a “wholly new tax” that is applied retroactively may have stronger due process claims. In the late 1920s, in Blodgett v. Holden and Untermyer v. Anderson, the Court held that the retroactive application of the first gift tax was invalid under the Due Process Clause. In Untermyer, the Court concluded that “[t]he taxpayer may justly demand to know when and how he becomes liable for taxes—he cannot foresee.” The Court has since limited the reach of Untermyer and Blodgett because they were decided around the early twentieth century during the era in which the Court applied a heightened level of review to economic legislation. 
Length of Retroactive Period Arguments
Retroactive tax statutes typically address a person’s current tax period or a tax period immediately preceding the current period. Taxpayers with due process claims have long contended that the length of a retroactive period can invalidate a tax statute. The Supreme Court has “consistently” held that an income tax statute that is retroactive to a date earlier in the current calendar year “does not per se violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.” In Carlton, the Court applied a two-part test to conclude that a tax statute with a retroactive period slightly over a year satisfied the Due Process Clause. The Court upheld the retroactive tax statute in Carlton due to, in part, the statute’s “modest period of retroactivity.” It is unclear if or when the length of a retroactive period alone can trigger a due process violation.
In 2022, in Moore v. United States, taxpayers challenged the Mandatory Repatriation Tax (MRT) on the grounds that it violated the Constitution’s Apportionment Clause and the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Ninth Circuit). In 2017, P.L. 115-97 (commonly referred to as the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act [TCJA]) added the “one-time, backward-looking” tax. The MRT required U.S. shareholders of “specified foreign corporations” to pay a tax on their pro-rata share of the corporation’s post-1986 untaxed foreign earnings as if the earnings were repatriated to the United States. Taxpayers paid the MRT when they filed their 2017 tax returns or elected to pay the tax in installments over eight years.
After “assum[ing]” the MRT was retroactive, the Ninth Circuit held that the MRT did not violate either the Apportionment Clause or the Due Process Clause. Applying the rational basis standard, the court upheld the MRT’s 30-year repatriation period on due process grounds because it fulfilled a “legitimate purpose by rational means.” The court observed that the TCJA made “significant change[s]” to the IRC’s international tax provisions. Based on those changes, U.S. shareholders of specified foreign corporations “would have been able to avoid taxation indefinitely on [their pro-rata share of] pre-2018 earnings.” The court concluded that the MRT served the legitimate purpose of preventing U.S. shareholders “from obtaining a windfall by never having to pay taxes on their offshore earnings.” The court decided that this legitimate purpose was achieved by rational means because the MRT “accelerat[ed] the effective repatriation date . . . to a [single repatriation] date following passage of the TCJA.” 
In reaching its holding, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the length of the retroactive period was not determinative. It explained that the taxpayers could not “cite a bright-line rule regarding how long ago a retroactive tax can apply because courts deferentially review tax legislation’s purpose on a case-by-case basis.” In the Ninth Circuit’s view, courts have regarded the period of retroactivity as “one, non-dispositive consideration.” The Ninth Circuit cited the 2015 decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in GPX International Tire Corporation v. United States, as an example. In GPX, the Federal Circuit considered the length of retroactivity as one of “five considerations” in determining whether retroactive countervailing duties violated the Due Process Clause. 
Considerations for Congress
On appeal, in Moore, the Supreme Court upheld the Ninth Circuit’s ruling that the MRT did not violate the Apportionment Clause, but declined to address the Due Process Clause ruling because the taxpayers had not sought review on that issue. Absent further instruction from the Court, Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause challenges to federal retroactive tax legislation may have viability, specifically in the context of new taxes and tax legislation with extended periods of retroactivity. When drafting retroactive federal tax legislation, Congress might consider ensuring that the legislation is rationally related to a legitimate legislative purpose and reviewing whether a court has upheld analogous tax legislation with a similar retroactive period.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13234/IF13234.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13234.html
LSB11433,En Banc Tenth Circuit to Consider Scope of DIDMCA OptOut Provision,2026-05-22T04:00:00Z,2026-05-28T13:39:33Z,Active,Posts,Jay B. Sykes,Banking,"The United States has a dual banking system in which banks may obtain either a federal or a state charter. State-chartered banks are not, however, unaffected by federal law. In addition to imposing a range of regulatory requirements on state-chartered banks, federal law frees state banks from the strictures of some state laws. On April 2, 2026, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit (the Tenth Circuit) granted rehearing en banc in National Association of Industrial Bankers v. Weiser, a case involving federal preemption of state interest-rate limits as applied to state-chartered banks. Weiser raises an issue of first impression concerning states’ ability to opt out of Section 521 of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 (DIDMCA), which allows state-chartered banks to charge certain interest rates when extending credit notwithstanding contrary state law. This Legal Sidebar discusses the Weiser litigation and highlights considerations that may be of interest to Congress. 
The Weiser Litigation 
At issue in Weiser are two provisions in DIDMCA. The first, Section 521, allows state-chartered banks to charge interest on loans at a rate up to the greater of 
one percent more than the discount rate on 90-day commercial paper in effect at the Federal Reserve Bank in the Federal Reserve district where a bank is located (the “discount-plus-one” rate) or
the rate allowed by the state where the bank is located. 
Section 521 thus preempts state law in two respects. Section 521 allows a state-chartered bank to charge the discount-plus-one rate even if a state imposes a lower interest-rate limit. Section 521 also permits a state-chartered bank to charge the maximum interest rate of the state in which it is located, even when lending to borrowers in other states with lower interest-rate limits. This latter power is often referred to as interest-rate “exportation.” Congress extended these powers to state-chartered banks to preserve their competitive parity with national banks, which possess such powers by virtue of Section 85 of the National Bank Act (NBA). 
The second provision at issue in Weiser, Section 525, allows a state to opt out of Section 521 with respect to loans “made in” such a state. The Weiser litigation involves the meaning of this language and the scope of the Section 525 opt-out right. 
Colorado has exercised that right. In 2023, Colorado adopted a law opting out of Section 521 with respect to consumer credit transactions in the state. In connection with that opt out, Colorado announced its intent to enforce its interest-rate limits on loans made by out-of-state state-chartered banks to Colorado borrowers. In Weiser, several bank trade associations (the banks) sought an injunction barring Colorado from doing so. The banks argued that, under Section 525 of DIDMCA, a bank loan is “made” only in the state where the bank is located, regardless of the borrower’s location. Thus, on the banks’ reading, loans made by out-of-state banks to Colorado borrowers are not “made” in Colorado within the meaning of Section 525. The implication is that Section 525 allows a state to opt out of preemption with respect to loans made by state-chartered banks located in that state, but not with respect to loans made by out-of-state banks. Colorado disagrees. It contends that bank loans are “made” in Colorado under Section 525 if either the bank or the borrower is located in Colorado. Colorado thus maintains that it can enforce its interest-rate limits on loans made by state-chartered banks to Colorado borrowers—even if those banks are located in other states. This dispute raises an issue of first impression for the federal courts.
In 2024, a federal district court issued a preliminary injunction barring Colorado from enforcing its interest-rate limits on loans made by members of the plaintiff trade associations. In concluding that the banks were likely to succeed on the merits of their claim, the court explained that the banks’ interpretation of Section 525 was consistent with the colloquial understanding that lenders—not borrowers—“make” loans. The court reasoned that this reading derived further support from other banking statutes that use the terms “make” and “made” in the same way—i.e., to refer to action by a lender.
In November 2025, a three-judge panel of the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court by a 2-1 vote. The panel majority determined that the district court erred in treating the terms “made” and “make” interchangeably. Focusing on the statutory term “made,” the majority concluded that a loan is “made” within the meaning of Section 525 when it is “completed” or “executed.” Because an executed loan requires a lender and a borrower, the majority reasoned, a loan is “made” in an opt-out state if either the lender or the borrower is located in that state. While the majority found Section 525 unambiguous, it indicated that an inquiry into statutory purpose confirmed the provision’s plain meaning. In analyzing DIDMCA’s legislative history, the majority explained that the language of Section 525 was derived from two statutes enacted in the 1970s that allowed state-chartered banks to charge certain interest rates, subject to a state’s ability to opt out and enforce its own interest-rate cap. In the majority’s view, this history suggested that Section 525 was intended to allow states to “override” and “reverse” the preemptive effect of Section 521 in its entirety. 
In dissent, Judge Veronica Rossman criticized the panel majority for failing to read Sections 521 and 525 “harmoniously.” She argued that textual and temporal links between the provisions suggest they share the same underlying policy—promoting competitive parity between state and national banks. Because the NBA does not contain a similar opt-out provision regarding national banks, Judge Rossman reasoned, Colorado’s interpretation of Section 525 would place out-of-state state-chartered banks at a disadvantage relative to national banks when lending to Colorado borrowers. Judge Rossman found this implication inconsistent with the purpose of ensuring competitive equality between state and national banks. In addition, like the district court, Judge Rossman emphasized that the words “made” and “make” are used consistently in banking statutes to refer to a bank’s act of making a loan. Judge Rossman also disputed the majority’s reading of Section 525’s legislative history, arguing that the 1970s statutes on which Section 525 was based focused on intrastate banking—not interstate lending or interest-rate exportation. As a result, she argued, those predecessor statutes do not illuminate the relationship between Sections 521 and 525 of DIDMCA.
On April 2, 2026, the Tenth Circuit vacated the panel decision and granted rehearing en banc—in this case, a rehearing before all of the Tenth Circuit’s active judges who are not disqualified. Because the Tenth Circuit vacated the panel decision, the district court’s preliminary injunction remains in effect. 
Considerations for Congress
In addition to raising a novel question of statutory interpretation, the Weiser litigation implicates two issues that may be of interest to Congress: state usury law and competition between state and national banks. 
In January 2026, President Trump proposed limits on credit-card interest rates, leading several Members of Congress to introduce legislation to that effect. While it remains to be seen whether federal interest-rate limits will gain traction, allowing states to opt out of federal interest-rate preemption is a related legislative option. 
Other Members may be concerned about preserving competitive parity between state and national banks. An ultimate decision in favor of Colorado may prompt other states to opt out of Section 521 of DIDMCA. In April 2026, Oregon enacted a law opting out of Section 521 with respect to consumer finance loans made in the state. In doing so, it joined Colorado and Iowa as the only states that are currently exercising their opt-out rights. Rhode Island is also considering DIDMCA opt-out legislation. As discussed, in the Weiser case, Judge Rossman argued in dissent that Colorado’s position would place state banks at a competitive disadvantage relative to national banks when it comes to interstate lending. If more states opt out of Section 521, that disadvantage may strengthen. 
These concerns about competitive equality appear to be the motivating force behind legislation in the 119th Congress. The American Lending Fairness Act of 2026 (S. 3889 and H.R. 7866) would repeal Section 525 of DIDMCA and allow states to opt out of Section 521 only with respect to loans made by banks that they charter. 
",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB11433/LSB11433.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/HTML/LSB11433.html
IF13233,Medicare’s Site-Neutral Payment Policy,2026-05-22T04:00:00Z,2026-05-23T10:38:11Z,Active,Resources,"Jim Hahn, Wen W. Shen",,"Overview
By law, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) determines Medicare program Parts A and B payments to providers and suppliers for services furnished to covered beneficiaries through multiple payment systems. Some Medicare payment systems pay for services furnished at particular sites of service (e.g., a physician’s office, an acute care hospital inpatient setting, a hospital outpatient department, or skilled nursing facility), while other payment systems apply to certain services independent of location, such as clinical laboratory or durable medical equipment services.
Each payment system uses a separate methodology specified in statute to determine the value and payment rate for covered services. Discrepancies can exist for similar types of care furnished to a beneficiary across the payment systems—for example, whether a patient is treated in a physician’s office and paid under the physician fee schedule (PFS), in a hospital outpatient department (HOPD) and paid under the outpatient prospective payment system (OPPS), or in an ambulatory surgery center (ASC) and paid under the ASC payment system.
Medicare’s site-neutral payment policy sets payments for certain services to be equivalent independent of the location where a beneficiary receives the service. The policy is intended to eliminate the differences and any corresponding incentives that might lower the quality of patient care or lead to inefficiencies in the Medicare program. This In Focus summarizes the background and rationale behind the site-neutral payment policy, the statutory basis for and implementation of the policy, legal challenges to the policy, and considerations for Congress.
Background and Rationale
Medicare payments for similar services are typically higher under the OPPS than the PFS, as the additional overhead costs associated with being part of the hospital or health system are included in the calculation under the OPPS but not in the PFS. The Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC), an independent congressional agency established by the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (P.L. 105-33) to advise Congress on issues affecting the Medicare program, cites this payment differential as one incentive contributing to vertical integration and industry consolidation, as independent physician practices have been acquired by hospitals, health systems, and corporate entities (such as private equity firms) who then receive higher Medicare payments under the OPPS. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that “at least 47% of physicians were consolidated with hospital systems in 2024—up from less than 30% in 2012,” and that industry consolidation was associated with higher health care prices.
Because Medicare beneficiary coinsurance is generally 20% for Part B services, higher Medicare payments under the OPPS rather than the PFS for similar or identical services require greater out-of-pocket obligations for the beneficiaries receiving the care. Higher OPPS payments also place more pressure on the Supplementary Medical Insurance (SMI) Trust Fund, which draws on general revenues to fund ~75% of Part B expenditures. 
MedPAC recommended in 2012 that payments for certain evaluation and management (E&M) services be aligned whether delivered in physicians’ offices or hospital outpatient departments. MedPAC subsequently expanded its recommendations in 2015 to include payments in post-acute settings for care furnished in inpatient rehabilitation facilities (IRFs) and skilled nursing facilities (SNFs). Policymakers continue to evaluate whether services are sufficiently comparable for site-neutral payment. Patients treated in one setting (a hospital outpatient department) may differ from those treated in a seemingly comparable one (physician offices), in terms of severity, clinical complexity, comorbidities, and need for ancillary services. Similar concerns would apply to additional settings under consideration, including IRFs and SNFs.
Statutory Authority
Medicare OPPS payments are governed by an intricate set of requirements under Social Security Act (SSA) Section 1833(t). In addition to specifying various statutory formulas for setting payment rates, Section 1833(t)(2)(F) authorizes CMS to “develop a method for controlling unnecessary increases in the volume of covered [outpatient] services.” The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-74, BBA 2015) Section 603 added subparagraph (21) to SSA Section 1833(t) to generally exclude items and services furnished by off-campus outpatient departments from payment by OPPS. Such services provided on or after January 1, 2017, were to be paid under “the applicable payment system” (subsequently determined by CMS rule to be the PFS; see below) rather than the OPPS. 
BBA 2015 Section 603 also included a “grandfather” exception for HOPDs billing for Medicare services prior to November 2, 2015. The 21st Century Cures Act (P.L. 114-255) expanded the exceptions to allow certain additional off-campus HOPDs to receive higher OPPS payments, including HOPDs under construction but not yet billing by November 2, 2015, and rural sole community hospitals. 
CMS Rules and Implementation 
In implementing BBA Section 603, CMS stated its belief that Congress intended the provision “to eliminate the Medicare payment incentive for hospitals to purchase physician offices, convert them to off-campus [provider-based departments], and bill under the OPPS for services furnished there.” The CY2017 OPPS and ASC Final Rule established the PFS as the applicable Part B payment system “for the majority of the nonexcepted items and services furnished by nonexcepted off-campus [HOPDs].” 
Invoking its authority under Section 1833(t)(2)(F), CMS later issued the CY2019 OPPS and ASC Final Rule, which further extended the site-neutral payment policy by applying it to clinic visits, the most billed service at hospital outpatient departments, when the service is delivered at an “excepted” off-campus HOPD. CMS asserted that “to the extent that similar services are safely provided in more than one setting, it is not prudent for the OPPS to pay more for such services because that leads to an unnecessary increase in the number of those services provided in the OPPS setting.” The policy was phased in over two years; OPPS payments were reduced to 70% in CY2019 and 40% in CY2020. OPPS payments for these services were set to be the same as under the PFS in subsequent years.
The CY2026 OPPS and ASC Final Rule extended the site-neutral payment policy to drug administration services under Part B (physician-administered drugs such as those used in chemotherapy, immunotherapy, and related injections) across off-campus HOPDs and ASCs. Beginning January 1, 2026, the OPPS and ASC payment for these services are the same as the payment under the PFS.
Not all attempts to broaden the site-neutral payment policy have advanced. To extend the policy beyond the overlap between care furnished and paid under the PFS and the OPPS, MedPAC’s April 2024 meeting considered options to lower payments for certain inpatient rehabilitation facility (IRF) services to similar care furnished in skilled nursing facilities (SNFs). MedPAC’s analyses, included in the June 2024 report, concluded that patient populations and clinical conditions in IRFs and SNFs were not sufficiently comparable to support a broader site-neutral policy for those services.
CMS has expressed its intent to expand the site-neutral payment policy to other services and solicited input on services to be considered, as noted in the CY2026 OPPS and ASC Final Rule.
Legal Challenges 
Critics of the site-neutral payment policy assert that the lower payments tied to the PFS would be insufficient to cover costs (e.g., overhead) that are higher in HOPDs. The impact on rural hospitals, many of which are under financial stress, has increased concern about access in already medically underserved areas.
The American Hospital Association (AHA) and other plaintiffs filed suit to challenge the 2019 OPPS final rule. They argued that the rule’s extension of the site-neutral payment policy—which reduced the payment rate for the clinic visit service for all off-campus HOPDs and not just non-excepted HOPDs—exceeded CMS’s authority under Section 1833(t)(2)(F) to “develop a method for controlling unnecessary increases” in outpatient department services volume and was contrary to BBA 2015 Section 603. In AHA  v. Azar, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit (D.C. Circuit) applied Chevron deference—a doctrine that required courts to defer to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes those agencies administer—and upheld the 2019 rule. The court concluded that “the OPPS statute does not unambiguously foreclose [CMS’s] adoption of a service-specific, non-budget-neutral rate cut as a method for controlling unnecessary increases in’ volume,” and “[n]othing in the text of section 603 indicates that preexisting off-campus PBDs are forever exempt from adjustments to their reimbursement.” 
Since the D.C. Circuit’s decision in AHA, the Supreme Court overruled Chevron deference in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo. At the same time, the Court stated that the decision “do[es] not call into question prior cases that relied on the Chevron framework.”
The CY2026 OPPS and ASC Final Rule’s expansion of the site-neutral payment policy to drug administration services has drawn public statements of concern from hospital stakeholders. As of date of publication, however, no suits have been filed to challenge the rule.
Considerations for Congress
Congressional interest in Medicare’s site-neutral payment policy includes budgetary and health care quality concerns. 
A December 2024 CBO analysis estimated that expanding site-neutral payment rates across three alternatives could save more than $170 billion over the 10-year window from 2025 to 2034. Most of the savings would result from the application of “full site-neutral rates for most service to all HOPDs (on-campus and off-campus” ($156.9 billion), with additional savings from applying site-neutral rates for drug administration services ($5.6 billion) and imaging services ($7.6 billion) to all off-campus HOPDs. Further, any reductions in OPPS payments would similarly lower beneficiary coinsurance obligations.
Considerations for Congress as CMS explores potential expansions to the policy include the following:
Questions remain regarding when services, patient populations, and clinical conditions are sufficiently comparable across care settings to justify equivalent payment rates.
New legal challenges may limit the expansion of site-neutral payments to other Medicare payment systems, patients, and clinical conditions.
Hospital groups continue to oppose expansion of the site-neutral payment policy amid concerns about patient access to care and the potential impact of financial stresses on a health care workforce facing recruitment, pipeline (supply), and burnout issues. 
Through ongoing legislative oversight, Congress may monitor the impact of site-neutral payments on the federal budget, Medicare providers, suppliers, and beneficiaries.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13233/IF13233.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13233.html
R48954,Data.gov: Implementation and Perspectives on Its Functions,2026-05-21T04:00:00Z,2026-05-22T17:08:41Z,Active,Reports,"Meghan M. Stuessy, Clinton T. Brass",,"Over many decades, Congress has legislated policies to provide federal data to different types of users for a variety of purposes or “use cases.” From constituents seeking to learn more about the functions of their representative government to researchers seeking authoritative data for ongoing work, Data.gov is the latest effort in a series of initiatives addressing ongoing debates about how the public may access government data.
Through administrative initiatives beginning in 2009 and implementation of the Open, Public, Electronic, and Necessary Government Data Act (OPEN Government Data Act; P.L. 115-435, Title II) from 2019 to the present, Data.gov has operated primarily as a directory to certain kinds of government-held information. The General Services Administration administers Data.gov’s day-to-day operations, while the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) effectively exercises control over the website’s implementation and develops related guidance for agencies. Data.gov hosts the federal data catalog, which lists information about many agency data assets and provides means to access some of them. However, Data.gov does not typically serve as a repository for the underlying data assets themselves; rather, it is characterized in law as “a single public interface online as a point of entry” that directs users to data assets hosted elsewhere, such as on individual agency websites.
The OPEN Government Data Act defines data as “recorded information” and data asset as “a collection of data elements or data sets that may be grouped together.” However, OMB’s definition from implementation guidance in Memorandum M-25-05 interpreted the act’s definition of the term data asset more narrowly to mean data that are both structured (e.g., organized into columns and rows and a database of digital images) and logically grouped (e.g., with a shared function or purpose). These definitions and others contained in the statute may permit agencies a level of discretion in determining which data assets are included and which are excluded from Data.gov’s federal data catalog. The OPEN Government Data Act differs markedly from previous administrative and legislative efforts to make federal data available to the public in that it requires agencies to use the statutory framework for data access built by the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) to determine which data should be included and made available on Data.gov.
In many ways, Data.gov is situated at a nexus of different perspectives and competing priorities seeking to influence policy on how to make federal data available. Policymakers and stakeholders have variously emphasized different aspects of information policy, and Congress may continue to weigh in on what aspects the federal government should value. These considerations include how long data should be kept, what types of data should be stored (and in what formats), whether and how data should be made more available or secure, who should gain access to data and when, and what type and quality of data should be applied for particular purposes.
This report provides an overview of the operations of Data.gov, including how they continue to be influenced by past administrative decisions. It also discusses six perspectives toward information availability that continue to influence Data.gov’s operations and poses questions raised by each viewpoint that policymakers might consider regarding the website’s present and future development. The report then examines several related issues that Congress may wish to consider. These include the ability of Data.gov to serve varied audiences, transparency of data asset inclusion and reporting procedures, and the persistence of data access over time. Lastly, the report discusses debates regarding whether Data.gov, as home of the federal data catalog, should function as either a registry for locating data or a repository for hosting federal data.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48954/R48954.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48954.html
R48953,FY2025 State Grants Under Title I-A of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA),2026-05-21T04:00:00Z,2026-05-23T13:53:04Z,Active,Reports,"Rebecca R. Skinner, Joe Angert",,"The Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), most recently comprehensively amended by the, Every Student Succeeds Act (P.L. 114-95), is the primary source of federal aid to support elementary and secondary education. The Title I-A program is the largest grant program authorized under the ESEA and was funded at $18.4 billion for FY2025. It is designed to provide supplementary educational and related services to low-achieving and other students attending elementary and secondary schools with relatively high concentrations of students from low-income families. 
Under current law, the U.S. Department of Education determines Title I-A allocations to local educational agencies (LEAs) based on four separate funding formulas: Basic Grants, Concentration Grants, Targeted Grants, and Education Finance Incentive Grants. State grants are the total of the allocations for all LEAs in a state under all four formulas. The four Title I-A formulas have somewhat distinct allocation patterns, providing varying shares of allocated funds to different types of LEAs and states. Thus, for some states, certain formulas are more favorable than others.
This report provides FY2025 state grant amounts under each of the four formulas used to determine Title I-A grants. Overall, California received the largest FY2025 Title I-A grant amount ($2.3 billion, or 12.47% of total Title I-A grants to states). Vermont received the smallest FY2025 Title I-A grant amount ($41.6 million, or 0.23% of total Title I-A grants to states).
",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48953/R48953.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48953.html
IF13232,"Unemployment Compensation, Strikes and Lockouts in 2025",2026-05-21T04:00:00Z,2026-05-22T16:23:00Z,Active,Resources,"Julie M. Whittaker, Katelin P. Isaacs","Unemployment Insurance, Labor Relations","Introduction
Eligible unemployed workers may receive weekly income support from the joint federal-state Unemployment Compensation (UC) program while they search for new work. In general, such workers must have lost their jobs through no fault of their own and be able, available, and seeking work. Some states provide UC benefits to workers during labor disputes that involve temporary work stoppages (e.g., when workers strike or employers prevent employees from work), if certain conditions are met. Congress has considered proposals to amend federal requirements for state UC programs in how to treat labor disputes in UC determinations.
This In Focus discusses the role of UC in labor disputes, including current UC eligibility and disqualification related to labor disputes as well as examples of recent federal legislation to expand or limit UC access in labor dispute situations. It also provides examples of union strike assistance payments.
Labor disputes among workers and employers may involve temporary work stoppages. Strikes occur when workers initiate the work stoppage. Lockouts happen when employers refuse to allow employees to work at the worksite. For 2025, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) reported that 16.5 million workers were represented by a union. Additionally, BLS reported 30 major work stoppages (i.e., involving 1,000 or more workers), impacting approximately 306,800 workers. (Workers involved in a work stoppage may or may not be members of a union.) 
Unemployment Compensation 
The joint federal-state UC program provides income support to workers through weekly UC benefit payments. Its two main objectives are to (1) provide temporary partial wage replacement to involuntarily unemployed workers and (2) stabilize the economy during recessions. The UC program is financed through employer taxes imposed by the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) and state payroll taxes required under each state’s unemployment tax law. Although there are broad requirements under federal law regarding UC benefits and financing, state specifics are set out under each state’s laws. States administer UC benefits with U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) oversight, resulting in 53 different UC programs operated in the states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. For additional background on UC, see CRS In Focus IF10336, The Fundamentals of Unemployment Compensation.
UC Eligibility and Disqualification
The UC program generally does not provide UC benefits to the self-employed, individuals who are unable to work, or individuals who do not have a recent earnings history. Eligibility for UC benefits is based on attaining qualified wages and employment in a position that is subject to unemployment payroll taxes (i.e., FUTA and state unemployment tax law) or through employment within state and local governments or some nonprofit entities. To receive UC benefits, claimants must be able, available, and actively searching for work. UC claimants generally may not refuse suitable work, as defined under state laws, and must maintain their UC eligibility. The methods states use to determine eligibility vary across state UC programs. An ineligible individual is prohibited from receiving UC benefits under a state’s laws until the condition serving as the basis for ineligibility no longer exists. UC eligibility is generally determined on a weekly basis.
In addition, states may disqualify claimants who lost their jobs because of inability to work, voluntarily quit without good cause, were discharged for job-related misconduct, or refused suitable work without good cause. In this situation, which is distinct from ineligibility, an individual has no rights to UC benefits until the person requalifies under a state’s laws, usually by serving a predetermined disqualification period or obtaining new employment. In some situations, UC benefits may be reduced or wage credits may be cancelled for disqualified individuals.
UC and Labor Disputes
Federal law does not specify whether an individual experiencing a period of unemployment due to a labor dispute should be considered ineligible or disqualified for UC benefits. The only provision in federal law that addresses UC coverage during a labor dispute is in Section 3304(a) of FUTA, which provides that UC benefits cannot be denied to an otherwise eligible individual for refusing to accept new work if the offered position is vacant due to a labor dispute among other conditions. However, model state UC legislation prepared by the Social Security Board (SSB) in 1936 provided optional suggested text that would have required most cases of unemployment due to a labor dispute to be subject to a disqualification period that would last until the termination of the labor dispute (with certain exceptions). 
In most states, when a striking worker is deemed disqualified for UC benefits because of the labor dispute, there is no permanent reduction or cancellation of UC benefit entitlement. Instead, the denial remains in place until the dispute is resolved and/or the jobsite is operational. After that point, the worker may become prospectively eligible to receive UC for any additional weeks the worker continues to be unemployed. Table 5-11 in DOL, Employment and Training Administration, 2023 Comparison of State Unemployment Insurance Laws, provides a broad summary of how states disqualify individuals involved in a labor dispute. (Table 5-12 in the same document provides a broad summary of exclusions from disqualification, many of which mirror the 1936 SSB list of suggested exceptions.) 
Recent DOL Letter
On January 8, 2026, the DOL Unemployment Insurance (UI) administrator sent a letter to state UI directors reminding them of federal law requirements with respect to UC eligibility during a labor dispute. In particular, the letter highlighted that an individual who is on strike must engage in activities that demonstrate to the state UC agency that the individual is able and available for work and actively seeking work under state UC law as required by 42 U.S.C. 503(a)(12).
UC and Work Stoppages in 2025
In 2025, most state laws treated claimants who voluntarily left a job because of a labor dispute as subject to disqualification and ineligible for UC benefits until the labor dispute is resolved. Unions generally oppose this approach and assert that access to UC is beneficial to the economy by supporting striking workers while they exercise their right to strike for better pay and workplace conditions. In contrast, employers generally oppose expanding UC benefits to actively striking workers, arguing that such entitlement would punish employers by effectively incentivizing and funding the strikes through increases in the employers’ state UC taxes, which generally fund weekly UC benefits.
Strikes
Striking involves walking off the job or refusing to report to work. Most state UC laws typically require that an individual be treated as disqualified for UC until the resolution of the labor dispute. States generally have exceptions for workers who are not participating in the dispute but have lost work because of it (e.g., nonunion office workers who were laid off as a result of a strike might not be disqualified since they had no control or voice in the union strategy). In some states, a worker not involved in a labor dispute who refuses to cross a picket line during the dispute would be considered to have voluntarily left work and might also be disqualified from receiving UC. Some states may authorize payment of UC benefits for striking workers if the strike is because an employer failed to conform to federal or state labor laws or the employer did not follow a collective bargaining agreement.
States with Exceptions to Strike Disqualification
In 2025, 2 states, New Jersey and New York, allowed striking workers to qualify for UC once a 2-week waiting period had been met. In addition to these 2 states, both Washington (up to 6 weeks of benefits available after a 1-week waiting period) and Oregon (up to 10 weeks after a 2-week waiting period) enacted legislation in 2025 to provide UC to strikers beginning in 2026.
Lockouts
A lockout occurs when an employer refuses to allow employees to work. Employers may use a lockout to attempt to obtain more leverage in collective bargaining negotiations. Depending on the circumstances, some states may find striking workers locked out of a worksite to be eligible for UC. 
Legislation in the 119th Congress
In the 119th Congress, several bills have been introduced that would alter federal requirements for how state UC programs treat unemployment due to labor disputes. 
The Securing Help for Involuntary Employment Loss and Displacement Act (SHIELD Act; H.R. 4424) would prohibit individuals who participate in a labor dispute, support strikes financially, or have a direct interest in a labor dispute to be eligible for UC benefits.
The Unemployment Insurance Modernization and Recession Readiness Act (S. 2312/H.R. 4439) would, among other provisions, prohibit states from denying UC benefits in certain situations based on strikes or lockouts or the failure of an employer to follow certain federal or state labor laws. 
The Empowering Striking Workers Act of 2025 (H.R. 5206/S. 2731) would require states to consider individuals who are employed but unable to work due to a labor dispute as unemployed on the earliest of 4 dates: 14 days after the date on which the strike began, the date the lockout began, the date on which the employer hired permanent replacement workers, or when the labor dispute ended and the individual became unemployed. 
Union Strike Assistance
Because most strike actions disqualify union members from receiving UC benefits, established unions sometimes have a strike fund, paid by members’ dues, to help support union members during strikes. If a strike is authorized, union members may be eligible to receive strike benefits through such a fund. For example, in the 2025 International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM) District 837 strike against Boeing in St. Louis, MO, IAM provided up to $300 per week as a strike pay, payable beginning at the end of the first week of unemployment. 
Occasionally, unions may offer more limited support for striking members because of financial limitations. For example, the Screen Actors Guild-American Federation of Television and Radio Artists (SAG-AFTRA) Emergency Financial Assistance/Disaster Relief Fund provided limited grants to some members who were experiencing an urgent financial need and could not pay for basic living expenses because of the SAG-AFTRA 2023 strike.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13232/IF13232.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13232.html
R48955,CARES Act Eviction Notice Requirements: Background and Recent Developments,2026-05-20T04:00:00Z,2026-05-29T16:55:24Z,Active,Reports,"David H. Carpenter, Maggie McCarty","Eviction Protections, CARES Act, COVID-19 Pandemic Domestic Response, Department of Housing & Urban Development (HUD)","The COVID-19 pandemic disrupted business operations nationwide, leading to dramatic job losses that threatened the ability of many to meet their financial obligations, including housing rental payments. It brought attention to the risks posed by potential increased evictions and tenant displacement, which could further the spread of the virus and cause economic hardship for tenants and landlords. In response to these concerns, Congress and the President enacted several laws providing significant amounts of supplemental funding to help tenants pay their rent and remain stably housed. The laws also included arguably unprecedented new federal policies designed to prevent landlords from pursuing eviction. Most of the funding and policies enacted were temporary, designed to address the immediate impacts of the pandemic. One eviction-related provision—a thirty-day notice to vacate requirement enacted as Section 4024(c) of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act) (Pub. L. No. 116-136, § 4024(c), 134 Stat. 281, 492 (2020))—remains in effect, although its scope and future remain subject to debate. 
In response to legal challenges to Section 4024(c)’s notice to vacate requirements, courts have reached some inconsistent holdings, but most have held that
the CARES Act notice to vacate requirement is not time-limited and, thus, is still in effect (see, e.g., Arvada Village Gardens LP v. Garate, 529 P.3d 105, 108 (Colo. 2023); D.H. v. Common Wealth Apartments, 231 N.E.3d 284, 288 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024); Olentangy Commons Owner LLC v. Fawley, 228 N.E.3d 621, 633 (Ohio Ct. of App. 2023); Sherwood Auburn LLC v. Pinzon, 521 P.3d 212, 216 (Wash. Ct. App. 2022); but see MIMG CLXXII Retreat on 6th, LLC v. Miller, 16 N.W.3d 489 (Iowa 2025));  
the CARES Act notice to vacate requirement is only applicable to the nonpayment of rent, rather than other grounds for eviction (see, e.g., West Haven Hous. Auth. v. Armstrong, 2021 WL 2775095, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 16, 2021); King County Hous. Auth. v. Knight, 563 P.3d 1058, 1063 (Wash. 2025); but see Pendleton Place, LLC v. Asentista, 541 P.3d 397, 402 (Wash. App. 2024), abrogated by King County Hous. Auth. v. Knight, 563 P.3d 1058, 1063 (Wash. 2025)); and
landlords must wait until after the thirty-day notice to vacate period passes before filing a judicial proceeding for eviction (see, e.g., Sherwood Auburn LLC, 521 P.3d at 217–18; Olentangy Commons Owner LLC, 228 N.E.3d at 632; but see Woodrock River Walk v. Rice, 906 S.E.2d 682, 685–87 (Va. Ct. of App. 2024)).  
The Biden Administration took a number of administrative actions intended to enforce the CARES Act notice to vacate requirement (see, e.g., Extension of Time and Required Disclosures for Notification of Nonpayment of Rent, 86 Fed. Reg. 55693 (Oct. 7, 2021) and 30-Day Notification Requirement Prior To Termination of Lease for Nonpayment of Rent, 89 Fed. Reg. 101270, 101270 (Dec. 13, 2024)). The Trump Administration has since taken steps to undo many of those actions (see, e.g., Revocation of the 30-Day Notification Requirement Prior to Termination of Lease for Nonpayment of Rent; Indefinite Delay of Effective Date, 91 Fed. Reg 12301 (Mar. 13, 2026)).
Although Congress passed the CARES Act’s notice to vacate requirement a number of years ago, there is some remaining ambiguity about the requirement’s applicability and uncertainty about the degree to which it has been enforced. Further, it remains controversial, with some low-income tenant advocates arguing for its retention and enhanced enforcement, while some housing industry groups have called for its repeal. Legislation to repeal the requirement has been introduced in several Congresses, including the Respect State Housing Laws Act, H.R. 1078, 119th Cong. (2026), which the House Financial Services Committee reported favorably on February 25, 2026.  ",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48955/R48955.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48955.html
R48952,Opportunity Zones Round Two Selection Process: Frequently Asked Questions,2026-05-20T04:00:00Z,2026-05-22T11:08:37Z,Active,Reports,"Anthony A. Cilluffo, Donald J. Marples","Economic Development, Tax Policy for Economic Development","The Opportunity Zone program provides tax incentives to taxpayers who invest in certain designated geographic areas. The program was enacted in 2017, as part of P.L. 115-97, and began operations in 2018. It was initially set to expire by the end of 2028; however, the program was permanently extended and amended in 2025 by P.L. 119-21. 
Changes to the program include a new selection round for Opportunity Zones. Most 2018 selections are scheduled to lose their designation at the end of 2028. A new selection round is to choose the areas that are eligible for the tax incentives for the 10-year period from January 2027 through the end of December 2036. 
The first iteration of the program, from 2018-2028 under the P.L. 115-97 rules, is referred to as “Round One Opportunity Zones.” The new selection round, starting in mid-2026 under permanent rules created by P.L. 119-21, is referred to as “Round Two Opportunity Zones.”
This report addresses questions about the upcoming selection process for Round Two Opportunity Zones. ",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48952/R48952.3.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48952.html
IF13231,Indexing Capital Gains Taxes for Inflation: Marginal Effective Tax Rates and Revenue Estimates,2026-05-20T04:00:00Z,2026-05-21T17:23:57Z,Active,Resources,"Jane G. Gravelle, Mark P. Keightley",,"Proposals to index capital gains taxes for inflation have recently generated public debate. For example, S. 798 and H.R. 1857 would inflation index capital gains on assets held for at least three years. Some Members of Congress have also advocated for the Administration to adopt indexing of capital gains by regulation. This In Focus compares capital gains taxation under current law with inflation indexing, examines how indexing affects marginal effective tax rates (METRs) on corporate stock returns, and presents revenue estimates of selected versions of inflation indexing options.  
Current Law and Inflation Indexing
A capital gain represents the increase in value of an asset over time. It is computed by subtracting the asset’s basis from the final sales price. For a financial asset, such as corporate stock, the basis is typically its original purchase price. For a physical asset, such as a building, the basis is the acquisition cost plus any improvements, minus depreciation.
Under current law, an asset’s basis is not adjusted for inflation. Consequently, a portion of any capital gain often reflects “phantom gains”; that is, compensation for eroded purchasing power rather than a true increase in investor wealth. For example, a stock originally purchased for $100 and sold for $150 after 10 years would result in a taxable gain of $50 under current law. But if inflation averaged 2% over those 10 years, inflation indexing would adjust the basis upward by $22 (2% compounded over 10 years), leaving a taxable real gain of $28 ($150 minus $122).
Capital gains receive a number of tax benefits under current law that some view as proxies for inflation indexing. Taxes on capital gains are deferred until realization. Long-term capital gains (on assets held for more than a year) are taxed at rates (0%, 15%, and 20%) that are lower than those imposed on ordinary income (up to 37%). And capital gains are excluded from taxation at death via a step-up in basis on inherited assets. 
Higher-income taxpayers (incomes over $200,000 if single and $250,000 if married and filing jointly) are subject to an additional 3.8% net investment income tax on capital gains and other types of passive capital income.  
Marginal Effective Tax Rates (METRs) on Returns to Stock Investments
Marginal effective tax rates (METRs) provide a useful measure through which to examine the effects of inflation indexing on investment. These measures account for the various factors that influence effective taxes: statutory tax rates, tax exclusion at death, inflation, holding period, and the composition of an asset’s return. 
Table 1 shows estimated METRs on corporate stock under current law and with inflation indexing by holding period for taxpayers subject to the top marginal capital gains rate (20%) and net investment income tax (3.8%). Corporate stocks are analyzed because they generate the majority of capital gains and do not depreciate, which simplifies the analysis. However, the METR framework can be used to understand the impact of taxes on investments more generally. See CRS Report R48277, CRS Model Estimates of Marginal Effective Tax Rates on Investment Under Current Law, by Mark P. Keightley and Jane G. Gravelle.
The last column of Table 1 displays the percentage reduction in METRs when switching from current law to inflation indexing. Somewhat counterintuitively, inflation indexing is more beneficial at shorter holding periods, as indicated by the declining percentage reduction in METR stemming from indexing. The reason is that nominal gains compound at a faster rate than phantom gains. As a result, real gains become a larger share of total nominal gains over time, while the proportion of phantom gains decreases. Because inflation indexing only eliminates tax on the phantom portion of gains, its importance falls as that portion shrinks.  
Table 1. METRs Under Current Law and Indexing, Historical Dividend and Capital Gains Returns, Top Marginal Tax Rate (23.8%)
Holding Period (years)
METR Current Law
METR Inflation Indexing
Percentage Reduction in METR

1
30.5%
23.7%
22.3%

5
29.1%
23.1%
20.5%

10
27.6%
22.5%
18.3%

15
26.2%
22.0%
16.2%

20
25.0%
21.4%
14.2%

30
22.9%
20.4%
10.7%

40
21.3%
19.6%
7.9%

Until Death
12.7%
12.7%
0.0%

Source: CRS calculations.
Notes: METRs are the weighted averages of effective tax rates on capital gains and dividends. Assumes annually a 3.61% dividend, 3.17% real appreciation, and 2% inflation. See CRS Report R48277, CRS Model Estimates of Marginal Effective Tax Rates on Investment Under Current Law, by Mark P. Keightley and Jane G. Gravelle. Tax rate includes 20% rate on dividends and capital gains and 3.8% net investment income tax. 
Deferral provides an alternative way to understand why the impact of indexing falls with the holding period. Without indexing, taxable gains are larger—because they include phantom gains—resulting in a larger tax being deferred. Thus, the deferral benefit is stronger under no indexing (current law), and as the holding period lengthens, that growing deferral benefit increasingly offsets the effective tax on phantom gains. As a result, a switch to inflation indexing adds less value as the holding period gets longer. This is indicated by narrowing the METR gap between the two regimes in Table 1.
The rates in Table 1 can be contrasted with the rates that apply to ordinary income. Internal Revenue Service data suggest that the average holding period for realized gains is about five years, and CRS estimates that about 40% of gains are never realized (see CRS Report R48562, Boundaries on the Long-Run Realization Response to Changes in Capital Gains Taxes, by Mark P. Keightley and Jane G. Gravelle). These shares indicate an aggregate weighted average METR of 22.5% under current law and 19.0% with inflation indexing, compared to the top ordinary income tax rate of 37%.
The effective tax rate on corporate stock depends on composition of returns. At one extreme, when no dividend is paid, inflation indexing again reduces the METR across holding periods (see Table 2). In this scenario, METRs are lower than those assuming a historical composition of returns (Table 1) due to the maximum benefit of deferral, as there is no current taxation of dividends. 
Table 2. METRs Under Current Law and Indexing, No  Dividend Payments, Top Marginal Tax Rate (23.8%)
Holding Period (years)
METR Current Law
METR Inflation Indexing
Percentage Reduction in METR

1
29.8%
23.2%
22.2%

5
26.0%
20.9%
19.8%

10
22.0%
18.4%
16.7%

15
18.8%
16.2%
13.9%

20
16.2%
14.3%
11.3%

30
12.2%
11.4%
7.1%

40
9.7%
9.3%
4.3%

Until Death
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

Source: CRS calculations. 
Notes: METRs are the weighted averages of effective tax rates on capital gains and dividends. Assumes annually a 3.61% dividend, 3.17% real appreciation, and 2% inflation rate. Tax rate includes 20% rate on dividends and capital gains and 3.8% net investment income tax. 
At the other extreme, where the entire return is paid as a dividend (not shown here), METRs do not vary much with the holding period under current law. For example, the rate is 30.8% for a 1-year holding period compared to 30.0% for a 40-year holding period. The METR for inflation indexing across all holding periods is simply the statutory tax rate (23.8%). 
Potential Revenue Effects
Implementation of inflation indexing would involve a number of policy choices. These include what assets would be eligible, which taxpayers would be eligible, whether the policy would apply retrospectively to previously acquired assets or prospectively to newly acquired assets, whether there would be a minimum holding period, whether indexation could result in losses, and what inflation measure to use for indexing.
Table 3 provides estimates of the potential individual income tax revenue effects from FY2026 to FY2035 of indexing the cost basis of all assets. The estimates were made by CRS using the Budget Lab at Yale’s open-source Tax-Simulator. Estimates for both prospective and retrospective indexing are presented assuming three different minimum holding periods. Gains were inflation indexed using the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U) through 2017, then adjusted using the Chained-CPI-U thereafter, consistent with the treatment of most individual provisions following reforms enacted in 2017 and the Tax-Simulator’s default indexing approach.
Table 3. Estimated Revenue Effects of Prospective and Retrospective Inflation Indexing Cost Basis Capital Gains by Minimum Holding Period
Proposal

Total Revenue Change, Billions of Dollars (FY2026-FY2035)

Prospective:


1-year minimum
-$165

3-year minimum
-$91

5-year minimum
-39

Retrospective:


1-year minimum
-$955

3-year minimum
-$855

5-year minimum
-$762

Source: CRS estimates and calculations using the Budget Lab at Yale’s Tax-Simulator (Commit 18a25c8f0).
The estimates contained in Table 3 are not considered official for revenue “scoring” purposes or compliance with budgetary rules, nor are they intended to represent the estimated cost of any specific legislative proposal that has been introduced. The Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) provides Congress with official tax revenue estimates. CRS could not determine how closely the estimates in Table 3 would be to those produced by the JCT, and they may differ significantly. The estimates in Table 3 are intended to inform congressional deliberation.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13231/IF13231.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13231.html
R48951,Shark Conservation and Management in the United States,2026-05-19T04:00:00Z,2026-05-22T17:08:36Z,Active,Reports,"Anthony R. Marshak, Pervaze A. Sheikh",,"Shark conservation and management in the United States have received attention from stakeholders and Congress due to biological, aesthetic, human safety, and other factors related to sharks. Stakeholders have discussed issues related to the status of shark populations, specifically regarding domestic and international fishing of sharks; human-shark conflicts, such as shark depredation of targeted fishery species (i.e., sharks completely or partially consuming marine species caught by fishing gear); and the predatory role of sharks in marine ecosystems. These discussions, among other matters, have prompted Congress to pass legislation related to the conservation and management of sharks and their body parts (e.g., shark fins), such as the Shark Finning Prohibition Act (P.L. 106-557), the Shark Conservation Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-348, Title I), and the legislation sometimes referred to as the “Shark Fin Sales Elimination Act of 2023” (P.L. 117-263, Division E, Title LIX, Subtitle E, Section 5946(b)). Additional statutes (e.g., the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act [MSA; 16 U.S.C. §§1801-1891d] and the Endangered Species Act [ESA; 16 U.S.C. §§1531-1544]) and multilateral agreements govern shark conservation and management, including for sharks inhabiting coastal, state, and international waters. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA’s) National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) primarily administers federal shark-related efforts, including the conservation and management of targeted and protected shark species.
Congress has considered legislative proposals relating to sharks, which have focused on shark conservation and management, the feeding of sharks, and shark depredation and human safety, among other topics. For example, H.R. 207 as passed by the House and S. 2314 as reported, the Supporting the Health of Aquatic systems through Research Knowledge and Enhanced Dialogue Act (SHARKED Act; introduced in the 119th Congress), would require the Secretary of Commerce to establish a task force to address shark depredation and would amend the MSA to include projects related to shark depredation as a priority for the NMFS cooperative research and management program. At times, Congress also has included directives to agencies regarding shark science, conservation, and management in language accompanying appropriations laws. These proposals and directives may reflect commentary by experts and stakeholders with respect to shark science, conservation, and management. 
Some Members of Congress, stakeholders, and experts have highlighted domestic and international approaches to shark conservation and management, and expressed opinions regarding intergovernmental agreements, international management approaches, and their effectiveness. Some stakeholders have also voiced that additional data are needed to fill information gaps, such as information on the status of shark populations and their ecology, habitat use, and interactions with fisheries. They further note the utility of that information for effective conservation and management. Additionally, some stakeholders and experts have raised concerns about shark depredation, including its alleged increase in recent years, and have provided potential considerations regarding depredation for fisheries management and shark conservation. Other stakeholders and experts have focused attention on the impacts of fishing (both commercial and recreational) and the wildlife trade on threatened and endangered sharks, including those listed under the ESA or classified as threatened or endangered by the International Union for the Conservation of Nature.
Congress may consider whether or not to pass or amend laws that focus on shark conservation and management, or whether to direct NMFS and partners to take certain conservation and management approaches for sharks. Congress also may consider whether current funding levels for shark conservation and management meet congressional goals, including as related to science needs and human-shark conflicts, or whether additional funding or funding directed to specific programs and activities is warranted. Congress also may consider the role of the United States in intergovernmental shark conservation and management activities (e.g., under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora or multilateral agreements through Regional Fisheries Management Organizations); intersections of shark conservation with illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing; and whether changes to present approaches may be warranted.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48951/R48951.6.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48951.html
IF13229,"Executive Order 14395, “Establishing the Task Force to Eliminate Fraud”",2026-05-19T04:00:00Z,2026-05-20T11:53:25Z,Active,Resources,Garrett Hatch,,"Background
Fraud, the act of obtaining something of value through willful misrepresentation, is a growing concern for the federal government. According to the U.S. Sentencing Commission, convictions for government benefits fraud increased 242% between 2020 and 2024. During the pandemic, criminal organizations and individual actors fraudulently obtained hundreds of billions of dollars from programs intended to assist American businesses and people, including more than $100 billion from the Unemployment Insurance program. Nearly 50 individuals have been convicted of fraudulently obtaining nearly $250 million in funds from one pandemic assistance program, the Federal Child Nutrition Program. Similarly, in 2025, more than 320 doctors, nurses, and pharmacists were arrested across the nation for schemes to defraud Medicare and other federal assistance programs out of an estimated $14.6 billion. The Government Accountability Office estimates that federal agencies lose between $233 and $521 billion annually to fraud.
On March 16, 2026, President Trump signed Executive Order (E.O.) 14395, ""Establishing the Task Force to Eliminate Fraud.” Section 1 of E.O. 14395 alleges that “loopholes” at the state level have created the conditions for fraud in federal benefit programs, such as allowing applicants to self-certify information, failing to verify applicants’ eligibility, and “refus[ing]” to implement adequate fraud controls, among other things. 
To address these issues, E.O. 14395 establishes a multi-agency task force to develop “a comprehensive national strategy to stop fraud, waste, and abuse within Federal benefit programs, including programs administered jointly with State, local, tribal, and territorial partners.”
Composition of Task Force
Section 2 of E.O. 14395 identifies three leadership positions at the task force and who shall fill them. The Vice President of the United States is to serve as chairman; the Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission is to serve as vice chairman; and the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security is to serve as senior advisor. Ultimately, the task force is “subject to the President’s direct supervision and control.”
In addition, E.O. 14395 requires the task force to include, at a minimum, representatives from the Department of Agriculture, Department of Education, Department of Health and Human Services, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Housing and Urban Development, Department of Justice, Department of Labor, Office of Management and Budget, Small Business Administration, Department of the Treasury, and Department of Veterans Affairs. As chairman, the Vice President is authorized to add other agencies, inspectors general, or components of agencies.
While the Homeland Security Council is not an official member, E.O. 14395 requires the task force to coordinate with the council on matters of law enforcement, transnational crime, public safety, national security, and organized criminal activity. 
Priorities and Operation
As noted, the primary purpose of the task force is to develop a coordinated national strategy for eliminating fraud, waste, and abuse in federal benefits programs. To that end, Section 3 lists nine priorities to guide the group’s work:
“Develop measures to improve eligibility verification processes in federal benefits programs and maximize [their] enforcement.”
Develop pre-payment controls, including the ability to determine when ongoing or potential fraud might “require proactively pausing” funding until effective controls are implemented.
“Evaluate indicators of fraud and high-risk vulnerabilities to fraud,” potentially by hiring third-party contractors.
Promote information and data sharing between the federal government and state, local, tribal, and territorial governments; benefit-providing agencies; and law enforcement agencies.
“Disrupt and dismantle fraud networks and facilitators ... through interagency information sharing.”
“Investigate and disrupt the mechanisms through which fraud is committed,” including mechanisms facilitated by government officials.
“Prevent remittance transfers that involve the proceeds of Federal benefits fraud.”
“Audit and ensure prospective compliance monitoring” for identifying fraud.
Analyze information from providers or retailers that redeem benefits to identify fraud and develop policies for revalidation or reauthorization to deter fraud.
Members of the task force are required to share information concerning programs that the task force deems relevant, consistent with applicable laws.
Improved Controls and Fraud- Prevention Measures
Section 4 requires each agency on the task force to submit to the chairman and vice chairman, within 30 days from the date of E.O. 14395, a report on the agency’s transactions and payment processes that are most susceptible to fraud schemes. Among the transactions and processes that agencies may examine, Section 4 lists new enrollments, redeterminations, provider enrollments, eligibility self-attestation procedures, changes to payment destinations, or transactions involving third-party intermediaries. The report is to include suggested policies for reducing the risk of fraud.
Within 60 days from the date of E.O. 14395, the task force shall coordinate member agency efforts to adopt minimum anti-fraud requirements for the transactions and processes that agencies reported as susceptible to fraud. 
If a transaction or process is administered by a state, local, tribal, or territorial jurisdiction, then the task force must discuss how these jurisdictions may demonstrate implementation of anti-fraud requirements. As part of this discussion, the task force is required to examine and recommend ways that federal funds may be withheld from jurisdictions that do not have adequate anti-fraud requirements, potentially including
“screening, proof of identity, and eligibility verification”;
“pre-payment integrity and risk controls,” including documentation of services provided;
data sharing, “updated criteria, minimum integrity checks, cross-program risk indicators, and coordinated recovery and enforcement pathways to prevent immigration sponsor and beneficiary and household-related” fraud;
“appropriate use of providers, vendors, contractors, nonprofit organizations, intermediaries, and service organizations; and”
“audit and remedial measures, including suspension, termination, repayment, exclusion, and debarment actions.”
Within 90 days from the date of E.O. 14395, each member of the task force is required to submit to the chairman and vice chairman a plan to implement the anti-fraud controls and measures developed. 
Related Anti-Fraud Initiatives
E.O. 14395 is one of several actions the Trump Administration has taken in 2026 on fraud. Among the others, two are particularly relevant. On January 8, 2026, the White House announced a new National Fraud Enforcement Division (NFED) within the Department of Justice. The new division is to enforce federal criminal and civil laws against fraudsters targeting federal government programs, federally funded benefits, businesses, nonprofits, and private citizens nationwide. In particular, the NFED is charged with overseeing multi-district and multi-agency fraud investigations and working with other departments to dismantle organized fraud schemes that cross jurisdictions. 
On March 6, 2026, the President signed E.O. 14390, “Combating Cybercrime, Fraud, and Predatory Schemes Against American Citizens.” E.O. 14390 focuses on fraud and cyber-enabled crime carried out by transnational criminal organizations (TCOs). It requires the Secretary of State to demand that foreign governments take action against TCOs operating within their borders and to penalize nations that do not do so, including through the imposition of trade sanctions, visa restrictions, and the expulsion of foreign officials who are “complicit in these schemes.” 
Congressional Considerations
E.O. 14395 seeks to address some well-known fraud vulnerabilities in federal benefits programs. The emphasis on strengthening pre-payment controls, including eligibility verification, might lead to actions that reduce future fraud losses. Weak pre-payment controls, notably the use of self-attestation when applying for benefits, directly contributed to the billions in federal funds lost to fraudsters during the pandemic. Similarly, some states have not consistently verified the eligibility of applicants prior to approving them for assistance from federally funded programs, so working with states to improve their pre-payment controls might also reduce the risk of fraud.
In addition, the task force may be supported by both the enhanced investigatory and prosecutorial resources of the newly established NEFD and the diplomatic tools the Department of State may bring to bear on foreign governments with TCOs operating within their borders.
It is not clear how effective the task force might be at accomplishing other objectives. E.O. 14395 calls for the task force to improve data sharing among jurisdictions, but that may be subject to whether Congress provides statutory authority to do so, at least for certain programs. Even improving federal and state agencies’ access to Treasury’s Do Not Pay system to screen applicants’ eligibility is a complex process that may not yield the results that some proponents anticipate.
It is also not clear how effective the task force may be in getting state, local, tribal, and territorial governments to enhance their internal controls. Some may argue, for example, that they do not have the funds needed to upgrade their financial or payment systems to accommodate new controls. The extent to which agencies may pause funding due to perceived fraud risks is also unclear, and attempts to withhold appropriated funds that have been awarded to jurisdictions may be met with legal challenges.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13229/IF13229.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13229.html
IF13230,Current Hantavirus Outbreak and Considerations for Congress,2026-05-18T04:00:00Z,2026-05-21T11:23:22Z,Active,Resources,"Todd Kuiken, Kavya Sekar, Pervaze A. Sheikh","Public Health Emergency Preparedness & Response, Wildlife & Ecosystems","Background and Current Hantavirus Outbreak 
Hantavirus is a zoonotic pathogen carried by rodents (e.g., mice and rats) and transmitted to humans generally from contact with their droppings, urine, and saliva. On May 2, 2026, the World Health Organization (WHO) received notification of two deaths and one critically ill passenger from an acute respiratory illness onboard the M/V Hondius cruise ship, originating from Argentina. These cases were later confirmed to be the Andes strain of the hantavirus, according to the WHO. Symptoms appeared for the initial case on the ship on April 6, 2026. Related policy issues for Congress include the nature of international coordination for outbreaks, domestic preparedness for disease outbreaks, and U.S. research and development for zoonotic diseases. 
As of May 13, 2026, the outbreak was ongoing; there were 11 reported cases of hantavirus linked to the cruise ship, 8 of which have been laboratory confirmed. Passengers from the M/V Hondius have been repatriated, and public health authorities have initiated contact tracing to monitor for additional spread. Additional passengers who departed the cruise ship prior to the identification of the outbreak may have been exposed to hantavirus and unknowingly exposed others. Symptoms of hantavirus from the Andes strain can appear in 4 to 42 days after exposure. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has stated that the “the overall risk to the American public and travelers remains extremely low.” No U.S. hantavirus cases associated with the current outbreak have been reported as of the publication of this product. 
What Is Hantavirus? 
Hantavirus has been known to infect humans for at least several decades. The disease was first documented during the Korean War in the 1950s, the virus was isolated in 1978, and the WHO recognized the disease in 1982. Hantavirus is endemic throughout the world. Hantaviruses belong to the family Hantaviridae, with each strain typically associated with a specific rodent species. 
More than 40 strains of hantavirus exist in nature and are broadly divided into two categories, Old World and New World. Old World hantaviruses are endemic in Europe and Asia and can cause hemorrhagic fever with renal syndrome, a disease associated with severe bleeding and kidney failure. New World hantaviruses are more prevalent in the Americas and more commonly can cause hantavirus pulmonary syndrome (HPS), a flu-like illness that can lead to heart and lung failures. Only a limited number of hantavirus strains are known to cause human disease. Depending on the strain, hantavirus has a reported fatality rate of less than 1%-15% in Asia and Europe and up to 50% in the Americas. According to the WHO, an estimated 10,000 to over 100,000 infections occur each year, the majority in Asia and Europe. Hantavirus is known to incubate one to six weeks after exposure, which means patients can show symptoms from as early as one week to eight weeks after infection. There are no specific treatments or vaccines for New World hantaviruses; there are some vaccines for certain Old World hantaviruses. The WHO has classified hantavirus as an emerging priority because of its lethality. 
The Andes strain of hantavirus, a New World strain found in South America, is the only hantavirus strain known to spread person-to-person. According to the CDC, human-to-human spread is usually limited to those with direct physical contact with an infected person, including prolonged time spent in close or enclosed spaces and exposure to the infected person’s body fluids. The Andean strain was first identified in 1996 in Argentina, where evidence for human-to-human spread was first indicated. A recent outbreak occurred in Argentina in 2018-2019. Given the relatively low number of prior outbreaks, there are some unknowns about human Andes virus transmission, including the extent of contact needed and whether asymptomatic transmission occurs. 
Hantavirus Cases in the United States
Hantavirus disease surveillance in the United States began in 1993 during an outbreak in the Southwest that killed 27 people. Since then, the CDC reported a total of 890 cases of hantavirus (35% resulted in death) in the United States from 1993 to 2023 (Figure 1). Those cases were concentrated in the western United States; 94% of cases occurred west of the Mississippi River (Figure 2). CDC has published summary data on hantavirus cases and outcomes through 2023. By reviewing CDC’s National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System data, CRS identified 20 cases in 2024, 40 cases in 2025, and 4 cases between January 1 and May 9, 2026. Recent-year data are subject to change.
U.S. Implications for the Current Outbreak. No U.S. cases of the Andes strain of hantavirus have been reported as of the publication date of this report. As of May 14, 2026, U.S. public health authorities were monitoring 41 people in the United States who may have been exposed to hantavirus related to the M/V Hondius outbreak. This includes 18 passengers from the M/V Hondius who were transferred for monitoring to the National Quarantine Unit in Omaha, NE, where they are encouraged to stay. The other 23 people under monitoring include passengers who left the ship before the outbreak was identified and other individuals who may have been exposed to ship passengers. According to the CDC guidance, those with high-risk exposures (e.g., passengers of the M/V Hondius) may have the option for home-based management or facility-based management at the National Quarantine Unit or in a location identified by a health department of each person’s jurisdiction. In all cases public health agencies are to conduct daily monitoring, according to the CDC.
Figure 1. Reported Hantavirus Cases in the United States, 1993-2023
/
Source: Chart generated by CRS with data from CDC.
Figure 2. Hantavirus Cases by State, 1993-2023
/
Source: Map generated by CRS with data from CDC.
Considerations for Congress
The identification of the Andean strain in the recent hantavirus outbreak highlights the potential risk of human-to-human transmission of this particular virus. Outbreaks of hantavirus and other zoonotic diseases (e.g., avian influenza) frequently occur globally and can spread to the United States by humans and animals via transportation networks (e.g., aircraft, ships, cars) and wildlife corridors (e.g., bird flyways). 
International Coordination. The WHO and other international organizations attempt to coordinate countries to enhance monitoring, reporting, and response to infectious disease threats. The United States withdrew from the WHO in 2026. Despite withdrawal from the WHO, the United States is still party to the International Health Regulations, through which CDC has received notifications from international partners about this outbreak. The CDC says it has worked closely with other federal agencies and international partners to bring Americans on the M/V Hondius home as quickly as possible. Congress may conduct oversight on U.S. coordination with international partners in this outbreak in light of the recent U.S. withdrawal from the WHO. Congress may also consider whether the United States’ ability to coordinate monitoring and responses to future zoonotic disease outbreaks with other countries is sufficient.
Scientific Research and Development. Zoonotic diseases are expected to increase due to greater human incursions into wild areas, ecosystem alterations, and broadening transportation networks. Many scientists contend that scientific research into zoonotic diseases is important for increasing preparedness to address outbreaks, enabling early detection of outbreaks, and improving the development of treatments and vaccines. Others suggest that certain types of zoonotic disease research introduce potential risk and should be limited or banned. There are many unknowns about hantaviruses and other pathogens that cause zoonotic diseases, including information about their emergence, spread, and transmission. The federal government conducts research on zoonotic diseases and supports other research through grants. Some of this research is aligned with a One Health approach, which recognizes the interconnectedness of human, animal, and environmental health to predict and mitigate zoonotic and panzootic diseases. Congress might consider whether levels of funding and agency priorities are appropriate for answering scientific questions and developing new products that could help contain the current outbreak and prevent future ones caused by hantavirus or other pathogens. 
U.S. Domestic Response. No U.S. hantavirus cases associated with the current outbreak have been reported as of the date of the publication of this report. Many U.S. laboratories can test for hantavirus; currently, only the Nebraska Public Health Laboratory can conduct diagnostic testing for the Andes virus strain. State and local public health agencies receive ongoing CDC grant funding that can support infectious disease containment activities. The CDC also has access to an Infectious Disease Rapid Response Reserve Fund with a balance of over $500 million that could support enhanced response. Congress may choose to review federal public health agencies’ efforts to contain this outbreak, whether such efforts are sufficient, and whether existing resources at the federal, state, and local level can support the response to the current outbreak and to future zoonotic threats.
The COVID-19 pandemic and recent outbreaks of hantavirus, avian influenza, and measles demonstrated how communication from and trust in public officials can influence how the public responds to a disease outbreak, including whether recommended procedures to combat or slow the spread of a disease are adopted by the public at large or at-risk individuals. Through its oversight authorities, Congress may choose to examine whether federal resources for public health and science agencies are sufficient to address how the U.S. government would respond to emerging infectious diseases and garner trust with the public about the risk of these diseases.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13230/IF13230.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13230.html
R48948,Suspension of the Federal Gas Tax: In Brief,2026-05-15T04:00:00Z,2026-05-16T04:53:50Z,Active,Reports,Ali E. Lohman,,"In May 2026, the average price of a gallon of gasoline for U.S. consumers had increased more than $1.50 compared with the price in February 2026. President Trump and multiple Members of Congress have proposed suspending the federal excise tax on gasoline as a way to potentially offset this price increase. The gas tax rate is established in statute by Congress. While some Members of Congress have previously proposed suspending the gas tax, no such law has ever been enacted. 
Reducing the price of gas by 18.4 cents per gallon could provide some relief to consumers. Suspending the gas tax may not reduce consumer prices by exactly 18.4 cents per gallon. Gasoline suppliers, distributers, refiners, and blenders could choose to reduce prices by more or less than 18.4 cents per gallon or not reduce prices at all. Suspending the gas tax may not reduce consumer prices by exactly 18.4 cents per gallon. Gasoline suppliers, distributers, refiners, and blenders could choose to reduce prices by more or less than 18.4 cents per gallon or not reduce prices at all.
The gas tax is the primary source of revenue for the federal Highway Trust Fund. The Congressional Budget Office projects that the balance in the Highway Trust Fund’s two accounts, the mass transit and the highway account, will approach zero in FY2027 and FY2028 respectively, which could delay reimbursements to state and local governments for work completed on federally-funded transportation projects and delay initiation of new transportation projects. Suspending the gas tax could cause the balances in the mass transit account and highway account to approach zero sooner. If, as in some current proposals in the 119th Congress, this reduction in revenue were coupled with a general fund transfer, this reduction would not affect the health of the Highway Trust Fund, but it would increase the budget deficit.
The gas tax is also the primary source of revenue for the Leaking Underground Storage Tank (LUST) Trust Fund, which helps the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and states cover costs of responding to leaking underground petroleum storage tanks in cases where the owner or operator does not clean up a site. In the United States, these leaking tanks have been a leading source of groundwater contamination and a threat to public drinking water. If the LUST Trust Fund were to not receive funding from the federal gas tax the remaining balance would be depleted over time. A general fund transfer to the LUST Trust Fund would enable continued petroleum tank cleanups and other activities to protect groundwater, but would increase the budget deficit.
Key words: gasoline, gasoline tax, gas tax, fuel tax, Highway Trust Fund, Leaking Underground Storage Tank Trust Fund
",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48948/R48948.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48948.html
LSB11432,Congressional Authority to Regulate Presidential Recordkeeping,2026-05-15T04:00:00Z,2026-05-16T04:53:17Z,Active,Posts,Todd Garvey,,"When Richard Nixon stepped from the White House lawn onto Marine One after resigning the presidency in the wake of the Watergate scandal, he could well have assumed that some of the most familiar remnants of his administration—hundreds of audio tape recordings of conversations he had in the oval office—would remain under his control. There was, at that point, a long tradition of Presidents retaining ownership of their papers and records after leaving office. Consistent with that practice, President Nixon soon reached an agreement with the Administrator of General Services ensuring that the tapes, along with more than 40 million pages of records, would be taken in former President Nixon’s custody to California, where the agreement explicitly permitted the oval office recordings to eventually be destroyed. 
Once word of this arrangement reached the legislative branch, Congress acted quickly to enact the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act (PRMPA), which effectively abrogated the agreement and directed the Administrator to take “complete possession and control” of the former President’s records. That law marked the beginning to a new legislative approach to the preservation of presidential records. President Nixon challenged the PRMPA as a violation of the separation of powers, among other claims, but the Supreme Court rejected those arguments in its 1977 decision of Nixon v. Administrator of General Services. 
Soon after, Congress solidified its new approach to the ownership and preservation of presidential records by enacting the Presidential Records Act of 1978 (PRA). That law established that “[t]he United States shall reserve and retain complete ownership, possession, and control” of the records of future Presidents by ensuring their preservation in the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). The PRA continues to govern the retention and preservation of presidential records to this day.
On April 1, 2026, the Department of Justice (DOJ) Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) expressed its opinion that the PRA is unconstitutional and that, as a result, “the President need not further comply with its dictates.” “As a matter of custom,” OLC opinions are treated as binding on the executive branch, but do not bind the courts or Congress.
This Sidebar summarizes the PRA and the OLC opinion. It then briefly addresses some of the arguments made by DOJ against the PRA, including (1) the opinion’s assertion that Congress has no authority to regulate presidential records and (2) the opinion’s characterization of the PRA as a statute designed to facilitate congressional access to presidential records. 
The Presidential Records Act 
The PRA is the statutory framework governing the retention, preservation of, and future access to presidential records. Under the PRA, records that Presidents and their staff create while discharging their official duties—but not those records of a “purely private or nonpublic character”— are owned and controlled by the United States. In other words, presidential records are the public property of the American people, not the personal property of any specific President. As described above, this approach represented a break from historical practice as all Presidents before Nixon had retained ownership of their records.
The PRA was not Congress’s first foray into the regulation of executive branch records. Congress enacted the Federal Records Act in 1950, which governed the retention and preservation of agency records, but that law has never applied to presidential records. It also enacted the Presidential Libraries Act of 1955, which authorized, but did not require, the Administrator of General Services to “accept and take title to” the “papers and other historical materials” of Presidents to place them into a presidential library. 
Besides establishing public ownership of presidential records, the PRA also created procedures (to be supplemented by executive branch regulations) governing the creation, preservation, retention, and disposal of presidential records both during and after a presidency. During a presidency, the law requires that a President
take all such steps as may be necessary to assure that the activities, deliberations, decisions, and policies that reflect the performance of the President’s constitutional, statutory, or other official or ceremonial duties are adequately documented and that such records are preserved and maintained as Presidential records.
The incumbent President exercises exclusive responsibility over custody, control, and access to records created during the President’s administration, but these records may not be destroyed except in narrow circumstances. 
After a President leaves office, the Archivist of the United States (the head of NARA) “assume[s] responsibility for the custody, control, and preservation of, and access to, the Presidential records of that President.” Although the PRA provides for the eventual public access to presidential records held by NARA, the law does not permit such access until 5 years after the end of the presidency, and the President may further restrict access to certain categories of documents—for example, records relating to appointments to federal office—for up to 12 years after the President’s term of office ends. Even after the expiration of the 5- or 12-year period, both former and incumbent Presidents may intervene at any time to assert claims of any “constitutionally based privilege” to prevent public access to those records. 
Finally, the PRA contains a special access provision. Under that provision, NARA can, regardless of the previously described temporal limitations, make presidential records available to (1) an incumbent President, if needed for the conduct of official business; (2) the courts, pursuant to subpoena in a criminal or civil proceeding; or (3) to Congress, pursuant to subpoena from a committee of jurisdiction, “if such records contain information that is needed for the conduct of its business and that is not otherwise available.” Access under this provision, however, remains subject to “any rights, defenses, or privileges which the United States or any agency or person [including the President or former President] may invoke.” 
The OLC Opinion
When he signed the PRA, President Jimmy Carter raised no constitutional objections to the new statute and instead noted how the law included an appropriate “safeguard” by providing a legal process for the “resolution of constitutional questions raised by disputes over the release of presidential records.” Subsequent Presidents, though sometimes raising concerns over the role played by executive privilege in disputes over access, have all acknowledged the law’s applicability. On April 1, 2026, however, DOJ posited that the PRA is unconstitutional because it “exceeds Congress’s enumerated and implied powers” and “aggrandizes the Legislative Branch at the expense of the Constitutional independence and autonomy of the Executive.” 
With respect to Congress’s authority, OLC began by noting that every law enacted by Congress must be supported by either an enumerated or implied constitutional power. OLC recounted the long history of Presidents retaining ownership over their documents prior to the 1970s and Congress’s non-intervention in that tradition, which it viewed as a “telling indication” that Congress possesses no such power to regulate presidential records. 
OLC determined that, in its view, the PRA could not be sustained under any of a number of possible sources of authority. The law could not be supported by the Congress’s implied oversight power, it reasoned, because the PRA is “unsupported by any valid legislative need”; or the legislature’s power over agencies, since that power does not extend to the office of the President; or the spending power, since that power cannot be used to “regulate coordinate branches of government”; or the Necessary and Proper Clause, since the law “restricts rather than empowers the President.” 
With respect to Nixon, OLC asserted that the Court’s 1977 opinion is both “distinguishable” and “wrong.” The opinion is distinguishable, according to OLC, because the PRMPA “sought a discrete set of identified materials under extraordinary circumstances” and was therefore a much narrower statute than the PRA, which “establishes a permanent regime governing all presidential records.” In any event, according to OLC, Nixon was also wrongly decided and does not reflect the Court’s current, “more thoughtful approach” to evaluating the separation of powers. The memorandum instead characterized the Nixon opinion as representative of the “ancien regime’ of the Court’s mid-twentieth century’ approach to separation of powers.” The opinion stops short of explicitly calling for Nixon to be overturned, but it does seem to suggest DOJ’s view that Nixon is the type of “fundamentally misguided” decision that the Court may revisit. 
Finally, OLC determined that, because constitutional “infirmit[ies] pervade[] the entire statute,” the “PRA is invalid in its entirety.” As a result, the memorandum concludes, “the President need not further comply with its dictates.”
Counterarguments to the OLC Position
The OLC legal position has supporters but has also been the subject of some criticism. This section notes counterarguments to two specific aspects of the memorandum’s legal reasoning: (1) the determination that the PRA exceeds Congress’s legislative power and (2) the characterization of the PRA as a statute designed to facilitate congressional access to presidential records. 
OLC’s conclusion that Congress lacks authority to enact the PRA is open to at least two counterarguments. First, although OLC is correct that the Court in Nixon did not identify the source of Congress’s power to dictate the custody and preservation of Nixon’s records, the Court explicitly stated in that case that Congress had authority to do so. In arriving at that conclusion, the Court explained that there was “abundant” precedent for congressional regulation of executive branch documents and that these previous statutes had “never been considered invalid as an invasion of [executive] autonomy.” While the earlier statutes applied only to agency records, the Court nevertheless explicitly concluded in Nixon that Congress had a “similar” power over presidential records that was based on its “important interests” to “preserve the materials for legitimate historical and governmental purposes.” “Congress,” the Court held, “can legitimately act to rectify the hit-or-miss approach that has characterized past attempts to protect these substantial interests by entrusting the materials to expert handling by trusted and disinterested professionals.” OLC, as noted above, asserts that this reasoning applies only to the PRMPA and not the PRA, and that it was flawed in that the opinion failed “to appreciate the Article II consequences of permitting Congress to regulate presidential records.”
Second, the OLC opinion did not address what may be Congress’s strongest source of constitutional authority for regulating government records: Article IV, Section 3 of the Constitution states that “Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States.” Although this provision, in light of its reference to “territory or other property,” has often constituted the source of Congress’s power over federal lands and other real property, the Supreme Court has stated that Congress’s “power of regulation and disposition was not confined to territory, but extended to other property belonging to the United States,’ so that the power may be applied . . . to the due regulation of all other personal and real property rightfully belonging to the United States.’” This interpretation of Article IV has roots as far back as Justice Joseph Story’s influential Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, published in 1833. Prior to enactment of the PRMPA and PRA, presidential records were viewed—including at least implicitly by Congress—as the private property of the President that created them. Long after Nixon had left office, for instance, the D.C. Circuit determined that “at the time when PRMPA was passed, President Nixon’s presidential papers were exclusively the property of the President.” As a result, the court held that the PRMPA—though constitutional under Nixon—was a taking of the former President’s property requiring just compensation under the Fifth Amendment. (The DOJ settled with the Nixon estate in 2000, agreeing to pay $18 million for his presidential records.) If, however, presidential records are now government property, as Congress determined they are in the PRA, Article IV may be a source of authority for the congressional regulation of government records, whether held by agencies or the President. 
The National Study Commission on Records and Documents of Federal Officials, an advisory body established as part of the PRMPA to “study problems and questions with respect to the control, disposition, and preservation of records and documents produced by or on behalf of Federal officials,” agreed with this interpretation. The Commission’s final report announced its conclusion that, under Article IV, Section 3, “Congress has the authority to declare documentary materials generated by Federal officials in connection with their official duties to be public property . . . and to provide for their disposition.” Whether a “President, Congressman, or any other elected or appointed public official,” the Commission endorsed the principle that any “individual who seeks or accepts public office should recognize that materials created in the discharge of the business of the public belong to the public.” 
OLC’s characterization of the PRA as a law that empowers Congress at the expense of the President also appears subject to various critiques. The OLC analysis frames the PRA as a congressional attempt to aggrandize its own access to presidential records, rather than regulate the handling of presidential records within the executive branch. This approach allows OLC to marshal separation-of-powers arguments that the Court has applied in the context of congressional investigations, including language from Trump v. Mazars, a case involving congressional access to the personal financial records of a sitting President. This framing also creates a context in which OLC can draw upon principles associated with interbranch comity and the accommodations process—a long-standing arrangement in which congressional access to sensitive executive records is sometimes resolved through good faith negotiation, and compromise. For example, the OLC analysis asserts the PRMPA and the PRA “interrupted” a historical arrangement where “Presidents owned and controlled presidential papers, and Congress obtained such papers through political negotiation and interbranch accommodation.”
Although OLC views the PRA as a tool for Congress to access presidential records, the PRA provides Congress with no right of access to the records of incumbent Presidents and contains only one provision pertaining to congressional access to records of a former President held by the NARA—a provision that similarly governs access by incumbent Presidents and access in litigation through judicial subpoenas. The rest of the law regulates the creation, preservation, and disposition of presidential records by and within the executive branch. As noted above, the law provides the President with exclusive control over his records while in office and then transfers custody of those records to NARA—an executive branch agency—once the President leaves office. This framing of the PRA as a law primarily concerned with record retention and eventual public access, rather than congressional access, is arguably confirmed by the law’s legislative history. The House Report associated with the law identifies the PRA’s dual purposes: 
(1) to establish the public ownership of records created by future presidents and their staffs in the course of discharging their official duties; and (2) to establish procedures governing the preservation and public availability of these records at the end of a Presidential administration. 
The importance of this distinction between congressional regulation of presidential records within the executive branch and congressional access to presidential records was underscored in Nixon. There, the Court indicated that President Nixon’s asserted separation-of-powers concerns were weakened by the “highly relevant” details that “control over the materials remains in the Executive Branch”; that the official charged with administrating the law was a “himself an official of the Executive Branch”; and that the “career archivists” charged with doing an initial screening of presidential records “similarly are Executive Branch employees.” This all remains true under the PRA. 
As described in Nixon, however, the PRMPA, unlike the PRA, did “not make the presidential materials available to the Congress—except insofar as Congressmen are members of the public and entitled to access when the public has it.” In comparison, as noted above, the PRA special access provision gives congressional committees of jurisdiction, along with the incumbent President and the courts, limited access to presidential records once transferred to NARA. Still, the terms of the PRA do not appear to aggrandize Congress’s existing authority to access these records. Instead, the PRA makes clear that access to presidential records by Congress remains “subject to any rights, defenses, or privileges which the United States or any agency or person may invoke,” including executive privilege. Committee access is further restricted by the fact that the committee must articulate how the requested records are “needed for the conduct of its business” and that the records are “not otherwise available.”
As a result, the PRA does not appear to expand Congress’s ability to access presidential records beyond what the body already possesses as part of its constitutional power of inquiry. If, for example, a committee were to request presidential records under the special access provision, both former and incumbent Presidents would be free to invoke any applicable legal privileges to NARA and subsequently ask a court to block Congress from accessing protected records. President Trump, for example, filed such a lawsuit in 2021 when a House investigative committee sought records from his first term. 
Even assuming that, as OLC asserts, congressional access to former Presidents’ records under the PRA’s special access provision was unconstitutional, that determination likely would not free the President from complying with the PRA’s other provisions, especially those on record retention and preservation. The OLC opinion concludes that the entire PRA must fall, since constitutional problems “pervade[] the entire statute,” The Supreme Court has made clear that courts should take a restrained approach when considering the effect one problematic provision has on the rest of the relevant statute. The default rule is to “sever” an unconstitutional provision and permit the rest of the statute to continue in force if the rest of the statute can stand on its own, unless it is evident that Congress would not have enacted the remainder of the statute independently of the invalid part. In light of the purposes articulated by Congress in enacting the PRA—public ownership of presidential records and the preservation of and eventual public access to presidential records—it would appear that the congressional access provision is ancillary to the central purpose of the statute and that the other preservation and ownership provisions can operate independently. Supporting this interpretation, Congress clarified its intent by including a severability clause in the PRA, which explicitly provides that “[i]f any provision of this Act is held invalid for any reason by any court, the validity and legal effect of the remaining provisions shall not be affected thereby.” 
Conclusion
When enacted, the PRMPA and PRA marked a clear shift from private ownership of presidential records to public ownership. Since that time, the PRA has governed the creation and preservation of presidential records, and no court has questioned the law’s facial constitutionality, nor, until the recent OLC opinion, has an incumbent President. Congress has various tools at its disposal if it wishes to respond to the executive branch’s determination that the President is not bound by the PRA, including amending or repealing the PRA or focusing its legislative and oversight powers on the White House’s ongoing compliance with existing law. 
",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB11432/LSB11432.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/HTML/LSB11432.html
IN12693,FEMA Review Council: Final Report,2026-05-15T04:00:00Z,2026-05-16T04:53:38Z,Active,Posts,"Diane P. Horn, Erica A. Lee, Elizabeth M. Webster",,"On Thursday, May 7, 2026, the FEMA Review Council (FRC), established by President Donald J. Trump to undertake a “full-scale review” of the agency, held its final meeting and voted to approve its final report of findings and recommendations. 
Establishment of FEMA Review Council (FRC)
Executive Order (EO) 14180 established the FRC in January 2025 to evaluate FEMA’s operations, staffing levels, alleged political bias, and role in federal emergency management. At approximately the same time, President Trump dismissed all members of the National Advisory Council, which Congress established to advise the Administrator on all aspects of emergency management.
Under the terms of the E.O., the Secretaries of Homeland Security and Defense co-chaired the FRC; broader membership included FEMA and nonfederal representatives. In past meetings, then-Co-Chair Kristi Noem echoed the President’s calls to eliminate FEMA as it currently exists; other members advocated narrower reforms, including reducing FEMA assistance for smaller disasters. 
The FRC was to publish a report with findings and recommendations in late 2025; subsequent EOs extended this deadline to no later than May 29, 2026. News reports described draft FRC reports and conflicts over proposed reforms, particularly a proposed 50% staffing cut. 
FRC Requests for Information
The FRC solicited information from the public in March 2025 and received more than 11,700 comments. According one outside group’s analysis, most comments were “overwhelmingly supportive ... of maintaining FEMA’s capacity, and of making good-faith reforms.” The FRC summarized the feedback and cited as common problems “bureaucratic inefficiencies, delays in funding, inconsistent program administration, workforce constraints, and insufficient engagement with local governments.” 
Additionally, the FRC reported receiving 1,387 survey responses (from nonfederal and non-governmental partners); engaging 50 states, territories, and at least 20 tribal nations; and conducting 17 listening sessions, including in the District of Columbia.
Selected FRC Report Recommendations 
A summary of selected FRC final approved recommendations and stakeholder perspectives are below.
Evaluating and redistributing FEMA’s workforce beyond DC to “realize ... efficiencies while reducing staff.” Several key emergency management organizations implored the FRC to preserve FEMA’s workforce; according to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), recent staff reductions have exacerbated persistent workforce challenges.  
Changing the criteria FEMA uses to evaluate whether the President should declare a major disaster. The FRC proposed increasing the cost thresholds used to evaluate the need for assistance for rebuilding public and nonprofit facilities (i.e., Public Assistance (PA)), to account for inflation. It also proposed simplifying procedures to determining the need for Individual Assistance (IA), using factors like damage to primary residences. In recent years, GAO and FEMA have both determined that PA cost thresholds are too low. On multiple occasions, FEMA has suspended previous proposals to change how it evaluated the need for PA, following significant criticism. FEMA revised the procedures to evaluate the need for IA in 2019 to establish “more objective criteria.” Some states expressed concerns that the revised procedures lack transparency and do not adequately represent a state’s actual financial capacity to manage disasters. 
Transforming PA to an up-front lump-sum formula grant to a state, tribe, or territory (STT) based on hazard characteristics and affected population. This is a change from the current reimbursement-based model based on site-by-site damage assessments. In the new model, STTs would administer project funds, in part to reduce FEMA administrative costs. These changes echo some congressional and industry proposals; though some past awards based on up-front, large-scale estimates have experienced delays and cost overruns. The FRC further recommended implementing sliding scale cost shares for PA and mitigation, to incentivize STT preparedness measures. 
Continuing the move to risk-based pricing for the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) through Risk Rating 2.0, with premiums priced on risk to individual properties rather than community profiles. The FRC further recommended that FEMA evaluate the development of a centralized clearinghouse to transfer NFIP policies to private insurers.
Restructuring the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (post-disaster funding to reduce future disaster losses) by modifying advance assistance, available 30 days after a declaration, and prioritizing projects to mitigate repetitive losses and harden critical infrastructure. The future of pre-disaster mitigation funding is not discussed in the FRC report.
Expediting assistance to disaster survivors and reducing overhead costs by consolidating existing IA programs that address housing and other critical disaster-related expenses into a single direct payment for survivors whose homes are rendered uninhabitable that is reflective of the disaster survivor’s needs (with limitations on the assistance amount). The existing IA program is not tied to uninhabitability, and some reports indicate concern that the FRC’s proposed change could mean survivors whose homes are not rendered uninhabitable may be ineligible to receive assistance for certain needs (e.g., funeral expenses, medical costs). The FRC further recommends FEMA focus on emergency/temporary housing and enable STTs and local governments to determine optimal local housing solutions.
Implementation of Recommendations
Executive actions may implement several recommendations including changing FEMA’s criteria to evaluate the need for a major disaster declaration. Other recommendations would more likely require legislation, including many proposed changes to the structure of disaster grants programs. The FRC indicated that it is “imperative” to implement recommendations in a phased approach over two to three years.
Relationship to Proposed Legislative Reforms
Several bills introduced within the 119th Congress (for example, H.R. 3251, H.R. 2247, H.R. 3347, H.R. 316) would fundamentally revise FEMA’s authorities to deliver disaster relief. One bill incorporating fundamental reforms, H.R. 4669, the Fixing Emergency Management for Americans (FEMA) Act of 2025, was ordered to be reported as amended by the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure in September 2025. News reports indicated that Committee leadership planned to advance the FEMA Act of 2025 irrespective of FRC recommendations. No companion legislation has been introduced to date in the Senate; one report indicates that formal Senate action on the bill was likely on hold until the release of the FRC’s findings. ",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12693/IN12693.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/HTML/IN12693.html
IF13228,Department of Labor’s Proposed Regulation on Fiduciary Duties in Selecting Designated Investment Alternatives,2026-05-15T04:00:00Z,2026-05-16T04:53:13Z,Active,Resources,"John J. Topoleski, Elizabeth A. Myers",,"Introduction
The fiduciary standards in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA; P.L. 93-406) require that individuals (referred to as fiduciaries) who make decisions in private-sector pension plans adhere to specified standards of conduct. The standards include an obligation to act prudently and for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to participants and beneficiaries. Among the individuals who are fiduciaries are those who choose plan investments in defined contribution (DC) plans (such as 401(k) plans).
In DC plans, participants have individual retirement savings accounts in which contributions by employees, employers, or both are invested. DC plans typically offer their participants a variety of investments, such as mutual funds, collective investment trusts (CITs), target date funds, employer stock, and annuities or other lifetime income products. The investment options that DC plan sponsors provide to their participants are called designated investment alternatives (DIAs).
In recent years, various stakeholders have expressed interest in expanding investment options in 401(k) plans to include alternative assets, such as private investments (e.g., private equity) and digital assets (e.g., cryptocurrencies). Proponents say that the benefits of incorporating these investments include the potential for higher investment returns and increased portfolio diversification. Opponents note the risky and speculative nature of these investments, the high and sometimes opaque nature of private equity fees, and concerns about the liquidity of these investments.
ERISA does not restrict the investments a 401(k) plan sponsor can offer; however, plan sponsors generally act cautiously for a number of reasons, such as the obligation to act prudently and the possibility of lawsuits by plan participants for perceived violations of fiduciary duty. 
Regulatory History
In 1979, DOL issued a regulation titled “Investment Duties,” which said that a fiduciary has satisfied their duties if they have given “appropriate consideration to those facts and circumstances” relevant to the particular investment and has “acted accordingly.”
In recent years, DOL has addressed the use of alternative assets in DC plans. In response to efforts to include cryptocurrency in DC plans, on March 10, 2022, the Department of Labor (DOL) issued a Compliance Assistance Release, “401(k) Plan Investments in Cryptocurrencies,’” in which the department expressed  “serious concerns” about plan fiduciaries’ decisions to allow DC plan participants to invest in cryptocurrencies. On May 28, 2025, DOL rescinded the March 2022 compliance release.
Regarding private equity, in a June 3, 2020, Information Letter, DOL indicated that offering “a professionally managed asset allocation fund with a private equity component,” as described in the letter, would not violate the fiduciary’s duties. On December 21, 2021, DOL issued a supplemental statement cautioning its applicability outside of the context of the 2020 Information Letter. On August 12, 2025, DOL rescinded the supplemental statement. 
On August 7, 2025, President Trump issued Executive Order 14330 directing DOL to clarify its “position on alternative assets and the appropriate fiduciary process associated with offering asset allocation funds containing investments in alternative assets under ERISA.” The executive order defined “alternative assets” as private market instruments (such as private equity and private credit that are not traded on public exchanges), real estate, digital assets, commodities, infrastructure projects, and lifetime income investment strategies.
DOL’s 2026 Proposed Regulation
On March 31, 2026, DOL issued a proposed regulation titled “Fiduciary Duties in Selecting Designated Investment Alternatives,” indicating that it “supplements and expands on the 1979 Investment Duties Regulation.” The proposed regulation “clarifies, and provides a safe harbor for, a fiduciary’s duty of prudence” under ERISA “in connection with selecting designated investment alternatives for a participant-directed individual account plan, including asset allocation funds that include alternative assets.” DOL is accepting comments on the proposed regulation through June 1, 2026. 
While E.O. 14330 specifically addressed alternative assets, DOL describes the proposed regulation as “asset neutral” and therefore applicable to any potential DIA. The proposed regulation defines a DIA as an investment alternative “designated by the plan into which participants and beneficiaries may direct the investment of assets held in, or contributed to, their individual accounts, including a qualified default investment alternative.” The proposal specifically excludes brokerage windows from the definition of DIAs. A brokerage window is an arrangement within a DC plan through which participants may purchase a wide range of investments beyond those selected by the plan. About 25% of plans offer brokerage windows.
DOL indicated that the goal of the proposed regulation is “to alleviate certain regulatory burdens and litigation risk that interfere with the ability of American workers to achieve, through their retirement accounts, the competitive returns and asset diversification necessary to secure a dignified and comfortable retirement.” To support this goal, DOL identifies three key principles of the proposal: (1) it affirms ERISA as a law grounded in process, (2) ERISA gives maximum discretion and flexibility to plan fiduciaries in selecting DIAs, and (3) when fiduciaries follow a prudent process, arbiters of disputes should defer to fiduciaries under a presumption of prudence.
The proposal begins with a discussion of the general duties of prudence by plan fiduciaries and statements that selecting DIAs is a fiduciary act and that prudent fiduciaries have maximum discretion to select investments to further the purposes of the plan. DOL notes that there is no requirement or restriction on DIAs that are otherwise legal. For example, a plan could not include an investment in a  sanctioned program or country. 
The proposal notes that fiduciaries have the “duty to act prudently when establishing a plan investment menu to maximize risk-adjusted returns” and that prudence “requires appropriate consideration of all relevant factors.”
Safe Harbor Factors in the Proposed Regulation
The proposal provides a process-based safe harbor for fiduciaries to use when selecting DIAs. DOL identifies six (non-exhaustive) factors for a fiduciary to “objectively, thoroughly, and analytically” consider when selecting DIAs. If fiduciaries follow the process with respect to the factors (which may include relying on recommendations from outside fiduciaries), then “the plan fiduciary’s judgment with respect to the particular factor or factors, including the relationship between the factors, is presumed to have met the duties” in ERISA.
The six factors in the proposed regulation include performance, fees, liquidity, complexity, performance benchmarks, and valuation. Within the six factors, the proposal provides 20 examples in total as illustrations of what DOL believes would (and would not) be considered prudent processes. The factors are summarized as follows:
Performance. DOL indicates that fiduciaries do not have to try to achieve the highest absolute returns. Rather, this factor says to consider the “risk-adjusted expected returns, over an appropriate time-horizon, of the designated investment alternative, net of anticipated fees and expenses.”
Fees. DOL notes that fiduciaries are not required to choose DIAs with the lowest fees. Rather they must determine that the fees are “appropriate, taking into account its risk-adjusted expected returns and any other value” that the DIA brings to the plan. DOL says that “a prudent plan fiduciary could choose to pay more in exchange for greater services.”
Liquidity. Liquidity refers to how easily an investment can be bought or sold. Some investments, such as mutual funds, are considered liquid because they can be redeemed for cash quickly, while others, such as annuities, may restrict or impose fees when cashing out. The proposal says that fiduciaries must consider whether the DIA has sufficient liquidity to be able to meet both the plan’s liquidity needs (such as a change in the plan’s investment menu) and participants’ liquidity needs (such as withdrawals). The proposal notes that “because participant-directed individual account plans are long-term retirement savings vehicles, particularly for participants early in their careers, there is no requirement that a fiduciary select only fully liquid products.”
Valuation. The DIA must be “capable of being timely and accurately valued in accordance with the needs of the plan.” Securities that are not publicly traded must be “valued through a conflict-free, independent process no less frequently than quarterly, according to procedures that satisfy” Financial Accounting Standards Board Topic 820.
Performance Benchmarks. Each DIA must have a meaningful benchmark in order to evaluate the performance of the DIA. The proposed regulation defines a meaningful benchmark as “an investment, strategy, index, or other comparator that has similar mandates, strategies, objectives, and risks to the designated investment alternative.”
Complexity. The fiduciary must determine that it has the skill to evaluate the complexity of DIAs and, if not, then it “must seek assistance from a qualified investment advice fiduciary, investment manager, or other individual.” The proposal provides examples of complexity as fees in private assets and participant needs (such as choosing appropriate investments based on participants’ characteristics such as ages and risk tolerances).
Skidmore Deference
The proposal suggests that the “regulation should carry persuasive weight to courts under Skidmore [Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944)].” Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Loper Bright v. Raimondo [603 U.S. 369 (2024)], courts no longer defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute, but courts may give such interpretations “due respect,” under Skidmore, based on the thoroughness of the agency’s reasoning and the agency’s expertise. In its proposal, DOL suggests that courts should find the agency’s reasoning persuasive such “that fiduciaries that comply with the regulation should be found to have followed a prudent process.” 
Duty to Monitor DIAs
The proposed regulation does not address the duty to monitor DIAs at regular intervals after their selection, and DOL notes that it anticipates issuing interpretive guidance on this in the near term. It says that DOL “generally is of the view that the factors and processes (or substantially similar factors and processes) outlined in the proposed regulation—including the illustrative safe harbor examples—apply to this ongoing duty.”",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13228/IF13228.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13228.html
R48947,Department of Transportation FY2027 Funding Request,2026-05-14T04:00:00Z,2026-05-16T04:53:20Z,Active,Reports,"William J. Mallett, John Frittelli, Ben Goldman, Ali E. Lohman, Jennifer J. Marshall, Naseeb A. Souweidane, Rachel Y. Tang",,"The Department of Transportation (DOT) is responsible for the federal regulation and funding of most modes of U.S. transportation. DOT is mainly organized into operating administrations that each oversee a mode of transportation (e.g., Federal Aviation Administration [FAA]) or maintain responsibility for a certain aspect of transportation (e.g., Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration). Two DOT offices—the Office of the Secretary (OST) and the Office of Inspector General (OIG)—have department-wide responsibilities. DOT also includes the Great Lakes St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation (GLSDC), a wholly owned government corporation that operates and maintains two locks on the St. Lawrence Seaway and other aspects of navigation infrastructure.
The Trump Administration’s FY2027 budget request for DOT by operating administration and office was released in April 2026. This report compares the President’s request with FY2026 enacted funding. This report also presents enacted funding for FY2022-FY2025 to provide additional context for the funding request. For surface transportation modes, FY2022-FY2026 is the period covered by the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA; P.L. 117-58), which authorizes federal spending on surface transportation. Congress reportedly is developing new surface transportation reauthorization legislation, but such legislation had not been introduced as of the publication of this report. For aviation, FY2022-FY2026 spans time periods covered by the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-254) and the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 (P.L. 118-63). (FAA is the Federal Aviation Administration.) CRS derived requested and enacted funding data primarily from DOT’s “budget estimates” documents. 
Overall, DOT’s budget request for FY2027 ($113.9 billion) is 23% lower than FY2026 enacted funding ($148.5 billion). The reduction comes mainly from
the absence of a Trump Administration request for the provision of multiyear advance appropriations beyond FY2026 (as was provided in Division J of the IIJA), which would be a reduction of about $12.9 billion for Amtrak and other railroad grants alone;
a requested reduction in annual appropriations for the Federal Transit Administration’s (FTA’s) Capital Investment Grant Program from $1.7 billion in FY2026 to $1.2 billion for FY2027;
a requested reduction in annual appropriations for OST’s National Infrastructure Investments from $145 million in FY2026 to $0 for FY2027; and
a requested reduction in annual appropriations to OST for the Essential Air Service program from $514 million in FY2026 to $142 million for FY2027. 
DOT’s budget request proposes a funding increase for some of its areas of responsibility, including funding increases for
FAA to hire more air traffic controllers,
shipbuilding programs administered by the Maritime Administration (MARAD), and
OST to establish a “DC Safe & Beautiful Fund.”
The FY2027 budget request would increase DOT full-time equivalent (FTE) staff by about 1,400, from 52,600 in FY2026 to 54,000 in FY2027. Most of the increase would come from adding employees at FAA. MARAD FTE staff also would increase. The budget request would reduce FTEs in most other administrations and offices, mainly expected from centralization of some administrative support services (e.g., information technology) in OST. According to data from DOT, some modal administrations had fewer staff in FY2026 than in FY2025. The agencies that experienced some of the largest staff reductions in percentage terms from FY2025 to FY2026 were the Federal Highway Administration (-24%), National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (-23%), FTA (-20%), Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (-10%), and Federal Railroad Administration (-9%). ",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48947/R48947.10.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48947.html
R48946,National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) FY2027 Budget and Policy Issues: In Brief,2026-05-14T04:00:00Z,2026-05-16T04:53:19Z,Active,Reports,"Anya L. Fink, Mary Beth D. Nikitin",,"The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is a semiautonomous agency within the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). NNSA is responsible for maintaining the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile, carrying out nuclear nonproliferation activities and nuclear and radiological emergency response, and providing nuclear reactors and fuel to the U.S. Navy. (For additional information on NNSA and its sites, see CRS Report R48194, The U.S. Nuclear Security Enterprise: Background and Possible Issues for Congress.)
For FY2027, NNSA requested $32.80 billion—$7.40 billion (29%) more than the FY2026 enacted discretionary amount of $25.40 billion. Of this, $27.44 billion was requested for programs related to development, production, certification, and maintenance of the U.S. nuclear warhead stockpile (i.e., the Weapons Activities account) and $2.39 billion for nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear counterterrorism (i.e., the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation account). NNSA also requested $2.39 billion for the Naval Reactors program, carried out in collaboration with the U.S. Navy, and $577.10 million for NNSA federal salaries and expenses. 
Congress generally authorizes funding for NNSA in an annual National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and provides funding for NNSA through an annual Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act. In authorizations and appropriations hearings for NNSA’s FY2027 budget request, some Members have discussed oversight issues, such as proposed funding increases and warhead development activities in the Weapons Activities budget, NNSA’s plutonium pit production strategy and costs, proposed cuts to the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation budget and staff, costs and schedules of NNSA projects, NNSA’s long-range plans to modernize infrastructure, NNSA’s potential contributions to the monitoring and verification of Iran’s nuclear capabilities, and U.S. policy on testing nuclear weapons. This report profiles NNSA’s FY2027 budget request and tracks selected legislative activity. ",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48946/R48946.4.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48946.html
LSB11431,Congressional Redistricting: High Court Narrows Voting Rights Act in Louisiana v. Callais,2026-05-14T04:00:00Z,2026-05-15T17:54:44Z,Active,Posts,L. Paige Whitaker,,"On April 29, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court in Louisiana v. Callais significantly narrowed the circumstances under which a racial vote dilution challenge to a redistricting map can be made under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended (VRA). In Callais, the Court held that the State of Louisiana engaged in an “unconstitutional racial gerrymander” when it created a second majority-minority district in its congressional redistricting map to comply with Section 2. Applying standards revised in Callais, the Court determined that because Section 2 did not require the creation of the second majority-minority district, there was no compelling governmental interest that justified the state’s use of racial considerations in creating the map. In so ruling, the Court held that Section 2 is violated “only when the evidence supports a strong inference that the State intentionally drew its districts to afford minority voters less opportunity because of their race.” 
This Legal Sidebar provides a brief history of Section 2 of the VRA in the context of redistricting and related legal framework, discusses the lower court litigation and the Supreme Court ruling in Callais, and offers some considerations for Congress.
Section 2 of the VRA and Legal Framework
Ratified in 1870, the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution guarantees that the right “to vote shall not be denied or abridged” based on race or color, and provides Congress with the authority “to enforce” the Amendment “by appropriate legislation.” Invoking that authority in 1965, Congress enacted the VRA to achieve the Fifteenth Amendment’s goal of bringing “an end to the denial of the right to vote based on race.” 
A key provision of the VRA, Section 2, prohibits discriminatory voting practices or procedures, including those alleged to diminish or weaken minority voting power (known as minority vote dilution). Section 2 prohibits any voting qualification or practice applied or imposed by any state or political subdivision (e.g., a city or county) that results in the “denial or abridgement” of the right to vote based on race, color, or membership in a language minority. The statute further provides that a violation is established if, “based on the totality of circumstances,” electoral processes “are not equally open to participation by members of” a racial or language minority group in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to elect representatives of their choice.
Section 2 has been invoked primarily to challenge congressional and state legislative redistricting maps in vote dilution cases. The Supreme Court has previously interpreted Section 2, under certain circumstances described in more detail below, to require the creation of one or more majority-minority districts in a redistricting map. A majority-minority district is one in which a racial or language minority group comprises a voting majority. In earlier cases, the Court determined that the creation of such districts can avoid minority vote dilution by helping ensure that racial or language minority groups are not submerged into the majority and thereby denied an equal opportunity to elect candidates of choice.
The 1986 landmark Supreme Court ruling in Thornburg v. Gingles established three preconditions that challengers to redistricting maps alleging racial vote dilution under Section 2 must meet: (1) “the minority group must be able to demonstrate that it is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district”; (2) “the minority group must be able to show that it is politically cohesive”; and (3) the minority group “must be able to demonstrate that the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it . . . usually to defeat the minority’s preferred candidate.” Subsequent Supreme Court case law explained that the first Gingles precondition requires that a district be “reasonably configured,” which requires adherence to traditional redistricting criteria, such as being reasonably compact and contiguous. After meeting the three preconditions, Gingles further provided that a challenger must demonstrate, based on “the totality of the circumstances,” that the political process is not “equally open” to minority voters. 
In cases following Gingles, some redistricting maps that were created to comport with Section 2 were challenged as unconstitutional racial gerrymanders in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In such challenges, if racial considerations are the “predominant factor” in how a map is designed, then courts apply a strict scrutiny standard of constitutional review that requires the government to show that the map is narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest. Case law in this area has thus signaled a possible tension between complying with the VRA and conforming to standards of equal protection.
Lower Court Litigation in Louisiana v. Callais
The dispute in Callais began when the Louisiana legislature redrew its congressional map following the 2020 census and created one majority-minority district out of the six congressional districts apportioned to the state. Voters in the state and civil rights organizations sued in federal district court, arguing that Section 2 required the creation of two majority-minority districts. Following litigation, the Louisiana legislature redrew the congressional redistricting map, creating a second majority-minority district.
In another Louisiana federal district court, self-described “non-Black voters” in the state sued, arguing that the newly redrawn map was an unconstitutional racial gerrymander. After determining that considerations of race predominated in drawing the second majority-minority district, a divided three-judge federal district court panel applied a strict scrutiny standard of constitutional review, requiring the creation of the district to be “narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling interest.” Assuming without deciding that compliance with Section 2 was a compelling interest for the creation of a second majority-minority district, the district court determined that such compliance would be “narrowly tailored” if it comported with the requirements set forth in Gingles for proving a Section 2 vote dilution claim and thereby seeking the creation of one or more majority-minority districts in a redistricting map. 
In Callais, the district court determined that the challenged majority-minority district did not meet the first Gingles precondition because, in view of “the State’s Black population [being] dispersed,” the legislature created the district “as a bizarre’ 250-mile-long slash-shaped district that functions as a majority-minority district only because it severs and absorbs majority-minority neighborhoods from cities and parishes all the way from Baton Rouge to Shreveport.” Therefore, the district court held that the map was “an impermissible racial gerrymander” in violation of the Equal Protection Clause and enjoined the State from using the map for any election. The Supreme Court stayed the decision pending an appeal. The State of Louisiana appealed to the Supreme Court under a provision of federal law permitting direct appeals from district court three-judge panels. In November 2024, the Court noted probable jurisdiction and consolidated Louisiana v. Callais with the related case, Robinson v. Callais. 
Supreme Court Ruling in Louisiana v. Callais
On April 29, 2026, in a major decision, the Supreme Court in Louisiana v. Callais held that the State of Louisiana engaged in an “unconstitutional racial gerrymander” when it created a second majority-minority district to comply with Section 2 of the VRA. The Court determined that Section 2, as interpreted by the Court in Callais, did not require the creation of the second majority-minority district and, therefore, there was no compelling governmental interest justifying the state’s use of racial considerations in drawing the district. The Supreme Court accordingly affirmed the district court’s judgment in the case and remanded. 
In sum, the Court in Callais established a more stringent standard that a challenger to a redistricting map alleging racial vote dilution under Section 2 must meet. Prior to Callais, as discussed above, a challenger was required to show that the design of a redistricting map resulted in minority vote dilution by meeting the standards set forth in Gingles, among other requirements. In Callais, the Court determined that to comport with the Fifteenth Amendment, a challenger now needs to present evidence that “supports a strong inference” that a state intentionally created a redistricting map that provides minority voters with less opportunity to elect preferred candidates. In so ruling, the Court determined that the Gingles standards required an update to align with the text of Section 2 and to reflect changes in society that have occurred since the Court decided Gingles in 1986. As a result of the Court’s modifications to the Gingles standards, Section 2 challengers now must show that a state drew a redistricting map based on racial, and not political, considerations and present evidence of current-day, intentional voting discrimination that is based on race.
Majority Opinion
Writing for the Court, Justice Alito reviewed the legal framework that existed when the Callais litigation began. As the Court explained, while states in racial gerrymandering lawsuits have asserted that compliance with Section 2 provides a compelling governmental interest under a strict scrutiny standard of review, the Supreme Court has assumed without deciding that the VRA could provide a compelling governmental interest. In Callais, the Court held that compliance with Section 2, only “as properly construed” by the Court in the case, provides a compelling reason for race-based redistricting. 
The Court held that Section 2 is violated “only when the evidence supports a strong inference that the State intentionally drew its districts to afford minority voters less opportunity because of their race.” According to the Court, in any legislation enforcing the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, there needs to be “a congruence and proportionality” between the constitutional guarantee sought to be enforced and the law enacted to accomplish that goal. In view of the Court’s long-held determination that the Fifteenth Amendment prohibits only state action that is taken with a discriminatory intent, the Court reasoned that any law seeking to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment likewise must focus on intentional discrimination. Therefore, the Court concluded, so long as Section 2 serves to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment’s ban on racial discrimination that is intentional, it is congruent and proportional. 
The Court emphasized that Section 2 “does not demand a finding of intentional discrimination.” Instead, according to the Court, Section 2 “imposes liability only when the circumstances give rise to a strong inference that intentional discrimination occurred.” As an example, the Court envisioned a circumstance in which, after applying the state’s redistricting algorithm, the resulting computer-generated maps contained majority-minority districts that the state rejected without a valid reason. In such an instance, the Court said there would be a strong inference of racial motivation and therefore, the Fifteenth Amendment would authorize the imposition of Section 2 liability without necessitating a court to ascertain if the “the state legislature as an institution as opposed to certain individual members or the State’s hired mapmaker, was motivated by race.” In contrast, the Court explained, the Fifteenth Amendment does not authorize Section 2 to invalidate a map simply because it does not contain one or more majority-minority districts.
In the Court’s view, Section 2 does not apply when a state creates a redistricting map on the basis of factors unrelated to race. These factors include, as the Court outlined, traditional redistricting criteria such as creating compact and contiguous district boundaries, maintaining political subdivisions, preserving existing districts, and protecting incumbents. In that same vein, the Court stressed that Section 2 cannot be invoked to counter the constitutionally permissible goal of partisan gerrymandering. According to the Court, when a state defends its redistricting map as a partisan gerrymander, challengers are required to “disentangle race from politics’ by proving that the former drove a district’s lines.’” In so doing, the Court announced that the challenger must be able to exclude the possibility that partisan goals animated how a district was drawn, and if either race or politics could account for how a district is drawn, a challenger will not prevail.
Turning to the three-pronged Gingles framework for proving racial vote dilution under Section 2, the Court in Callais determined that an “update” was needed so that it comports with the text of the statute and reflects developments in society that have occurred since the Court decided Gingles in 1986. In that vein, the Court cited four historical developments. First, the Court observed that “vast social change” has occurred throughout the nation, specifically in southern states where many challenges under Section 2 have arisen, resulting in Black-voter participation at similar or higher levels as the remainder of the electorate. 
Second, the Court contrasted the current two-party system in states where Section 2 suits are most frequently filed with the one-party system that was in place in 1986 in the area in which the Gingles case arose. According to the Court, in that time and place, “an overwhelming majority of white voters did not vote for any black candidate in the Democratic party primary elections,” where the ultimate general election winners were chosen; and in general elections, “white voters in heavily Democratic areas often ranked black candidates last among Democrats.” Such disparities in voting—within the same political party—demonstrated that minority voters had less opportunity to elect candidates of choice due to their race, not due to their party affiliation, the Court observed. Today, by comparison, in areas where both major political parties are strong and where there is a high correlation between party preference and the race of a voter, the Court warned that a challenger “can easily exploit §2 for partisan purposes.” 
Third, the Court stated that as a result of its 2019 decision in Rucho v. Common Cause, holding that claims of unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering are not justiciable in federal court, federal law permits states to draw districts for partisan advantage. As a result, without an update to the Gingles framework, the Court reasoned that a challenger to a redistricting map under Section 2, in areas where party affiliation and race are closely correlated, could unacceptably disguise a partisan gerrymandering claim as racial vote dilution claim.  
Fourth, the Court observed that since Gingles was decided in 1986, advancements in the use of computers in the redistricting process have occurred. Therefore, the Court reasoned that challengers to redistricting maps under Section 2 can rely on computer technology to generate large numbers of maps that achieve a state’s traditional redistricting goals while also establishing “greater racial balance,” if such a map is possible to produce.
Informed by the four historical developments, the Court modified the three preconditions set forth in Gingles and the “totality of circumstances” showing that a plaintiff needs to make in a Section 2 vote dilution case. With modification, the Court indicated that the first Gingles precondition is now met when challengers produce an alternative map containing a proposed majority-minority district that does not “use race as a districting criterion” and complies with the state’s “legitimate districting objectives,” such as traditional redistricting criteria. The Court explained that if the state’s goals involve partisan gerrymandering, protection of incumbents, or other goals that are constitutionally permissible, then the challengers must produce an alternative map that likewise achieves those goals. If challengers cannot produce such a map, then the challengers have failed to show that the state’s redistricting map was prompted by racial considerations, in the Court’s view.
The modified second and third Gingles preconditions are now met, the Court held, when challengers show “that voters engage in racial bloc voting that cannot be explained by partisan affiliation.” The Court went on to explain that if a challenger can provide an analysis that controls for party affiliation, that will be crucial for distinguishing between a district that was drawn for political as opposed to for racial purposes. Finally, the Court determined that the “totality of circumstances” analysis needs to focus on evidence relating to current-day intentional discrimination in voting based on race, as prohibited by the Fifteenth Amendment, and not on racial discrimination that occurred in the past. The Court acknowledged that it may be difficult for challengers to present such evidence because the VRA has been successful in ending racial discrimination in voting.
Applying the revised legal framework to the second majority-minority district in Louisiana, the Supreme Court concluded that the facts in the case required affirmance of the district court ruling. The Court indicated that strict scrutiny applied “because the State’s underlying goal was racial” in creating the redistricting map, and accordingly, the state had to prove that its use of racial considerations was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest. Under strict scrutiny review, the Court determined that there was no compelling interest justifying the use of race because it was unnecessary for the state to create a second majority-minority district to comport with Section 2. Applying the newly revised first prong of the Gingles framework, the Court found that the challengers did not meet the standard because they failed to produce an alternative map that met the state’s non-racial goals—specifically, the state’s political goals—including incumbency protection. Likewise, the Court said that the challengers did not meet the second and third prongs of Gingles because, to prove racially polarized voting, the challengers presented “evidence that black and white voters consistently supported different candidates, but their analysis did not control for partisan preferences.” Further, even if the challengers had met the updated Gingles framework, the Court determined that they still would not have demonstrated “an objective likelihood of intentional discrimination” under a totality of the circumstances analysis. The Court concluded that because Section 2 did not require the State of Louisiana to create a second majority-minority district, there was no compelling governmental interest that justified the state’s use of race in creating the redistricting map, and therefore, held the map “an unconstitutional gerrymander.”
Concurrence
Justice Thomas wrote a concurrence, joined by Justice Gorsuch, criticizing prior Supreme Court cases that he viewed as interpreting Section 2 of the VRA in a manner that “effectively g[ave] racial groups an entitlement to roughly proportional representation.’” By construing Section 2 to authorize the creation of congressional districts “along racial lines,” Justice Thomas maintained that the Court had “rendered §2 repugnant to any nation that strives for the ideal of a color-blind Constitution.’” Justice Thomas also argued, as he did more than 30 years ago in Holder v. Hall, that he would have gone further than the Court in Callais to hold that Section 2, based on its statutory text, does not apply to redistricting maps.
Dissent
Justice Kagan wrote a dissent, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan, criticizing the Court majority in Callais for having made “a nullity of Section 2 and threaten[ing] a half-century’s worth of gains in voting equality.” Instead of providing an “update” to Section 2, Justice Kagan characterized the Court in Callais as “eviscerat[ing] the law.” Justice Kagan argued that as a result of the Court’s ruling, a challenger to a redistricting map under Section 2 not only needs to prove vote dilution, but also a “race-based motive,” which is “nearly impossible.” When a state defends a map in court that creates racial vote dilution, unless there is “smoking-gun evidence of race-based motive,” Justice Kagan maintained that a “State need do nothing more than announce a partisan gerrymander.”
Considerations for Congress
The Supreme Court decision in Louisiana v. Callais significantly limits the circumstances in which states can constitutionally be required, under Section 2 of the VRA, to create majority-minority districts in congressional, state, and local redistricting maps. Specifically, the Court in Callais modified what a challenger to a redistricting map must show to prove racial vote dilution under Section 2: “evidence [that] supports a strong inference that the State intentionally drew its districts to afford minority voters less opportunity because of their race.” The Court’s ruling in Callais will likely affect how redistricting maps are drawn in the future. Existing majority-minority districts that were designed to comport with Section 2 might be challenged as unconstitutional racial gerrymanders in view of Callais. More immediately, prompted by the ruling, some state legislatures are considering or have already enacted modifications to their redistricting maps that eliminate majority-minority districts for the upcoming 2026 congressional elections. 
If Congress seeks to respond to the Supreme Court ruling in Callais, within the bounds of the Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court, Congress could enact race-neutral standards for congressional redistricting maps. For example, in the current Congress, legislation has been introduced that would require states to establish independent congressional redistricting commissions to combat partisan gerrymandering, prohibit mid-decade redistricting, and require at-large congressional elections. Congress might also choose to consider race-neutral amendments to the VRA or further prohibitions on intentional racial discrimination in elections. Alternatively, Congress could choose to amend Section 2 of the VRA to codify the modified Gingles framework from Callais or the modified evidentiary standard for Section 2 claims.  ",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB11431/LSB11431.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/HTML/LSB11431.html
IF13227,The McNamara-O’Hara Service Contract Act (SCA),2026-05-14T04:00:00Z,2026-05-15T13:53:13Z,Active,Resources,"Elizabeth Weber Handwerker, Jon O. Shimabukuro",Labor Standards,"Introduction
The McNamara-O’Hara Service Contract Act (SCA) of 1965, 41 U.S.C. §§ 6701-6707, requires the payment of locally prevailing wages and fringe benefits to employees working pursuant to contracts that
are made by the federal government or the District of Columbia;
involve an amount greater than $2,500; and
have a principal purpose of furnishing nonconstruction services in the United States by service employees.
The SCA was intended to establish labor standards for service employees who were generally not covered at the time by the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) or by state minimum wage laws. Because, at the time of passage, federal contracts were typically awarded to the lowest bidder and labor costs were the predominant factor in most service contracts, companies providing the lowest wages were more likely to be successful. The Johnson Administration advocated for service contract proposals in Congress, saying they would prevent low-bid federal contracts from depressing wages.
This In Focus examines the SCA and how it is currently implemented and enforced by the Wage and Hour Division (WHD) of the Department of Labor (DOL).
Coverage
Service Employees
The SCA defines a service employee as “an individual engaged in the performance of a contract made by the Federal Government ... the principal purpose of which is to furnish services in the United States.” The definition does not encompass those determined to be “bona fide executive, administrative, or professional” employees for purposes of the FLSA. Typical covered positions include cooks, medical assistants, and gardeners. 
Covered Contracts
The SCA applies to contracts exceeding $2,500 for services furnished in the “United States,” which includes any state, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, the Outer Continental Shelf, American Samoa, Guam, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, Wake Island, and Johnston Island. The SCA does not apply on military bases within foreign countries. 
The SCA does not apply to contracts for construction services (many of which are covered instead by the Davis-Bacon Act of 1931); purchases of goods (many of which are covered by the Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act of 1936); the carriage of freight or personnel; the furnishing of services by radio, telephone, telegraph, or cable companies; public utility services; and the operation of postal contract stations. It also does not apply to employment contracts for direct services to a federal agency by an individual.
Typical examples of covered service contracts involve the provision of guard services, janitorial services, cafeteria services in federal buildings, and the provision of call centers answering questions about federal programs.
Wage Determinations and Other Requirements
Monetary Wages
WHD generally determines prevailing wages using median (or sometimes mean) wages for the occupation and locality as estimated annually by the Occupational Employment and Wage Statistics program of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). Wage determinations may also be based on wage rates included in collective bargaining agreements, where they have been determined to prevail in a locality for specified occupational classes of employees. When changes in prevailing wage determinations increase or decrease employee compensation during a multiyear service contract, a contractor may request an adjustment in the price of the service contract.
Wage determinations can be affected by executive action involving federal contracts. In 2014, Executive Order (E.O.) 13658 established an hourly wage floor of $10.10 for workers performing work on federal contracts, including those subject to the SCA, beginning on January 1, 2015, with annual adjustments for inflation thereafter. In 2021, E.O. 14026 established a higher hourly wage floor for service contracts beginning January 30, 2022. In 2025, Section 2(d) of E.O. 14236 revoked E.O. 14026, but the earlier E.O. 13658 remains in effect for some multiyear service contracts awarded between January 1, 2015, and January 29, 2022. The hourly wage floor for workers on these contracts has been adjusted for inflation to $13.65 per hour (unless the prevailing wage is higher).
Federal agencies must obtain wage determinations for every new service contract, extension, or major modification. These determinations (which list required wages and benefits) are available for most commonly employed occupations by locality at sam.gov; where they are not already published, agencies request wage determinations from WHD. The sam.gov website also links to the SCA Directory of Occupations, which describes work done in each occupational classification so that agency staff can select the most appropriate wage determination for each position.
Fringe Benefits
The SCA requires contractors to provide covered workers with locally prevailing fringe benefits, such as pensions, health insurance, and life insurance benefits that are not otherwise required by federal, state, or local law. Since 1997, WHD has determined the dollar amount of required health and welfare benefits using the benefits component of the BLS Employment Cost Index (ECI) for all employees in private industry rather than through an evaluation of the fringe benefits commonly provided for individual occupations in each locality. The SCA allows the Secretary of Labor to deviate from the requirement that fringe benefits be determined for various classes of service employees in a locality when it is “necessary and proper in the public interest.” 
In July 2025, WHD updated the benefit rate to $5.55 per hour. Employers may either pay this amount directly to employees or pay a third party to provide these benefits. Under E.O. 13706, certain federal contractors are required to provide paid sick leave to their employees. The fringe benefit rate for employers subject to the SCA and the E.O. is $5.09 per hour. Hawaii state law uniquely requires most employers to provide health insurance coverage for their employees, and costs associated with providing this benefit are deducted from the nationwide fringe benefit rate. The required SCA fringe benefit rate in Hawaii is $2.42 per hour ($1.96 per hour for employers subject to the SCA and E.O. 13706).
The SCA also requires service contracts to provide vacation and holiday pay for workers “as determined ... to be prevailing for such employees in the locality.” SCA vacation benefits are often linked to length of service, for example, “2 weeks paid vacation after 1 year of service, 3 weeks after 5 years, and 4 weeks after 15 years.” In addition, many SCA wage determinations require paid federal holidays. The value of these benefits is not included in the health and welfare benefits described above. 
Additional Requirements
The SCA requires contractors to maintain safe and sanitary workplaces and requires that employees receive notices of required compensation. DOL regulations mandate recordkeeping for contractors to show they have complied with the prevailing wage and fringe benefit requirements. New contractors providing substantially similar services as a previous contractor with a unionized workforce are required to pay wages and benefits no lower than those provided under an existing collective bargaining agreement. For multiyear contracts, the SCA requires adjustment of wages and fringe benefits at least every two years.
Enforcement
WHD enforces the SCA by conducting investigations of alleged violations. If WHD determines that a contractor has failed to pay the appropriate wage and fringe benefits, it can withhold payments due on the contract or on any other contract between the federal government and the same contractor, and use withheld payments to compensate employees in compliance with the SCA. If the withheld payments are insufficient to compensate the employees, the federal government may bring an action against the contractor in any court of competent jurisdiction. Federal courts have confirmed that the SCA does not confer a private right of action; that is, an employee may not sue the contractor for unpaid wages or fringe benefits.
A contracting agency may cancel its contract with a contractor that has violated the SCA on written notice to the contractor and execute a new contract for another entity to complete the contracted work. Added costs associated with the new contract may be charged to the original contractor.
The SCA directs the Comptroller General to distribute a list of entities that have violated the SCA to federal agencies. Unless the Secretary of Labor determines unusual circumstances warrant further contracting, an entity on the list may not be awarded another federal contract for three years from the list’s publication date. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has indicated that, subject to the reasonable application of the Secretary’s guidelines, unusual circumstances may exist when a violation was not willful and there is no history of past violations. 
Information on WHD enforcement of the SCA since FY2013 is available on the WHD website. Over the period from FY2013 to FY2025, the number of SCA compliance actions declined from 916 to 387 compliance actions per year. WHD enforcement data available since FY2005 show 2%-4% of the violations WHD identified each year were SCA violations. On average, identified SCA violations involved about 30 employees, with an average amount of back pay owed per employee of about $2,750. A 2020 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report found the most common type of SCA violation identified by WHD during FY2014–FY2019 was underpayment of fringe benefits. This report recommended improvements in communication between WHD and federal contracting agencies regarding SCA violations and debarments. 
Relevant Legislative Proposals
Legislation that would have adjusted the monetary threshold for SCA applicability and either expanded or limited the law’s coverage has been introduced in Congresses since 2017. The Service Contract Modernization Act, introduced in the 117th (S. 2963) and 118th Congresses (S. 335), would have adjusted the SCA’s $2,500 threshold for inflation in future applications. The Outdoor Recreation Enhancement Act, introduced in the 115th Congress (H.R. 2771), would have amended the SCA to exempt contracts with the Secretary of the Interior or the Secretary of Agriculture involving outdoor recreational activities. In the 119th Congress, the Strengthening Job Corps Act of 2025 (H.R. 2281) would codify the SCA’s application to Job Corps operators and service providers and extend its requirements to academic and career technical instructional employees on federal contracts. These employees generally are not subject to the SCA because of their exempt status under the FLSA.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13227/IF13227.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13227.html
R48945,Housing Cost Burdens in 2024: In Brief,2026-05-13T04:00:00Z,2026-05-15T10:38:04Z,Active,Reports,"Mark P. Keightley, Maggie McCarty","Homeownership & Housing Finance, Housing-Related Assistance to Communities & Tribes, Public & Assisted Housing, U.S. Economy",This report uses the 2024 American Community Survey to quantify the prevalence of housing cost burden in the United States in 2024. The report describes differences in housing cost burden rates among renters and homeowners across various demographic groups and income brackets. ,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48945/R48945.3.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48945.html
IN12692,U.S. Aircraft Combat Losses in Operation Epic Fury: Considerations for Congress,2026-05-13T04:00:00Z,2026-05-14T16:38:00Z,Active,Posts,"Jennifer DiMascio, Daniel M. Gettinger","Fighter Aircraft, Air, Land, Sea, Space & Projection Forces, Defense Authorization, Defense Budgets & Appropriations, Defense Readiness, Training, Logistics & Installations","Overview
On February 28, 2026, the United States, in coordination with Israel, initiated military operations against Iran under the designation Operation Epic Fury (OEF). The conflict has involved air, maritime, and missile combat engagements across the Middle East. The pace of combat activity declined amid a ceasefire in April. Within weeks, some strikes resumed, and conditions remain fluid. 
The Department of Defense (DOD, which is “using a secondary Department of War designation,” under Executive Order 14347 dated September 5, 2025) has not published a comprehensive assessment of combat losses in OEF. During a May 12, 2026, hearing, Acting Pentagon Comptroller Jules W. Hurst III testified that the department’s cost estimate for military operations in Iran has increased to $29 billion. “A lot of that increase comes from having a refined estimate on repair or replacement costs for equipment,” he said. 
Listed here are 42 fixed-wing or rotary-wing aircraft, including uncrewed aircraft (i.e., drones), reportedly lost or damaged in OEF, according to news reports and statements by DOD and U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). The number of aircraft damaged or destroyed may remain subject to revision due to multiple factors, which may include classification, ongoing combat activity, and attribution.
Reports of OEF Aircraft Losses and Damage 
Four F-15E Strike Eagle fighter aircraft
On March 2, 2026, CENTCOM reported that three F-15Es were shot down and destroyed by friendly fire over Kuwait; all six aircrew ejected safely and were recovered.
On April 5, 2026, CENTCOM reported that one F-15E was shot down and destroyed during combat operations over Iran; both aircrew were safely recovered during separate search-and-rescue operations.
One F-35A Lightning II fighter aircraft
A March 19, 2026, news article reported that Iranian ground fire damaged one F-35A during combat operations over Iran. 
One A-10 Thunderbolt II ground-attack aircraft
In an April 6, 2026, news conference, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Air Force General Dan Caine stated that on April 3, enemy fire struck one A-10 that subsequently crashed and was destroyed during search-and-rescue operations; the pilot ejected and was recovered safely. 
Seven KC-135 Stratotanker aerial refueling aircraft
On March 12, 2026, CENTCOM reported that two KC-135s were involved in an incident over friendly airspace; one aircraft crashed in Iraq, resulting in the deaths of all six aircrew. The second KC-135 made an emergency landing at an undisclosed location in the region where U.S. forces are hosted. 
A March 14, 2026, news article reported that five KC-135s were damaged while on the ground at Prince Sultan Air Base, Saudi Arabia, during an Iranian missile and drone attack.
One E-3 Sentry airborne early warning-and-control system aircraft (AWACS)
A March 28, 2026, news article reported that one E-3 was struck and damaged while on the ground at Prince Sultan Air Base, Saudi Arabia, during an Iranian missile and drone attack. A May 7, 2026, news article reported that the E-3 had been parked on an unprotected taxiway.
Two MC-130J Commando II special operations aircraft
An April 5, 2026, news article reported that two MC-130Js supporting search-and-rescue operations for a downed F-15E were intentionally destroyed on the ground in Iran after becoming unable to depart; all aircrew were safely evacuated. 
One HH-60W Jolly Green II combat search-and-rescue helicopter
On April 6, 2026, General Caine said in a press conference that on April 5, one HH-60W sustained damage from small-arms fire supporting search-and-rescue operations for a downed F-15E in Iran. 
Twenty-four MQ-9 Reaper medium-altitude long-endurance uncrewed aircraft
An April 9, 2026, news article reported that the U.S. military had lost 24 MQ-9 Reapers since the start of U.S. military operations against Iran.
One MQ-4C Triton high-altitude long-endurance uncrewed aircraft
An April 14, 2026, news article citing a U.S. Navy document reported that one MQ-4C crashed in a mishap. 
Potential Issues for Congress
These reported incidents may raise several considerations for congressional oversight: 
Information available to Congress. It is unclear whether DOD has provided Congress an accounting of the aircraft lost in OEF. Congress may assess whether or not it has sufficient information and time to evaluate the potential effects of aircraft losses in U.S. military operations and potential DOD plans or programs to develop or procure replacements.
Budgetary impacts. Aircraft losses could generate unplanned costs for their replacement, repair, or sustainment. Congress may consider whether or not to approve, reject, or modify potential reprogramming actions or supplemental appropriations or to make adjustments to planned procurement and readiness accounts.
Force sufficiency. It is unclear how the extent of aircraft losses may affect DOD’s ability to meet current operational requirements, maintain global force posture, and respond to unforeseen contingencies. Congress may assess whether losses in certain high-demand platforms that are aging and limited in number, such as the E-3 Sentry, create capability gaps or increase risk in other theaters. 
Industrial base capacity. Congress may assess whether current production lines and supply chains are capable of replacing lost aircraft within time frames needed to meet DOD operational requirements. Congress may seek information about the extent to which competing demands—including foreign military sales or production constraints—may affect DOD’s ability to regenerate capacity.
Operational risk. Reported losses may provide insights into the survivability of U.S. aircraft in contested environments. Congress may assess whether reported losses reflect changes in the threat environment or in adversary capabilities. Congress may also assess whether any changes to the threat might signal the need to adjust U.S. operational concepts, tactics, techniques, procedures, or basing posture.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12692/IN12692.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/HTML/IN12692.html
IF13226,Seabed Mining on the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf: Background and Recent Developments,2026-05-13T04:00:00Z,2026-05-16T04:53:13Z,Active,Resources,"Caitlin Keating-Bitonti, Laura B. Comay",,"As part of a national effort to secure reliable supplies of critical minerals, President Trump issued Executive Order (E.O.) 14285 of April 24, 2025, “Unleashing America’s Offshore Critical Minerals and Resources.” One potential source of offshore critical minerals is the federally managed U.S. outer continental shelf (OCS; Figure 1). The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM), within the Department of the Interior (DOI), has authority under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA; 43 U.S.C. §§1331-1356c) to lease areas of the U.S. OCS for the development of offshore energy and non-energy marine minerals, including critical minerals. (This authority is separate from U.S. seabed mining authority in areas beyond U.S. jurisdiction, which are administered by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.) For U.S. OCS marine minerals, BOEM’s roles include evaluating the OCS for mineral resources and leasing submerged lands for mineral development. Pursuant to the OCSLA, BOEM has issued regulations (30 C.F.R. §§580-582) addressing leasing for non-energy marine minerals.
E.O. 14285 directed the Secretary of the Interior to “identify which critical minerals may be derived from seabed resources” and to “establish an expedited process for reviewing and approving permits for prospecting and granting leases for exploration, development, and production of seabed mineral resources” consistent with applicable law, among other actions. In June 2025, DOI announced that BOEM and its sister agency, the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement, were “updating [critical mineral] policies across all stages of development” to “reduce delays, improve coordination and provide greater certainty for industry, all while upholding key environmental safeguards.” On February 24, 2026, BOEM published a proposed rule to make “administrative revisions” to its mineral leasing regulations. Some stakeholders have supported these executive actions, while others have expressed concerns about potential societal and environmental costs of seabed mining.
Congress is considering executive actions and legislative proposals related to seabed mining on the OCS. Some Members have introduced legislation that would codify E.O. 14285 (H.R. 3803) or mandate actions on aspects of the order (e.g., H.R. 4018, S. 2860). In the 119th Congress, some committees (e.g., House Committee on Natural Resources) have held hearings to consider whether seabed mining can help diversify U.S. critical mineral supplies and how such activities should be regulated.
Figure 1. U.S. Outer Continental Shelf (OCS)
/
Source: CRS, modified from BOEM, “Outer Continental Shelf.” 
Notes: CNMI = Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands. The OCS (i.e., federal waters) generally extends from the outer boundaries of state-controlled waters (generally 3 nautical miles [nmi] from shore) to 200 nmi from shore (royal blue). In some areas, the United States has claimed extended continental shelf (ECS) beyond this 200-nmi limit based on geological and geophysical data, thereby extending the outer limits of the OCS (navy blue). In cases where the OCS abuts a neighboring country’s continental shelf, the OCS may measure less than 200 nmi from the U.S. shoreline.
Seabed Deposits on the OCS 
Seabed deposits with critical minerals may occur across the OCS, but not all deposits on the OCS may be economically viable to mine. Five types of OCS seabed deposits that may contain critical minerals are listed below from nearshore to deeper-water environments:
heavy mineral sands—mud- and sand-sized grains deposited by a river or glacier in a marine nearshore environment;
phosphorites—sedimentary rocks containing a high concentration of calcium phosphate that generally occur along continental shelves, slopes, and seamounts;
polymetallic sulfide deposits/hydrothermal deposits—mineral accumulations formed from hot waters emitted at seafloor spreading ridges and in areas of undersea volcanic activity;
ferromanganese crusts—mineral encrustations that form on hard surfaces from seawater rich in dissolved metals occurring in volcanically active regions; and
polymetallic nodules—potato-shaped rocks composed of concentric mineral layers that form around a hard nucleus, such as a shark tooth, lying on the deep seafloor.
OCS Areas Currently Being Considered for Critical Mineral Leasing
In response to E.O. 14285 and pursuant to its statutory authority under OCSLA (43 U.S.C. §1337(k)), BOEM has initiated the process for four potential mineral lease sales in federal waters offshore of American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), Virginia, and Alaska. To date, BOEM has not issued any leases for critical mineral activities. BOEM’s critical mineral leasing process may start with an unsolicited request for a lease sale or by BOEM’s own initiative. In either case, BOEM may publish a request for information and interest (RFI) specifying areas or minerals to be considered. The RFI may be followed by additional steps to pursue a marine mineral lease sale. 
Unsolicited Requests for Mineral Lease Sales
American Samoa. On April 8, 2025, BOEM received a request from the Impossible Metals company to commence a leasing process for exploration and potential development of critical minerals on the OCS offshore of American Samoa. During an April 2025 House Committee on Natural Resources hearing, Impossible Metals confirmed it had previously requested a lease sale for polymetallic nodules on the OCS off American Samoa in 2024. At that time, BOEM opted not to initiate leasing steps.
On June 16, 2025, in response to Impossible Metals’ second request, BOEM published an RFI for a lease sale for OCS minerals offshore of American Samoa. BOEM’s most recent activity in this matter, as of the date of this publication, was to complete its Area Identification (Area ID) decision memo. The memo determines the OCS areas that are to undergo environmental review for a proposed critical mineral lease sale, pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act (42 U.S.C. §§4321 et seq.). The American Samoa Area ID memo identifies an area larger than the original RFI area for consideration for a potential lease sale. The memo also discussed industry interest in ferromanganese crusts and polymetallic nodules in the area.
Virginia. On November 13, 2025, BOEM received an unsolicited lease sale request from Odyssey Marine Exploration focused on heavy mineral sands and phosphorites offshore of Virginia. While BOEM announced that it had “initiated the process for a potential mineral lease sale” off Virginia, as of the date of this publication, BOEM had not published an RFI related to this unsolicited request.
BOEM-Initiated Mineral Leasing Proposals
CNMI. On November 12, 2025, BOEM published an RFI for a mineral lease sale on the OCS offshore of the CNMI. According to the RFI, while the area lies east of the CNMI, its southern boundary “is approximately equal distance between ... Guam and Rota, the southernmost island of the CNMI.” The RFI area is a prospective region for ferromanganese crusts and polymetallic nodules. BOEM’s most recent activity in this matter, as of the date of this publication, was to complete its Area ID decision memo for the CNMI, identifying the OCS areas that are to undergo environmental review for a potential critical mineral lease sale. The CNMI Area ID memo identifies an area larger than the original RFI area, including a new area located west of the CNMI. Industry commenters had expressed “interest in polymetallic sulfides to the west of the CNMI.”
Alaska. On January 29, 2026, BOEM published an RFI for a lease sale for minerals on the OCS offshore of Alaska. BOEM anticipates that Alaska’s OCS contains heavy mineral sands and ferromanganese crusts. The Alaska RFI area covers over 113 million acres, an area larger than California. Portions of the RFI area lie above 75°N, at water depths over 7,000 meters, and on the U.S. extended continental shelf (ECS; Figure 1). Russia, a party to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, “does not recognise” the U.S. ECS, as the United States is not a party to the convention. BOEM’s most recent activity in this matter, as of the date of this publication, was to close the RFI comment period on April 1, 2026.
Potential Questions for Congress
As the federal government works to strengthen and diversify the U.S. domestic critical mineral supply chain, Congress may consider questions related to critical minerals on the OCS, including but not limited to the following.
Is there sufficient scientific knowledge to reduce seabed mining impacts to the marine environment? Are BOEM’s mining mitigation measures sufficient to reduce potential environmental impacts?
Do BOEM’s regulations for marine minerals pose economic burdens for the U.S. mining industry?
What role, if any, should states and U.S. territories have in BOEM’s critical mineral leasing process? Should coastal states and territories receive a share of the revenue the federal government collects from seabed mining leases?
Could a mineral lease sale on the U.S. ECS lead to geopolitical disagreements, particularly with Russia?
In the absence of U.S. onshore processing facilities, where should marine minerals harvested by U.S. companies be processed? Should the United States include marine minerals in domestic stockpile initiatives as a means to encourage the construction of domestic processing facilities?
For Further Reading
For further discussion of OCS seabed mining and issues for Congress, see CRS Report R48302, Critical Minerals on the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf: The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management’s Role and Issues for Congress.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13226/IF13226.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13226.html
R48944,Energy and Water Development: FY2027 Appropriations,2026-05-12T04:00:00Z,2026-05-15T14:52:56Z,Active,Reports,"Mark Holt, Anna E. Normand",,"The Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies appropriations (E&W) bill funds civil works activities of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) in the Department of Defense; the Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation) and Central Utah Project (CUP); the Department of Energy (DOE); the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC); the Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC); and several other independent agencies. DOE typically accounts for about 80% of the bill’s funding.
Overall Funding Totals
President Donald Trump submitted his FY2027 budget request on April 3, 2026. The request includes $67.597 billion in discretionary appropriations for energy and water development agencies, an increase of $5.866 billion (10%) above the FY2026 enacted amount, excluding emergency appropriations, mandatory appropriations, rescissions, offsets, and adjustments. The E&W budget request for FY2027 includes offsets totaling $4.917 billion from unobligated appropriations transferred from the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (P.L. 117-58). 
Energy and Water Development Appropriations, FY2026 and FY2027 Actions
(in millions of nominal dollars and % change from FY2026 enacted)
AgencyFY2026 EnactedFY2027 Request
(% Change)
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers10,435 6,663 (-36%)
Bureau of Reclamation/CUP1,650 1,292 (-22%)
Department of Energy49,12459,330 (21%)
Independent Agencies522 312 (-40%)
Total Appropriations61,73167,597 (10%)
Rescissions and Offsets-3,692-4,917
Adjusted Total58,03962,680 (8%)

Sources: P.L. 119-74 and related H.R. 6938 explanatory statement; President’s FY2027 Budget Appendix, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/appendix_fy2027.pdf.
Notes: Enacted amounts do not include supplemental or reconciliation appropriations. CUP = Central Utah Project.
Selected Key Issues
Zero Funding Request for Wind, Solar, and Hydrogen Research and Development (R&D). No appropriations are requested for FY2027 for Wind, Solar, and Hydrogen R&D, which received $480 million in FY2026. 
Proposed Elimination of Federal Regional Commissions and Authorities. All but one of the federal regional commissions and authorities would be terminated by the FY2027 request; the Appalachian Regional Commission annual appropriation would be reduced from $200 million in FY2026 to $120 million in FY2027 (-40%). 
Requested Increase for National Nuclear Security Administration. The FY2027 request for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is $7.398 billion (29%) over the FY2026 enacted amount of $25.404 billion. NNSA is a semiautonomous DOE agency responsible for nuclear warheads, nuclear weapons nonproliferation, and naval reactor R&D.
USACE Account Reorganization. The budget request proposes a 36% cut to USACE and a new District Salaries and Expenses account. This account would fund the salaries of USACE district and field office employees, plus other operational costs, separately from direct study and project costs, which would be funded in traditional study and project accounts.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48944/R48944.3.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48944.html
R48943,Income and Poverty by State and Congressional District,2026-05-12T04:00:00Z,2026-05-14T15:07:57Z,Active,Reports,"Ben Leubsdorf, Joseph Dalaker",Poverty,"Members of Congress may assess the economic well-being of households in the geographic areas they represent: states and congressional districts. This report describes two widely used statistical measures: median household income (a single number that represents the middle of the income distribution) and the poverty rate (the percentage of the population that lives in poverty, with income below a dollar threshold that represents needs for a low level of material well-being). It also provides current estimates for states and U.S. House districts based on data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s American Community Survey (ACS), a large-scale survey of U.S. households. 
",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48943/R48943.3.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48943.html
R48942,Yemen: In Brief,2026-05-12T04:00:00Z,2026-05-14T15:22:56Z,Active,Reports,Christopher M. Blanchard,"Middle East & North Africa, Yemen","Yemen has been politically, economically, and militarily divided for more than a decade; its slow-burning internal conflicts are at risk of reigniting amid multisided confrontations between regional and global actors. Yemen descended into conflict in 2014 prompting years of foreign military interventions, regional security disruptions, and lingering confrontations that have posed national security challenges for the United States and its partners. As of 2026, the Iran-backed Ansar Allah movement (aka the Houthis, a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization) and its aligned de facto government control the national capital, Sana’a, and much of western Yemen, home to most of Yemen’s population. A Saudi Arabia-based, internationally recognized government (IRG) nominally administers non-Houthi held areas at the direction of a Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), whose members represent anti-Houthi forces with distinct agendas. 
Until January 2026, the PLC included leaders of the Southern Transitional Council (STC), an independence-seeking coalition of southern Yemeni forces backed by the United Arab Emirates. That month, Saudi military strikes halted an STC campaign to assert security control across the south, leading to the expulsion of STC figures from the PLC and simmering IRG-STC tensions. With Saudi support, the IRG is seeking to unify Yemeni factions and consolidate command and control over forces in non-Houthi held areas. As of April 2026, the IRG’s reach remains limited, local authorities and armed groups remain influential, and STC supporters continue to call for self-determination.
Saudi Arabia, Iran, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Israel all act in Yemen in pursuit of what their governments perceive to be their national interests. As the leader of an anti-Houthi multilateral coalition and now chief sponsor of Yemen’s residual national government, Saudi Arabia has played a prominent if inconclusive role in Yemen’s politics and security. Differences between Saudi Arabia and the UAE within the Saudi led anti-Houthi coalition, including over UAE support to the STC, resulted in confrontation and Saudi military intervention in Yemen in late 2025, followed by the UAE’s exit from Yemen and increased Saudi engagement across non-Houthi held areas. Saudi-Houthi talks, brokered by the UN Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for Yemen, have continued in Amman, Jordan, but no new steps toward implementation of a UN-sponsored conflict resolution roadmap have been announced.
From 2023 to 2025, the Houthis disrupted shipping in the Red Sea corridor by launching drone and missile attacks against commercial and naval vessels, along with hundreds of attacks on Israel. Since 2025, the Trump Administration has sought to manage Houthi disruptions through force, sanctions, and limited negotiation. From March to May 2025, the Administration launched Operation Rough Rider, a campaign of strikes on Houthi targets that degraded but did not eliminate the Houthis’ missile and drone capacities. A May 2025 U.S.-Houthi ceasefire ended Houthi attacks on U.S. vessels, but maritime transit had not returned to pre-crisis levels even before the U.S.-Israeli military operations against Iran began in February 2026. 
As of May 2026, the Houthis had conducted limited new attacks on Israel in the context of the 2026 U.S./Israel-Iran conflict but had not resumed strikes on vessels. Disruptions to transit in the Strait of Hormuz increased the importance of the Red Sea corridor for international energy markets. These conditions could make renewed Houthi attacks on targets in Gulf States and/or vessels near Yemen more consequential. As the Houthis weigh their possible leverage, they may consider Iran’s support capacity, likely U.S. and regional responses, and the risks of renewed conflict.
",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48942/R48942.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48942.html
R48941,"Combating Robocalls and Robotexts: Background, Selected FCC Activity, and Legislative Activity in the 119th Congress",2026-05-12T04:00:00Z,2026-05-14T15:22:54Z,Active,Reports,Patricia Moloney Figliola,,"Curtailing robocalls and robotexts presents challenges for lawmakers, regulators, the telecommunications industry, and consumers. Robocalls are calls made with an automatic telephone dialing system—usually referred to as an “autodialer”—that transmits a message made with a prerecorded or artificial voice. Robotexts are text messages also made using autodialers. An autodialer is any equipment that can “store or produce telephone numbers ... using a random or sequential number generator” and dial those numbers. The term robocall generally encompasses both robocalls and robotexts. 
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regulates robocalls and robotexts. Both are generally illegal if they are made to any mobile phone (and in the case of robocalls, to a nonbusiness landline) without the recipient’s prior express written consent. Three laws are the primary basis for the FCC’s authority to regulate robocalls:
The Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA; P.L. 102-243) restricts the use of autodialers, the use of prerecorded/artificial voice messages, and unsolicited advertisements both by voice phone call and by fax. The TCPA and its implementing regulations generally prohibit prerecorded advertising calls to residential landline numbers unless the called party has given prior express written consent. 
The Truth in Caller ID Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-331) prohibits any person, in connection with any voice service or text messaging service, to “cause any caller identification service to knowingly transmit misleading or inaccurate caller identification information with the intent to defraud, cause harm, or wrongfully obtain anything of value.” 
The Pallone-Thune Telephone Robocall Abuse Criminal Enforcement and Deterrence Act (TRACED Act; P.L. 116-105) expanded the actions the FCC could take to fight illegal robocalls. The TRACED Act is the basis for many of the tools targeting illegal robocalls. For example, the TRACED Act led to implementing the protocol designed to limit the completion of illegal robocalls and prevent caller ID spoofing.
FCC regulations have provided the framework through which the telecommunications industry has developed network-based tools to stop robocalls from reaching customers. The telecommunications industry, both service providers and equipment manufacturers, and third-party application (app) developers have created end-user tools for consumers to block suspected robocalls and robotexts, including built-in phone features, carrier services, and apps. Combining one or more methods may provide a more effective defense for consumers than any single approach.
Through legislation and rulemaking, the FCC uses several methods to fight illegal robocalls, but scammers may adapt their methods over time, such as adopting internet-based calling systems and artificial intelligence (AI), making technical solutions partly effective. The FCC has taken a range of enforcement actions to stop illegal robocalls, including revoking certain certifications of service providers, disconnecting noncompliant voice service providers from the U.S. telephone network, issuing fines, and publicly classifying some entities as threats to communication services. 
Four bills have been introduced in the 119th Congress that would affect robocall regulation: The Foreign Robocall Elimination Act (H.R. 6152/S. 2666) would direct the FCC to establish a task force on unlawful robocalls; the Quashing Unwanted and Interruptive Electronic Telecommunications Act (H.R. 1027) would establish a disclosure requirement for robocalls that use AI to emulate a human being and increase forfeiture and fine amounts for certain violations of the TCPA; and the Creating Legal and Ethical AI Recordings Act (H.R. 334) would provide statutory authority to apply standards to systems that transmit artificial or prerecorded telephone messages generated using AI. Further, H.R. 6152 would require voice providers to post a bond before being able to conduct business, potentially pushing them and their insurers to more rigorously prevent scam traffic. Congress may consider a range of options to target robocalls and texts, including passing one or more of the pending bills, expanding the FCC’s authority to collect the civil penalties it issues for illegal robocalls, examining recent FCC actions for consistency with congressional intent, or deferring to the FCC to continue its efforts to stop robocalls.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48941/R48941.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48941.html
IF13225,Farm Bill Primer: Horticulture Title,2026-05-12T04:00:00Z,2026-05-13T16:38:12Z,Active,Resources,"Zachary T. Neuhofer, Jason O. Heflin",,"Congress has included a horticulture title in the farm bill since the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-234). The horticulture title of a farm bill generally contains reauthorizations, amendments, and new programs that support specialty crops (defined as fruits, vegetables, tree nuts, dried fruits, horticulture, and nursery crops including floriculture; 7 U.S.C. §1621 note); organic agriculture (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§6501-6524); local, regional, and urban food systems; hemp production; and pesticide regulation. Initially, the horticulture title consisted primarily of programs that supported specialty crops and organic agriculture. In subsequent farm bills, the Agricultural Act of 2014 (P.L. 113-79) and the Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018 (2018 farm bill; P.L. 115-334), Congress expanded the title to include programs related to local and regional food systems, hemp production and cultivation, and pesticide regulation. These programs are administered primarily through the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), although the primary law regulating pesticides, the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA; 7 U.S.C. §§136-136y), involves the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 
This CRS In Focus provides a summary of existing programs and provisions that support specialty crops; organic agriculture; local, regional, and urban food systems; and hemp production and cultivation. It also discusses proposals that would amend pesticide provisions, including provisions currently subject to litigation pending before the Supreme Court. This summary does not discuss pending legislation or include all the programs in the farm bill that directly or indirectly support these issue areas and which receive support from other titles, such as the commodity, trade, research, nutrition, and crop insurance titles.
Farm Bill Programs
The 2018 farm bill amended, reauthorized, and codified programs in the horticulture title through FY2023. Congress enacted three one-year extensions of the 2018 farm bill, most recently in the FY2026 agriculture appropriations law (P.L. 119-37). Some programs in the horticulture title received increases or continuations in mandatory funding in the FY2025 budget reconciliation law (P.L. 119-21). Additionally, the 2018 farm bill definition of hemp was amended in Section 781 of P.L. 119-37.
Specialty Crops
Specialty crop support in the horticulture title includes Specialty Crop Block Grants (SCBG). SCBG is administered by USDA’s Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) and provides grants to state departments of agriculture that “enhance the competitiveness of specialty crops.” The program received an increase in mandatory funding from $85 million to $100 million per year in P.L. 119-21. USDA is authorized to distribute grants through SCBG through FY2026. The 2018 farm bill also authorized discretionary appropriations for programs that support specialty crops. Some examples include an allocation for market news data collection for specialty crops and grants to support the maple syrup industry.
In a future farm bill, Congress may consider reauthorizing expiring specialty crop programs or altering mandatory funding levels for programs, such as SCBG. Additionally, Congress may consider reauthorizing or changing the authorized discretionary appropriations for specialty crop programs. Some in the agriculture industry and some Members of Congress have proposed amending existing specialty crop programs or creating new programs to enhance the marketing and promotion of specialty crops or to support mechanization of specialty crop production. Others may contend that farmers have sufficient funding opportunities for these efforts or that funding should be reduced to support other efforts.
Organic Agriculture
The horticulture title includes authorizations and support for agriculture products certified organic under USDA’s National Organic Program (NOP). The 2018 farm bill made changes to the USDA organic certification process to enhance enforcement, limit program fraud, and fund technology upgrades. The 2018 farm bill also reauthorized organic programs that receive mandatory spending, including the Organic Certification Cost Share Program and the Organic Production and Market Data Initiative. These programs received funding from P.L. 119-21 through FY2031. 
Following the extensions of funding to organic programs in P.L. 119-21, Congress may consider whether to amend organic standards, reauthorize or amend appropriations for organic programs, or create new programs. Some in the industry and some in Congress have expressed support for additional technical assistance, outreach, and education to support organic production across existing USDA programs. Some have also proposed to make further amendments to organic certification standards and organic enforcement. Additionally, some have proposed expanding market data collection for various commodities, while others have questioned the federal role in assisting and promoting organic agriculture.
Local, Regional, and Urban Food Systems
Support for local, regional, and urban food systems in the farm bill includes the Local Agriculture Market Program (LAMP) and the Office of Urban Agriculture and Innovative Production (OUAIP). LAMP is an umbrella program created in the 2018 farm bill that consists of grant programs that support the marketing and promotion of farmers’ markets and local food, regional partnerships, and the production of value-added products. LAMP programs receive $50 million in annual mandatory funding and are authorized through FY2026. OUIAP, created in the 2018 farm bill, provides grants and technical assistance to a variety of operations such as community farms and gardens and rooftop farms. The farm bill authorizes $25 million in annual appropriations for OUAIP through FY2026. 
In a future farm bill, Congress may consider whether or not to reauthorize USDA to provide grants for expiring local, regional, and urban food system programs, such as LAMP. Additionally, Congress may consider reauthorizing or amending the authorizations of appropriations for local and urban food programs. Some in the industry and some in Congress have proposed creating new local food programs or amending the scope of existing programs. This could include expanding the types of eligible businesses that may participate and expanding the eligible activities for grants. Others have supported reducing funding and emphasis for local food programs.
Hemp Production
The 2018 farm bill changed the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. §802) to exclude hemp from the definition of marijuana and amended 7 U.S.C. §1639o to define hemp as the cannabis plant (hemp is a variety of cannabis sativa) and any part or derivative of the plant with a delta-9 tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) concentration of 0.3% or less. The 2018 farm bill also directed USDA to create a regulatory framework for hemp cultivation (i.e., hemp production plan), and producers were made eligible for federal crop insurance and agricultural research programs. 
Section 781 of P.L. 119-37 further amended the statutory definition of hemp, changing the THC limit to a total THC concentration of less than 0.3% rather than only a delta-9 THC concentration of less than 0.3%. The new definition explicitly includes industrial hemp (i.e., hemp used for non-cannabinoid purposes) while providing for certain exclusions, such as products that contain cannabinoids that were synthesized or manufactured outside the plant. Additionally, the law directed the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to publish lists of cannabinoids within 90 days of enactment. The new hemp definition is to become effective on November 12, 2026. For more on the changes to the definition of hemp, see CRS In Focus IF13136, Changes to the Statutory Definition of Hemp and Issues for Congress. 
Congress may consider whether or not to take further action on hemp after the statutory changes to the definition of hemp in P.L. 119-37. Some in the industry and some in Congress have expressed interest in repealing the new hemp definition, delaying the effective date of the new hemp definition, or further amending the statutory definition of hemp (e.g., increasing the allowable delta-9 THC content). Others expressed support for definitional changes along the lines of P.L. 119-37 prior to its enactment. If no further changes are made to the statutory definition of hemp established in P.L. 119-37, Congress may choose to amend existing statutes for hemp production plans to reflect the new definition of hemp, such as by updating the standards for state and USDA hemp production plans to reflect the change to a statutory definition based on total THC limit rather than only delta-9 THC. Additionally, Congress may consider whether to further differentiate the statutory requirements for producers of industrial hemp and those producing hemp for cannabinoid purposes. 
Pesticide Regulation
Prior farm bills have included provisions amending various aspects of the FIFRA. Among other changes, these amendments excepted certain plant-incorporated protectants—pesticides intended to be produced and used in a living plant—from import notification requirements (P.L. 113-79; 7 U.S.C §136o(c)). They also amended the consultation process required under Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act (16 U.S.C. §1536) for pesticide registrations and registration reviews (P.L. 115-334; 7 U.S.C. §136a(c)).
Substantial proposed changes to FIFRA have appeared in unenacted farm bills. Some of these provisions would have established further exemptions for certain plant-incorporated protectants and required additional coordination among agencies for certain regulatory activities under FIFRA. Others would have addressed ongoing issues of concern to industry groups and other interest groups about the relationship between state and federal law in FIFRA’s preemption provision in Section 24 (7 U.S.C. §136v), which, among other things, prohibits states from enacting pesticide labeling or packaging requirements in addition to or different from those under FIFRA. One proposal would have prohibited political subdivisions of a state (e.g., towns, counties, and municipalities) from regulating pesticides that are subject to regulation under FIFRA, effectively reversing a 1991 Supreme Court opinion, Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, in which the Supreme Court held that Section 24 does not preempt town ordinances regulating the use of pesticides. Another proposal would have required Section 24(b)—which prohibits states from enforcing “any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from those required under” FIFRA—to “be applied” to prohibit states and courts from enforcing requirements in addition to or different from labeling or packaging approved by EPA, including requirements related to warnings. Currently, federal circuit courts disagree as to whether Section 24(b) preempts state law tort claims based on a manufacturer’s alleged failure to warn of harms stemming from pesticide sale or use. For more on this circuit split, see CRS Legal Sidebar LSB11304, Preemption in the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (2025). This issue is before the Supreme Court in Monsanto Co. v. Durnell, No. 24-1068. 
Congress may consider these issues again, including the application of FIFRA to plant-incorporated protectants and the preemptive effect of FIFRA as applied to localities. Congress may also again consider whether FIFRA should preempt state law failure-to-warn claims.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13225/IF13225.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13225.html
IF13224,Federal Requirements for Student Consumer Information Transparency in Higher Education,2026-05-12T04:00:00Z,2026-05-14T14:52:59Z,Active,Resources,Rita R. Zota,"Postsecondary Education, Colleges & Universities, Direct Loan Program, Federal Student Aid Programs, Higher Education, Pell Grants, Student Loans","In light of rising college costs and growing student loan debt, the availability of practical information about college costs, value, and quality has garnered congressional interest. Students and their families may consult various sources to inform their decisions about pursuing postsecondary education, such as publications with college rankings, school guidance counselors, or family and friends. The federal government also plays a role in ensuring student consumer information transparency in higher education. This In Focus describes statutory requirements of the Department of Education (ED) relating to student consumer information transparency, ED’s implementation of these requirements, and some prevailing issues with and gaps in existing requirements.
Existing Higher Education Act Transparency-Related Requirements
The Higher Education Act (HEA) is the primary federal law governing postsecondary education in the United States. It includes several requirements for ED-administered data collection and reporting on institutions of higher education participating in HEA Title IV student aid programs (e.g., Federal Pell Grants and Direct Loans) (IHEs). These requirements were designed to contribute to college transparency for students and their families in making decisions about applying to and attending college. 
For example, Section 131 of HEA requires that ED establish definitions for and collect and publish data on, for each IHE, measures of tuition and fees and cost of attendance (COA) for full-time undergraduate students and the number of undergraduate students who received and their average amount of financial assistance.
Section 132(i) of HEA requires ED to annually collect and make publicly available other additional information on COA and financial assistance, such as COA for first-time, full-time undergraduates by whether they live on or off campus and information about annual grant aid awarded to undergraduate students, including by specific source of aid. Section 132(i) requires ED to collect other comprehensive information, such as 
enrollment by student characteristics (e.g., the percentages of first-time, full-time, or degree- or certificate-seeking students enrolled at an IHE, disaggregated by race and ethnic background);
graduation rates within expected time for degree completion (e.g., the percentages of first-time, full-time, or degree- or certificate-seeking undergraduate students enrolled at an IHE who obtain a degree or certificate within 100%, 150%, and 200% of the normal time for graduation from the student’s program); and
number of degree completions (e.g., the number of certificates, associate degrees, baccalaureate degrees, master’s degrees, professional degrees, and doctoral degrees awarded by the IHE).
Section 132(i) authorizes ED to collect this information through the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) and requires ED to publish it on the College Navigator website (see “Administration of HEA Requirements”). In addition, ED must make available on College Navigator 
college affordability and transparency lists, which identify IHEs that are highest and lowest in metrics such as COA or net price for each academic year (§132(c)); 
state higher education spending charts, which provide comparisons among states in changes in spending, tuition and fees, and the provision of state financial aid at public IHEs (§132(g));
a college pricing summary page for each IHE, including key cost indicators (§132(i)); and
a multiyear tuition calculator, developed by ED, to assist students and their families in estimating tuition and fees in future years (§132(j)).
Section 132(h) requires ED to develop a net price calculator that allows prospective students to enter information about themselves to obtain estimates of what they would likely pay to attend an IHE after factoring in any grants and scholarships. IHEs are required to make available a net price calculator, such as the ED-developed one, on their websites.  
Administration of HEA Requirements
ED’s National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) and its Office of Postsecondary Education (OPE) play primary roles in administering HEA requirements relating to student consumer information transparency in higher education. 
NCES annually administers the IPEDS through a series of 12 surveys. NCES uses IPEDS to collect from IHEs information required by Sections 131 and 132(i), as well as institutional data required by other statutes. In addition, Section 487 of HEA requires that an IHE enter into a program participation agreement (PPA) with ED to participate in Title IV student aid programs. A PPA is a document in which the IHE agrees to comply with the laws, regulations, and policies applicable to Title IV programs. Failure to meet any PPA requirements may result in the loss of Title IV eligibility or other sanctions. Section 487(a)(17) requires that IHEs complete the IPEDS surveys as part of their PPA. NCES also administers the College Navigator website where it publishes data collected primarily through IPEDS, including data required under Sections 131 and 132(i).
OPE, with support from NCES, administers other Section 132 requirements, such as college affordability and transparency lists and state higher education spending charts, using data sourced from IPEDS. OPE created the College Affordability and Transparency Center (CATC) website to consolidate all of the statutorily required student consumer transparency resources, as well as the ones created administratively. For example, OPE created a Net Price Calculator Center to assist student consumers with locating individual institutional net price calculators. The College Navigator website includes a link to the CATC.
Other administrative student consumer transparency tools include the College Scorecard (Scorecard), which ED launched in 2015. ED intended it to note “key indicators about the cost and value of institutions” with an eye toward making institutional comparisons a more interactive experience. Unlike other student consumer information resources, the Scorecard does not source data primarily from IPEDS, which is largely limited to statutorily required data. Using administrative datasets, ED added measures of postgraduate earnings and student loan repayment outcomes to the Scorecard to complement data sourced from IPEDS. While the Scorecard includes data by field of study as well as by institution, availability is limited to estimates that are based on large enough cell sizes to minimize disclosure of information about an individual.
On October 10, 2023, ED published the Financial Value Transparency and Gainful Employment regulations. As part of the rule, IHEs must report student-level data on costs and student aid for each student receiving Title-IV aid for an applicable program of study. Additionally, under the rule, by July 1, 2026, ED is to establish a website that makes publicly available information about IHEs and applicable programs. On April 20, 2026, ED published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to update these reporting requirements.
Current Student Consumer Information Transparency Approach Limitations
While implementation of existing HEA requirements contributes to increasing student consumer information transparency in higher education, limitations to this approach may prevent a student from obtaining complete and personalized information about college prices, outcomes, and value.
Incomplete Data Sources
The utility of existing transparency initiatives may be limited by the underlying data sources, which is primarily IPEDS. Because the institutional burden to report these data can be high, the IPEDS data collection generally hews closely to statutorily required data elements. That approach may limit ED’s ability to produce information that more precisely reflects a student and their family’s specific circumstances. For example, relatively few data elements collected in IPEDS require disaggregation by race or ethnicity or by different income bands. Many statutorily required metrics concern first-time, full-time undergraduate students, not other student types (e.g., part-time students). Required COA metrics generally reflect published prices and do not account for institutional discounting practices or price reductions for individual students. In addition, IPEDS data are reported in the aggregate at the institutional level, not at the student-level, which restricts analyses examining relationships among different student characteristics, such as part-time status and income.
These data limitations are not unique to IPEDS. Similarly, the other administrative data utilized in the Scorecard are not reflective of the entire universe of students but are limited to Title-IV aided students. This could lead to the provision of earnings estimates that are biased in a non-random way. 
Optimal Student User Experience
It is unclear to what extent existing student consumer information transparency resources are utilized by students and their families and whether such resources are viewed as helpful. One study found evidence to suggest that behavioral changes in where students applied to school may be related to the Scorecard, but there is little evidence from this study or elsewhere about actual user experience with the various resources. Some issues that may detract from a positive user experience could be (1) the extent of student and parent knowledge of these resources and how to access them; (2) whether each of the statutorily required and administrative transparency measures contribute to more informed decisionmaking among student consumers; (3) to what degree, if any, the various resources are duplicative in nature and contribute to student consumer confusion; and (4) whether the existing suite of resources could be streamlined to mitigate any such confusion.
Legislative Proposals
Various bills have been introduced in the 119th Congress to improve student consumer information transparency in higher education. The College Transparency Act (H.R. 4806 and S. 2511) would authorize ED to establish and maintain a secure, privacy-protected student-level postsecondary data system to enable the provision of complete and personalized information to students and more accurate analyses of higher education outcomes, costs, and financial aid. The Student Financial Clarity Act of 2025 (H.R. 6498) would replace most of the existing Section 132 requirements with the collection of detailed institution- and program-level measures that would be made publicly available on the Scorecard website. The Net Price Calculator Improvement Act (S. 1557) would require ED to develop a universal net price calculator that would generate personalized estimates of net prices across institutions based on a concrete set of student-user inputs.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13224/IF13224.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13224.html
R43434,"Policy and Legislative Research for Congressional Staff: Finding Documents, Analysis, News, and Training",2026-05-11T04:00:00Z,2026-05-15T13:52:58Z,Active,Reports,"Sarah K. Braun, Tilly Finnegan-Kennel, Ellen M. Lechman, Michele L. Malloy",,"This report is intended to serve as a finding aid for congressional documents, executive branch documents and information, news articles, policy analysis, contacts, and training, for use in policy and legislative research. It is not intended to be a definitive list of all resources, but rather a guide to pertinent subscriptions available in the House and Senate in addition to selected resources freely available to the public. This report is intended for use by congressional offices.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R43434/R43434.25.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R43434.html
IF13223,The Federal Role in Hazardous Wildfire Fuel Treatments,2026-05-11T04:00:00Z,2026-05-13T09:08:03Z,Active,Resources,Alicyn R. Gitlin,,"Introduction
Hazardous fuels are combustible vegetation that accumulates on the landscape, presenting a threat of starting and spreading wildfires that resist control. Hazardous fuels and their associated wildfire threats cross land management and ownership boundaries. Federal and nonfederal land managers mitigate hazardous fuels (hazardous fuel treatments) for various reasons, including altering fire behavior; protecting desired uses or resources; and promoting overall ecosystem health. Much of the debate surrounding hazardous fuels and wildfire mitigation focuses on how to protect life and property in the wildland-urban interface (WUI), where human development abuts undeveloped wildlands.
More than 50 bills introduced during the 119th Congress pertain to treating hazardous fuels. Most prominent among these is the Fix Our Forests Act (H.R. 471, S. 1462), which would affect various aspects of treatment planning, environmental compliance, contracting, implementation, litigation, research, and assistance, among other things.
Federal Role and Statutory Authorities
Hazardous fuels generally are managed by the owner of the underlying land. Five federal land management agencies (FLMAs) across two departments are responsible for the majority of hazardous fuels treatments on federal and tribal lands—the Forest Service (FS), under the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA); and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), National Park Service (NPS), Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), and Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), under the Department of the Interior (DOI). The federal government also provides assistance to nonfederal groups to address hazardous fuels on nonfederal lands. 
No federal law explicitly requires hazardous fuels mitigation from a broad perspective. Instead, various statutes implicitly authorize the FS, BLM, NPS, FWS, and BIA to mitigate hazardous fuels as part of their mandates to manage and protect the lands and resources under their jurisdictions (e.g., 16 U.S.C. §551, 43 U.S.C. §§1701 et seq., 54 U.S.C. §100101, 16 U.S.C. §668dd(a)(4)(B)).
On federal lands, hazardous fuels treatments are planned by the FLMAs, sometimes in collaboration with stakeholders such as states, tribes, wood products industries, conservation and recreation groups, researchers, or firefighters. FLMAs generally lead fuel treatment planning and environmental compliance on the lands they manage. Contractors or state partners implement the treatments.
Congress has, at times, provided specific authorities related to hazardous fuels management on federal lands. Prominent among these is the Healthy Forests Restoration Act, which pertains primarily to lands managed by BLM and the FS (HFRA, 16 U.S.C. §§6501 et seq.). HFRA contains various provisions related to planning, implementation, and administrative processes for specified land management projects on FS and BLM land, including hazardous fuel treatments. HFRA also includes provisions regarding grant programs, cross-boundary collaboration, and other items.
Fuel Types and Fire Behavior
The term hazardous fuels has no standardized or broadly applicable statutory definition. Existing statutory definitions pertain to specific areas of federal land or other specific circumstances. Statute defines certain activities on federal lands as “authorized hazardous fuel reduction project[s]” for the purpose of HFRA (16 U.S.C. §6511(2), 16 U.S.C. §6512(a)). 
Wildland firefighters classify fuel types and other fuel characteristics to predict a fire’s heat output (intensity) and rate of spread. Examples of surface fuel types include grass, shrub, and timber understory (biomass on the forest floor). Ladder fuels exist between the surface and canopy (crown), creating vertical continuity. In forests, crown characteristics such as canopy cover percentage, base height, and density determine the probability that a fire can move from the surface into the crown of an individual or small group of trees (called torching) or, in high winds, move through the crown as a wind-driven, high-intensity crown fire. A crown fire can sustain a greater rate of spread in a forest than a surface fire. A grass fire with no trees to slow the wind can spread faster than a forest fire.
A conflagration is a rapidly moving, destructive fire. Conflagrations are often spread when burning trees and twigs produce firebrands—flaming hot fuel particles carried by wind and convection currents—that cause new ignitions (spotting) ahead of the fire’s leading edge.
Within each fuel type, fuel moisture, chemistry, and density all determine flammability, with moisture being the most important factor. Dead fuels dry more quickly than live fuels. Fine fuels (called flash fuels)—especially grasses—dry out quickly, ignite easily, and spread fire rapidly. Large fuels with less surface area per volume (heavy fuels) take longer to absorb moisture, and to lose moisture, than fine fuels. Heavy fuels take longer to ignite than flash fuels, and can burn for a longer amount of time.
Types of Hazardous Fuel Treatments
Fuel treatments can inhibit wildfire ignitions, reduce heat output, and slow wildfire spread. Land managers choose mitigation approaches on the basis of various factors, such as cost, terrain, human safety, wildlife occupancy, public opinion, workforce, and local industries. Options for fuel treatments include the following:
Burning. The use of fire to mitigate hazardous fuels and reduce the chances for future extreme or uncharacteristic fire behavior is an established, widely used practice. Burning to achieve resource benefits can occur as a prescribed fire, where the ignitions are planned, or as an unplanned ignition (i.e., lightning) allowed to burn under supervision. Qualified personnel or land owners might ignite prescribed fires in predetermined locations, under predetermined conditions, to meet desired resource objectives. Prescribed burning generally is subject to various legal requirements, such as personnel qualifications, permitting, and liability considerations.
Cultural burning refers to the Indigenous practice of cultivating fire on the landscape, and was a part of life for many Native Americans for millennia. Cultural burning might be applied for wildfire mitigation or other purposes. The reasons for cultural burns will vary among cultural affiliations.
Mechanical Treatments. Mechanical treatments involve the manipulation, and may also include the removal, of hazardous fuels with tools and equipment, such as hand tools, chainsaws, and heavy machinery. Mechanical fuel treatments rearrange and resize fuels. The total amount of fuel (fuel load) is not decreased unless crews remove the cut biomass after the treatment (Figure 1). Crews can haul fuels from the site, redistribute them on the surface, burn them, or use some combination of these approaches. 
Figure 1. Fuel Loads
/
Source: CRS.
Notes: A fuel load is not decreased (left) unless the fuels are removed from the site (middle, right). Fuels can be hauled away, redistributed, burned, or a combination of approaches.
Grazing. Targeted grazing is defined by the American Sheep Industry Association as “the application of a specific kind of livestock at a determined season, duration, and intensity to accomplish defined vegetation or landscape goals.” Targeted grazing differs from normal livestock grazing because the goal is vegetation management instead of animal production. Concentrated livestock consume and trample fine fuels.
Herbicide. Herbicide application is the controlled use of chemicals to kill or suppress unwanted vegetation. Some common uses for herbicides in hazardous fuels control include reducing the presence of specific undesirable species or clearing areas to bare soil. Herbicides can be applied manually, with vehicles, and aerially. Personnel applying certain herbicides require licensing at the jurisdictional level where they make the herbicide applications. The Environmental Protection Agency ensures applicator certification programs meet minimum standards.
Strategic Treatment Configurations. Land managers can configure hazardous fuel treatments of varying intensities across a landscape for purposes such as optimizing limited budgets or facilitating wildland firefighting operations. For example, fuel breaks are strips or blocks of land where reduced fuels change wildfire behavior and provide firefighters with places to respond to wildfires. Fuel breaks are often strategically located to protect values at risk. Shaded fuel breaks are a type of fuel break that retains enough crown cover to keep the surface cool and moist, in order to resist surface fires. Firebreaks are created with the intent of stopping fire spread or to provide a control line for firefighters to work; the fuels are completely removed down to the bare soil or a road. Firebreaks may be created as a precautionary measure before a fire starts or during firefighting operations. 
An approach called Potential Operational Delineations (PODs) combines local knowledge and spatial analysis to create planning units. PODs are collaboratively developed. Fire managers and other stakeholders identify networks of features such as roads, fuel type changes, or water bodies to outline units. Land managers prioritize treatments appropriate to each of the units, which become strategic zones for fire response.
Issues for Congress
An issue facing Congress is the pace and scale at which hazardous fuels mitigation occurs. Related considerations include determining the appropriate number, size, and location of treatments; the appropriate level of environmental compliance; workforce capacity; and whether and how to assist state, tribal, and private landowners. 
A related issue is how to track fuel reduction accomplishments and choose the appropriate performance metrics to determine treatment effectiveness. The FS and DOI annually report hazardous fuels treatments as acres treated. The acres treated metric is hard to interpret because (1) multiple treatments on the same part of the landscape—which sometimes are required to maintain or measurably decrease fire hazard—may be counted multiple times, and (2) the metric does not reveal whether the treatments effectively reduce wildfire risk to pertinent resources.
The DOI is consolidating its wildland fire activities, including hazardous fuel treatments, within a new bureau, the U.S. Wildland Fire Service (WFS) (S.O. 3448). Both DOI and FS requested in their budget justifications that FY2027 appropriations for hazardous fuels go to the new WFS instead of the FS. Congress directed the Secretary of Agriculture, in consultation with the Secretary of the Interior, to contract with an independent researcher to study the impacts of the proposed consolidation on several topics, including the hazardous fuels reduction program (P.L. 119-74 and explanatory statement). ",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13223/IF13223.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13223.html
IF13222,"Fees to Administer Title I of the Toxic Substances Control Act: Authority, Implementation, and Reauthorizing Legislation",2026-05-11T04:00:00Z,2026-05-12T15:23:05Z,Active,Resources,"Jerry H. Yen, Angela C. Jones",,"In June 2016, the Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st Century Act (LCSA; P.L. 114-182) amended Title I of the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA; 15 U.S.C. 2601 et seq.) to provide the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) with more authorities to gather information regarding various industrial and commercial chemicals. EPA uses this information to evaluate risks to human health and the environment and to determine if regulation may be warranted. LCSA supplements the discretionary appropriations for TSCA implementation by authorizing the collection of fees from chemical manufacturers and processors. These fees partially cover EPA’s costs for reviewing chemicals for risks. This fee collection authority expires at the end of FY2026. This In Focus discusses the authority to collect fees under TSCA, associated rulemakings, the relationship between discretionary appropriations and fee receipts, selected issues regarding the fees, and proposed reauthorization legislation. 
Section 26(b) of the Toxic Substances Control Act, as amended
LCSA amended TSCA Section 26(b) (15 U.S.C. 2625(b)) to authorize the collection of fees from chemical manufacturers and processors to partially cover certain EPA costs of implementing the TSCA amendments. EPA may collect fees in a given fiscal year if appropriations for the Chemical Risk Review and Reduction (CRRR) program project match or exceed what was appropriated in FY2014 to the program project. In EPA’s FY2015 budget justification, the agency reported allocating $58.6 million in FY2014 to the CRRR program project. This allocation was part of the $93.8 million appropriated for the Toxics Risk Review and Prevention program within the agency’s Environmental Programs and Management (EPM) account. Since FY2017, annual appropriations have included a provision that directs EPA to allocate to the CRRR program project an amount not less than the amount EPA allocated for the program project for FY2014.  
Fee collections are initially limited to 25% of EPA’s annual costs of administering certain TSCA activities and are not to exceed $25.0 million per year. After 2019 and every three years thereafter, EPA may adjust fees to ensure that collected fees are sufficient to cover 25% of such annual costs. Upon calculating the total amount of fees that EPA may assess, Section 26(b) authorizes EPA to promulgate a rule to set fee amounts associated with certain submissions or activities under TSCA. Specifically, Section 26(b) authorizes EPA to set fees for the submission of testing information under Section 4, the submission of new chemicals and significant new uses of chemicals under Section 5, the request to protect certain submitted information as confidential business information under Section 14, and risk evaluations of existing chemicals under Section 6. Additionally, Section 26(b) directs EPA, after consultation with the Small Business Administration, to promulgate a rule to prescribe standards for determining whether entities may qualify as a small business concern for purposes of reduced fee payments. 
Section 26(b) requires the deposit of collected fees into the TSCA Service Fee Fund in the U.S. Treasury. Section 26(b) also provides that the TSCA Service Fee Fund be subject to accounting and auditing requirements. 
Fee Rulemakings
In October 2018, EPA finalized a rule to collect fees from those entities required to submit information and those that manufacture chemicals subject to an agency risk evaluation under the amended TSCA. Based on an EPA estimate of $80.2 million per year to carry out Sections 4, 5, 6, and 14, the rule established different fee amounts depending on the type of information being submitted to EPA or whether the risk evaluation was EPA-initiated or manufacturer-requested. For example, the fee for submitting a notice for a new chemical was set at $16,000 unless the submitter qualified as a small business concern. The fee for an EPA-initiated risk evaluation of an existing chemical was set at a total of $1.35 million combined for all entities subject to the fee unless the entity qualified as a small business concern. The rule established fee amounts only for FY2019, FY2020, and FY2021, and provided for adjustments to the fees for inflation and other factors once every three years (i.e., after FY2021). When the 2018 rule was promulgated, EPA expected to collect $20.0 million per fiscal year in TSCA fees under the rule. 
In February 2024, EPA finalized a rule to adjust the collection of TSCA fees and make certain other changes. To inform its adjustment of TSCA fees, EPA reevaluated the total annual costs to carry out Sections 4, 5, 6, and 14 as $146.8 million (an 83% increase from the 2018 estimate). Based on this estimate, EPA adjusted the fees. For example, EPA increased the fee for the submission of a notice for a new chemical to $37,000 unless the submitter qualified as a small business concern. The fee for an EPA-initiated risk evaluation of an existing chemical was increased to a total of $4.29 million combined for all entities subject to the fee unless the entity qualified as a small business concern. With the increase in various fees, EPA estimated (in its 2024 rule) that the agency would collect $36.7 million per year in TSCA fees under the rule.  
Discretionary Appropriations and Fee Receipts
Within the past 10 fiscal years, EPA allocations to the CRRR program project have increased. Earlier in this period, between FY2016 and FY2022, EPA reported allocating an average of $59.7 million per fiscal year to this program project. For FY2023 and FY2024, EPA reported allocating $82.8 million per fiscal year to this program project. In its FY2026 budget justification, EPA stated that the agency allocated $96.4 million to the program project in FY2025. Since FY2017, annual appropriations have included a provision that provided funding to the TSCA Service Fee Fund at the beginning of the fiscal year to be offset by fee receipts later in that fiscal year. Funding provided in advance of fee receipts has ranged between $3.0 million and $10.0 million.
From FY2019 through FY2024, EPA annually collected between $2.7 million and $5.5 million in TSCA fees, except for FY2021, when EPA collected $28.6 million due to the initiation of risk evaluations for existing chemicals under Section 6. In its FY2026 budget justification, EPA estimates TSCA fee receipts for FY2025 and FY2026 to be $4.8 million and $26.2 million, respectively. The expected increase in fee receipts is due to the initiation of the next round of risk evaluations for existing chemicals under Section 6. 
Selected Issues
The expiration of TSCA fees at the end of FY2026 provides Congress an opportunity to review EPA’s implementation of the TSCA amendments and decide how or whether to reauthorize fees. Additionally, Congress may oversee the accuracy with which EPA estimates fee receipts and the extent to which EPA reviews are timely with its current funding.    
Fees Reauthorization
Since 2018, TSCA fees have been intended to supplement discretionary appropriations to cover certain agency costs of implementing TSCA. If Congress were to allow the authority to collect TSCA fees to lapse, funding to carry out TSCA would solely rely on discretionary appropriations, as was the case prior to 2018. If Congress were to reauthorize TSCA fees, policymakers would encounter several decisions. For example, Congress could maintain the same split between fees and discretionary appropriations for covering costs. Alternatively, Congress could change this split to require chemical manufacturers and others to contribute more or less in fees. 
Chemical manufacturers have noted that higher levels of user fees may discourage chemical innovation by raising the cost of commercializing chemicals. Generally, chemical manufacturers seek to commercialize new chemicals with more desirable properties and characteristics (e.g., reduced toxicity) that may replace less desirable existing chemicals. EPA acknowledges that higher fees generally correlate with fewer new chemical notifications.
Congress also may consider the distribution of fees across the regulated community, particularly the extent to which fees are discounted for small business concerns. In setting fees, EPA has determined that small business concerns generally are entitled to an 80% discount on fees. Congress may clarify the standards for EPA to determine whether an entity may qualify as a small business concern or explicitly specify the extent to which EPA must discount fees for small business concerns. Congress may also consider enacting a fee schedule to explicitly set fees for the type of information being submitted to EPA or whether the risk evaluation for a chemical was EPA-initiated or manufacturer-requested.  
Timeliness of EPA Decisions with Fees
The timeliness of EPA decisions (e.g., risk evaluations) under TSCA has been a long-standing issue. The extent to which EPA decisions may be expedited with additional resources depends in part on the complexity of decisions that the agency is expected to make. For example, review of chemicals associated with relatively limited exposure scenarios or low toxicity may be more straightforward and take less time than review of chemicals associated with many complex exposure scenarios or relatively greater toxicity. Additional funding may not necessarily expedite reviews, especially those that are more complex. 
Prior to 2016, EPA’s statutory responsibilities for the review of new chemicals under TSCA were different. EPA had discretion in reviewing new chemicals for unreasonable risk under Section 5. In practice, EPA screened new chemicals to focus on reviewing those that were more likely to present unreasonable risk than others. LCSA amended TSCA to require EPA to review every new chemical for unreasonable risk. EPA asserts that this amendment significantly increased its workload. As the 90-day time frame for review was retained, EPA has reported delays in new chemicals review. 
Reauthorizing Legislation
The House Committee on Energy and Commerce discussion draft, dated January 14, 2026, would reauthorize TSCA fees for another 10 years upon enactment. Additionally, the House discussion draft would direct EPA to submit more detailed accounting information on the TSCA Service Fee Fund—such as the amount of funding for each category of activity in which fees receipts were used and the number of actions EPA took per category of activity—to the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works and the House Committee on Energy and Commerce. Also, the House discussion draft would require EPA’s annual audit of the TSCA Service Fee Fund to include an analysis of the number of rules, orders, and consent agreements issued under Section 4, and the number of notices received, reviewed, and pending under Section 5. The Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works discussion draft, dated February 26, 2026, would reauthorize TSCA fees until the end of the fiscal year that is 20 years after the enactment of LCSA (i.e., September 30, 2036). ",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13222/IF13222.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13222.html
R48940,Current Foreign-Born Population by State and Congressional District,2026-05-08T04:00:00Z,2026-05-09T05:56:23Z,Active,Reports,"Tilly Finnegan-Kennel, Ben Leubsdorf","Census, Temporary Immigration, Unauthorized Foreign Nationals, Permanent Immigration","The United States in 2024 was home to an estimated 50.2 million foreign-born individuals, who lived in every state and congressional district. This report provides a snapshot of recent U.S. Census Bureau estimates for the foreign-born population (i.e., people now living in the United States who were not U.S. citizens at birth) in each state, as well as estimates for the foreign-born population in each congressional district. It also discusses alternative and additional sources of data on the foreign-born population. ",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48940/R48940.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48940.html
IF13221,Community Development Block Grants for Disaster Recovery: A Primer,2026-05-08T04:00:00Z,2026-05-09T05:56:25Z,Active,Resources,Joseph V. Jaroscak,,"In response to some disasters, Congress has provided supplemental funding for long-term disaster recovery and other related purposes under the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program’s statutory authority (42 U.S.C. §§5301 et seq.). Administered by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), this assistance is commonly referred to as CDBG-DR funding. 
Since FY1993, Congress has appropriated, and HUD has allocated, more than $111 billion in CDBG-DR funds. Roughly $65 billion of this total has been provided since FY2016. During this period, Congress also began to provide dedicated supplemental CDBG appropriations for certain mitigation activities, which are included in the totals.
Overview
CDBG-DR funding is intended to support needs unmet by other forms of federal disaster assistance, including Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) grants and Small Business Administration loans. Typically, Congress directs HUD to allocate CDBG-DR funds for use in the “most impacted and distressed areas” in jurisdictions with major disaster declarations under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. §§5121 et seq.; Stafford Act)—see for example P.L. 118-158.
CDBG-DR is not a program with its own standing authorization or regulations. Instead, CDBG-DR funds, generally, are subject to the conventional CDBG program’s statutory authority and regulatory requirements. The text of CDBG-DR supplemental appropriations typically include specific statutory directives and authorize HUD to establish waivers and alternative requirements as circumstances may require, which can make each instance of CDBG-DR appropriations unique. 
Grants Management Process
Although directives in appropriations acts and aspects of HUD’s grant administration may vary, the CDBG-DR funding and disbursement cycle typically follows a common series of general steps governed by congressional requirements and overarching HUD regulations. The basic steps in the CDBG-DR funding and disbursement process are listed below:
Congress provides funding through a supplemental appropriations act, which defines eligibility and may include specific guidelines for the use of funds;
HUD sets allocation amounts and establishes rules for the use of funds provided in the corresponding CDBG-DR supplemental appropriations act;
Eligible grantees (i.e., states, localities, U.S. Territories, or federally recognized tribes) draft CDBG-DR action plans and certifications, engage in public participation, and submit the documents to HUD;
HUD reviews and approves action plans and certifications, negotiates grant agreements, and obligates funds;
Grantees implement action plans and expend CDBG-DR funds; and
HUD monitors grantee program activities and expenditures.

Eligible Activities and Requirements
Broadly, eligible uses in the conventional CDBG program’s statute and regulations (42 U.S.C. §5305 and 24 C.F.R. §570.201) establish the baseline of eligible CDBG-DR activities. Provisions in supplemental appropriations acts or HUD rulemaking could modify eligible activities and associated requirements.
Typically, grantees need to demonstrate that a proposed CDBG-DR activity has a direct “tie-back” or connection to the disaster for which funds were provided. Additionally, CDBG-DR activities must meet one of the conventional CDBG program’s three national objectives:
to principally benefit low- and moderate-income (LMI) persons;
to aid in the prevention or elimination of slums or blight; or
to provide an urgent need for the purposes of health or safety.
In general, grantees are required to utilize 70% of their funds for activities that principally benefit LMI populations. In some cases, HUD has relaxed the LMI requirement to 50%, typically pursuant to authority provided by Congress in a supplemental appropriations act. For the purposes of CDBG-DR, LMI is defined as at or below 80% of the area median income.
Oversight Findings 
The ad hoc nature of the CDBG-DR process, some argue, has allowed Congress and HUD to adapt grant requirements to the specific needs of affected communities. Some analysis indicates that it may have also contributed to coordination and planning challenges. 
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has reported instances of protracted CDBG-DR rulemaking periods, inconsistent administrative time frames, and funding delays. Some grantees have also expressed concern to GAO regarding the administrative burden of simultaneously managing multiple CDBG-DR grants with differing sets of requirements. Additionally, GAO has highlighted ongoing fraud risk associated with CDBG-DR funds.
Some HUD Office of Inspector General (HUD-OIG) audits have identified potential deficiencies in HUD’s grantee guidance, monitoring processes, and grantee data collection, which may pose risks related to improper payments and challenges with preventing or identifying waste, fraud, and abuse. 
HUD Administrative Reforms
HUD has instituted some measures to standardize CDBG-DR processes within the current framework. For example, on January 8, 2025, HUD published a “Universal Notice” in the Federal Register to standardize and clarify the CDBG-DR rulemaking process. According to HUD, the Universal Notice is a uniform rulemaking document designed to accompany an Allocation Announcement Notice (AAN) when Congress provides supplemental appropriations and rulemaking authority for CDBG-DR. The Universal Notice outlines waivers and alternative requirements for three key phases of the grants management process, carried out by CDBG-DR grantees: 
Action Plan development;
financial certification and oversight of funds; and
implementation.
HUD’s stated intent in establishing a Universal Notice is to “provide grantees and the public with increased transparency, consistency, and more timely access to CDBG–DR funds, helping to minimize program delays and accelerate recovery.”
The first AAN subject to the Universal Notice requirements was published on January 16, 2025, and provided allocations for disasters occurring in 2023 and 2024 pursuant to P.L. 118-158. HUD amended the Universal Notice on March 19 and March 31, 2025. According to HUD, the amendments were intended to conform with several executive orders and a presidential memorandum issued between January 20 and February 19, 2025, on subjects pertaining to cost of living and diversity, equity, and inclusion practices. HUD also announced a 60-day extension for CDBG-DR grantees that were subject to the initial Universal Notice requirements.
Prior to establishment of the Universal Notice, HUD took initial steps to standardize CDBG-DR processes by including a “consolidated notice” as an appendix of allocation announcements in the Federal Register. HUD adopted this practice for disasters occurring in 2020, 2021, and 2022, as well as selected 2023 disasters. The consolidated notice—and its accompanying guidance—outlined uniform CDBG-DR processes and requirements for grantees covered by these allocations and rulemaking. 
Recent Proposed Legislation
GAO has recommended congressional action on authorization of a federal unmet needs disaster recovery program. HUD’s Congressional Budget Justifications (CBJs) for FY2023-FY2025 expressed support for congressional authorization of CDBG-DR. HUD’s FY2026 and FY2027 CBJs did not include such language. 
In the 119th Congress, some Members of Congress have proposed legislation that would authorize CDBG-DR within HUD or establish a similar new program to provide for unmet disaster recovery needs in another agency.
Reforming Disaster Recovery Act
A version of a Reforming Disaster Recovery Act has been included in two housing-related legislative packages that were agreed to in the Senate during the 119th Congress (S.Amdt. 4308 and S. 2296 Division I, Title LV, Section 5505). The bill would formalize HUD’s role in disaster response and recovery. Specifically, it would authorize CDBG-DR as a standing program, establish a dedicated fund for the program within the Treasury, and create the Office of Disaster Management and Resiliency within HUD’S Office of the Secretary to oversee and coordinate the agency’s disaster preparedness and response functions. 
Natural Disaster Recovery Program Act
A Natural Disaster Recovery Program Act of 2025 (H.R. 316) would establish a dedicated fund in the Treasury and authorize FEMA to provide assistance for unmet disaster recovery needs of states and tribal governments, among other provisions. 
Considerations for Congress
Past congressional hearings on CDBG-DR have addressed HUD’s role in the disaster recovery process. Topics have included the efficacy of CDBG-DR assistance and considerations pertaining to potential authorization.
Permanently authorizing CDBG-DR would designate HUD as a principal disaster management agency, with a more direct and official role in disaster management. Although HUD does currently have disaster management responsibilities, including its administration of CDBG-DR, permanent authorization could formally broaden HUD’s scope in this policy area. This could require further consideration on HUD’s staffing and technical capacity to carry out potentially expanded and formalized functions pertaining to disaster mitigation, response, and recovery.
If Congress authorizes CDBG-DR or another form of unmet needs assistance into a standing disaster recovery and mitigation program, it would face consideration of what the best agency is to administer it. HUD or another economic development-focused agency may be a potential choice, depending on the priorities of the authorization legislation, or an agency with more regular disaster management responsibilities.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13221/IF13221.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13221.html
IF13220,Congressional Nominations to U.S. Service Academies: Member Office Management Considerations,2026-05-08T04:00:00Z,2026-05-09T05:56:22Z,Active,Resources,"Sarah J. Eckman, R. Eric Petersen",,"Members of Congress are authorized by law to nominate candidates for appointment to four U.S. service academies: the U.S. Military Academy (USMA); U.S. Naval Academy (USNA); U.S. Air Force Academy (USAFA); and U.S. Merchant Marine Academy (USMMA). A fifth service academy, the U.S. Coast Guard Academy (USCGA), does not require a congressional nomination for appointment. These institutions provide college-age Americans with a tuition-free, four-year undergraduate education and prepare them to be officers of some of the U.S. uniformed services. Upon graduation, service academy graduates are commissioned as officers in the active or reserve components of the military or the merchant marine for a minimum of five years.
This In Focus provides some management considerations for addressing service academy nominations, a timeline for congressional nomination actions (Figure 1), and statutory and regulatory requirements for allocating congressional nominations to service academies. Additional information is available in CRS Report RL33213, Congressional Nominations to U.S. Service Academies: An Overview and Resources for Outreach and Management, CRS In Focus IF13219, Congressional Nominations to U.S. Service Academies: Candidate Qualifications and Noncongressional Nominating Authorities, and CRS Infographic IG10096, U.S. Service Academy Nominations: Timelines. 
Congressional Considerations
The nomination of constituents to one of the service academies can provide Members of Congress with the opportunity to perform community outreach and other representational activities. In some states and congressional districts, nominations are highly competitive. Others are less competitive, and some offices do not receive expressions of interest from enough applicants to fill the number of nominations allocated. As a result, some congressional offices may need to dedicate considerable staff resources to the selection process to identify qualified candidates, while others can incorporate service academy nominations alongside other constituent service activities.
The nomination authorities, number of appointments, and criteria establishing the qualifications of potential service academy appointees are set in statute, federal regulations, and policies established by each academy. Each congressional office with nominating authority can develop its own process for managing its service academy nominations and selecting nominees.
Some congressional offices have adapted and modified approaches like those used by USMA, USNA, USAFA, and USMMA to make their nomination decisions. These might include evaluation of several broad components of a potential nominee’s qualifications for appointment, such as character, scholarship, leadership, physical aptitude, and motivation. Other congressional offices reach decisions through the consideration of a candidate’s academic preparation, extracurricular participation, and community service, and the recommendations of those familiar with their activities in those areas. To make these assessments, congressional offices often require prospective nominees to apply, which can be a combination of self-reported qualifications and additional documentary materials.
Figure 1. Academy Nominations Timeline for Member Offices
/
Source: CRS compilation based on information from the service academies’ websites and congressional guides. Graphic created by Brion Long, Visual Information Specialist.
Notes: Timeline provides generalized information representing when events and activities most frequently occur.
In addition to establishing criteria for nomination decisions, each congressional Member office may determine how to administer the nomination decisionmaking process. Some offices handle nominations internally, assigning the task of managing applicant files and developing nomination recommendations to a staff member. Other offices assign staff to oversee nomination-related activities but delegate the screening and development of nomination recommendations to a volunteer panel. A nominations review panel could include educators, service academy alumni, representatives of veterans’ groups, and other community leaders from a Member’s state or district. The use of volunteers in congressional offices is governed by regulations issued by the Select Committee on Ethics in the Senate and by the Committees on House Administration and Ethics in the House.
The service academies offer guidance and support for congressional Member offices regarding the nomination and appointment process. Coordination with the service academies may help Members of Congress assist constituents throughout the appointment process. The service academies, for example, may be able to help identify prospective nominees or academy alumni, and clarify institutional policies. The service academies may encourage congressional Member offices to host Academy Days in their districts, which are informational sessions for prospective nominees, similar to college admissions fairs.
Appointment Criteria
Appointment and nomination criteria for the service academies are established by statute, regulations issued by the appropriate executive branch authority, and policies set by each academy. Three service academies—USMA, USNA, and USAFA—are housed in the military branches of the Department of Defense (DOD). (Pursuant to Executive Order 14347 dated September 5, 2025, DOD is also “using a secondary Department of War designation.”) USMMA is governed by regulations issued by the Department of Transportation.
Department of Defense Academies
Three service academies—USMA, USNA, and USAFA—are overseen by three military branches of the DOD. Allocations for nominations by Members of Congress of prospective appointees to these academies are established by statute and are substantially similar for each academy. The number of positions, or charges, subject to congressional nomination at each DOD academy includes
10 from each state, 5 of whom are nominated by each Senator from that state;
5 from each congressional district, nominated by the Representative from the district;
5 from the District of Columbia, nominated by the Delegate from the District of Columbia;
4 from the U.S. Virgin Islands, nominated by the Delegate from the U.S. Virgin Islands;
6 from Puerto Rico, 5 of whom are nominated by the Resident Commissioner from Puerto Rico, and 1 who is a native of Puerto Rico nominated by the Governor of Puerto Rico;
5 from Guam, nominated by the Delegate from Guam;
3 from American Samoa, nominated by the Delegate from American Samoa; and 
3 from the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, nominated by the Delegate from the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands.
When a congressionally nominated academy position is vacant, a Member of Congress may nominate up to 15 people for possible appointment. As DOD service academy cadets or midshipmen who received a congressional nomination graduate, or as their appointments are otherwise terminated, a nominating Member office can make new nominations to fill any vacated positions in the next regular admissions period. Typically, one appointment per DOD academy per Senator and Representative is available annually. In some years, however, a congressional office might have the opportunity to make nominations to fill multiple vacancies at an academy. The service academies can provide congressional offices with information about the number of appointments available for Members to nominate. 
Nominees to DOD service academies may be submitted by Members of Congress in three categories: without ranking, with a principal candidate and nine ranked alternates, or with a principal candidate and nine unranked alternates. When the Member specifies a principal candidate, that individual is to be appointed to a DOD academy if he or she meets all other admission criteria. If the principal candidate is disqualified, the service academy is to appoint the first fully qualified, ranked alternate, if specified by the Member. In circumstances where Members do not specify a principal candidate or ranked alternates, one individual from among the Member’s nominees who is found to be fully qualified is to be appointed by the academies to serve as a cadet or midshipman.
Congressional nominees who are not initially offered appointments and are designated by the academies as qualified alternates may receive an appointment via a noncongressional authority. Nominees who are not initially offered academy appointments may be offered admission to an academy preparatory program. These are one-year programs, hosted at other military schools. Students who complete the preparatory program can reapply to the academy and seek renomination during the appropriate admissions cycle. Noncongressional appointees from a Member’s state or district are not counted as part of the Member’s statutory allotment of appointees, nor are students appointed to an academy prep school.
United States Merchant Marine Academy
Members of Congress nominate individuals for appointment to USMMA. The number of seats in an entering class at this service academy is allocated by regulation issued by the Secretary of Transportation (46 C.F.R. 310.53), who is also the appointment authority for the academy. Under the regulation, each Member of Congress may nominate 10 candidates per vacancy to compete for admission to the academy. Members of the House of Representatives may nominate candidates from anywhere within their state. The regulation allocates four vacancies to nominees from the District of Columbia and one vacancy each to nominees from Puerto Rico, Guam, Northern Mariana Islands, U.S. Virgin Islands, and American Samoa. The regulation states that nominating officials may select individuals for nomination by any method they wish, including a screening examination.
United States Coast Guard Academy
Procedures for appointments to USCGA are established by regulations issued by the Secretary of Homeland Security. Additional qualifications may be set by the superintendent of USCGA, who is responsible for appointments to the academy. No congressional nomination is required for admission to this service academy.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13220/IF13220.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13220.html
IF13219,Congressional Nominations to U.S. Service Academies: Candidate Qualifications and Noncongressional Nominating Authorities,2026-05-08T04:00:00Z,2026-05-09T05:56:24Z,Active,Resources,"Sarah J. Eckman, R. Eric Petersen",,"Members of Congress are authorized by law to nominate candidates for appointment to four U.S. service academies. These schools are the U.S. Military Academy (USMA); U.S. Naval Academy (USNA); U.S. Air Force Academy (USAFA); and U.S. Merchant Marine Academy (USMMA). A fifth service academy, the U.S. Coast Guard Academy (USCGA), does not require a congressional nomination for appointment. 
Although it is an essential component of the appointment process, a congressional nomination does not guarantee an individual’s admission or appointment to a service academy. Each academy requires the submission of a preliminary application to initiate the admissions process. In addition to requesting a nomination from a Member of Congress or another nominating official, an individual seeking appointment to a service academy must separately apply to the service academies to which he or she seeks to be appointed. Even when a candidate meets all these requirements and is deemed to be qualified for admission, he or she may not receive an official appointment, due to the limited number of spaces available at each service academy.
This In Focus provides applicant qualification information for USMA, USNA, USAFA, USMMA, and USCGA; a timeline of actions for prospective nominees (Figure 1); and discussion of noncongressional appointment authorities to some service academies. It can be used to inform congressional staff of basic candidate qualifications or be provided to constituents who aspire to enroll in a service academy and seek a congressional nomination. Additional information for congressional offices is available in CRS In Focus IF13220, Congressional Nominations to U.S. Service Academies: Member Office Management Considerations, CRS Report RL33213, Congressional Nominations to U.S. Service Academies: An Overview and Resources for Outreach and Management, and CRS Infographic IG10096, U.S. Service Academy Nominations: Timelines.
Acceptance and successful completion of a service academy appointment requires at least a nine-year obligation, including four years of tuition-free preparation at an academy and five years of active duty service as an officer in the regular or reserve components of the military or the merchant marine.
Applicant Qualifications
To qualify for an appointment to any service academy, an applicant must meet the following criteria:
U.S. citizen or national; at least 17 years of age and not yet 23 years of age on July 1 of the year the applicant would enter an academy (25 years of age for USMMA);
unmarried;
not pregnant, and without legal obligation to support children or other dependents;
demonstrate comprehensive academic preparation; demonstrate leadership in athletics and other extracurricular activities;
take the SAT or ACT (or CLT for applicants to USMA, USNA, or USAFA);
pass a comprehensive medical examination administered by the Department of Defense Medical Examination Review Board; and
pass the Candidate Fitness Assessment for academies to which the applicant is applying: USMA, USNA, USAFA, USMMA, USCGA.
Beyond what is required in federal law and regulation, each academy can further specify academic, physical, and leadership requirements for admission. The extent and nature of eligibility and recommended preparation varies by academy. Links to each academy’s expectations are provided in Table 1.
Figure 1. Timeline for Potential Applicants to Service Academies
/
Source: CRS compilation based on information from the service academies’ websites and congressional guides. Graphic created by Brion Long, Visual Information Specialist.
Notes: Timeline provides generalized information representing when events and activities most frequently occur. ** All four academies accept SAT and ACT results. USMA, USNA, and USAFA accept CLT results.
Table 1. Service Academy Applicant Preparation Links
USMA
https://www.westpoint.edu/admissions/steps-to-admission

USNA
https://www.usna.edu/Admissions/Apply/FAQ.php

USAFA
https://www.academyadmissions.com/requirements/academic/

USMMA
https://www.usmma.edu/node/8266

USCGA
https://uscga.edu/admissions/admission-requirements/

Source: Service academies.
Noncongressional Nominating Officials
Although congressional offices provide most of the nominations each year, a smaller number of nominations to the Department of Defense (DOD) service academies—USMA, USNA, and USAFA—are made by executive branch officials. (Pursuant to Executive Order 14347 dated September 5, 2025, DOD is also “using a secondary Department of War designation.”) All qualified nominees not selected for appointment through the congressional nomination process are considered qualified alternates for the purposes of selection by the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force and the academy superintendents to their respective academies. Applicants requesting congressional nominations are also eligible for nominations from the Vice President. Vice presidential nominations are made for the nation at large, and applicants may apply for those through the White House with supporting materials submitted through each DOD service academy. Other nomination and appointment sources are only available to those with a military service-connection. The governor of Puerto Rico may also nominate a candidate who is a native of Puerto Rico to each academy. The distribution of nominations by noncongressional authorities is listed in Table 2.
Table 2. Distribution of Noncongressional Nominations to Department of Defense Service Academies, by Authority
Nominating Authority
Number and Type

President
100 children of living or deceased members of the Armed Forces with eight years of service.
The President is also authorized to appoint an unlimited number of children whose parents have been awarded the Medal of Honor.

Vice President
Five, at large.

Service Secretary
85 enlisted members each of the regular and reserve services of the Secretary’s branch.
20 honor graduates of designated honor schools in any military branch, and from members of the Secretary’s service Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC).
150 qualified alternates who received congressional nominations but were not appointed, in order of merit.

Service Academy Superintendent
50, at large.
65 children of deceased, 100% disabled, or missing/captured Armed Forces veterans or missing/captured federal civilian personnel. 

Governor, Puerto Rico
One, who must be a native of Puerto Rico.

Source: 10 U.S.C. 7442, USMA; 10 U.S.C. 8454, USNA; and 10 U.S.C. 9442, USAFA.
At the conclusion of the nomination and academy admissions processes, in his capacity as commander in chief of the military, the President is the appointing authority for all DOD service academy admissions.
USMMA nominations are governed by regulations issued by the Department of Transportation. USCGA does not require a congressional nomination for appointment.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13219/IF13219.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13219.html
R48939,"National Security, Department of State, and Related Programs Appropriations: A Guide to Component Accounts",2026-05-07T04:00:00Z,2026-05-09T05:54:53Z,Active,Reports,"Carlos Acevedo, Emily M. McCabe, Cory R. Gill","Foreign Affairs, Foreign Affairs Budget & Appropriations","National Security, Department of State, and Related Programs (NSRP) appropriations legislation funds many U.S. nondefense international affairs activities. Between FY2008 and FY2025, the bill was titled Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS) appropriations. Within NSRP appropriations, the Department of State and Related Programs (Title I) portion makes up about one-third of the funding, and the various foreign assistance accounts compose the remainder. For FY2026, NSRP is one of 12 appropriations acts that fund the federal government. 
Congress appropriated NSRP funds for FY2026 in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2026 (Division F of P.L. 119-75). Division F of the act is divided into seven titles. Each title funds a variety of government activities, ranging from government agencies’ operational and administrative costs to direct grant funds for private nonprofit or multilateral organizations. By title, NSRP provisions set out activities as follows:
Title I—Department of State and Related Programs funds State Department diplomatic programs and general operations, including Foreign and Civil Service personnel salaries and training, public diplomacy and cultural exchange programs, information technology maintenance and modernization, dues to the United Nations (UN) and other international organizations, international broadcasting, and embassy construction and diplomatic security. It also provides funding to U.S. diplomacy-focused nongovernmental organizations and legislative commissions.
Title II—Administration of Assistance funds general operations and oversight of foreign assistance but not foreign assistance programs.
Title III—Bilateral Economic Assistance is the primary funding source for the U.S. government’s humanitarian and international development programs. It includes bilateral assistance for disaster relief, global health, and economic development activities, as well as funding for several independent development-oriented agencies, notably the Millennium Challenge Corporation and Peace Corps.
Title IV—International Security Assistance is the primary title for U.S. security cooperation programs abroad outside of the Defense appropriations bill. It includes counternarcotics and rule-of-law strengthening programs; nonproliferation, anti-terrorism, and demining programs; some assistance to foreign militaries; and some funding for international peacekeeping efforts.
Title V—Multilateral Assistance contributes funds to several multilateral finance and grant-making institutions.
Title VI—Export and Investment Assistance funds the three U.S. government export promotion agencies: the Export-Import Bank, the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), and the Trade and Development Agency.
Title VII—General Provisions guides the allocation of funds appropriated in other titles and lays out restrictions and priorities for programming.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48939/R48939.3.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48939.html
R48937,"Congressional Votes on Surface Transportation Authorizations, 1978-2021",2026-05-07T04:00:00Z,2026-05-09T05:53:59Z,Active,Reports,Lena A. Maman,Transportation Funding,"Prior to 1978, Congress enacted separate highway and public transportation authorization acts. Congress began passing multiyear surface transportation authorization acts in 1978. These acts were often extended prior to the passage of subsequent multiyear acts. This report compiles congressional votes on enacted multiyear legislation related to surface transportation authorizations as well as information regarding the extensions of these acts. CRS obtained the information presented in this report from Congress.gov, the Congressional Quarterly Almanac, and the Federal Highway Administration.
The current surface transportation authorization, which is Division A of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (P.L. 117-58), expires on September 30, 2026.


",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48937/R48937.4.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48937.html
LSB11430,Congressional Court Watcher: Circuit Splits from April 2026,2026-05-07T04:00:00Z,2026-05-09T05:54:56Z,Active,Posts,"Michael John Garcia, Alexander H. Pepper",Jurisprudence,"The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the thirteen “circuits” issue thousands of precedential decisions each year. Because relatively few of these decisions are ultimately reviewed by the Supreme Court, the U.S. Courts of Appeals are often the last word on consequential legal questions. The federal appellate courts sometimes reach different conclusions on the same issue of federal law, causing a “split” among the circuits that leads to the nonuniform application of federal law among similarly situated litigants.
This Legal Sidebar discusses circuit splits that emerged or widened following decisions from April 2026 on matters relevant to Congress. The Sidebar does not address every circuit split that developed or widened during this period. Selected cases typically involve judicial disagreement over the interpretation or validity of federal statutes and regulations, or constitutional issues relevant to Congress’s lawmaking and oversight functions. The Sidebar includes only cases where an appellate court’s controlling opinion recognizes a split among the circuits on a key legal issue resolved in the opinion. This Sidebar refers to each U.S. Court of Appeals by its number or descriptor (e.g., “D.C. Circuit” for “U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit”).
Some cases identified in this Sidebar, or the legal questions they address, are examined in other CRS general distribution products. Members of Congress and congressional staff may click here to subscribe to the CRS Legal Update and receive regular notifications of new products and upcoming seminars by CRS attorneys.
Bankruptcy: The Fourth Circuit held that a Chapter 13 plan’s technical compliance with the “means test” calculation of disposable income under 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) did not immunize the plan from the requirement in Section 1325(a) that the plan be proposed “in good faith,” as the two are separate, independent requirements. Chapter 13 debtors generally must devote their disposable income to paying unsecured creditors. Prior to 2005, bankruptcy courts evaluated the calculation of disposable income on a case-by-case basis, including whether claimed expenses were reasonably necessary. The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA) created the “means test,” providing a statutory formula for calculating the reasonably necessary expenses and disposable income of debtors with above-median income. Under Section 1325(b)(3) and Section 707(b)(2)(A)(iii), such debtors may deduct certain payments on secured debts from their disposable income. The debtor in this case owned three luxury vehicles subject to secured loans. He proposed a Chapter 13 plan in compliance with the “means test” that would have paid off the secured loans on the vehicles but paid only 7.7% of his unsecured debts. The bankruptcy court, affirmed by the district court, determined that the plan did not meet the good faith requirement of Section 1325(a). The Fourth Circuit affirmed the lower courts’ ruling, rejecting the debtor’s argument that, after BAPCPA, the good faith inquiry cannot consider expenses claimed under the “means test.” The Fourth Circuit acknowledged that its approach differed from that of the Ninth Circuit, which has held that the good faith analysis cannot consider a debtor’s retention of “luxury” items in compliance with the “means test” (Goddard v. Burnett).
Civil Procedure: A divided Second Circuit panel affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought in federal court under state law against a federally chartered corporation, concluding that federal courts lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the case. By statute, federal courts have “diversity jurisdiction” to hear certain civil suits arising under state law that exceed a certain monetary value when there is “diversity” of citizenship among the parties—for example, the parties are citizens of different states. In 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1), Congress provided that a corporation generally “shall be deemed to be a citizen of every State and foreign state by which it has been incorporated and of the State or foreign state where it has its principal place of business . . . ” (italics added). The panel majority disagreed with the Fourth Circuit, which has read the connecting “and” in Section 1332(c) to mean that either condition is sufficient for diversity jurisdiction analysis, so that a federally chartered corporation would be treated as a citizen of the state of its principal place of business for purposes of evaluating whether diversity existed. By contrast, considering the text and legislative history of Section 1332(c)(1), the Second Circuit panel majority instead concluded that the “and” connecting the two clauses serves to limit the provision’s application only to those corporations that have both a state of incorporation and a state that serves as its principal place of business. Because federally chartered corporations are not incorporated by a U.S. or foreign state, the majority concluded that Section 1332(c) did not provide a mechanism for federal courts to exercise diversity jurisdiction over them (Schneiderman v. Am. Chem. Soc’y). 
Civil Procedure: The Ninth Circuit held that postjudgment interest on an award of attorneys’ fees began to accrue when a district court entered a judgment awarding fees, not when the district court earlier approved a settlement that created a legal entitlement to attorneys’ fees. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1961, “[i]nterest shall be allowed on any money judgment” in civil cases and that “interest shall be calculated from the date of the entry of the judgment.” In this case, a relator settled a False Claims Act (FCA) suit. Under the FCA, relators who win or settle an FCA claim are entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees, but the FCA does not address postjudgment interest. The Ninth Circuit held that a “money judgment” triggering interest requires a definite and certain designation of the amount owed (in addition to identified parties), rejecting the relator’s argument that interest should begin to accrue when a party secures an unconditional entitlement to attorney’s fees. In so holding, the Ninth Circuit concurred with the Third, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits, and disagreed with the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Eleventh, and Federal Circuits. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the text of Section 1961 is conclusive, rejecting the policy and equitable concerns relied on by some other circuits (United States ex rel. Thrower v. Acad. Mortg. Corp.).
Civil Procedure: The Ninth Circuit affirmed a lower court’s dismissal of a suit seeking to compel the release of a statewide list of registered voters, but rejected arguments that plaintiffs lacked constitutional standing to sue, where the plaintiffs’ injury was premised on the denial of information to which they were allegedly entitled under the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA). The plaintiffs alleged that the State of Hawaii violated Section 20507(i)(1) of the NVRA by failing to disclose state voter registration data. On the merits, the panel split with the First Circuit and held that Section 20507(i)(1) does not provide plaintiffs with a right to voter registration lists, but does entitle them to information about state efforts to ensure those lists’ accuracy. Before reaching that decision, however, the circuit court considered whether the denial of information under the NVRA and other government sunshine laws (i.e., laws requiring the disclosure of government information on request) constitutes a concrete injury providing standing to bring suit. The Ninth Circuit panel held that it does, relying on the Supreme Court’s decisions in Federal Elections Commission v. Akins and Public Citizen v. U.S. Department of Justice, in which the Court held that the denial of a request for information made available by a sunshine law gave rise to a cognizable injury. The panel disagreed with the Fifth and Sixth Circuits, which read the Supreme Court’s later decision in TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez as requiring plaintiffs bringing suit under information-disclosure statutes to show adverse consequences resulting from the denial of information. The Ninth Circuit decided that TransUnion did not address government sunshine laws or abrogate earlier caselaw concerning standing to bring suit in such cases. The panel also split with the Third Circuit, which held that a denial of an information request under the NVRA is not the type of information denial that supports standing under Akins and Public Citizen (Pub. Int. Legal Found, Inc. v. Nago). 
Firearms: Vacating a lower court’s preliminary injunction, the First Circuit allowed the State of Maine to enforce a 72-hour waiting period requirement before a seller could deliver a firearm to a purchaser, holding that the law did not facially violate the Second Amendment. The panel observed that its analysis of the law’s compatibility with the Second Amendment was governed by the framework set forth by the Supreme Court in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association., Inc. v. Bruen, which first looks at whether the conduct regulated by the challenged law is covered by the plain text of the Second Amendment and, if so, requires the government to prove that the law is consistent with the nation’s historical firearms tradition. The First Circuit decided the case at step one of the Bruen framework, holding that the state’s waiting period requirement was not covered by the plain text of the Second Amendment. The panel reasoned that the text of the Second Amendment protects a person’s right to have and carry firearms, whereas state laws regulating the purchase or acquisition of firearms concerned conduct antecedent to that right. The panel described lower courts as split on when or whether laws regulating the purchase of firearms violated the Second Amendment, including a Tenth Circuit decision that found that a seven-day waiting period likely was unconstitutional (Beckwith v. Frey).
Immigration: The Second Circuit held that an alien taken into immigration custody after having unlawfully entered the country years earlier could not be treated as an “applicant for admission” subject to detention without bond during the pendency of removal proceedings. In many cases, an alien may be released from custody on bond or on his or her own recognizance during the pendency of removal proceedings. Except in narrow circumstances, however, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) directs that “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained [during removal proceedings]” (italics added). A separate provision, Section 1225(a)(1), provides that an alien “present in the United States who has not been admitted” shall be treated as an “applicant for admission,” but does not provide any corresponding specification on who is treated as an “alien seeking admission.” The Second Circuit agreed with the Seventh Circuit that the two terms are not coextensive, and that an “alien seeking admission” under Section 1225(b)(2)(A) includes only those aliens not lawfully admitted who are encountered at the border, and not those found unlawfully present within the United States. The panel noted its disagreement with the Fifth and Eighth Circuits, which have treated “applicant for admission” and “alien seeking admission” as synonymous terms, meaning that aliens present in the United States but not lawfully admitted are subject to mandatory detention under Section 1225(b)(2)(A) (Cunha v. Freden).
Labor & Employment: The Second Circuit revived unseaworthiness and maritime negligence claims brought by a former volunteer firefighter injured while traveling on a boat owned by the defendant fire district. Under the warranty of seaworthiness, vessel owners have a duty to furnish a vessel reasonably fit for its intended use. In a 1946 decision, Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, the Supreme Court extended this duty beyond employed seamen to non-seamen working on the vessel and doing seamen’s work. In 1972, Congress amended the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA) to increase benefits payable to workers covered by that Act, but also to eliminate those workers’ ability to bring a claim for unseaworthiness. The firefighter was not a seaman and, as a public employee, was not eligible for LHWCA compensation. Circuit courts have split on whether non-seamen excluded from the LHWCA may still bring an unseaworthiness claim under Sieracki after the LHWCA amendments. The Second Circuit held that such claims are possible, agreeing with the Fifth and D.C. Circuits, and disagreeing with the Ninth Circuit. Separately, the Second Circuit held that the firefighter could pursue a federal negligence claim under general maritime law even though he had received benefits under a state law that provides that its remedies are exclusive of all other remedies against an employer. Weighing complex precedents regarding federalism and admiralty law, the Second Circuit held that courts must balance state and federal interests. In adopting a balancing-test approach, the Second Circuit concurred with the Eleventh Circuit and disagreed with the Third and Fifth Circuits, which have adopted a categorical rule in favor of federal maritime remedies. Applying balancing, the court concluded that the firefighter might be able to prove maritime negligence claims that could not be barred by state law. The Second Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal of the firefighter’s claims and remanded for further proceedings (In re Verplanck Fire Dist.).
Labor & Employment: A divided D.C. Circuit held that the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) has jurisdiction over certain facilities even when they are not located at an extraction site, processing plant, or related road. Under 30 U.S.C. § 802(h)(1), a “mine” subject to MSHA jurisdiction includes extraction sites (Section 802(h)(1)(A)); related roads (Section 802(h)(1)(B)); and a list of items and places, including “facilities,” that are used in, to be used in, or resulting from mining-related activity (Section 802(h)(1)(C)). An MSHA inspector issued citations to an independent trucking company for improper safety conditions in the repair of mining-related trucks at a separate facility. The Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission vacated the citations and the Secretary of Labor, through the MSHA, petitioned for D.C. Circuit review. In 2023, the same panel majority held that the statutory definition of “mine” was ambiguous and would have remanded the case to permit the Secretary to offer an interpretation of the text that would then be entitled to Chevron deference. The Supreme Court vacated that decision in light of Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo. Returning to the D.C. Circuit, the Secretary argued that the list in Section 802(h)(1)(C) is defined functionally without a locational limit, while the trucking company argued for a narrow geographical limit. The panel majority rejected both interpretations as inconsistent with the text, context, and legislative history of the statute. It instead held that a “facility” is a “mine” when it is “necessarily connected with the use and operation of extracting, milling, or processing coal and other minerals,” and that, without determining the outer limits of that definition, the trucking company facility at issue was covered. In rejecting a narrower locational limit, the D.C. Circuit panel majority split with the Sixth Circuit. The panel majority separately held that the roles of the MSHA and the Commission in the case did not create an Article III justiciability concern (Sec’y of Labor v. KC Transport, Inc.).",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB11430/LSB11430.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/HTML/LSB11430.html
IG10097,The Decennial Census,2026-05-07T04:00:00Z,2026-05-08T13:53:05Z,Active,Infographics,Taylor R. Knoedl,"U.S. Census Bureau, Decennial Census","/
Information as of May 7, 2026. Prepared by Taylor R. Knoedl, Analyst in American National Government and Jamie Bush,
Visualization Information Specialist. For more information see CRS Report IF12909, The Decennial Census of Population and
Housing: An Overview.
The Decennial Census
The U.S. Census Bureau provides statistical data about the nation's people and economy through over 130
different surveys, including its foundational survey: the decennial census. The decennial census is mandated
by Article I, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution, in order to determine each state's apportionment of seats in the
House of Representatives.
Preparing for and conducting the decennial census typically takes over ten years, beginning the prior decade and
extending into the next decade.
Phone
Mail
Enumerators went door-to-door to
complete the Census Bureau’s nonresponse
follow up (NRFU) operation for respondents
that did not self-respond to the survey.
Online
 Determine initial
timelines and testing
schedule
 Other relevant
research to support
decennial census
operations
 Begin initial design
research and testing
 Engage with public on
planning
 Complete initial
operations design
 Continue research and
testing, including
large-scale tests
 Finalize operational
planning, supported
by results from
large-scale testing
 Conduct the decennial
census; initial release of data
and products, including
reapportionment totals and
redistricting data
 Conduct close-out activities,
including the
post-enumeration survey
(PES)
Data Collection
The Census Bureau collected responses to
the decennial census survey using three
initial methods in 2020. Collected data are
protected by confidentiality standards in
Titles 13 and 44 of the U.S. Code.
67%
Data Tabulation and Product Release
The Census Bureau aims to enumerate every person within the United States and its territories.
Census Bureau President Congress
State Population Counts for
Reapportionment
13 U.S.C. §141(b)
Post-Enumeration Survey (PES)
The Census Bureau conducts a Post-Enumeration
Survey at the conclusion of the decennial census
to assess the accuracy of the decennial census.
Early Planning Design Selection Development &
Integration
Peak Production
& Close-out
53.6%
33%
12.1%
1.3%
Data sent to states for redistricting
States receive demographic data for redistricting,
which includes voting age population, geographic
data, and data on other variables.
Data Tables & Products
Data from the decennial census are used for many
purposes, including to inform various policy
decisions, guide federal funding, oer the public
insights on population trends, and help the private
sector make informed business decisions.
Timeline
Data Collection
2019 - 2021 2021 - 2024 2025 - 2029 2029 - 2033
Enumerator
Separate from initial three methods
Data collected are protected by confidentiality standards in Titles 13 and 44 of the U.S. Code.
Population counts are used for
reapportionment of seats in the
House of Representatives. This
primarily consists of total
residents of each state. For more
information, please see CRS
Report: Apportionment and
Redistricting Process for the U.S.
House of Representatives.
Privacy Enhancing
Techniques
",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IG/PDF/IG10097/IG10097.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IG/HTML/IG10097.html
IN12690,The FY2027 President’s Budget in Historical Context: Revenues,2026-05-06T04:00:00Z,2026-05-09T05:56:17Z,Active,Posts,D. Andrew Austin,"Budget, Public Finance & Taxation, Legislative & Budget Process, Executive Budget Process","On April 3, 2026, the Trump Administration submitted its budget for FY2027, which proposes to constrain nondefense spending, maintain spending on border security and immigration enforcement, and increase defense spending. In February 2026, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) issued its budget and economic outlook along with its current-law baseline projections. This Insight discusses the Administration’s fiscal proposals in the context of longer-term budgetary trends and highlights selected events and legislation.
Revenue Trends
Figure 1 shows federal receipts by major category as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) since FY1962. Federal receipts exceeded outlays (gray line) in five years (FY1969, FY1998-FY2001). In all other years, the government ran a deficit, which required borrowing through the sale of Treasury securities. Economic conditions and employment levels affect tax receipts, as do major tax measures. 
Individual income tax collections reflect economic conditions, rising when employment and asset values increase and fall during recessions, and they are also the largest component of federal receipts, accounting for an estimated 8.6% of GDP in FY2026. Payroll taxes, such as for Social Security and Medicare, are the next largest revenue source, accounting for an estimated 5.7% of GDP in FY2026. Corporate income taxes as a share of GDP fell from 3.5% in FY1962 to an estimated 1.2% in FY2026. 
Major Tax Legislation
The Revenue Act of 1964 (P.L. 88-272) lowered high Korean War-era marginal tax rates. Acts in the 1970s adjusted the tax code to offset bracket creep, where inflation pushed households into higher tax brackets. The 1981 Kemp-Roth act (P.L. 97-34) indexed brackets and cut marginal rates by about a quarter. A 1983 act (P.L. 98-21) aimed to stabilize Social Security’s finances for the coming 75 years by raising Social Security tax rates, phasing in a two-year increase in the full retirement age, and curtailing certain benefits. The 1986 Tax Reform Act (P.L. 99-514) lowered marginal rates and curtailed many tax preferences while aiming for budget neutrality. The 1993 omnibus act (P.L. 103-66) increased certain taxes, helping to reduce deficits. Those taxes, constraints on federal spending, and the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union and subsequent so-called “peace dividend” helped achieve budget surpluses in the late 1990s. 
Figure 1. Federal Receipts by Major Category as a Percentage of Gross Domestic Product, FY1962-FY2031
Figure is interactive in HTML report version.
/
Source: CRS calculations based on Office of Management and Budget and Bureau of Economic Analysis data. 
Notes: Revenue and outlay data are for fiscal years. Acts are shown in the calendar year in which they were enacted. FY2026 values are estimated and those for later years reflect Administration proposals and projections. Blue labels in HTML version are clickable links. Kemp-Roth = Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981; OBRA = Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993; EGTRRA = Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003; ARRA = American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009; ATRA = American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012; Recon. Act = Reconciliation Act. P.L. 117-169 is the budget reconciliation measure commonly referred to as the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 (IRA).

In 2001, the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act (EGTRRA; P.L. 107-16) lowered individual tax rates, expanded child and earned income tax credits, and shielded many taxpayers from the alternative minimum tax. Over the 10-year horizon, EGTRRA was estimated to increase the deficit by $1.35 trillion, although longer-term costs were limited by a provision to sunset reduced rates at the end of 2010. That sunset provision allowed the measure to avoid a Byrd Rule objection, which bars consideration of measures that increase the deficit beyond the 10-year budget-scoring window. In 2003, the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act (JGTRRA; P.L. 108-27) accelerated some EGTRRA tax reductions, increased the child tax credit, and lowered tax rates on dividend and long-term capital gains income. Federal deficits increased sharply after 2001 due to those tax cuts, the end of the dot-com boom, wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and increased spending in other areas, such as veterans programs.
Deficits increased even more sharply in the wake of the 2008-2010 financial crisis and ensuing Great Recession. A 2008 measure (P.L. 110-185) authorized stimulus checks, and the 2009 ARRA (P.L. 111-5) provided a larger degree of economic stimulus, including an estimated $182 billion in tax reductions. A 2010 measure (P.L. 115-312) extended various lowered rates that were about to sunset. In late 2012, concerns that a “fiscal cliff” could undermine a slow recovery from the Great Recession led to passage of a measure (P.L. 112-240) that extended most of the JGTRRA tax cuts that were slated to expire.
The 2017 reconciliation act (P.L. 115-97) permanently lowered the corporate income tax rate to 21%, lowered some individual income tax rates, and capped the state and local tax (SALT) deduction, among other changes. CBO in 2018 estimated that the act would increase federal deficits by $1.8 trillion over the 10-year budget window. The deep economic disruption caused by the COVID-19 pandemic complicates later assessments of the act’s fiscal costs.
The 2025 reconciliation act (P.L. 119-21) extended most of the 2017 reconciliation act individual and corporate tax provisions. It also exempted certain overtime and tips income from taxation and extended and expanded certain farm subsidies, among other provisions. Over the 10-year budget window, the act was estimated to decrease revenues by $4.5 trillion relative to a current-law baseline, while increasing defense funding by $150 billion and Department of Homeland Security immigration-related funding by about $130 billion. Several tax provisions expired in 2025, such as pandemic-era enhanced subsidies for health insurance and the work opportunity credit.
FY2027 Administration Budget
The Administration’s topline budget summary mentions no major revenue proposals.
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) projects federal receipts as a share of GDP will rise from 17.1% in FY2026 to 18.3% in FY2032, largely due to an increase in individual income taxes from 8.2% of GDP in FY2026 to 9.2% of GDP in FY2031, before adjusting for changes in tariff policy. CBO projects more modest growth in total receipts, from 17.5% of GDP in FY2026 to 17.8% in FY2036, with individual income tax revenues rising from 8.6% to 9.1% of GDP over the FY2026-2036 period. 
Economic growth is one key determinant of the trajectory of revenues. The Administration projects that the economy will grow 3.0% per year, faster than the 1.8% rate projected by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) or the 2.0% rate projected by the Federal Reserve. More recently, the International Monetary Fund warned that the war with Iran would likely reduce economic growth rates.
Tax administration is another determinant of revenue collections. Reductions of funding and staff at the Internal Revenue Service reduced resources for enforcement. CBO and other economic researchers have found a strong positive relationship between enforcement and revenue collections.
OMB projected that tariff revenue (shown in Figure 1 within “Other Taxes”) would rise from 0.6% of GDP in FY2025 to 1.4% of GDP in FY2027 and in later years. The Administration’s projections do not reflect refunds provided for tariffs that the Supreme Court found lacked legal basis. CBO’s revised projections indicate that the ruling’s effect on revenues would increase federal debt by $2.0 trillion over the coming decade. Tariffs were the largest federal revenue source in the 19th century, but declined in importance in the last century, especially as post-World War II international agreements lowered tariffs. 

",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12690/IN12690.3.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/HTML/IN12690.html
IN12689,Colombia’s 2026 Presidential Election,2026-05-06T04:00:00Z,2026-05-08T11:38:08Z,Active,Posts,Clare Ribando Seelke,"Colombia, South America, Latin America, Caribbean & Canada","On May 31, Colombia, a top U.S. security partner in Latin America, is scheduled to convene an election to replace President Gustavo Petro (2022-present), who is constitutionally barred from seeking reelection. U.S. officials and some Members of Congress have expressed concerns about the Petro government’s counterdrug and security policies. The 119th Congress has reduced foreign assistance to Colombia and placed additional conditions on that assistance. Some Members of Congress also have expressed concerns about political violence in Colombia since the June 2025 assassination of a presidential hopeful and threats against other candidates. 
The three main candidates are Iván Cepeda of Petro’s leftist Historic Pact (PH) and two conservative rivals—Paloma Valencia of the Democratic Center (CD) and independent Abelardo De la Espriella. Members of Congress may examine these candidates’ platforms and assess their possible implications for relations with the United States. If no candidate captures more than 50% of the vote, a runoff election is scheduled for June 21; the winner is to take office on August 7. 
Domestic Context and Campaign
The legacy of outgoing President Petro, a polarizing figure whose popularity has risen since November, has influenced the elections. Supporters have praised Petro’s focus on reducing inequality through labor reform and historic minimum wage increases despite his government’s corruption scandals. The Petro administration’s deemphasis of coca eradication has coincided with record cocaine production. Also, the government’s “total peace” negotiations involving ceasefires with illegally armed groups may have bolstered the power of such groups and fueled violence. Increased violence could inhibit voting in some regions as armed groups seek to influence the election results.
The results of Colombia’s March 8 legislative elections illustrated a left-right division among voters regarding how best to address violence, corruption, and economic issues but also the continued relevance of traditional parties, including the Liberal and Conservative parties. PH captured the most Senate (25 of 103) and House of Representatives (43 of 183) seats, while CD garnered the second-largest number in both chambers (17 and 28, respectively). Four parties that aligned with the PH early in Petro’s term despite ideological differences—but later broke with PH—together won 69 House seats and 38 Senate seats. The next president likely will need to form cross-party alliances. 
Candidates
Colombia began its presidential contest with hundreds of candidates. After three interparty primaries were held concurrently with legislative elections, Paloma Valencia, winner of the center-right primary, emerged as a leading candidate, alongside Cepeda and De la Espriella—neither of whom participated in a primary.
/
Iván Cepeda is a left-wing PH senator, human rights activist, and “total peace” negotiator. Cepeda has pledged to combat corruption, prioritize peace and armed conflict victims’ rights, enact a progressive tax reform, and bolster rural development. Cepeda opposed U.S. “intervention” in Venezuela and is skeptical of militarized drug policies.
Cepeda selected Aida Quilcué, a former senator and Indigenous activist, as his running mate, reinforcing PH’s support for underrepresented groups.

/
Abelardo De la Espriella is a right-wing criminal defense lawyer who has represented controversial figures including Alex Saab, a U.S.-indicted money launderer for former Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro. De la Espriella, a political outsider who also holds U.S. and Italian citizenship, rejected support from political parties. He has proposed aggressive security policies similar to those of Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele and supports military strikes on drug trafficking targets in Colombia and aerial fumigation of coca crops.
His running mate, José Manuel Restrepo, is an economist and former minister of finance.

/
Paloma Valencia, a conservative CD senator, is a lawyer backed by former President Álvaro Uribe (2002-2010). Valencia has proposed a strong security plan to recapture territory from criminal groups and a counterdrug alliance with U.S. and European officials. She has pledged to streamline government and restart private investment in oil exploration and mining.
Valencia chose Juan Carlos Oviedo, a moderate economist who directed the national statistics agency, to join her ticket.


Other contenders include Sergio Fajardo, a former mayor of Medellin, and Claudia Lopez, a former mayor of Bogotá, both of whom are centrists.

Polls
Since January 2026, Cepeda has led in the polls but remained short of an absolute majority. A weighted average of recent polls suggests that Cepeda could narrowly lose to Valencia but defeat De la Espriella in a runoff (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1. Voter Intentions
/
Source: CRS, using data from a weighted average of polls as published by Colombia’s La Silla Vacia, https://www.lasillavacia.com/silla-nacional/ponderador-de-encuestas-cepeda-pierde-la-ventaja-en-segunda-vuelta/. 
Implications for U.S. Policy and Issues for Congress
U.S.-Colombian relations have been strained under the second Trump Administration amid the Administration’s differences with President Petro. Drug policy changes, U.S. foreign assistance cuts and tariffs, and Colombia’s decision to sign a cooperation plan with China on the Belt and Road Initiative have contributed to strained relations. In September 2025, President Trump determined that Colombia had failed to meet its counternarcotics commitments, the State Department revoked Petro’s visa, and the Department of the Treasury sanctioned Petro under counternarcotics authorities. Those sanctions remain in place despite a reportedly cordial February 2026 White House meeting.
Colombia’s next president may seek a positive relationship with the U.S. government, as the United States remains Colombia’s top economic partner and a source of security and humanitarian support. Iván Cepeda is regarded as less polarizing than President Petro and supports human rights programming and initiatives for Afro-Colombians and Indigenous peoples such as those funded in the FY2026 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 119-75). Nevertheless, his backing of Petro’s security policies could strain relations. Valencia and De la Espriella have vowed to join President Trump’s Americas Counter Cartel initiative. Valencia has proposed a modernized Plan Colombia bilateral security initiative. De la Espriella has endorsed security policies such as El Salvador’s “state of exception” policy, which has raised some human rights concerns in Congress. Cepeda could maintain Petro’s high corporate taxes and frequent regulatory changes, which have created uncertainty among investors, while his opponents reportedly could seek to attract U.S. businesses by rolling back investment restrictions and limiting regulations.
",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12689/IN12689.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/HTML/IN12689.html
IN12688,DFC Shipping Reinsurance Facility: Iran Conflict and Strait of Hormuz,2026-05-06T04:00:00Z,2026-05-08T09:08:43Z,Active,Posts,"Shayerah I. Akhtar, Nick M. Brown",,"Background
In February 2026, U.S. and Israeli forces initiated military operations against Iran. Iran responded with retaliatory attacks and threats against commercial shipping transiting the Strait of Hormuz, through which more than one-quarter of crude oil and petroleum maritime trade transited to global markets. Hostilities and related developments contributed to a near-stoppage of maritime energy and other commerce through the Strait. 
On March 3, 2026, President Trump ordered the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) “to provide, at a very reasonable price, political risk insurance and guarantees for the Financial Security of ALL Maritime Trade, especially Energy, traveling through the Gulf.” He also stated naval escorts could be provided for transiting vessels. 
DFC announced a reinsurance facility on March 6, pledging an unprecedented $20 billion—almost ten-fold larger than any active DFC commitment—to help alleviate the maritime commerce disruptions. DFC indicated further details would be forthcoming. It is unclear if DFC has provided any coverage yet. The facility’s potential consequences for DFC’s strategic focus, operations, and risk profile raise issues for possible congressional oversight.
DFC announcements indicate a $40 billion facility ($20 billion each from DFC and from private partners), focusing initially on “Hull & Machinery and Cargo.” DFC announced seven U.S. insurance partners, naming Chubb, a global property and casualty insurer, as the lead underwriter. Chubb is to “manage the facility, determine pricing and terms, assume risk, and issue policies” and “manage all claims.” DFC indicated a forthcoming application portal, meanwhile listing some key applicant information it would require to determine eligibility.
DFC Background
DFC is a federal agency that provides political risk insurance (PRI), direct loans, loan guarantees, and equity to promote private investment overseas to advance global development and U.S. foreign policy. DFC’s PRI program aims to cover risk of investment losses due to events such as political violence and expropriation, and includes reinsurance to increase underwriting capacity. DFC in April removed information from its application portal indicating a cap of $1 billion on PRI. 
DFC’s support is subject to statutory parameters, including to prioritize less-developed economies, manage risk, ensure development impact, screen for environmental and social effects, and complement private capital (“additionality”). In reauthorizing DFC in 2025 (P.L. 119-60, Division H, Title LXXXVII), Congress more than tripled the cap on DFC’s potential exposure to claims and other financial payouts (the maximum contingent liability, MCL) to $205 billion. Congress also, among other things, expanded DFC’s authorities to invest in some upper-middle-income and high-income economies (with high-income support limited to 10% of the total MCL, or $20.5 billion), while prohibiting DFC support in “countries of concern,” such as Iran and the People’s Republic of China (PRC, or China). 

Possible Issues and Options for Congress
Scale of Coverage. At end-2025, DFC’s portfolio exposure was roughly $42 billion (of which about $1 billion was PRI), leaving approximately $160 billion in available financing. The financing that may be needed to address Strait maritime commerce disruptions is unclear. Insurance needs may be as high as $352 billion; major private insurers have reportedly relaunched limited or more costly war risk cover for vessels following initial cancelations when the conflict erupted. Shippers also have been reluctant to put crews in harm’s way regardless of insurance availability. 
DFC could use the origin country, the destination country, the vessel flag, or the shipping entity domicile to classify support for Hormuz-transiting shipments. Most origin countries are high-income economies. DFC’s $20 billion backing, if deployed in full and largely to high-income economies, could preclude DFC from providing other support in high-income countries, given that the facility would comprise as much as 97.6% of DFC’s $20.5 billion high-income cap. The vessel flag, firm domicile, or destination may present additional issues: many of these countries also are high-income (e.g., Singapore) or restricted from DFC support (e.g., the PRC). Congress could 
engage in fact-finding to assess how DFC would determine the facility’s country income designations; 
examine whether the facility is in tension with DFC’s mandates (e.g., one Member has raised potential PRC gains from the facility);
assess how the facility may affect DFC’s support for its other priorities; and 
consider whether, and if so, how to modify DFC funding or authorities to support the facility or other congressional priorities, including seeking information on the utilized scale of the facility.  
Staffing. DFC’s workforce shrank by 25% in 2025, potentially straining its application review and monitoring capacity. CRS identified $75 million in active DFC reinsurance projects, a small share of DFC’s portfolio. Press releases indicate that DFC, Chubb, and the interagency may each be involved in due diligence for each vessel. Congress may assess: 
DFC’s specific role in the facility, and how DFC and its partners plan to coordinate to minimize potential duplication of efforts; 
to what extent DFC is equipped with staff and expertise to administer the facility; and 
whether any DFC workforce shortfalls would erode efforts to comply with statutory requirements (e.g., “countries of concerns” prohibition) and shift aspects of facility administration to the private sector at potentially higher costs.
Risk. Federal accounting practice subjects some PRI to federal credit rules. DFC may cover PRI claims with corporate reserves or borrowing from Treasury, and the government pledges “the full faith and credit of the United States of America” for all valid claims. Given the implications of DFC operations for taxpayer liability, Congress could oversee or mandate reporting from DFC and/or the Administration on 
how DFC will use evidence to assess risk for reinsured vessels;
the facility’s effect on DFC’s risk profile; and
applicability of the Anti-Deficiency Act if expected claims exceed appropriations.
Statutory Compliance. The planned rapid response nature of the reinsurance facility may raise questions about how DFC has tailored its application requirements. DFC applicants must generally seek private sector financing first and show it is inadequate. The reentry of some major private insurers into the maritime war risk insurance market, as noted above, could limit the additionality of DFC-backed support. DFC also may have to expedite its application and screening process, which can take longer than a year to reach Board approval, for support to be relevant in the conflict.
Members may conduct oversight or mandate DFC reporting on
any assessments about shortcomings in private sector PRI offerings and to what extent DFC support would be “additional”; 
estimates of reduced property risk to covered vessels, if any, due to planned coordination with U.S. Central Command and the Treasury; 
whether, and if so, how DFC may expedite consideration of applications, including processes to assess development impact and environmental and social impact; and
tensions, if any, between the President’s offer of “a very reasonable price” to shippers and DFC’s statutory requirement to “minimize cost” for taxpayers.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12688/IN12688.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/HTML/IN12688.html
IF13218,Endangered Species Committee (“God Squad”) Exemption of Oil and Gas Activities in the Gulf of America,2026-05-06T04:00:00Z,2026-05-07T16:53:12Z,Active,Resources,"Anthony R. Marshak, Pervaze A. Sheikh, Laura B. Comay",,"Introduction
On March 31, 2026, the Endangered Species Committee (ESC; also known as the “God Squad”) voted to issue an exemption from Section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) for oil and gas exploration, development, and production activities in the Gulf of America (GoA). In accordance with Sections 7(h) and 7(j) of the ESA, the ESC exempted these oil and gas activities from the ESA requirements known as Section 7 consultation after the Secretary of Defense—who is using “Secretary of War” as a “secondary title” under Executive Order 14347 dated September 5, 2025—notified the Secretary of the Interior (the ESC chair) that an exemption was necessary for reasons of national security. 
This exemption was the first issued for national security reasons. To date, GoA oil and gas companies have abided by reasonable and prudent alternatives (RPAs) and other measures to mitigate effects on ESA-listed species and critical habitat when carrying out activities, as required in a 2025 National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) biological opinion (BiOp) and 2018 and 2025 BiOps from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS). 
In the request for an exemption, the Secretary of Defense stated that ongoing litigation related to endangered species threatens to halt oil and gas production in the region and that litigation diverts resources away from approving permits; limits agency discretion, leading to more restrictive operations; and creates instability and uncertainty that might discourage long-term development. Further, the Secretary asserted that if oil and gas exploration and development were halted, U.S. military operations and readiness would be disrupted, and U.S. adversaries such as Iran and Russia would benefit. In light of the Secretary’s determination under Section 7(j), the ESC granted the exemption. Several stakeholder groups have filed lawsuits regarding the ESC’s findings. 
Congress may be interested in how this exemption from Section 7 consultation could affect ESA-listed species (e.g., Rice’s whales, certain sea turtles) and critical habitat in the GoA, its potential implications for Gulf oil and gas operations, and any precedent the decision might set for other areas with ESA-listed species.
Section 7 Consultations and Exemptions
Section 7 of the ESA requires federal agencies to ensure that actions they undertake, authorize, or fund are not likely to jeopardize listed species under the ESA or adversely modify designated critical habitat of listed species. Section 7 requires federal agencies to consult with FWS and/or NMFS (jointly referred to as the Services) when their proposed actions may affect listed species or critical habitat. Section 7 consultation is the process used to evaluate the effects of agency actions on listed species and critical habitat and to consider alternatives to minimize those effects. If the action may adversely affect listed species or critical habitat, formal consultation ensues. Formal consultation generally concludes with the Services issuing a BiOp on the effects of the action. If the action is likely to jeopardize listed species or adversely modify critical habitat, the Services are required to identify any RPAs the federal agency can take to avoid jeopardy. If the Services find no jeopardy or an RPA is identified, an incidental take statement (ITS) is included. An ITS states the amount of take of a listed species anticipated from the proposed action and exempts the action from prohibitions on take of listed species under Section 9 of the ESA.  
If the Services issue a jeopardy BiOp without identifying any RPAs, or if the federal agency determines that it cannot implement the action without violating the ESA (i.e., it does not want to use the RPA), the agency may apply for an exemption under Section 7(h). Under the process detailed in Sections 7(g)-(h), the agency (or the governor[s] of affected state[s]or affected license applicant[s]) may apply for an exemption after consultation is completed. Upon determining that a request for an exemption may be warranted, the Secretary of the Interior or Secretary of Commerce, as applicable to jurisdiction, passes the application to the ESC, composed of six specified federal officials and one individual from each affected state. After a process of deliberation and consideration of several factors associated with the action, the ESC votes on whether to grant an exemption. 
For an exemption to be granted, the ESC must find that there are no RPAs to the action, that the benefits of that action outweigh the benefits of alternative courses of action, that the action is of regional or national significance, and that the federal agency or private applicant went through the process according to the rules and acted in good faith. 
If the exemption is given, reasonable mitigation and enhancement measures are to be implemented to minimize the effects of the action on listed species and critical habitat. Using this process, the ESC granted two exemptions (in 1979 and 1992). No other exemptions were granted until the March 2026 exemption for GoA oil and gas activities employing the authority of Section 7(j) of the ESA. Section 7(j) states that the ESC shall grant an exemption if the Secretary of Defense finds that the exemption is necessary for reasons of national security. The language of this section does not make clear whether the full process for granting an exemption under Section 7(g) and (h) needs to be followed in conjunction with such a determination. Granted exemptions for a proposed action are permanent unless certain conditions arise. The March 2026 action covers all current leases and new leases issued through 2029 in the area covered by the BiOps.
ESA Requirements for Oil and Gas Development in the GoA Prior to Exemption
NMFS and FWS have issued BiOps for oil and gas activities in the GoA as part of their consultations with the Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) and Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE). BOEM and BSEE administer oil and gas activities pursuant to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. In March 2020, NMFS issued a BiOp for BOEM’s and BSEE’s GoA oil and gas activities. Several environmental organizations filed a lawsuit arguing that NMFS did not adequately evaluate the potential for future GoA oil spills, and did not require sufficient safeguards for ESA-listed species from offshore drilling operations. A U.S. district court in Maryland vacated NMFS’s 2020 BiOp in August 2024, effective December 20, 2024 (later extended to May 21, 2025). Due to the wide range of oil and gas activities covered by the BiOp, industry stakeholders asserted that any gap between the vacatur and adoption of a new BiOp could “halt or seriously slow all operations in the U.S. Gulf of Mexico.” NMFS issued the BiOp in May 2025 and no gap occurred.
The NMFS 2025 BiOp covers the full range of BOEM’s and BSEE’s management and regulation of outer continental shelf oil and gas activities—from lease sales, through exploration and development of leases, to eventual decommissioning of oil and gas infrastructure when leases terminate—for GoA oil and gas leases issued within five years of the BiOp’s publication (approximately through 2029), and leases issued prior to the BiOp’s publication. The BiOp’s scope includes activities throughout the projected 40-year life of a given lease, as long as the lease was issued in the specified timeframe. In terms of geographic area, the BiOp covers the Western and Central GoA planning areas and the “small portion” of the Eastern GoA planning area that is not withdrawn from leasing.
In the 2025 BiOp, NMFS found that without precautionary measures, GoA oil and gas activities could jeopardize the future survival of endangered Rice’s whales. In a 2022 stock assessment, the most current for the species, NMFS estimated that 51 Rice’s whales remain. The BiOp includes measures for preventing vessel strikes on Rice’s whales, which experts identify as a significant threat to their long-term viability. Experts also identify the Deepwater Horizon oil spill as having contributed to the mortality of some Rice’s whales, among other factors. The BiOp also identified adverse impacts to some other ESA-listed species (e.g., sperm whales, certain sea turtles). A separate FWS 2018 BiOp for GoA oil and gas activities found that such activities were unlikely to jeopardize nesting sea turtles or other ESA-listed species under FWS’s jurisdiction (e.g., manatees) or to destroy or adversely affect their critical habitats. The FWS BiOp, which covered a similar set of activities, geography, and time range as the NMFS BiOp, also included conservation recommendations to minimize adverse impacts to these listed species. A 2025 FWS decision affirmed the conclusions of the 2018 BiOp. 
In its 2026 decision, the ESC granted “an exemption from the requirements of the [ESA]” for the agency actions that were analyzed in the 2025 NMFS BiOp and the 2018 and 2025 FWS BiOps. The ESC stated that with this exemption, BOEM and BSEE are not required to comply with the Section 7(a)(2) procedural requirements or substantive “jeopardy” and “adverse modification” mandates. Also, incidental take of listed species in carrying out the covered activities would not violate the ESA. The ESC noted that other protective measures that BOEM and BSEE mandated in the covered agency actions before the ESA consultation process would remain implemented.
Considerations for Congress
Congress may consider issues that might arise from the exemption, including but not limited to the following:
Congress may consider any precedents this exemption might set for other authorized activities with potential national security concerns and BiOps in place—for instance, whether a similar approach could be used to exempt activities from ESA consultation in other regions where oil and gas development is occurring; whether it could be applied to water conveyance operations where BiOps are issued and water supply is deemed a security concern; or whether national security exemptions in accordance with Executive Order 14276, “Restoring America’s Seafood Competitiveness,” might be applicable to the fishing industry’s interactions with ESA-listed species, and how any such exemptions might intersect with other conservation mandates. 
Congress could consider whether to define the scope and applicability of the term national security in the context of an exemption from the ESA’s Section 7(a)(2). 
Section 7(j) of the ESA does not specify ESC procedures when the Secretary of Defense finds that an exemption is necessary for national security reasons. Congress may consider whether to specify the process for granting an exemption for national security interests.
The Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) includes protections for marine mammals (e.g., Rice’s whales) during authorized oil and gas activities, including under a Letter of Authorization (LOA) for GoA geophysical survey activities. Congress may consider how the exemption might affect future LOAs and intersections between the ESA and MMPA. 
GoA oil and gas companies had been subject to ESA regulations and mitigation measures while producing oil and gas. Congress may consider to what extent the exemption might facilitate production compared to pre-exemption levels, and how it would affect listed species. 
The exemption of GoA oil and gas activities appears to apply to a broad scope of activities. Congress may consider whether to clarify the scope or number of activities that could be included in an exemption.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13218/IF13218.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13218.html
R48936,The Electoral College: Frequently Asked Questions,2026-05-05T04:00:00Z,2026-05-08T14:52:54Z,Active,Reports,R. Sam Garrett,,"Individual voters in the United States do not directly elect the President and the Vice President. Instead, their votes select intermediaries, known as electors, to cast votes for a presidential ticket on their behalf. Those electors make up the electoral college, which elects the President and the Vice President. Provisions in Article II and in the Twelfth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution establish the electoral college.
The frequently asked questions discussed in this report provide a resource for Members of Congress and congressional staff as they conduct oversight, consider legislation, and address constituent questions related to policy issues concerning the electoral college. The report does not contain legal analysis. 
Some Members of Congress have occasionally proposed constitutional amendments to abolish or alter the electoral college. As of this writing, such proposals have not substantially advanced beyond introduction in recent Congresses.
Throughout American history, one candidate has almost always won both the popular vote and the electoral college. On four occasions, the electoral college has produced a presidential winner inconsistent with the national popular vote. Currently, to win the presidency or vice presidency, a candidate must receive at least 270 of 538 electoral votes to achieve an electoral college majority. A contingent election would occur if no candidate won a majority in the electoral college. In such an instance, the House of Representatives would elect the President and the Senate would elect the Vice President.
This report will be updated in the event of substantial legislative activity concerning the electoral college.
",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48936/R48936.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48936.html
LSB11429,Artificial Intelligence and the Fourth Amendment: Two Emerging Legal Issues,2026-05-05T04:00:00Z,2026-05-07T12:53:04Z,Active,Posts,Peter G. Berris,,"Various law enforcement components at the federal, state, and local levels report using artificial intelligence (AI) for some functions. Legislatures at the state and federal level have considered a variety of proposals relevant to the intersection of law enforcement, crime, and AI. Legal commentary has focused on the potential impact of AI on criminal justice, including everything from the admissibility of AI evidence, to sentencing, to AI-powered robot police officers, to the Fourth Amendment.
Precise conceptualizations of AI vary, but the FBI has used the definition from the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act. That legislation defines AI to include, among other things, artificial systems “designed to think or act like a human,” or that “perform[] tasks under varying and unpredictable circumstances without significant human oversight,” or that “can learn from experience and improve performance when exposed to data sets.” Another federal statute defines AI as “a machine-based system that can, for a given set of human-defined objectives, make predictions, recommendations or decisions influencing real or virtual environments” and that uses human or machine inputs to perceive environments, abstract its perceptions, and thereby “formulate options for information or action.”
This Legal Sidebar focuses on the potential Fourth Amendment implications of AI in two contexts. The first pertains to law enforcement seeking to obtain data generated from consumer use of AI products such as chatbot conversation histories and related data. The second context involves law enforcement use of surveillance tools augmented with AI, with a particular focus on Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs). This Legal Sidebar begins with a brief overview of Fourth Amendment concepts relevant to both topics and concludes with considerations for Congress. For a list of additional CRS products covering other aspects of AI, see CRS Insight IN12458, Artificial Intelligence: CRS Products, by Laurie Harris and Rachael D. Roan (2025).
The Fourth Amendment and AI
The Fourth Amendment imposes limits on searches and seizures by the government. Courts have determined that a Fourth Amendment search occurs if “the Government obtains information by physically intruding on a constitutionally protected area” or “when the government violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable.” With respect to the seizure of property, that “occurs when there is some meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interests in that property.” If a law enforcement activity qualifies as a search or seizure, then the Fourth Amendment requires that it must be reasonable, which ordinarily means that the search or seizure must be conducted pursuant to a warrant supported by probable cause, with some exceptions.
Law Enforcement Access to Chatbot User Data
Consumer use of AI products generates data that may be of interest to law enforcement in criminal investigations. For example, investigators have sought or used chatbot conversation histories as evidence in cases involving a range of offenses, including arson, child exploitation, fraud, and vandalism. In an arson prosecution stemming from the Lachman Fire and the Palisades Fire, for instance, the government alleged in charging documents that the defendant had various exchanges with OpenAI’s ChatGPT, a generative AI program, on the topic of fire, including asking the program: “Are you at fault if a fire is [lit] because of your cigarettes.” 
In some cases, it appears that law enforcement has obtained chatbot user data by accessing a suspect’s phone or device. To illustrate, in one vandalism case, local law enforcement seized a suspect’s phone as evidence. According to law enforcement, the suspect provided a passcode and consent to search the device. Law enforcement obtained incriminating ChatGPT conversations where the suspect asked ChatGPT about the consequences of smashing windshields and otherwise damaging vehicles. (Federal courts have expounded on the various, potential legal considerations when law enforcement accesses a suspect’s device—topics beyond the scope of this product.) 
In other cases, however, it appears that law enforcement has sought chatbot user data from AI companies. In such scenarios, the extent to which users’ data such as chat histories are protected by the Fourth Amendment may hinge in large part on the limits of the third-party doctrine, which the Supreme Court has held to mean that “a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.” The third-party doctrine reflects a judgment that a person “takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the information will be conveyed by that person to the Government.” In articulating this doctrine, the Supreme Court in 1976 concluded that a bank customer lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in financial records stored with his bank by virtue of his being a customer there. Under a broad construction of the third-party doctrine in the modern era, a potentially vast amount of digital information would exist beyond the protections of the Fourth Amendment, because such information is often shared by customers with technology providers in the ordinary course of using a product.
In the 2018 opinion Carpenter v. United States, the Supreme Court recognized a limitation to the potentially expansive scope of the third-party doctrine. That case involved the warrantless search of historical cell-site location information (CSLI)—data that record the location of a cellular device when it connects to “a set of radio antennas called cell sites’” typically mounted on towers or structures and operated by private companies to provide network coverage. In Carpenter, law enforcement obtained a defendant’s CSLI—covering 127 days—from cellular providers through a court order issued pursuant to the Stored Communications Act (SCA). The Carpenter Court held that the CSLI was not exempt from Fourth Amendment protection pursuant to the third-party doctrine, even though the CSLI was shared by the defendant with cellular providers in the course of his cell phone use. The Court rejected the idea that the defendant’s sharing of CSLI with the providers was voluntary, observing that “[c]ell phone location information is not truly shared’ as one normally understands the term” given that carrying a cell phone is “indispensable to participation in modern society” and in light of the fact that “a cell phone logs a cell-site record by dint of its operation.” In addition, the Court concluded that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the CSLI due to the revealing nature of the information at issue. This, the Court observed, amounted to “near perfect surveillance” because cell phones accompany their owners in nearly every physical space and because the CSLI is both accurate and retrospective. As the Court in Carpenter put it, CSLI can provide “an intimate window into a person’s life, revealing not only his particular movements, but through them, his familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.’” Nevertheless, the Court described Carpenter as a “narrow” holding that did not abolish the third-party doctrine or predetermine its application to other forms of technological surveillance. 
It appears that federal courts have not yet had the occasion to determine whether a user maintains a reasonable expectation of privacy in chatbot histories, or whether that expectation is forfeited by virtue of the third-party doctrine. A Supreme Court case argued in April 2026—discussed below—may shed additional light on the scope of Carpenter and on the types of technologies that are protected by the Fourth Amendment by virtue of their indispensability in modern society and the revealing nature of the data they generate. In practice, it appears that law enforcement may already be seeking warrants for some such information pursuant to a statutory scheme—namely, the SCA. 
The Stored Communications Act and Chatbot Data
Law enforcement access to chatbot user data implicates the Stored Communications Act (SCA). Congress enacted the SCA as part of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA). Some legislative history suggests that Congress’s intent in doing so was to add supplemental protections from providers’ disclosure of stored wire and electronic communications beyond those potentially covered by the Fourth Amendment. For instance, the Senate Judiciary report accompanying the ECPA described the proliferation of electronic data storage and the risk that such data “may be subject to no constitutional privacy protection” because it “is subject to control by a third party computer operator.” In general terms, the SCA restricts when certain information may be disclosed by Electronic Communication Services or Remote Computing Services, which typically include entities such as “cell phone providers, email providers, or social media platforms” and cloud computing providers. Pursuant to a provision of the SCA codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2703, the government may compel such providers to share communications’ content and metadata if it obtains the requisite level of legal process, which ranges from a subpoena to a warrant, depending on the category of information sought. Analysis of the SCA and related considerations may be found in CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10801, Overview of Governmental Action Under the Stored Communications Act (SCA), by Jimmy Balser (2022).
Reverse Warrants for Chatbot Histories
Carpenter involved a law enforcement search for customer data pertaining to a known suspect. In other words, law enforcement had already identified the defendant as a possible suspect when it obtained a court order compelling certain wireless carriers to provide that person’s phone records. In the digital space, law enforcement sometimes works in the opposite direction—seeking customer data to identify an unknown suspect. Take, for example, a suspected arson where law enforcement knows the time and address of the fire, but has not been able to identify a suspect through traditional investigative means. There, law enforcement might seek a reverse keyword warrant to compel a technology provider to disclose account information for users who searched for the address of the suspected arson in the fifteen days preceding the fire. Similarly, if investigators know the time and location of a robbery, but lack other leads, they might request a geofence warrant to compel a technology provider to disclose information about smartphone users who were near the robbery scene around the time it occurred. 
Reverse warrants, like geofence and reverse keyword warrants, seek to identify a suspect by compelling technology providers to identify user accounts that match the criteria specified in the warrant. Some legal observers have argued that chatbot user data may provide another pool of user data from which law enforcement might seek to identify suspects in this manner. It appears that at least one reverse chatbot warrant may have already been obtained at the federal level. In September 2025, federal authorities obtained a warrant for chatbot user data in connection with a child exploitation investigation. According to the warrant affidavit, investigators had been unable to identify the suspect beyond an online username. The suspect had, however, told an undercover investigator online about several exchanges the suspect had with ChatGPT, unrelated to the crime being investigated. Those included “two unique, specific prompts” made to ChatGPT and “unique responses generated by ChatGPT.” For example, the suspect disclosed to the investigator that he had asked ChatGPT to speculate on “what would happen if sherlock holmes met q from star trek?” The suspect also provided ChatGPT’s response to the investigator. With the aim of identifying the suspect, federal prosecutors obtained a warrant specifying the suspect by reference to the ChatGPT prompt about Sherlock Holmes and Q, which it said was made “on about April 18, 2025.” The warrant also used ChatGPT’s responses to specify the user. The warrant further compelled the company OpenAI to disclose the user’s names, account credentials, session histories, IP addresses, and other identifying information for April 2025. 
At the time of this writing, it does not appear that federal courts have issued any binding decisions on reverse chatbot warrants specifically. Courts have diverged on the constitutionality of reverse warrants in other contexts. In April 2026, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Chatrie v. United States, on the constitutionality of geofence warrants. Depending on how the Court resolves Chatrie, it may shed light on at least two legal issues relevant to reverse warrants for chatbot user data. The first is the same threshold question discussed above: whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in the user data at issue. Although Chatrie focuses on Google Location History information rather than chatbot user data, the opinion could be relevant if it further clarifies Carpenter and the limits of the third-party doctrine. The second question that the Supreme Court might reach in Chatrie is whether a reverse warrant is legally sufficient for Fourth Amendment purposes. In 2024, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that a geofence warrant was invalid for Fourth Amendment purposes because it “amounted to a general’ warrant prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.” General warrants are those that leave too much discretion for executing officials to engage in “general, exploratory rummaging.” 
Law Enforcement Use of AI for Surveillance (e.g., Vehicle Information)
The potential for AI systems to be used for mass surveillance garnered widespread attention following a 2026 dispute between the federal government and Anthropic (an AI company). As another CRS product explains, that dispute reportedly centered in part on Anthropic seeking to limit its AI products from being used for mass domestic surveillance by the government. 
Depending on the context, surveillance can potentially involve a variety of law enforcement techniques ranging from wiretaps to the collection and analysis of bulk data. The precise legal issues implicated by the use of AI for surveillance will depend on the type of surveillance and the context of the use. 
So far, case law on AI and surveillance remains in its nascency, and that limited body of jurisprudence has sometimes focused on the possible Fourth Amendment ramifications of AI in the context of ALPRs. ALPRs are “camera systems that capture the license plate data of vehicles, along with related information.” Although the details vary, “information obtained from ALPR systems may be included in certain databases.” Law enforcement agencies employ ALPRs for purposes such as evidence gathering and identifying potential suspects, among others. 
At least some ALPRs reportedly employ AI for functions such as reading license plates or selecting the “best photo” to upload to a database. One private ALPR company states that law enforcement customers can use AI-powered search tools to automatically look for images of “vehicles with unique characteristics,” using search phrases like “white F-150 with a ladder in the back.” 
Thus far, federal courts have generally rejected Fourth Amendment challenges to law enforcement’s use of ALPRs. Some of those cases have focused on the underlying collection of ALPR data, typically concluding that there is no protected privacy interest in license plates displayed in plain view. Other cases focus on law enforcement access to ALPR databases, generally rejecting the contention that ALPR data should be subject to the same protections as the historical CSLI at issue in Carpenter.
Some courts have cautioned, however, that technologically-advanced ALPR systems could still violate the Fourth Amendment moving forward. One federal district court judge considered the potential impact of AI on ALPRs, writing:
[L]ower court acceptance of ALPR databases leaves serious doubt about the point, if any, at which governmental use of cameras crosses the line to an impermissible warrantless search and whether linking images to a larger network or enhancing them through the use of artificial intelligence or other emerging technologies leads to a different result. Such surveillance could become too intrusive and run afoul of Carpenter at some point. But when?
Other federal judges have offered similar sentiments, at least in passing. 
Although these courts have yet to identify a precise line where AI-powered ALPRs might run afoul of the Fourth Amendment, two potential areas of tension could “involve sustained tracking of a particular defendant through ALPRs, or an increase in the comprehensiveness of ALPR data.” For example, in a case rejecting a Fourth Amendment challenge to footage from a pole camera, a federal appellate court acknowledged that there could be additional Fourth Amendment concerns if pole-camera surveillance were used “over longer periods . . . [or] in combination with other tools—such as facial recognition, automated tracking or artificial intelligence—to build a far more comprehensive portrait of an individual’s life.” 
Courts have concluded that “comprehensive” technology-aided surveillance programs violated the Fourth Amendment in other contexts. In Leaders of a Beautiful Struggle v. Baltimore Police Department, for instance, the en banc Fourth Circuit concluded that “Carpenter prohibited the warrantless use of aerial surveillance to record an enormous swath of Baltimore over 12 hours daily.” There, the court focused on the volume and detail of the data at issue, which it said provided exactly the type of “intimate window” into a “person’s associations and activities” that Carpenter counseled against.
Congressional Considerations
The two emerging issues described in this product are unlikely to be the only Fourth Amendment questions prompted by the widespread adoption of AI. If so, AI would join a long line of technological advancements like electronic eavesdropping, GPS tracking, thermal imaging, and wiretapping that, when adopted by law enforcement, have sometimes resulted in legal tension with constitutional privacy protections. Some federal judges have suggested that Congress could enact new privacy legislation in light of the potential civil liberties implications of developing technologies. Augmenting Fourth Amendment protections is a path Congress has taken in some contexts. The SCA, discussed above, is one example through which Congress sought to achieve “a fair balance between the privacy expectations of American citizens and the legitimate needs of law enforcement agencies.” On the one hand, it protects information that in some situations would otherwise be unguarded by the Fourth Amendment due to the third-party doctrine. On the other hand, it creates a framework for law enforcement agencies to access that information when they obtain the requisite level of process. Beyond the digital realm, Congress enacted the Privacy Protection Act, which “limits the ability of federal, state, and local officials to conduct certain searches and seizures implicating First Amendment activities.” Congress could also leave resolution of any Fourth Amendment issues posed by AI to the courts. 
Additional CRS Resources Relevant to the Fourth Amendment and Technology
CRS Report WPD00172, Search Me! Episode 1: Advances in DNA Investigations and the Fourth Amendment, by Jonathan M. Gaffney and Peter G. Berris (2026)
CRS Report R48852, Geofence and Keyword Searches: Reverse Warrants and the Fourth Amendment, by Peter G. Berris and Clay Wild (2026)
CRS Legal Sidebar LSB11393, The Fourth Amendment Meets the Fourth Estate: Law Enforcement Searches of Journalists, by Cassandra J. Barnum and Peter G. Berris (2026)
CRS Legal Sidebar LSB11274, Geofence Warrants and the Fourth Amendment, by Peter G. Berris and Clay Wild (2026)
CRS In Focus IF13068, Automated License Plate Readers: Background and Legal Issues, by Peter G. Berris, Kristin Finklea, and Dave S. Sidhu (2025)
CRS Legal Sidebar LSB11339, Advances in DNA Analysis: Fourth Amendment Implications, by Peter G. Berris (2025)
CRS Legal Sidebar LSB11165, Disrupting Botnets: An Overview of Seizure Warrants and Other Legal Tools, by Peter G. Berris (2024) 
CRS Report R48160, Law Enforcement and Technology: Use of Automated License Plate Readers, by Kristin Finklea (2024)
",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB11429/LSB11429.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/HTML/LSB11429.html
IN12687,Argentine Beef Import Quota Expansion,2026-05-05T04:00:00Z,2026-05-06T16:07:58Z,Active,Posts,"Benjamin Tsui, Christine Whitt",,"In February 2026, the average price cattle producers received for their cattle reached a record high. The price increase was in part due to the year-over-year decreases in U.S. cattle inventory, suspended cattle imports from Mexico due to New World Screwworm, and slower pace of U.S. cattle slaughter. The reduction in cattle inventory led to an increase in the retail price of beef across the United States. The U.S. beef cattle supply chain is made up of interconnected links. The supply chain comprises cattle producers that raise beef cattle, processors that slaughter the beef cattle to develop beef products, and entities that sell the beef products to U.S. consumers directly or through intermediaries. Typically, if the price the cattle producer receives for the cattle increases, the price for beef products that U.S. consumers purchase also would increase. This price dynamic may sometimes contribute to entities along the U.S. beef supply chain and U.S. consumers of beef products having different perspectives on policies affecting domestic production of cattle and U.S. beef prices, particularly in periods of rising cattle and U.S. retail beef prices. 
On February 6, 2026, President Trump issued a proclamation to address the high U.S. beef prices for American consumers by temporarily increasing the volume for the U.S. beef tariff-rate quota (TRQ) for imported Argentine beef. Under TRQs, a certain volume of imports enter in-quota and face lower or no duties. Imports that enter outside of the in-quota volume (i.e., out-of-quota) face higher duties. The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the authority to regulate foreign commerce and impose tariffs. Congress delegated authority to administer agricultural TRQs to the President, including for beef imports, under Section 404 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (P.L. 103-465, 19 U.S.C. §3601). Additionally, the President “may temporarily increase the quantity of imports” under the in-quota rate of an agricultural product TRQ if existing supplies are inadequate to “meet domestic demand at reasonable prices” because of “natural disaster, disease, or major national market disruption.” The February 2026 proclamation was issued a day after the United States and Argentina signed an Agreement on Reciprocal Trade and Investment. The Trump Administration had publicly proposed increasing Argentine imports since October 2025.
Several Members of Congress expressed concerns before and after the proclamation announcement. Some Members cited concerns related to Argentina’s inconsistent food safety and animal health standards. Other Members expressed concerns about potential destabilization for the U.S. cattle market. In the 119th Congress, the trade title of H.R. 7567, as passed by the House on April 30, 2026, would address President Trump’s February 2026 proclamation. The bill would express congressional concerns that the expanded quota is detrimental to U.S. cattle producers and could have a “ripple effect throughout the domestic economy affecting feed suppliers, equipment dealers, veterinarians, and other rural businesses.” H.R. 7567 would require the Secretary of Agriculture and U.S. Trade Representative to jointly submit a report, to specified congressional committees, detailing what effect a change in the TRQ or other duties for Argentine beef imports would have on U.S. beef and cattle markets. 
Some analysts argue that an increase in Argentine beef imports would have a negligible effect on the price of U.S. beef. Other analysts claim U.S. beef cattle producers may respond by slowing down the rebuilding of the U.S. cattle herd.
U.S. Beef Imports and Tariff-Rate Quotas
Due to limited domestic beef cattle production and high beef prices since 2020, foreign beef imports have increased to augment U.S. supply, and U.S. beef exports have decreased (Figure 1). According to USDA, most beef imports are lean beef trimmings (i.e., the lower quality pieces of meat that remain on the carcass after the marketable cuts, such as steaks and roast, have been removed), which are an input of U.S. ground beef.
Figure 1. U.S. Beef Production, Domestic Consumption, and Trade
/
Source: CRS using U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS), “Production, Supply, and Distribution Online,” April 2026.
Argentina has an annual country-specific in-quota quantity of 20,000 metric tons (MT) that faces a lower duty of $44 per MT and a higher 26.4% duty on the product’s value when the in-quota threshold is reached. Argentine beef imports enter into the United States under the World Trade Organization TRQ established under the Uruguay Round Agreements. From 2018 to 2025, Argentine beef imports were on average less than 2% of total U.S. beef imports. In 2024 and 2025, there was an uptick of out-of-quota beef imports from Argentina and other countries (Figure 2) while domestic beef production continued to fall and domestic beef consumption continued to rise. 
The February 2026 presidential proclamation increased Argentina’s in-quota volume by an additional 80,000 MT in quarterly tranches of 20,000 MT through calendar year 2026. The additional quota for Argentina would account for less than 5% of total 2025 beef imports. The proclamation also restricts imported Argentine beef that is allowed under the additional quota to lean beef trimmings.  
Figure 2. U.S. Beef Imports
/
Source: CRS using U.S. Census Bureau Trade data via USDA, FAS, “Global Agricultural Trade System,” April, 2026.
Congressional Considerations
Congress may choose not to take action concerning the importation of beef or domestic supply. If Congress chooses to act, it may consider legislation that would address the President’s current and/or future trade actions. Congress may consider options that would restrict beef TRQs to protect the domestic cattle and beef industry from import competition or expand the TRQs in an effort to lower U.S. retail beef prices. 
Additionally, Congress may consider increasing or decreasing the type and/or amount of federal support or oversight that may affect a U.S. cattle producer’s decision on herd size. Congress may also consider policies that either increase or decrease domestic production of cattle and beef. Such policies may affect one or all of the stages of the U.S. beef supply chain. Policies that could affect U.S. cattle producers may include the increase or decrease of direct financial support to offset higher production costs. Congress may also consider examining competition in the U.S. beef supply chain.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12687/IN12687.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/HTML/IN12687.html
IF13217,Federal Government and Anthropic: Considerations for AI Innovation and Competition,2026-05-05T04:00:00Z,2026-05-07T09:38:00Z,Active,Resources,"Laurie Harris, Clare Y. Cho","Artificial Intelligence, Telecommunications & Internet Policy, Competition Policy & Law, Technology & Innovation","On February 27, 2026, President Trump directed federal agencies to stop using technology developed by the U.S. artificial intelligence (AI) company Anthropic, and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth announced he was directing the Department of Defense (DOD) to designate Anthropic a “Supply-Chain Risk to National Security.” (DOD and the Secretary are now using “Department of War” and “Secretary of War,” respectively, as “secondary” designations per Executive Order 14347.) These actions followed a reported months-long dispute between DOD and Anthropic regarding certain uses of its AI technologies. The national security risk designation and use prohibitions may have implications for AI innovation and competition, including at Anthropic and other domestic AI companies. This In Focus provides information on the AI models under debate, actions taken by the U.S. government (USG), the potential implications of those actions, and considerations and questions for Congress.  
Frontier AI Models: Potential Capabilities and Limitations
Frontier AI models are the most advanced foundation models—general-purpose AI models pretrained on large datasets that can be used for many applications. Anthropic’s Claude model, one such frontier model, reportedly has been deployed across DOD and national security agencies for such applications as intelligence analysis, operational planning, and cyber operations. In June 2024, Anthropic stated it was the first AI company to deploy frontier models in classified USG networks. In July 2025, four U.S. AI companies entered into contracts with DOD to “accelerate [DOD] adoption of advanced AI capabilities to address critical national security challenges.” DOD awarded up to $200 million each to Anthropic, Google, OpenAI, and xAI. The Pentagon reportedly agreed to the use in classified systems of xAI’s Grok model, Google’s Gemini model, and six other tech companies’ AI models, as of May 1, 2026. 
While asserting a belief in “the existential importance of using AI to defend the United States and other democracies,” Anthropic claimed that, during contract negotiations with DOD, it requested two use exceptions for its Claude model. First, Anthropic stated that it “do[es] not believe that today’s frontier AI models are reliable enough to be used in fully autonomous weapons. Allowing current models to be used in this way would endanger America’s warfighters and civilians.” Second, Anthropic asserted that “mass domestic surveillance of Americans constitutes a violation of fundamental rights.” 
Anthropic’s requested use exceptions highlight a broader debate over frontier AI model capabilities and limitations. Though frontier AI models demonstrate powerful capabilities, as measured by publicly available benchmarks and assessments, some studies have described their potential limitations. A December 2024 Frontier AI Trends Report by the UK’s AI Security Institute reported that, in its evaluations of frontier AI systems across domains critical to national security and public safety, model safeguards are improving, but the institute found “vulnerabilities in every system [it] tested.” According to Stanford University’s 2025 AI Index Report, complex reasoning tasks remain a challenge, though AI model performance on “demanding benchmarks” continues to improve. 
Recent Federal Actions
On February 27, 2026, President Trump directed federal agencies to “IMMEDIATELY CEASE all use of Anthropic’s technology” and outlined a six-month “phase out period for Agencies like the Department of War who are using Anthropic’s products, at various levels.” On March 5, 2026, Anthropic CEO Dario Amodei confirmed receipt of a letter from DOD designating Anthropic a supply chain risk to America’s national security, which reportedly went into immediate effect.
In response, federal agencies took actions to stop using Anthropic’s Claude models. For example, the General Services Administration (GSA) announced that it was removing Anthropic from USAi.gov and its multiple award schedule (i.e., long-term government-wide contracts with commercial firms). Other agencies such as the State Department and the Department of Health and Human Services reportedly ceased use of Claude. The Office of Personnel Management removed Claude from its list of AI use cases (updated March 4, 2026) and added xAI’s Grok and OpenAI’s Codex (Claude was listed on the prior list, dated January 30, 2026).
Potential Effect on Anthropic
As a private company, Anthropic provides limited public financial information. Some information suggests that federal agencies and government contractors no longer using Anthropic’s AI models might not have a significant financial effect on the company. The $200 million awarded by DOD and a $18,960 award from the Department of State in 2026 (the only government contract with Anthropic on usaspending.gov) are relatively small compared to its run-rate revenue (i.e., annual revenue estimate based on its current financial performance). On February 12, 2026, Anthropic stated its run-rate revenue had reached $14 billion, and on April 6, 2026, Anthropic announced it had surpassed $30 billion. In January 2026, Anthropic CEO Dario Amodei reportedly stated that about 80% of Anthropic’s business is with enterprise customers, which he viewed as a relatively predictable, stable source of income.
Other information suggests that federal agencies and government contractors no longer using Anthropic’s AI models might have a significant financial effect on the company. Anthropic has stated that the USG’s actions are “harming Anthropic irreparably.” Additionally, it is unclear what percentage of Anthropic’s enterprise customers are federal agencies and USG contractors. If Anthropic loses a significant share of its revenue or funding from investors, it might have difficulty continuing to develop its AI models, potentially affecting its ability to compete and innovate. 
The effect of the USG’s actions on Anthropic may partially depend on the response of its other clients and the scope of the prohibition, which is under dispute. On February 27, 2026, Secretary Hegseth stated, “Effective immediately, no contractor, supplier, or partner that does business with the United States military may conduct any commercial activity with Anthropic.” Anthropic responded that it does not believe this action is legal, asserting that “a supply chain risk designation under 10 U.S.C. §3252 can only extend to the use of Claude as part of [DOD] contracts—it cannot affect how contractors use Claude to serve other customers.” Anthropic filed federal lawsuits in two courts on March 9, 2026. One lawsuit claims that the government’s actions exceed its legal authority and violate the Administrative Procedure Act as well as Anthropic’s due process and First Amendment rights. The second lawsuit seeks review of the designation of Anthropic as a supply chain risk under a separate statute. In the first lawsuit, Microsoft, a company that “has established a close business relationship with Anthropic,” filed an amicus brief urging the court to temporarily block the implementation of this designation. On March 26, 2026, a federal judge ordered a preliminary injunction to temporarily block the implementation of this designation and halted the President’s directive ordering federal agencies to stop using Claude, and GSA restored Anthropic in USAi.gov and its multiple award schedule. In the second lawsuit, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit denied Anthropic’s request to stop DOD from labeling it as a security risk. 
One trade group reportedly raised concerns that the designation is being used in a procurement dispute and should instead be reserved for foreign adversaries. Some initial reporting indicated that a subset of defense contractors have stopped using Anthropic, while others are waiting to see how the conflict is resolved. On April 17, 2026, Anthropic executives met with White House officials, discussing “opportunities for collaboration” and “balance between advancing innovation and ensuring safety.”
Potential Implications for Innovation and Competition
The USG’s actions against Anthropic might have broader effects on AI markets and competition. For example, if the USG’s actions negatively impact Anthropic’s revenues such that it can no longer operate, that would reduce the number of companies offering frontier AI models and prevent other companies from creating AI products using Anthropic’s models. However, the USG’s actions also appear to have boosted public adoption of Claude, which became the most popular app on Apple’s chart of top free apps in the United States on February 28, 2026. Further, OpenAI’s decision to strike a deal with the Pentagon reportedly resulted in a “massive wave of public backlash” as users uninstalled ChatGPT.
The USG’s actions against Anthropic have also raised concerns about potential effects on innovation and U.S. competitiveness. Some trade groups reportedly raised concerns that designating an American technology company as a national security risk would “have a chilling effect on U.S. innovation.” A letter reportedly sent by former defense officials, academics, and tech policy leaders to the House and Senate Armed Services Committees asserted that “blacklisting an American company weakens U.S. competitiveness” and warned, “this is not a marketplace any serious entrepreneur or investor can build around.” Microsoft’s amicus brief in support of Anthropic asserts: “This is not the time to put at risk the very AI ecosystem that the Administration has helped to champion.”
Considerations for Congress
Federal policies and actions may influence competition between AI companies and potentially encourage or stifle innovation. Congress may wish to conduct oversight on the extent of DOD’s authority to declare Anthropic a supply chain risk to national security and how the designation may affect private-sector innovation. Congress may also consider legislation to clarify privacy and security considerations around the use of AI technologies for sensitive applications, such as public surveillance. Alternatively, Congress may wait for federal courts to determine the legal merits of the Trump Administration’s actions against Anthropic before considering a legislative response. In weighing these options, among others, Congress might consider a range of questions, including 
How do certain types of government actions affect revenue reliability for AI businesses? 
How might this dispute between Anthropic and the federal government influence future agreements between private companies and the federal government?
How difficult and costly is it for government agencies to switch from one AI foundation model to another? 
Anthropic developed AI models that underpinned many federal uses with a stated goal of “building reliably safe systems.” How might restricting the use of Anthropic’s models by the USG affect the reliability of AI-powered government services and decisionmaking, particularly for high-impact uses—those that have a legal, material, binding, or significant effect on rights or safety?
How might USG actions in response to a company’s efforts to maintain safety measures affect industry efforts to innovate in AI safety and security?
In light of what has been described as a global “AI race,” what might be the effects of USG actions against one AI company on the ability of, or incentives for, other U.S. AI companies to innovate and invest in building AI models? ",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13217/IF13217.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13217.html
R48935,"Facial Recognition Technology: Definitions, Applications, and Policy Considerations for Congress",2026-05-04T04:00:00Z,2026-05-06T14:38:04Z,Active,Reports,Dominique T. Greene-Sanders,,"Facial recognition technology (FRT) is a type of biometric technology designed to identify or verify an individual by analyzing unique and measurable facial features. FRT has received attention from policymakers and the public, in large part because of technical advances and use by both public and private sector entities. FRT usage has the potential to optimize performance, enhance security, and increase the speed of tasks that were once handled by humans (e.g., identity verification in airports). The use of FRT has raised issues regarding data privacy and disclosure of its use, as well as bias and accuracy—particularly across different demographic groups. 
There is no universally accepted definition of FRT, and disagreement persists among technology developers, policymakers, and academics regarding what the term includes when used in various contexts. Legislation and guidelines have offered differing definitions of FRT, ranging from narrow ones focused on verification and identification to broader interpretations that include emotion detection, age estimation, and facial characteristic classifications. Different definitions may affect which technologies are categorized as FRT.
FRT is employed across a wide range of sectors, including the military, law enforcement, financial services, public health, and education, as well as in activities such as employment decisions and immigration enforcement. FRT usage offers several potential benefits, such as increased security, efficiency, and convenience. Additionally, FRT usage raises concerns, for example, whether FRT systems are designed and deployed in ways that avoid or mitigate bias and are transparent and accurate—particularly across different demographic groups. FRT applications in three particular sectors—transportation and airport security, housing, and law enforcement—have garnered specific interest from the public, Congress, and industry, based on perceptions of the frequency of FRT’s use and its potential risks and benefits.
Some state and local governments have passed laws to prohibit or restrict FRT use, especially by law enforcement. As Congress debates the use of FRT across various sectors, it may consider an approach that balances support for innovation and the beneficial uses of FRT while minimizing potential risks. In particular, Congress may consider how FRT is defined in order to avoid inadvertent restriction of narrower identity verification uses, such as personal smartphone access. Considerations for Congress might also include whether existing mechanisms are sufficient for determining accountability regarding FRT use by federal agencies and others. Finally, Congress may also consider requirements for disclosure of FRT use and for testing and validation of FRT systems, potential ways to require FRT system evaluations for federal use, and mechanisms to incentivize FRT system evaluations for commercial use.
",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48935/R48935.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48935.html
R48934,Introduction to Tribal Forestry,2026-05-04T04:00:00Z,2026-05-06T16:23:03Z,Active,Reports,"Mariel J. Murray, Anne A. Riddle","Native American Lands & Resources, Federal Land Management","The United States and federally recognized Tribes (“Tribes”) have a unique relationship that affects federal policies regarding forestry on tribal lands. In particular, the United States has a federal trust responsibility, which is a legal obligation under which the United States, through treaties, acts of Congress, and court decisions, “has charged itself with moral obligations of the highest responsibility and trust” toward Tribes and tribal citizens. This responsibility can include federal obligations to protect tribal trust assets, which are tribal trust lands, natural resources, trust funds, or other assets held by the federal government in trust for Tribes and tribal citizens. The Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) within the Department of the Interior (DOI) is the lead agency charged with managing tribal trust assets, including tribal forests. 
Forested tribal lands can be described in different ways. For consistency throughout this report, CRS primarily uses the term Indian forest land as defined by the National Indian Forest Resources Management Act (NIFRMA). NIFRMA defines the term Indian forest land as including tribal trust or restricted fee lands that are commercial and noncommercial timberland and woodland, and are “considered chiefly valuable for the production of forest products or to maintain watershed or other land values enhanced by a forest cover.” These include lands both within and outside of tribal reservation boundaries.
According to the most recent periodic assessment of tribal forests and forest management in the United States, as of 2019, there were 19.4 million acres of tribal forest. Tribal forest acres are highly concentrated within a few states, and with a few Tribes. For example, 5.4 million acres (28%) of tribal forests belong to a single Tribe, the Navajo Nation, Arizona, New Mexico & Utah. Accordingly, 8.4 million acres (43%) of tribal forests are located in Arizona and New Mexico, including Navajo forests and forests belonging to other Tribes. Overall, almost all tribal forest acreage (17.8 million acres, or 92%) is located in the western United States and Alaska. 
Congress has acknowledged the federal trust responsibility toward forest management on Indian forest lands, and federal law provides the overall framework. Congress continues to debate the appropriate management of these lands, including how to manage wildfire on these lands, and whether to fund tribal forestry activities on these lands, and if so at what level. Like other federal forests, it may be challenging for Congress to balance diverse interests—including economic, social, and cultural interests—concerning the management and use of these lands. Other federal authorities govern whether, and how, Tribes may manage their forest lands and associated programs, activities, and revenues. In this context, Congress may deliberate federal oversight of forestry on tribal lands and evaluate tribal self-determination considerations. In addition, Congress may debate the appropriate federal role in supporting forest management on lands associated with other Indigenous entities in the United States, such as Native Hawaiians and Alaska Native Corporations.
Another consideration is the degree to which Tribes may engage in the management (or co-management) of federal forests near tribal lands. This issue particularly concerns forests to which a Tribe has a historical tie, or forests that are geographically near tribal forest and therefore may share certain management issues or needs. During the 119th Congress, Congress has considered amending existing authorities, or establishing new authorities, to facilitate more federal-tribal co-management of forested federal lands.
",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48934/R48934.3.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48934.html